Apathy, alienation and young people: the political engagement of British millennials by Fox, Stuart
Fox, Stuart (2015) Apathy, alienation and young people: 
the political engagement of British millennials. PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30532/1/Final%20Corrected%20Version%20-%20Apathy
%2C%20Alienation%20and%20Young%20People%20The%20Political%20Engagement
%20of%20British%20Millennials.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
  
 
 
 
APATHY, ALIENATION AND YOUNG PEOPLE:  
THE POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT OF BRITISH MILLENNIALS 
 
 
 
STUART FOX, BA, MA 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
DECEMBER 2015
i 
 
Abstract  
Conventional wisdom holds that WRGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOHRIWHQNQRZQDVµWKH
0LOOHQQLDOV¶ are a politically alienated generation. Their hostility towards 
political parties, association with protest movements, and low electoral turnout 
are all said to indicate their alienation from the processes and institutions of 
Western democracy. This conventional wisdom stands, however, on shaky 
ground. Previous research has given too little attention to the definition and 
measurement of political alienation, and has barely explored its causal 
relationship with political participation. The use of methods capable of 
exploring the generational distinctiveness of the Millennials has been limited, 
as have efforts to outline why the Millennials should be conceptualised as a 
distinct political generation in the first place, and what is gained from doing so.  
Focussing on the case of Britain, this study explores the extent to which the 
Millennials are a distinct political generation in terms of political participation, 
political apathy, and political alienation, and considers how their 
conceptualisation as a distinct generation improves our understanding of their 
political characteristics. Furthermore, it tests the theory that their alienation 
from, rather than their apathy towards, formal politics can explain their distinct 
political behaviour. Through critiquing and developing conceptualisations of 
the Millennials as a political generation, and of political apathy, alienation and 
participation, this thesis challenges the conventional wisdom. The Millennials 
are a distinct generation in terms of their political participation, apathy and 
alienation ± but they are distinct for their lack of participation, their unusually 
high levels of apathy towards formal politics, and their unusually low levels of 
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alienation from it. The Millennials have the potential to be the most politically 
apathetic, and least politically alienated, generation to have entered the British 
electorate since World War Two.  
In addition, this research also shows that while generational differences are 
significant and often substantial, they make only a limited contribution to 
explaining variation in political apathy, alienation and participation. This 
research argues, therefore, that future studies into and policy responses to the 
political behaviour of young people must recognise their distinct levels of 
political apathy. At the same time, however, the focus on political generations 
should not be so intense as to obscure the role of more influential causes of 
differences in political participation.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I see no hope for the future of our people if they are dependent on the frivolous 
\RXWKRIWRGD\IRUFHUWDLQO\«>they] are reckless beyond words  
Hesiod, 8th Century BC 
Anybody with a passing familiarity of recent public discourse about the 
political engagement of the young in Western democracies could be forgiven 
for thinking that the above quote comes from a newspaper editorial or 
SROLWLFLDQ¶VVSHHFKIn fact, these are the words of the Greek poet Hesiod, 
writing in the 8th century BC about his concern for the future of Greek society 
RQFHLWZDVOHIWLQWKHKDQGVRIZKDWKHSHUFHLYHGWREHWKHµUHFNOHVV\RXWK¶ In 
the context of the political engagement of young people, this is becoming an 
increasingly common sentiment among politicians, journalists and academics 
in countries such as the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and many 
other European Union (EU) democracies. The apparent disconnection of the 
generation of young people who entered Western electorates around the turn of 
the millennium ± the Millennials ± from the institutional processes of Western 
democracy, and particularly elections, has many worrying about the future of 
those same societies.   
7KHPDLQFRQFHUQUHODWHVQRWWRZKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRISROLWLFDO
engagement means for Western democracy today, but to what it will mean 
ZKHQWKHVH\RXQJSHRSOHJURZXSDQGWRGD\¶VPRUHDFWLYHROGHUJHQHUDWLRQV
KDYHSDVVHGDZD\7KHIHDULVWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRIHQJDJHPHQWPD\EH
the result of a cohort effect i.e., it may reflect a habit formed during their early 
years of political socialisation which will stick with them throughout their adult 
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lives. Consequently, a growing number of scholars, politicians, governments, 
charities and think tanks suggest that Western democracy could be heading for 
a crisis of legitimacy. 
Alongside this somewhat bleak outlook, however, a more optimistic picture has 
developed regarding the other ways in which the Millennials participate in 
politics. As technological and social evolution has dramatically altered the 
ways in which citizens can engage with and participate in politics, scholars 
KDYHWDNHQPRUHRIDQLQWHUHVWLQµLQIRUPDOSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶i.e., political 
activity outside of the formal, institutionalised arena of democracy. Many 
studies KDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRISDUWLFLSDWLRQLQIRUPDO
politics is not matched by similarly low levels of activity outside that arena. 
Some have argued that the Millennials have a particular propensity towards 
what Norris (2001) identifies aVµFDXVH-RULHQWHGSROLWLFV¶i.e., issue-specific 
activity in which the citizen engages to directly influence a political actor, 
regardless of whether that actor is a politician, political party, corporation or 
media outlet. Rather than simply viewing the Millennials as an unusually 
unengaged political generation, therefore, this line of thinking suggests that 
they are in the vanguard of a transformation in the way Western citizens affect 
politics in their daily lives.  
This multi-faceted picture of the Millennials has produced a paradox, however: 
if they are sufficiently interested in political issues to participate in cause-
oriented activity, why are they so reluctant to engage with those same issues 
through formal political processes, such as elections? The attempts to resolve 
WKLVSDUDGR[KDYHLQWHUWZLQHGWKHLVVXHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQLTXHSROLWLFDO
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participation with the question of whether political apathy or political 
alienation best describes why young people have always been found to be less 
engaged with and active in politics than their elders. In the case of the 
Millennials, the question is whether their unusually low levels of formal 
political participation (even when compared with previous generations at the 
same age) result from an unusually low interest in politics on their part, or from 
an unusually profound sense of alienation from the political system. 
It is against this background that this study of the political participation, apathy 
and alienation of the Millennials is set. Through an interrogation of literature 
relating to the political participation, apathy and alienation of young people in 
Western democracies, detailed analyses of the participatory characteristics of 
the Millennials and of the effects of political apathy and alienation on them, 
and the utilisation of under-used methods for identifying cohort effects in 
political attributes, this thesis offers the most detailed and robust answer to 
these questions to date. Focussing on Britain as an illustrative example of 
Western democracies more broadly, the study addresses three fundamental 
issues which lie at the heart of the common characterisation of the Millennials 
as being at the vanguard of a transformation in political participation and the 
unanswered questions about why that might be. First, the thesis considers how 
and why the Millennials might be considered to be a distinct political 
generation, and examines what is gained from conceptualising them in this 
way. It also examines the participatory characteristics of British Millennials, 
and assesses the extent to which the picture of a generation unusually inactive 
in formal politics while being unusually active outside of the formal arena is 
accurate. Second, the thesis develops original definitions, conceptualisations 
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and measurements of political apathy and alienation, and uses them to provide 
a robust test of the competing theories that political apathy or political 
alienation provides the best explanation for the distinct participatory 
characteristics of the Millennials. Third, the thesis explores potential causes of 
the unusually apathetic/alienated nature of the Millennials, in the form of 
consequences of Western social evolution. 
7KH6WXG\RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶3ROLWLFDO3DUWLFLSDWLRQ 
In 2002, Matt Henn and his colleagues published a seminal study of British 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ following the unusually low turnout young 
people entering the British electorate in the 1997 and 2001 general elections. 
Prior to 1997, the turnout of the under 25s was always above 60% and usually 
not far off the electorate average. In 1997, however, only 54% of under 25s 
voted compared with 71% overall; in 2001, this figure fell to 40% (House of 
Commons Library 2013). Henn et al. (2002) examined whether or not the 
unusually low turnout of the under 25s in the elections around the turn of the 
millennium FRXOGEHH[SODLQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH\ZHUHµDJHQHUDWLRQDSDUW¶
i.e., a distinct political generation, who had developed a habit of low electoral 
participation relative to their predecessors. Henn et al.¶VZDVDPRQJWKHILUVWRI
many such studies which marked a turning point in academic research on 
\RXQJSHRSOH¶VSROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQWDQGZKLFKFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV
ZHUHLQGHHGµDJHQHUDWLRQDSDUW¶ 
One of the features of this turning point was the increased attention paid to 
FRKRUWHIIHFWV3ULRUWRWKHODWHVWKHPDMRULW\RIVWXGLHVRI\RXQJSHRSOH¶V
political participation explained their lower levels of activity in terms of the 
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political life cycle i.e., the idea that young people were less active in politics 
because their current life circumstances ± such as not yet being married, not 
having a job or children, and not yet being invested in a community ± inhibited 
political engagement. The assumption was that people became more active as 
they aged and as their circumstances changed and facilitated an interest in 
political issues. Following the unusually limited engagement with elections of 
the Millennials, however, there was a greater focus on cohort effects and the 
idea of political generations first outlined by Karl Mannheim (1928; 
[1928]1944) i.e., on the potential for the Millennials to have been socialised in 
an environment which ultimately led them to exhibit even lower levels of 
political engagement than had been seen among previous young generations. 
There were also methodological changes in the field which saw a greater use of 
qualitative and mixed method approaches to counter what some had suggested 
was a damaging dominance of quantitative methods. Several studies argued 
that over-reliance on quantitative approaches was producing inaccurate 
impressions of the Millennials as an unusually apathetic generation, and that 
qualitative methods were needed to study how the Millennials themselves 
perceived their engagement with politics (e.g., Marsh et al. 2007; Henn et al. 
2002). The result was a richer, more detailed and varied characterisation of the 
Millennials as political agents.  
These methodological changes were accompanied by conceptual 
developments, particularly LQUHODWLRQWRZKDWZDVPHDQWE\µSROLWLFDO
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶3ULRUWRWKHODWHVPRVWVWXGLHVDVVXPHGDGHILQLWLRQRI
political participation which focussed almost entirely on formal and electoral 
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political activity.  At the turn of the century, many scholars began to argue that 
WKHZD\VLQZKLFKPRGHUQFLWL]HQVFRQFHSWXDOLVHµSROLWLFV¶WKHRSSRUWXQLWLHV
open to them to participate in politics, and the extent to which they were 
prepared to influence political decisions, had all changed as a result of social 
evolution ± particularly the growth of education, the Internet and social media. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\VWXGLHVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOEHKDYLRXUEHJDQWRDGRSWD
PXFKEURDGHUFRQFHSWLRQRIµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ZKLFKRIWHQUHVXOWHGLQ
more detailed characterisations than those based on their lack of activity in the 
formal political arena. 
1.2 The Political Alienation of the Millennials and the Birth of the 
Conventional Wisdom 
After the 1990s many studies followed Henn et al.¶VH[DPSOHDQG
integrated these developments into their research, and produced a much richer 
understanding of the Millennials as a distinct political generation than was 
developed about previous cohorts in earlier studies. These academic 
developments led to the characterisation of the Millennials as a politically 
interested and engaged generation which was leading the way in embracing 
new forms of political participation which took advantage of societal and 
technological evolution. At the same time, however, they exhibited an 
unprecedented reluctance to participate in the formal and institutional 
processes of democracy through which the issues they cared about could be 
LQIOXHQFHG7KHDWWHPSWVWRUHFRQFLOHWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶LQWHUHVWLQSROLWLFDOLVVXHV
with their reluctance to participate in formal politics led to the theory ± rapidly 
embraced by the majority of scholars in the field ± that they were also distinct 
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from previous generations for their alienation from politics. Studies at the 
vanguard of this theoretical development such as Marsh et al. (2007) and Henn 
et al. (2005) DUJXHGWKDW³IDUIURPEHLQJSROLWLFDOO\DSDWKHWLF«>WKH
Millennials] DUH«KLJKO\DUWLFXODWHDERXWWKHSROLWLFDOLVVXHVWKDWDIIHFWWKHLU
OLYHV´0DUVKet al. 2007, p.122), and that, therefore, at the heart of their 
³GLVHQFKDQWPHQWZLWK:HVWPLQVWHUSROLWLFV«>PXVWEH@ a strong sense of 
SROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQSROLWLFDODSDWK\´+HQQet al. 2005, p.574). 
Alongside the suggestion that while the Millennials were unusually inactive in 
formal politics they were also unusually active in informal political activity, the 
theory of the Millennials as a politically alienated generation rapidly spread 
beyond academia and into public discourse. There is now an entrenched 
conventional wisdom which dictates that young people in Western democracies 
are not uninterested in politics or inactive when it comes to promoting their 
political agendas; instead, they are a politically engaged and active generation 
of citizens who feel a profound disconnection from the processes, institutions 
and actors of formal politics.  
Moreover, challenging the conventional wisdom has become somewhat 
controversial because of the normative dimension that has become interwoven 
with it. The suggestion that the young are politically alienated has become 
associated with positive normative connotations because of its implication that 
their lack of participation is the fault of the political elite or the political 
system. The suggestion that they are not alienated and that a lack of motivation 
(i.e., political apathy) explains their lack of participation, on the other hand, 
implies a negative normative view because it has become associated with an 
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image of the Millennials as lazy citizens unwilling to live up to their civic duty 
and participate in the governance of their community. Moreover, suggesting 
that young people are politically apathetic is also seen as a way of letting the 
political elite off the hook. As the academics Mark Evans, Gerry Stoker and 
Max Halupka illustrate in their discussion of the political alienation of 
$XVWUDOLDQ\RXQJSHRSOH³>Q@HJDWLYHVWHUHRW\SLQJRI\RXQJHUJHQHUDWLRQVDV
DSDWKHWLFDSROLWLFDODQGGLVHQJDJHGLVPDGEDGDQGGDQJHURXV«SROLWLFLDQV
accuse younger voters of apathy to divert attention from their own behaviRXU´
(Evans et al. 2015).  
These two processes ± the development of a characterisation of the Millennials 
as a distinct generation with an unprecedented reluctance to engage in formal 
politics alongside an unprecedented embrace of informal politics, and the 
attachment of normative implications of them as victims of elite failure to the 
explanation for this behaviour (i.e., their political alienation) ± have resulted in 
the well-entrenched conventional wisdom regarding the political engagement 
of young people in Western democracies. The appeal of this conventional 
wisdom is apparent from its popular profile in the media, in government policy, 
and in the campaigns and speeches of political parties and politicians.  
The extent to which this appeal has seen the conventional wisdom spread 
throughout popular public discourse was clearly illustrated in Britain as the 
2015 general election approached. The journalists Suzanne Moore and Sophie 
Ridge, for example, suggested that the young were ³turned off from voting not 
politics´ 5LGJHDQGDUJXHGWKDW%ULWLVKSROLWLFVZDV³ROGDQG
FUXPEOLQJ´DQGWKHUHIRUH asked ³LVLWDQ\ZRQGHUWKH\RXQJZRQ¶WYRWH"´
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(Moore 2015). They DOVRVXJJHVWHGWKDWLIWKH\RXQJZHUHJLYHQµUHDO
DOWHUQDWLYHV¶WRYRWHIRUWKH\ZRXOGEHPRre likely to do so (Moore 2015). 
-HQQLIHU'DOHDJUHHGDUJXLQJWKDW³FOHDUO\WKHUHLVDGHVLUHDPRQJWKH
\RXQJSXEOLFWREHLQYROYHGLQSROLWLFVEXW03VVLPSO\DUHQ¶WLQWURGXFLQJ
SROLFLHV«WKDWDUHUHODWDEOHWR\RXQJSHRSOH´7KHMRXUQDOLVW$OH[6WHvenson 
VXPPDULVHGWKLVYLHZQLFHO\\RXQJSHRSOHKHDUJXHG³UHDOO\GRFDUHDERXW
SROLWLFDOLVVXHV,W¶VMXVWWKHSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVWKH\KDWH´6WHYHQVRQ 
Similarly, Ian Birrell (2015), Rowena Mason (2013) and James Kirkup (2014) 
suggested that it was the failures of politicians that were responsible for 
alienating young people from political parties and therefore from the elections 
in which they fought. Emma Barnett (2015) argued WKDW³>\@RXQJSHRSOHDUHQ¶W
from Mars. They care about the same stuff DVHYHU\RQHHOVH«,I\RXDFWXDOO\
JLYHWKHPVRPHWKLQJWRYRWHIRURUDJDLQVWJXHVVZKDW"7KH\¶OOWXUQXS´ 
This position was also supported by a number of charities and think tanks. 
Javed Khan of the charity Barnardos suggested that British young people were 
HIIHFWLYHO\EHLQJµVKXWRXW¶RIWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPE\WKHIDLOXUHRISROLWLFLDQV
to represent them, and that the young would only vote if the political 
establishment could prove its willingness to represent their concerns (Khan 
2015). Jazza John of Bite the Bullet, a campaign organisation which promotes 
youth participation in politics, similarly argued that young people felt 
politicians could not be trusted to represent their interests fairly, and perceived 
SROLWLFVDVDµFORVHGJDPH¶Sims 2015). The think tank Demos has argued that 
%ULWLVK0LOOHQQLDOVDUH³WXUQHGRIIYRWLQJEHFDXVHSROLWLFLDQVDUHQ¶WRIIHULQJ
WKHPFUHGLEOHSRVLWLYHSROLFLHVWKDWDGGUHVVWKHLVVXHVWKH\¶UHPRVWFRQFHUQHG
DERXW´Daily Mail 2014). In a report which identified itself aVDµVWXG\RIWKH
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GLVLOOXVLRQPHQWRIWKH\RXQJ¶Demos DUJXHGWKDW³PDQ\>\RXQJSHRSOH@DUH
GLVHQJDJHGIURPWUDGLWLRQDOSROLWLFVFRPSOHWHO\«WKLVLVQRWGXHWRDSDWK\EXW
GLVLOOXVLRQPHQWZLWKSROLWLFLDQVDQGSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV´%LUGZHOOet al. 2014, 
p.17).  
$VLPLODUDUJXPHQWLVWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQLVQRWFDXVHGE\DIDLOXUH
RIWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPWRLQWHUHVWRUDSSHDOWRWKHPEXWE\WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
perception that they have no influence over politics. As the commentator 
Kenny Imafidon argueG³\RXQJSHRSOHVLPSO\FDQQRWEHEUDQGHGDV
DSDWKHWLF«>WKH\@QHHGWRIHHOWKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSROLWLFVFDQPDNHD
difference and that together as a collective they can create massive changes and 
FKDOOHQJHWKHVWDWXVTXR´%LUGZHOOet al. 2014, p.12). The charity vInspired, 
which promotes political engagement among young people and claims to 
³NQRZWKDW\RXQJSHRSOHDUHQRWSROLWLFDOO\DSDWKHWLF´Doughty 2014), argues 
WKDW³WKH\VLPSO\GRQ¶WIHHOLQIRUPHG´,WV&(20RLUD6ZLQEDQNSRLQWVRXW
that 80% of Millennials campaigned on a political issue in 2013 through means 
such as petitions and consumer boycotts; the reason this does not translate into 
formal political participation is because young people do not know how to 
influence formal politics effectively (Swinbank 2014). Similarly, the television 
presenter Rick Edwards, who presents a youth-focussed political program and 
launched a campaign to get young people involved in the 2015 British general 
election, agrees that low electoral turnout among the young does not reflect 
their apathy but their lack of information (Barnett 2015).  
7KHRWKHUFRPPRQO\VXJJHVWHGFDXVHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQ± and 
ZKLFKSXWVWKHEODPHIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQHYHQPRUHVTXDUHO\RQWKH
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shoulders of political elites ± is specific, controversial political events or 
government decisions. As the ten year anniversary of the Iraq War approached, 
for example, journalists such as Owen Jones and Sam Parker (Jones 2013; 
3DUNHUDUJXHGWKDWWKHZDU³UREEHGDJHQHUDWLRQRIWKHLUIDLWKLQSROLWLFV´
3DUNHUDQGµH[SORGHG¶WKHLUWUXVWLQWKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVV-RQHV
Tim Wigmore (2014), Alexandra Sims (2015), Lucy Sherriff (2015) and Daniel 
Pryor (2013), as well as the think tank the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(Birch et al. 2013), pointed towards more recent actions by the Coalition 
*RYHUQPHQWDVGULYHUVRI0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQ6LPVIRULQVWDQFH
DUJXHVWKDW³>V@KDUSULVHVLQWXLWLRQIHHVFXWVWR\RXWKVHUYLFHVDQG
uncertainties over housing and jobs have left young people feeling overlooked 
DQGLJQRUHGE\WKHSROLWLFDOFOLPDWH´7LP:LJPRUHDUJXHGWKDW 
³[t]wice in the past ten years, governing parties have broken their electoral 
SURPLVHV« [and] [s]wathes of young people are giving XSRQGHPRFUDF\´, 
ZKLOH6KHUULIIDQG3U\RUSRLQWHGWRWKH/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWV¶
GHFLVLRQWRSHUIRUP³RQHRIWKHPRVWPHPRUDEOH8-WXUQVLQSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\´
and increase university tuition fees in 2010, as well as the MPs expenses 
scandal in 2009.  
In addition, the IPPR links what it considers to be the maltreatment of the 
young at the hands of the Coalition government to the 0LOOHQQLDOV¶IDLOXUHWR
vote and their alienation from politics. By refusing to vote, the Millennials 
leave little incentive for the government to prioritise them in policy-making, 
meaning that policies are skewed towards older voters, which in turn 
FRPSRXQGVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶EHOLHIWKDWWKH\KDYHQRUHDVRQWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQ
politics: non-YRWLQJ³XQOHDVKHVDYLFLRXVF\FOHRI disaffection and under-
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UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ«$VSROLF\EHFRPHVOHVVUHVSRQVLYHWRWKHLULQWHUHVWVPRUHDQG
PRUHGHFLGHWKDWSROLWLFVKDVOLWWOHWRVD\WRWKHP´%LUFKet al. 2013, p.2).  
These views are by no means limited to the media and think tanks ± politicians 
and Parliamentary Committees have also supported the conventional wisdom. 
Both the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) and the Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee (PCRC) have investigated the causes of low 
political engagement among the young and pointed towards political alienation 
as an explanation. The CSPL, for instance, found that 46% of British voters 
FRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVµDOLHQDWHG¶IURPWKHSDUW\V\VWHPRQWKHEDVLVWKDWWKH\
had no trust in politicians or parties (Grice 2013). The Committee Chair, Lord 
%HZSRLQWHGRXWWKDWRISDUWLFXODUFRQFHUQZDV³WKHQXPEHURI«\RXQJ
SHRSOH«ZKRIHHOGLVFRQQHFWHGIURPWKHSDUW\V\VWHP´Grice 2013). In 2014, 
the PCRC completed an inquiry into low voter engagement and concluded that 
Britain¶VGHPRFUDF\ZDVµEURNHQ¶DQGIDLOLQJWRDSSHDOWR\RXQJHUYRWHUV
(Padmanabhan 2014). 
Several politicians have also supported the view that it is they who bear some 
responsibility for failing to engage the Millennials with politics. The Speaker 
of the House of Commons, John Bercow, argues that unless young people start 
engaging with politics, British democracy will atrophy, and that the burden is 
on the political elite to avoid that (Birdwell et al. 2014). The Conservative MP 
Chloe Smith argued that there iVD³VSDFHLQGHPRFUDF\ZLWKWKLVJHQHUDWLRQ¶V
QDPHRQLW´6PLWKDQGWKDWWKHLUODFNRIPRWLYDWLRQWRHQJDJHZLWK
SROLWLFVVWHPVIURPWKHLUKRVWLOLW\WRZDUGV%ULWDLQ¶VSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV(PPD
McClarkin, Conservative MEP, thinks that there is a general apathy among the 
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British public when it comes to many aspects of politics, but that it is most 
profound among young people, which reflects the failure of the political parties 
to sufficiently integrate them into their campaigns (Flannery 2015). Similarly, 
the Labour MP Graham Allen believes that radical measures are needed to 
improve the ways in which political parties communicate with young voters to 
engage them in the political process (Padmanabhan 2014). Sadiq Khan, another 
Labour MP, agrees with the IPPR and KDVDUJXHGWKDWSROLWLFLDQV¶IRFXVRQWKH
political priorities of older voters at the expense of the young who do not vote 
has created a vicious circle in which the Millennials feel ignored by politicians 
and so do not vote (Duff and Wright 2015).  
These examples demonstrate the breadth of the conventional wisdom ± and just 
in Britain. A similar pattern is clear in countries as varied as America (e.g., 
Cass 2015; Griffiths 2014; Glum 2014; Lock 2014; Montenegro 2014; The 
Economist 2014), Iceland (Benjamin 2014; Arnadottir 2014), Switzerland 
(swissinfo.ch 2014), Canada (McHardie 2014; Delacourt 2014; Lee and 
Medeiros 2014), and Australia (Evans et al. 2¶1HLOOThroughout 
Western democracies, the prominence of the conventional wisdom is clear: the 
Millennials, while distinct from previous generations, are said to be politically 
interested and engaged, but their alienation prevents them from participating in 
formal political processes, and that alienation is the result of the failures of the 
political elite and establishment.  
1.3 :KDW¶V:URQJZLWKWKH&RQYHQWLRQDO:isdom? 
The conventional wisdom presents a coherent and potentially even compelling 
DFFRXQWIRUKRZDQGZK\WRGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOHHQJDJHZLWKDQGSDUWLFLSDWHLQ
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politics. A fundamental problem with it, however, is that the academic 
evidence upon which it is based stands on shaky ground.  
The first issue relates to the detail of the 0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
There is considerable dispute about just how active the Millennials are outside 
of formal politics. While many scholars (such as Sloam (2012a; 2012b), Norris 
(2001), and Dalton (2013)) argue that the Millennials are leading the way in 
embracing alternative forms of political participation, others (such as 
Wattenberg (2012) and Putnam (2000)) argue that while their political 
participation is undoubtedly diversifying, they are still less active than most of 
their elders. Many of these disputes relate to problems of data availability, and 
there is a clear need for a detailHGDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDO
participation across a range of political arenas to clear this question up.  
Furthermore, while few dispute that the Millennials are a distinct political 
generation in terms of their political participation, the evidence supporting such 
a view is still limited and little attention has been paid to considering why the 
Millennials are a distinct generation and what is even meant by the term 
µSROLWLFDOJHQHUDWLRQ¶LQWKLVFRQWH[WResearch methods capable of estimating 
cohort effects while accounting for the influence of the political life cycle 
and/or period effects (which refer to the influence of historic circumstances at a 
given moment) have had limited use in this field. Furthermore, there has been 
limited engagePHQWZLWK0DQQKHLP¶V>@ZRUNRQSROLWLFDO
generations, and particularly with the questions he raises about how and why a 
JLYHQJURXSRISHRSOHFDQEHOLQNHGWRJHWKHULQWRDµJHQHUDWLRQ¶LQDPRUH
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substantial way for explaining their behaviour than they could be linked 
through some other characteristic. 
The second problem relates to the theory that it is alienation, and not apathy, 
ZKLFKH[SODLQVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ7KHFRQFHSWVRIµSROLWLFDO
DSDWK\¶DQGµSROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQ¶are central to the current understanding of 
how and why the Millennials participate in politics, and yet they are also 
among the most poorly understood in this field. There is a rich extant literature 
which could provide guidance as to how the concepts should be defined and 
measured, and to what their causal relationship with political behaviour is, yet 
this research is almost entirely absent from studies on the political alienation 
and apathy of the Millennials. Furthermore, the empirical rigour needed to 
confidently argue that the Millennials are a distinct generation in terms of 
political alienation is even sparser than that for their political participation. 
)LQDOO\WKHODFNRIHPSLULFDOULJRXUZLWKZKLFKWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\DQG
alienation have been explored means that there are no empirically verifiable 
theories about what the causes of their distinct apathy or alienation might be. 
The speculations in the media outlined above are just that, and have little 
academic basis.  
1.4 Rescuing the concepts of Apathy and Alienation 
The objective of this thesis is to address these weaknesses in the literature and 
so subject the conventional wisdom to empirical scrutiny. For practical 
purposes, this research focusses on the case of Britain as an illustrative 
example of Western democracies more broadly. Britain is a good case in which 
to test the conventional wisdom for two reasons: first, there is a great deal of 
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survey data available, relating to a vast range of acts associated with political 
participation as well as political apathy and alienation, going back almost half a 
century; second, there are good reasons for believing that if the Millennials are 
alienated from politics, it will be more apparent in Britain than many other 
Western democracies. For instance, electoral turnout among the youngest 
voters has fallen more sharply in Britain than elsewhere (Whiteley 2012; 
Sloam 2014; Martin 2012). In addition, Sloam (2014) has argued that while 
British Millennials may be more active in cause-oriented politics than formal 
politics, they are less active in this area than their European counterparts, 
leading him to believe that their alienation is more profound.  
Finally, there have been several dramatic and controversial events in recent 
British politics which have been extensively linked with the alienation of the 
young. While British politics is certainly not unique for being affected by 
scandals and controversies, the rate at which such events have occurred over 
the last two decades is unusually high compared with similar countries. These 
include the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the financial crisis in 2008 and subsequent 
recession in 2009/10 (the consequences of which were disproportionately felt 
by the young), the Parliamentary Expenses scandal in 2009, and several high-
profile government decisions which have negatively affected the young, such 
as the increases in university tuition fees (despite a promise from the Liberal 
Democrats not to do so) and the disproportionate concentration of the Coalition 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VDXsterity measures on services used by young people (Banaji 
2008; Pattie and Johnston 2012; Furlong and Cartmel 2012; Sloam 2012a; 
2012b). Simply put, there is a good case to argue that there are few national 
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contexts in which the alienation of the Millennials should be so profound, and 
therefore easier to identify empirically.  
Focussing, therefore, on the distinct case of Britain, this thesis addresses the 
IXQGDPHQWDOSUREOHPVZLWKWKHFXUUHQWH[SODQDWLRQRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQLTXH
political behaviour outlined above. ,WILUVWJUDSSOHVZLWK0DQQKHLP¶V
[1928]1944) questions regarding how and why the Millennials could be 
usefully thought of as a distinct political generation in the British electorate, 
based on the work of Becker (1990; 1992) and Grasso (2014) in terms of the 
influence of substantial historic periods on the early years of political 
socialisation. It then examines the political participation of British Millennials, 
and considers how active they are in different dimensions of political activity. 
This includes not only formal and cause-oriented political participation, but 
civic and issue-specific formal participation as well. It then uses age-period-
cohort analyses to estimate the influence of cohort effects, the political life 
cycle and historic circumstances on political participation in Britain, and to 
analyse the empirical case for identifying the Millennials as a distinct political 
generation for their political participation.  
The thesis then focusses on political apathy and political alienation. Using and 
updating the extant literature on both concepts, conceptually clear and 
HPSLULFDOO\UREXVWLQGLFDWRUVRIµIRUPDOSROLWLFDODSDWK\¶DQGµIRUPDOSROLWLFDO
DOLHQDWLRQ¶ are developed. It then examines the impact of these on differences 
in political participation, and determines whether political apathy or political 
alienation offers the best explanation for the distinct behaviour of the 
Millennials. Age-period-cohort analyses are then again used to estimate cohort, 
18 
 
life cycle and period effects in apathy and alienation in Britain since the 1980s, 
and to determine whether the Millennials can also be described as a unique 
generation in terms of these characteristics. Finally, the thesis considers 
potential explanations relating to social evolution for the generational 
disWLQFWLYHQHVVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\DQGDOLHQDWLRQ. Developing theories 
relating to the effect of rising levels of post-materialism and the fragmentation 
of media consumption on apathy and alienation, the thesis explores whether 
either of these processes can explain the trends which set the Millennials apart 
from older generations. 
1.5 Six Key Findings 
The empirical analyses throughout the following chapters lead to six key 
findings relating to the critique of this field outlined above. First, the 
Millennials are indeed found to be a distinct political generation in terms of 
their political participation. However, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
they are not unusually inactive in formal politics while being active in other 
areas, but are instead unusually inactive in all four dimensions of political 
activity identified by this research. This relative inactivity not only reflects 
their current stage in the political life cycle, but a cohort effect as well i.e., not 
only are they typically less active than their elders today, but they have lower 
levels of participation than those generations did when they were young.  
Second, and in another challenge to the conventional wisdom, the Millennials 
are found to also be a distinct generation for their political apathy: they are 
potentially the most apathetic generation in the history of British survey 
research. They are both more apathetic than their elders today, and have 
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entered the electorate with higher levels of apathy than did any of their 
predecessors since the Second World War. While some of their apathy is the 
result of their current stage in the life cycle, and so will likely reduce as they 
age, they are also likely to exhibit typically higher levels of apathy than older 
generations throughout their adult lives.  
Third, the Millennials are shown to be a distinct generation for their political 
alienation as well ± but not in the manner predicted by the conventional 
wisdom. Rather than being unusually alienated from the formal politics, the 
Millennials are the least alienated generation in the British electorate in terms 
of two dimensions of alienation: political powerlessness (referring to how 
much power one perceives they have over political decisions) and political 
normlessnHVVUHIHUULQJWRRQH¶VWUXVWWKDWWKHQRUPVDQGFRQYHQWLRQVZKLFK
govern just political interaction are being adhered to). 
The one dimension of alienation in which the Millennials are currently more 
alienated than their elders is political meaninglessness, which refers to an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQILGHQFHLQWKHLURZQNQRZOHGJHDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
political process. While there is no evidence that the Millennials are distinct as 
a political generation, there is a clear life cycle effect which means that the 
Millennials are typically more alienated in this regard than their elders. As they 
age and move through the life cycle, however, their levels of meaninglessness 
alienation should decline.  
)RXUWKERWKWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWSROLWLFDODSDWK\DQGGLVWLQFt political 
alienation are shown to have an important effect on their political behaviour, 
and both contribute to an explanation for why they are so inactive in politics 
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compared to older generations. The fact that the Millennials are particularly 
alienated from formal politics by their lack of confidence in their 
understanding of it is a definite obstacle to their participation. Given that this 
form of alienation is related to the life cycle, there are grounds for believing 
that it will dissipate as they age, and so they may become more active in time. 
The other dimensions of political alienation ± feeling that one has an influence 
over the political process and trusting the political process and the actors and 
institutions within it ± play little role in explaining the Millennials¶ low levels 
of participation. 
Far more important than their alienation, however, is their apathy. Formal 
political apathy has a substantial impact on how likely an individual is to 
participate in politics, regardless of the dimension of political activity (i.e., 
formal, cause-oriented etc.). The fact that the Millennials are the most apathetic 
generation in the electorate has a considerable impact on their participation, 
and while it does not completely account for the differences between them and 
their elders, it accounts for a good deal. The concerning point about the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\LVWKDWZKLOHLWLVH[SHFWHGWRGHFOLQH somewhat as they 
move through the life cycle, they are expected to nonetheless exhibit higher 
levels of apathy throughout their lives, meaning that its depressing effect on 
their participation is also likely to endure to a greater extent than has been seen 
in other generations.  
Fifth, the thesis demonstrates that two key processes associated with social 
evolution ± the rise of post-materialism and media fragmentation ± offer only a 
OLPLWHGFRQWULEXWLRQWRH[SODLQLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQLTXHOHYHOVRIDSDWK\DQG
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alienation. Despite the success of rising post-materialism in explaining a range 
of other trends in political characteristics (such as partisan dealignment), this 
SURFHVVFDQQRWDFFRXQWIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\KLJKOHYHOVRISROLWLFDO
apathy or low levels of alienation, both of which challenge theoretical 
expectations. The fragmentation of media consumption is more successful, in 
that it helps explain why the Millennials are so apathetic about politics: as the 
consumption of media becomes more individualised and varied, young people 
end up consuming less political information, resulting in them being exposed to 
a weaker stimulus to develop an interest in politics. The media fragmentation 
WKHRU\LVOHVVVXFFHVVIXOKRZHYHULQH[SODLQLQJZK\WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDO
alienation appears to be so low.  
Finally, the numerous analyses which examine generational differences in 
political behaviour, apathy and alienation throughout this research demonstrate 
that while there are certainly significant and at times substantial differences 
between the Millennials and their elders, generational differences ultimately 
contribute little to explaining differences in political participation, apathy or 
DOLHQDWLRQRYHUDOO:KLOHLWLVKHOSIXOWKHUHIRUHWRYLHZWKH0LOOHQQLDOVDVµD
JHQHUDWLRQDSDUW¶IRUH[SODLQLQJZK\WKH\DUHVRSROLWLFDOO\LQDFWLYHFRPSDUHG
with previous generations, this thesis repeatedly demonstrates that it is 
differences in political apathy, political alienation, social capital and political 
and social resources that are far more influential in explaining why different 
groups of people may be more or less politically active than others.  
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1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter Two begins the test of the conventional wisdom with a review of the 
existing research of the political participation of the Millennials in Western 
society, and of the theories that their behaviour is explained by political apathy 
and/or political alienation. It also elaborates on the key criticisms levelled 
against this literature above. Chapter Two also highlights the consistency of 
this research throughout Western society over the past fifty years, 
demonstrating the similarity in both the behaviour of the young and the study 
of that behaviour and so justifying the argument that a Western society-wide 
process ± such as social evolution ± is likely to be responsible for the unique 
characteristics of the Millennials. 
Chapter Three begins by providing a more detailed discussion of the concept of 
DµSROLWLFDOJHQHUDWLRQ¶ and addressing the challenges outlined by Mannheim 
([1944]1928). It specifies the theory which underpins the notion that the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWSROLWLFDOVRFLDOLVDWLRQLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHXQLTXH
political behaviour, apathy and alienation they exhibit. It then begins the 
SURFHVVRIH[DPLQLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQILUVWE\
considering how to define and measure political participation in modern 
Britain, and then by identifying the various dimensions or arenas of political 
activity. Finally, Chapter Three compares the participation of the Millennials in 
all four dimensions of British political participation ± formal, cause-oriented, 
civic and issue-specific formal ± with that of older generations.  
Chapter Four focusses on determining whether the Millennials are a distinct 
political generation for their political behaviour. It begins by outlining the 
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process, strengths and weaknesses of age-period-cohort analysis. It estimates 
the influence of cohort, age and period effects on political participation in 
Britain, and determines whether ± once the influence of the political life cycle 
and historical circumstances have been accounted for ± the Millennials can be 
described as a unique generation in terms of how they participate in politics.  
Chapter Five turns to defining, conceptualising and measuring political apathy 
and alienation. Through bridging the literature on the apathy and alienation of 
the Millennials with that dedicated to the study of those concepts, Chapter Five 
GHYHORSVFOHDUGHILQLWLRQVDQGFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVRIµIRUPDOSROLWLFDODSDWK\¶
DQGµIRUPDOSROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQ¶,WWKHQH[SOores how they manifest 
themselves, and determines a valid way of measuring each using the 2010 
British Election Study.  
Chapter Six uses these concepts to explore the political apathy and alienation 
of British Millennials compared with older generations in modern Britain. It 
also explores the effects of apathy and alienation on both formal and cause-
oriented political participation, and considers whether the differences in apathy 
and alienation between the Millennials and their elders can account for the 
differences in their respective political behaviour.  
In Chapter Seven the two theories relating to social evolution which are 
expected to affect political apathy and alienation are developed and outlined. 
Drawing on existing literature relating to the growth of post-materialistic social 
and political values among Western publics, and the fragmentation of media 
consumption, the chapter outlines the two theories and develops testable 
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hypotheses about their expected impacts on political apathy and political 
alienation.  
Chapter Eight then performs two functions. It first uses age-period-cohort 
analysis to estimate the effects of cohort, age and period effects on political 
apathy and the three dimensions of political alienation in Britain since the 
1980s, and to determine whether and how the Millennials might be considered 
to be a distinct political generation. Variables relating to the post-materialism 
and media fragmentation theories outlined in Chapter Seven are then used to 
estimate the impact of these two processes on trends in political apathy and 
DOLHQDWLRQ7KH&KDSWHUWKHQFRQVLGHUVZKHWKHUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWDSDWK\
and alienation can be explained by these broader processes relating to Western 
social evolution. 
Finally, Chapter Nine returns to and reiterates the central arguments of the 
thesis and relates its findings to the conventional wisdom regarding the 
political engagement of young people in Western democracies. It also 
considers the broader implications of the findings. It outlines what the limited 
influence of the post-materialism and media fragmentation theories on trends in 
political apathy and alienation means for social modernisation theory more 
broadly, and argues that more attention needs to be paid in studies of social 
evolution to the changing ways in which citizens are consuming political 
information. Chapter Nine then considers the lessons learned about the 
concepts of political apathy and political alienation throughout this research, 
and identifies avenues of further study through which more can be learned 
about the way in which these characteristics affect political behaviour. It also 
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identifies extant fields of political research which could benefit from the 
incorporation of the concepts of formal political apathy and alienation 
developed here, such as ongoing studies of the rise of far-right populism 
throughout Europe, and the low levels of political participation expressed by 
other under-represented groups in Western democracies. Finally, Chapter Nine 
returns to the more public-facing dimension of the study of the MLOOHQQLDOV¶
political behaviour and considers the implications of the findings of the thesis 
for the policy responses currently being considered by Western governments to 
improve the formal political participation of young citizens. 
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Chapter Two: The Political Participation, Apathy and Alienation of 
Young People in Western Democracies 
The study of the politics of youth has always been one of two time periods ± 
the politics of today and the politics of the future. On the one hand, the youth 
of a given society are an important sub-group of that community, potentially 
having their own attitudinal or behavioural characteristics, facing unique 
political, social and/or economic challenges, and expressing distinct political 
priorities. In the same way that different groups in society, such as men or 
women, and religious or ethnic minorities, are worthy of study, so too can the 
young be an insightful object of social research. On the other hand, in studying 
the young at a given time we are also studying the middle-aged/old of the 
future. Studying the political characteristics, habits and values of the young 
gives us a valuable insight into how our societies will develop as this 
generation ages and replaces their elders. It is for this multi-dimensional 
character that the study of young citizens has become such a substantial feature 
of modern social science.  
In recent years, it is the latter of these two dimensions that has become the 
more prominent in light of the political characteristics of the most recent 
generation of young citizens ± the Millennials ± some of which are thought to 
constitute a serious threat to democratic stability. As Chapter One noted, at the 
end of the last millennium, the electoral turnout of the youngest citizens in 
almost every Western democracy was substantially lower than that of older 
generations. The quest to explain why, and to determine what could be done to 
re-engage these young citizens, has had a profound impact on the study of 
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young people in academia, and produced several substantial evolutions in 
social research. This, in turn, has had an equally significant effect on our 
understanding of the ways in which modern young people engage with and 
participate in politics. Furthermore, a variety of explanations for the distinction 
RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSROLWLFV have been produced.  
This chapter reviews the literature on the political characteristics of young 
FLWL]HQVLQ:HVWHUQGHPRFUDFLHVVLQFHWKHµELUWK¶RIWKHILHOGIROORZLQJWKH
behavioural revolution in political science in the 1940s. It outlines the 
development of this field from a pre-VµILUVWZDYH¶RIUHVHDUFK± which 
was heavily dependent on quantitative methods, theoretically underpinned by 
the life cycle and employed narrow, election-focussed conceptions of political 
participation ± WRDµVHFRQGZDYH¶ZKLFKHPHUJHGRXWRIWKHHYROXWLRQRIVRFLDO
science research more broadly, and the challenges to the assumptions of the 
first wave approaches. It details the participatory characteristics of the 
Millennials, and discusses the explanations developed for their distinct 
behaviour. Finally, it also highlights how the study of the political 
characteristics of young people is very similar and reveals similar 
characteristics throughout Western democracies. This is suggested to indicate 
that the Millennials are in fact a Western democracy-wide cohort of citizens, 
whose emergence is linked to Western democracy-wide causal processes and 
trends. 
The chapter then focusses on the political apathy versus political alienation 
dimension to the study of the young, and demonstrates how the shift from the 
first to the second wave of research in this field was linked to a shift in 
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emphasis for explanations for their distinct behaviour. In the first wave, this 
explanation was usually based around the life cycle and suggested that the 
young were largely politically apathetic, but that this would change as they 
aged. In the second wave, more attention was paid to generational factors, and 
the idea that toGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOH± the Millennials ± were a distinctly 
alienated political generation gained prominence.  
Finally, the chapter sets the stage for the remainder of the thesis by 
highlighting the four key weaknesses in the current literature which will be 
addressed throughout this research: i) the lack of clarity surrounding the 
participatory characteristics of the Millennials, particularly outside of the 
formal political arena, and surrounding whether their distinct characteristics 
reflect life cycle, period or generational effects; ii) the lack of clarity regarding 
the conceptualisation of political participation in light of the effect of social 
HYROXWLRQRQ:HVWHUQFLWL]HQV¶RSSRUWXQLWLHVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLLLWKHODFNRI
clarity regarding the role of political apathy and alienation in driving that 
behaviour because of a failure to adequately define, conceptualise or 
operationalise them; and iv) the failure to empirically examine potential causes 
of trends in apathy and alienation which may explain the MillHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFW
behaviour.  
2.1 YounJ3HRSOHLQµ7KH*RRG2OG'D\V¶ 
The study of political participation and engagement began in earnest following 
the behavioural revolution in political science in the 1940s.1 While age was not 
                                                 
1
 ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWZKLOHWKLVFKDSWHUUHIHUVWRWZRµZDYHV¶RIUHVHDUFKLQWKLVILHOGWKH
intended distinction is very broad and somewhat fuzzy. Obviously, behaviouralist studies were 
FRQGXFWHGZHOOEHIRUHZKDWLVGHILQHGKHUHDVµWKHILUVWZDYH¶, such as Campbell et al (1954) 
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often considered an important explanatory variable in the earliest studies 
(Abramowitz 1980), a picture gradually began to emerge throughout Western 
GHPRFUDFLHVRIWKHW\SLFDO\RXQJFLWL]HQLQZKLFK³DODFNRISROLWLFDO
awareness, political apathy and low levels of political participation«>were] 
FRPPRQSODFH´0DWWKHZVet al. 1999, p.138, e.g., Abrams and Little 1965a; 
1965b; Barnes et al. 1979; Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. [1944]1968; 
Campbell et al. 1960). 
Unlike today, however, this characterisation of the young did not cause 
concern about the future of democratic society, because the vast majority of 
studies were underpinned by the theory of a stable political life cycle. This 
suggests that the young are expected to be less politically engaged than older 
citizens becauVHRIWKHµVWDUW-XS¶SUREOHPVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHDUO\DGXOWKRRG
such as completing full-time education, finding a partner and starting a family, 
launching a career, and buying a home ± none of which are particularly 
conducive to political engagement (Jankowski and Strate 1995; Smets 2008). 
As people age, however, their circumstances change; as they have children, 
own their own houses, cultivate savings, pay more tax, and look towards their 
retirement, they start to take more interest in political affairs, and so political 
engagement increases (Smets 2008; Martin 2012; Jankowski and Strate 1995). 
More recent studies into the life cycle have also shown that political 
engagement declines again once people reach old age (though not usually to 
                                                 
and Lazarsfeld et al ([1944]1968). These early studies were in many ways distinct from later 
ones for a variety of reasons, including prominently the absence of computer power and the 
consequences for data analysis. With regard to the study of the young, however, these earlier 
VWXGLHVDUHVLPLODUWRZKDWLVGHILQHGLQWKLVFKDSWHUDVµZDYHRQH¶VWXGLHVLQWHUPVRIWKHLU
reliance on a life cycle model, and their preference for quantitative analyses. For purposes of 
VLPSOLFLW\WKHUHIRUHWKHVHWZRFOXVWHUVRIUHVHDUFKDUHFRQFHSWXDOLVHGDVWKHµILUVWZDYH¶LQWKLV
discussion. 
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the low levels seen among the young), and start to face physical, social and 
economic impediments to participating in politics (Smets 2008). 
The political life cycle was assumed to be stable from one generation to the 
next. Each successive cohort was assumed to go through the same life process 
as their parents, and to ultimately adopt similar habits, attitudes and values 
which were conducive to a stable democracy: SROLWLFDOVRFLDOLVDWLRQZDV³DQ
HGXFDWLRQLQWUDGLWLRQDOLVP« [with] the young being effectively de-politicised, 
learning to accept and endorse the status quo, to assimilate the orientations to 
politics of their elders, and in particular to share with them certain 
FRQVHTXHQWLDOSHUFHSWLRQVRIZKDWDUHDQGDUHQRWWKHVDOLHQWLVVXHV´$EUDPV
and Little 1965a, p.95; Campbell et al. 1960; Berelson et al. 1954). The below-
average participation of the young, therefore, was not thought to be a problem 
for democracy, but rather a necessary part of its stability and security.  
The dominance of the theory of a stable political life cycle was one of the key 
characteristics of the first wave of research. Another was the narrow 
FRQFHSWLRQVDQGGHILQLWLRQVRIµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶WKHVHVWXGLHVXVHG
µ3ROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ZDVJHQHUDOO\FRQVLGHUHGWRUHIHURQO\WRDFWLYLW\
related to elections or interaction with elected officials, such as voting, joining 
or campaigning for a political party, or writing to elected officials or the media 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Almond and Verba 1963; Abrams and Little 1965a). The 
exception was political protest, which was often studied in relation to young 
people as they were found to be particularly likely to do it (e.g., Barnes et al. 
1979; Abrams and Little 1965b). For the most part, therefore, the conclusion 
that young people were characterised by limited political participation was 
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EDVHGRQDQDUURZFRQFHSWLRQRIµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ZKLFKZDVEDVHG
almost entirely within the formal arena of politics i.e., dominated by traditional 
political institutions (such as political parties) and in which citizen-elite 
interactions are governed or represented by law (such as through elections) 
(Parry et al. 1992). There was almost no consideration of informal political 
activity, and those studies which did examine informal participation tended to 
focus RQSROLWLFDOSURWHVWDVDIRUPRIµGHYLDQW¶RUµXQFRQYHQWLRQDO¶± and 
therefore undesirable ± political participation (e.g., Abrams and Little 1965b).  
The final key characteristic of the first wave is that this research was largely 
dominated by quantitative research methods, usually survey research. Limited 
attention was paid to more detailed studies of political attitudes or values, with 
conclusions relating to them often derived from observations of behaviour 
(e.g., Lazarsfeld et al. [1944]1968) 
2.2 Young People and Politics in the First Wave 
This research developed a characterisation of young citizens with remarkable 
consistency throughout Western democracies. The most widely studied 
characteristic was that they were the least likely to vote in elections. This was 
repeatedly confirmed in the UK (Abrams and Little 1965a; Mulgan 1997; 
Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995; Parry et al. 1992; Jones and Wallace 1992; 
Lansdown 1995), the US (Verba and Nie 1972; Nie et al. 1974; Bennett 1997; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Hyman 1972), in West Germany (Baker 1973), and other 
West European democracies (Topf 1995; Milbrath and Goel 1977). Several 
studies also pointed towards the lower likelihood of the young being registered 
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to vote in the first place (Mulgan 1997; Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995; Abrams 
and Little 1965a; Bennett 1997). 
Furthermore, the young were found to be less likely than older age groups to 
engage with political parties, such as through joining them, donating money to 
them or campaigning for them in elections (Abrams and Little 1965b; 
Matthews et al. 1999; Parry et al. 1992; Cochrane and Billig 1982; Verba and 
Nie 1972; Campbell et al. 1960; Hyman 1972; Lazarsfeld et al. [1944]1968). 
They were also less likely to exhibit a party identification i.e., to express a 
psychological orientation in favour of or against a particular party (or parties in 
ideological proximity) (Parry et al. 1992; Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Nie 
1972; Butler and Stokes 1969). This also extended to a reluctance to engage 
with other political institutions such as trade unions (Wilkinson and Mulgan 
1995; Parry et al. 1992) or government officials or agencies (Verba and Nie 
1972). In addition, several studies found that the young were less likely to 
engage with the media as a source of political information (Bennett 1997; 
Feldman and Kawakami 1991; Verba and Nie 1972; Adoni 1979; Atkins 1981; 
McLeod et al. 1981). 
The one act in which young people were found to be more likely to engage 
than older voters was protest. Barnes et al. (1979), for instance, examined 
protest potential in Britain, the US and several other Western democracies, and 
found that the young consistently had a greater expectation of becoming 
involved with protests than their elders. They also showed that the young were 
more likely to be involved in protest movements or organisations, such as those 
relating to feminism and environmentalism in the 1960s (Barnes et al. 1979), 
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while Abrams and Little (1965b) showed that British young people were 
disproportionately likely to engage with the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (see also Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995; Parry et al. 1992; Ranade 
and Norris 1981; Verba and Nie 1972; Hedin et al. 1984). 
2.3 Why Were the Young Inactive? 
As outlined above, the basis of the majority of explanations for the yRXQJ¶V
political behaviour was the life cycle. They were suggested to be in a stage of 
their lives during which political engagement was not a priority and they were 
pre-occupied with other concerns, and so they rarely participated in politics. 
The life cyFOHZDVDOVRXVHGWRH[SODLQ\RXQJSHRSOH¶VSURSHQVLW\WRVXSSRUW
protest politics, with Barnes et al. (1979) and Abrams and Little (1965a; 
1965b) suggesting that youth was associated with a desire to rebel against the 
status quo which ultimately saw many young people supporting disruptive 
protest movements. 
Some studies investigated more directly the reasons behind the lack of 
participation among the young, and usually pointed to other characteristics 
which confirmed that they lacked the motivation to seriously engage with 
politics ± in other words, they were more politically apathetic than older 
people. Verba and Nie (1972), Abrams and Little (1965a) and Bennett (1997), 
for instance, highlighted the lack of political knowledge among American and 
British young people, suggesting that it undermined their capacity to identify 
the relevance of politics to their lives, which compounded their lack of 
PRWLYDWLRQWRHQJDJHZLWKLW2WKHUVSRLQWHGWRZDUGV\RXQJSHRSOH¶VODFNRI
engagement with institutional sources of political information through which 
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they could develop both the interest in political issues and knowledge of them 
needed to facilitate political participation, such as the news media (Bennett 
1997; Feldman and Kawakami 1991) or political parties (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Butler and Stokes 1969; Remy and Nathan 1974). 
While political apathy ± ZKHWKHULQGXFHGE\\RXQJSHRSOH¶VVWDJHLQWKHOLIH
cycle or their lack of engagement with sources of political information, or a 
combination of the two ± was the most common explanation for their low 
participation it was not the only one. Some scholars outlined characteristics 
indicative of the young being actively discouraged from participating in 
politics i.e., indicative of their political alienation. Bynner and Ashford (1994) 
and Bhavnani (1991), for example, challenged the idea that the young were 
politically apathetic on the basis of their engagement with protest politics, 
suggesting that if they were motivated to protest then they could be motivated 
to participate in formal politics as well. Bynner and Ashford (1994) also 
highlighted the tendency of young people to be more likely to participate in 
µHDVLHU¶IRUPVRIIRUPDOSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQVXFKDVZDWFKLQJSDUW\SROLWLFDO
broadcasts. Such studies concluded thDW\RXQJSHRSOH¶VUHOXFWDQFHWR
participate in formal politics more broadly must be more to do with the nature 
of formal politics itself ± such as it being unappealing or too complicated ± 
than with the apathy of the young towards it.  
Another potential caXVHRIORZSDUWLFLSDWLRQZDV\RXQJSHRSOH¶VGLVOLNHRIRU
lack of faith in the formal political system. Dennis et al. (1971), for example, 
showed that while young people were not hostile towards the notion of 
µGHPRFUDF\¶WKH\DSSHDUHGWREHPRUHKRVWLOHWowards its manifestation in 
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their home country. In Britain, for example, around half of 11-17 year olds 
rejected the view that their political system was worthy of replication (Dennis 
et al. 1971). In addition, Marsh (1975), Dennis et al. (1971) and Abrams and 
Little (1965b) found evidence of young people being dissatisfied with their 
lives in countries such as Britain or America, and of them blaming their 
political system for this which ultimately led to either their disengagement 
from it or their propensity for protesting against decisions taken within it. 
This theory was challenged, however, by studies such as Conradt (1980), Baker 
(1973), Remy and Nathan (1974) and Campbell et al. (1960), who showed that 
young people actually held their democratic systems in high regard. The 
propensity for protest among the young, they suggested, did not reflect 
democratic dissatisfaction but simply the tendency of youth to challenge the 
status quo. This challenge could not refute, however, the arguments of 
Bhavnani (1991) and Bynner and Ashford (1994) that acknowledging the 
protest potential of young people undermined the sustainability of the view that 
they were largely apathetic about politics and that this explained their lack of 
formal participation. 
Finally, several studies suggested that young people were alienated from 
politics by a failure of politicians and the media to adequately address and 
represent their political concerns and agendas. This, in turn, gave rise to the 
view among the young that the political system simply was not worth engaging 
with (Marsh 1975; Banks et al. 1992; Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995). There 
were two challenges to this position, however. First, Abrams and Little (1965a) 
showed that while there was certainly evidence of a slightly different political 
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agenda among British young people, they continued to express little interest in 
engaging with politics regardless of the political issues being discussed. 
Second, Bennett (1997) highlighted the lack of political knowledge and 
attention to politics among American young people and argued that it meant 
they would be largely unaware of the issues dominating public political 
discourse, even if the issues they cared about most were at the top of the 
agenda. This meant, therefore, that politicians failing to pay attention to certain 
issues were unlikely to have much impact on how young people felt about 
politics.  
While there were some who challenged it, the majority of first wave studies 
supported the conventional wisdom that young people exhibited below average 
participation in formal politics because they lived in a stage of their lives not 
conducive to political engagement. This was compounded by their lack of 
engagement with institutional sources of both a stimulus to engage and a 
source of political knowledge, such as the media or political parties. This was 
not thought to be problematic for the stability of democracy, however, because 
young people were assumed to follow broadly the same life cycle as that of 
their parents and grandparents. Eventually, therefore, they would not only 
develop an interest in and knowledge of politics as their life circumstances 
changed and the motivation to engage with it grew (such as by having children 
or purchasing a house), but would develop similar political values and attitudes 
which underpinned the continuation of a stable democratic system (Abrams 
and Little 1965a; 1965b; Berelson et al. 1954).  
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2.4 The Arrival of the Millennials and the Challenge to the First Wave 
Until the 1990s, this view of the young as largely apathetic, inactive citizens 
who would become more active as they aged was largely, though not entirely, 
unchallenged. This began to change, however, with the arrival of new 
generations of young people into the electorate around the turn of the 
millennium (i.e., the Millennials), who exhibited a lower propensity to vote in 
elections than even previous generations of young citizens. Furthermore, the 
gap between their turnout and that of older generations began to grow, 
suggesting that their declining turnout was not necessarily driven by processes 
influencing turnout for the wider electorate.  
In Britain, for example, the turnout of the 18-24 age group in the 1983, 1987 
and 1992 general elections was 64%, 67% and 67% respectively: an average of 
66%, compared with an average overall turnout of 75%. For the 1997, 2001 
and 2005 elections, the turnout for this age group was 54%, 40% and 38% 
respectively: an average of 44%, compared with an overall average of 64% 
(House of Commons Library 2013; see also Phelps 2005; Whiteley 2012). The 
difference between the average turnout of the youngest voters and that of the 
wider electorate increased from 9% between 1983 and 1992, to 20% between 
1997 and 2005. There was a modest recovery in the 2010 election, with 44% of 
under 25s voting compared with an overall turnout of 65% (Henn and Foard 
2012), but the difference between them was still 21%.  
In America, the turnout of the 18-24 year olds in Presidential elections was just 
over 50% in 1972, and remained fairly steady at around 44% in the 1976, 1980 
and 1984 elections that followed (CIRCLE 2013). As in Britain, the difference 
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between the average turnout of the young and overall turnout grew throughout 
this period: for the 1972, 1976 and 1980 presidential elections, the difference 
was 17%, whereas for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections, it was 21% (McLeod 
2000). Levine and Lopez (2002) showed that youth turnout in US presidential 
elections fell by between 13-15% between 1972 (when the voting age was 
lowered to 18) and the late 1990s. Wass (2007) found similar evidence in 
Finland, showing that the youngest Finnish voters in 1999 were 1.4% less 
likely to vote than their predecessors, and Franklin (2004) showed that a 
similar trend was apparent throughout Western democracies, particularly those 
that had lowered the voting age to 18 in the 1970s. Throughout the late 1990s 
and into the new millennium, multiple studies found evidence of a cohort 
effect, in which young people entering Western electorates in the late 1990s 
were substantially less likely to vote in national elections than previous cohorts 
of young voters, and that the difference between their turnout and that of the 
wider electorate was widening (Miller and Shanks 1996; Vowles 2004; Norris 
2004; Wattenberg 2002; Gimpel et al. 2004; Burgess et al. 2000; Clarke et al. 
2004). 
This evidence of a cohort effect presented a strong challenge to many of the 
theories and assumptions about how and why young people engaged with 
politics, but particularly to the dominance of life cycle theory to explain young 
SHRSOH¶VEHORZ-average political participation. The theory of an inter-
generationally stable political life cycle was incapable of explaining why this 
particular generation of young people was so much less likely than previous 
generations to vote in elections. Moreover, if their participation was the result 
of a cohort rather than a life cycle effect, there was little reason to expect that 
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WKHWXUQRXWRIWKLVJHQHUDWLRQZRXOGHYHQWXDOO\PDWFKWKDWRIWKHLUSDUHQWV¶DV
they aged (Henn et al. 2002; Phelps 2005; Wass 2007; McLeod 2000; 
Wattenberg 2002). 
The challenge was given greater impetus as more evidence of cohort effects in 
other political characteristics began to appear, which suggested that there was a 
wider shift in the way that young citizens related to politics underway. Studies 
such as Whiteley (2012), Dalton (2004; 2013) and Dalton and Wattenberg 
(2000) showed that there were cohort effects apparent in the decline of party 
identification across many Western democracies, with the Millennials 
developing the weakest attachment to political parties of any generation. 
Putnam (1995; 2000) argued that similar effects were apparent in social capital, 
while Dalton (2004) found the same for political trust. Clarke et al. (2004), 
Dalton (2009; 2013), Blais et al. (2004), Furlong and Cartmel (2012), 
Wattenberg (2012) and Rubenson et al. (2004) found evidence that new 
generations were developing new conceptions and understandings of 
citizenship, which placed far less emphasis on the civic duty of voting in 
elections. Blais et al. (2004), Furlong and Cartmel (2012), Zukin et al. (2006), 
Jowell and Park (1998), Park (2000) and Rubenson et al. (2004) also found that 
new cohorts were developing lower levels of interest in formal politics. Dalton 
(2013) and Whiteley (2012) also suggested there was a cohort effect relating to 
political interest, but that it was one in which younger generations were 
becoming more interested in politics. 
Wattenberg (2012) suggested that throughout Western democracies there were 
also cohort effects apparent in declining levels of political knowledge, 
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identifying American Millennials as the least politically knowledgeable 
generation in the history of survey research. Finally, accompanying the cohort 
effect in electoral turnout was evidence of cohort effects with regard to other 
forms of political participation. Studies such as Grasso (2014), Putnam (2000) 
and Wattenberg (2012) argued that the cohort-based decline in turnout was 
being replicated in other political acts, such as protest activity or forms of civic 
participation. Others, such as Norris (2001; 2004) and Dalton (2013) argued 
that the cohort effect went the other way; that the Millennials were at the 
leading edge of a generation-based increase in informal political participation, 
particularly acts associated with protest and volunteering.  
While there were disagreements regarding the nature of these cohort effects, 
there was clearly growing evidence of a cohort effect in political participation, 
interest, knowledge and values which suggested that the Millennials were, as 
Henn et al. SXWLWµDJHQHUDWLRQDSDUW¶(YHU\DGGLWLRQDOSLHFHRI
evidence hinting at the presence of a cohort effect was another challenge to the 
LGHDWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQFould be explained by their stage in the 
political life cycle, as well as to the assumption that they would eventually 
mimic their parents in the way that they engaged with politics.  
This sparked serious concern among academics, politicians and journalists 
alike as to what the implications of this shift might be for representative 
democracy. In light of research into political socialisation which suggested that 
KDELWVIRUPHGGXULQJ\RXWKFRXOGODVWWKURXJKRXWDJLYHQLQGLYLGXDO¶VRU
FRKRUW¶VDGXOWOLYHV-Hnnings 1984; Jennings and Niemi 1968; 1981), concern 
EHJDQWRJURZWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRIIRUPDOSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQFRXOG
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become a lifelong habit which could have serious consequences for the 
legitimacy of future democratic decisions (Henn and Foard 2012; Farthing 
2010; Soule 2001). This concern eventually became a priority for policy-
makers throughout Western society, who increasingly began to focus on the 
µSUREOHP¶RIORZ\RXWKHQJDJHPHQWZLWKSROLWLFV7LPPHUPDQEvans 
and Sternberg 1999). There was a shift in the way policy-makers viewed young 
people as citizens; they increasingly became ³WKHIRFXVRIWKHIHDUVUDWKHUWKDQ
WKHKRSHVRI:HVWHUQVRFLHWLHV´3DLQet al. 2010, p.972). 
These developments underpinned three significant changes in the academic 
study of young people and politics which constituted the transition from the 
first to the second wave of research. The first was the shift from a focus on the 
life cycle as the explanation for the political characteristics of the young 
towards a focus on cohort effects. This invariably led to greater interest in the 
role of political socialisation and the habits formed during youth as a source of 
differentiation between the behaviour of generations (Wattenberg 2012; Martin 
2012). It also led to a change in the way young people were viewed as political 
actors, with studies such as Marsh et al. (2007) DQG2¶7RROHleading the 
FKDUJHWRVWRS\RXQJSHRSOHEHLQJYLHZHGDVµSROLWLFDODSSUHQWLFHV¶OLYLQJLQD
stage of the life cycle which diminished their significance. Instead, Marsh et al. 
(2007) argued that young people should be viewed as political actors in their 
own right, both by scholars and politicians, and their political attitudes, values 
and behaviour seen as expressions of fully-fledged democratic citizens rather 
than apprentices who would one day mimic their parents (see also Henn et al. 
2002; Henn et al. 2005).  
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The second major change was that the definition and conceptualisation of 
µSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶HPSOR\HGLQmuch first wave research was challenged. 
Scholars such as Phelps (2005), Marsh et al. (2007) and Henn et al. (2002) 
criticised the tendency of earlier studies to focus only on formal or electoral 
behaviour as meaningful political participation. They suggested that such a 
view not only undermined the importance of other forms of political activity, 
but also led to the view of young people as politically apathetic which, it was 
argued, was unjustified once their participation in informal politics was 
considered (Marsh et al. 2007; Henn et al. 2002). In addition, a growing body 
of literature was arguing that social evolution in Western democracies ± such 
as in the form of technological development (e.g., the Internet) ± was 
substantially expanding opportunities for Western citizens to participate in 
politics (Norris 2001; Stolle et al. 2005; Sloam 2007; see Fox 2014 for a 
review).  
This was not only giving rise to new forms of political participation, but also 
creating opportunities for people to interact with each other as never before to 
the extent that they could form new political organisations, such as trans-
QDWLRQDOFDPSDLJQJURXSV6ORDPE1RUULV2¶1HLOO
2010). Finally, White et al. (2000) and Marsh et al. (2007) argued that new 
generations of young citizens ± such as the Millennials ± were conceptualising 
their participation in politics in a distinct way from older generations. This saw 
them place less emphasis on engaging through formal channels based on 
traditional institutions of social and political identity (such as class or religion) 
and more emphasis on engaging through channels which reflected their 
conception of politics as a lived experience (Marsh et al. 2007; 2¶7RROH
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White et al. 2000). In light of such developments, focussing only on formal 
politics was said to be unsustainable and suggested to lead to inaccurate 
LPSUHVVLRQVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV+HQQet al. 2002; Henn 
et al. 2005; Marsh et al. 2007; Sloam 2007; Youth Citizenship Commission 
(YCC) 20)DKP\6KHHULQ9RZOHV2¶1HLOO1RUULV
2001; McLeod 2000; Zukin et al. 2006; de Vreese 2007; Vesnic-Alujevic 
2012). 
The third major change to the study of young people was primarily 
methodological. Linking with the criticism that first wave studies employed 
overly narrow conceptions of political participation, many studies also argued 
that such studies were overly dependent on quantitative research methods, 
which led to a disproportionate focus on observable political behaviour and 
easily measurable attitudes (Marsh et al. 2007; Henn et al. 2002; Moffett and 
Albowicz 2003; Skattebol 2011; Gauthier 2003). Such critics argued that 
insufficient use was made of alternative, qualitative approaches which were 
capable of identifying how the \RXQJFRQFHSWXDOLVHGµSROLWLFV¶DQGWKHLU
political participation (Marsh et al. 2007; Henn et al. 2002; Print et al. 2004; 
Sheerin 2007). If such approaches were adopted, the view of young people as 
largely inactive and uninterested in politics would, it was claimed, be 
challenged (Marsh et al. 2¶7RROH4; Henn et al. 2002; Gauthier 
2003). 
2.5 The Second Wave and the Political Characteristics of the Millennials 
Collectively, these challenges led to the transition from the first to the second 
wave of research into the political characteristics of young people. In some 
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areas, this shift led to substantial differences in the way in which the 
Millennials were thought to relate to and participate in politics. In others, the 
conclusions reached by second wave scholars were largely in agreement with 
those in the first. 
Second wave studies confirmed that young people had always been less likely 
to vote in elections than older people, and also that the Millennials were 
unusual for being so unlikely to vote even when compared with previous young 
generations (Russell et al. 2002; Pattie et al. 2004; Sloam 2007; Henn and 
Foard 2012; Henn et al. 2002; Henn et al. 2005; Marsh et al. 2007; Furlong and 
Cartmel 2012; Farthing 2010; Phelps 2005; 2012; Hansard Society 2012; 
Burgess et al. 2000; Jacobs et al. 2009; McLeod et al. 2000; Sheerin 2007; 
Vowles 2004; Print et al. 2004; Mellor and Kennedy 2003; Wass 2007; Dalton 
2012; 2013; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Wattenberg 2002; 2012; Norris 
2002; Smets and van Ham 2013; Sloam 2014; Martin 2012).  
The unprecedented reluctance of the Millennials to vote was shown to reflect a 
broader reluctance to participate in formal politics more generally. The 
Millennials were shown to be less likely to join or otherwise engage with 
political parties (such as through campaigning for them) (Russell et al. 2002; 
Henn et al. 2005; Mycock and Tonge 2012; Henn and Foard 2012; Whiteley 
2012; Dalton 2013; Soule 2001; Utter 2011; Sheerin 2007; Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2002; Martin 2012). They were also shown to be less likely to 
develop a party identification ± both than older people and previous 
generations of young citizens ± and those that did identify with a party 
generally exhibited weaker attachments (Russell et al. 2002; Mycock and 
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Tonge 2012; Whiteley 2012; Zukin et al. 2006; Dalton 2013; Norris 2002; 
2011; Wattenberg 2002; 2012; Martin 2012). In addition, the Millennials were 
shown to be less likely to join or otherwise engage with other traditional 
political institutions (such as trade unions) and religious institutions, and to 
identify with social institutions which underpinned much political support, 
such as social class (Phelps 2012; Pattie et al. 2004; Flanagan et al. 2012; 
Dalton 2013; Quintelier 2008; Putnam 2000; Marsh et al. 2007). They were 
also shown to be less likely to directly interact with the government, such as 
through contacting elected officials or government agencies (Henn and Foard 
2012; Pattie et al. 2004; Russell et al. 2002; Sloam 2014; Hansard Society 
2012; Martin 2012) 
The Millennials were also found to be less interested in formal political issues 
than their elders, and even than previous generations of young citizens (Henn 
and Foard 2012; Henn et al. 2005; Dalton 2013; Sheerin 2007; Wattenberg 
2012; Putnam 2000; Utter 2011; Pattie et al. 2004; Delli Carpini 2000; Park 
2000; Blais et al. 2004; Rubenson et al. 2004). They were also shown to exhibit 
lower levels of political knowledge than their elders, with some studies (such 
as Wattenberg 2012) suggesting that they were the least knowledgeable 
generation to have entered Western electorates in recent history (Russell et al. 
2002; Hansard Society 2012; Pattie et al. 2004; Mellor and Kennedy 2003; 
McLeod 2000). 
:KHQLWFDPHWRWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶IRUPDOSROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQWDnd 
participation, therefore, the second wave of research produced very similar 
conclusions to the first: the Millennials were generally less active in, attached 
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to, interested in and knowledgeable of formal politics than their elders. The 
major difference between the first and second waves was that the latter showed 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶WREHOHVVDFWLYHDQGHQJDJHGZLWKIRUPDOSROLWLFVWKDQ
SUHYLRXVJHQHUDWLRQVDWWKHVDPHDJH:KHQORRNLQJEH\RQGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
immediate engagement with and participation in formal politics, however, 
many second wave studies suggested that there was much more to the story 
than simply greater political apathy than previous generations. 
While few disputed that the Millennials were typically less interested in formal 
politics than their elders, for instance, several argued that once their 
engagement outside of the formal political arena was examined they were 
found to maintain an active interest in political issues, and that the difference 
with the interest of their elders in such areas was much smaller (Russell et al. 
2002; White et al. 2000; Henn and Foard 2012; Henn et al. 2002; Henn et al. 
2005; Marsh et al. 2007; ICR 2006; Print et al. 2004; Dalton 2013; Moffett and 
Albowicz 2003; Martin 2012; Sheerin 2007). Studies such as Marsh et al. 
(2007), White et al. (2000), Moffett and Albowicz (2003) and Henn et al. 
(2002) also argued that if political issues ± even those which were often at the 
heart of mainstream political debate in the formal political arena ± were 
explored with the Millennials from the perspective of their daily lives and 
experiences, the Millennials were found to have an active interest in and 
awareness of them. On the basis of similar evidence in New Zealand, Sheerin 
(2007) concluded that the Millennials appeared to have an unprecedented lack 
of interest in formal political processes and institutions, but maintained an 
active interest in political issues, particularly those of relevance to their daily 
lives. 
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$VLPLODUGHEDWHRFFXUUHGZLWKUHJDUGWRWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SRlitical knowledge. 
Few disputed that the Millennials were less knowledgeable about formal 
SROLWLFVWKDQWKHLUHOGHUVEXWPDQ\DUJXHGWKDWWKH\ZHUHQRQHWKHOHVV³KLJKO\
DUWLFXODWHDERXWWKHLVVXHVZKLFKDIIHFWWKHLUOLYHV´0DUVKet al. 2007, p.122), 
and that therefore to consider them uninformed or unknowledgeable was 
misleading (Sheerin 2007; White et al. 2000; Henn et al. 2002; Dalton 2013).  
5HODWHGWRWKHLVVXHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHZDVWKHLVVXHRI
their engagement with sources of political knowledge, primarily the news 
media. First wave scholars established that young people were generally less 
likely to engage with news media than their elders, and that this in part 
reflected and in part compounded their lack of political interest. Second wave 
scholars agreed, showing that the Millennials were less likely to engage with 
news media than their elders and previous young generations, and were 
consequently less politically interested and knowledgeable (Wattenberg 2012; 
Buckingham 1999). Some, however, suggested that this view was biased as it 
ZDVEDVHGRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWUDGLWLRQDOVRXUFHVRIPHGLD
such as newspapers, and that if more attention was paid to their engagement 
with new media, such as the Internet, then they would be found to be quite 
active in seeking out and engaging with political information (Norris 2001; 
2¶1HLOO&DVHUR-Ripolles 2012; Di Gennaro and Dutton 2006; 
Gibson et al. 2005; Baumgartner and Morris 2010). De Vreese (2007), for 
example, argued that contrary to spending less time interacting with news 
media than their elders, the Millennials spent more time doing so because the 
Internet and social media were such a big part of their daily lives. Such 
scholars argued that any effort to study WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWK
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political news media should, therefore, account for the evolution of the media 
LWVHOIGH9UHHVH1RUULV2¶1HLOO 
A characteristic explored in the second wave which was barely a feature of 
earlier research was WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶FRQFHSWLRQRIFLWL]HQVKLS6HYHUDOVFKRODUV
suggested that one of the key reasons the Millennials were less likely to vote 
than previous generations is because they were less likely to consider voting to 
be a civic duty (Dalton 2013; Norris 2004; Clarke et al. 2004). Russell et al. 
(2002), for example, found that British Millennials were more likely than older 
people to feel that voting was not a duty but something worth doing only if 
they cared who won the election. Sanders et al. (2005) showed that 56% of 
British under 25s felt that voting was a civic duty, compared with 73% of 35-
44 year olds and more than 90% of the over 65s. Wattenberg (2012) identified 
a similar trend in other Western democracies: for example, in the Netherlands 
26% of 18-29 year olds felt that voting was a civic duty, compared with 44% of 
over 65s; in Japan, the equivalent figures were 32% and 61% respectively; and 
in Finland, they were 24% and 63%.  
This trend was not taken to suggest that the Millennials thought that political 
participation was unimportant. Several studies showed that the Millennials felt 
following and participating in politics was a good and important thing for a 
citizen to do: Mellor and Kennedy (2003), for example, found that more than 
half of Australian Millennials felt that a good citizen should follow and 
participate in politics (see also Mayer and Schmidt 2004; White et al. 2000; 
Russell et al. 2002; YCC 2009; Dalton 2013). Instead, this trend was taken as 
evidence of an evolving notion of what it meant to be a democratic citizen; 
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while the Millennials still felt that political participation was important, they 
did not feel that they had to participate in formal politics unquestioningly, 
particularly if political elites failed to convince them it was worth doing so 
(Dalton 2013; Norris 2011). 
In a further difference between the two research waves, the second wave 
assigned far more significance to informal political participation. Norris (2001) 
identified a particular aspect of informal politicVDVµFDXVH-RULHQWHGSROLWLFV¶
acts outside of the formal political arena in which the actor engages directly 
with an entity (such as another individual or an institution) which is either 
directly responsible for a political decision or issue (such as a company drilling 
for oil) or which is related to a political issue the individual cares about (such 
as a trans-national campaign organisation) (Norris 2001; Sloam 2014). 
Examples include signing petitions, supporting new social movements, 
protesting, political consumerism, and many forms of Internet based activism 
(Sloam 2012b; 2014; Norris 2001; Theocharis 2012).  
Many second wave studies argued that the Millennials were more active in this 
area than previous generations, and that consequently the difference between 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶FDXVH-oriented political participation and that of their elders 
was much smaller than that for formal politics. In some cases, they were even 
suggested to be more active than their elders in this area. Sloam (2012b), for 
instance, argued that British Millennials were particularly active in protest 
activity ± even more so than previous generations of young people ± pointing 
towards their participation in protests against the Iraq War in 2003, and the 
Occupy movement in 2010/11. In addition, Sloam (2012a; 2012b), Norris 
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(2001; 2011), Print et al. (2004) and Paloniemi and Vainio (2011) argued that 
Millennials were far more likely than their elders to engage with and/or support 
new social movements and global campaign organisations.  
Martin (2012) showed that 21% of British 18-29 year olds had participated in a 
consumer boycott, compared with 24% of the over 60s; the equivalent figures 
for the US were 25% and 18%; in Australia they were 40% and 25% (see also 
Vromen 2003); and in Canada they were 48% and 22%. Martin (2012) also 
found that Australian Millennials were roughly three times more likely to take 
part in a protest or public demonstration than the over 60s, while Print et al. 
(2004) showed that 61% were willing to or had already participated in a 
protest, and 95% were willing to or had already signed petitions. Whether the 
specific form of cause-oriented activity was protesting, signing petitions, 
supporting campaign organisations or taking part in political consumerism, 
many seconGZDYHVWXGLHVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WR
be active in this area than previous generations, and that this pointed to an 
evolution, rather than a decline, of political engagement and participation 
among this generation (Fahmy 2006; Furlong and Cartmel 2012; Marsh et al. 
2007; Matthews et al. 1999; Henn and Foard 2012; Mycock and Tonge 2012; 
Theocharis 2012; Henn et al. 2005; Sheerin 2007; Vromen 2003; Mellor and 
Kennedy 2003; Print et al. 2004; Gauthier 2003; ICR 2006; Paloniemi and 
Vainio 2011; Delli Carpini 2000; Jacobs et al. 2009; Dalton 2013; Norris 2002; 
2011; Sloam 2014; Martin 2012). 
While there was little doubt that the Millennials were active in cause-oriented 
politics, and that the difference between their cause-oriented participation and 
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that of their elders was smaller than that seen for formal political activity, there 
was much more doubt about the extent to which they were more active than 
previous generations of young citizens in this area. This partly reflected the 
facWWKDWWKHVHZHUHRIWHQµQHZ¶IRUPVRISROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRUDWOHDVWQHZ
forms as far as the academic study of political activity was concerned, meaning 
WKDWGDWDDYDLODELOLW\ZDVOLPLWHG2¶1HLOO%DNNHUDQGGH9UHHVH
Dalton 2013). In some cases, however, there were direct challenges to this 
view based on empirical evidence. Grasso (2014), for instance, examined 
cohort effects in formal and informal political participation throughout Europe, 
and not only questioned the view that the Millennials were more active than 
their elders in informal politics, but suggested that they were the least 
politically active generation ± in both formal and informal politics ± in Europe. 
Similarly, Wattenberg (2012) argued that the Millennials were actually less 
active in cause-oriented and informal politics than previous generations, and 
that they appeared to be more active because such acts were becoming more 
common throughout the electorate. In other words, Wattenberg (2012) argued 
that a period effect ± in which cause-oriented political activity was becoming 
more common for all Western citizens ± was being mistakenly interpreted as a 
cohort effect (see also Putnam 2000). The one exception to this dispute was 
volunteering. Many studies ± including those sceptical of the extent to which 
the Millennials were more active than previous generations in informal politics 
± showed that the Millennials were more likely to volunteer in their local 
communities than previous generations (Dalton 2013; Zukin et al. 2006; 
Wattenberg 2012; Sloam 2014; Henn et al. 2005; Henn and Foard 2012; Roker 
et al. 1999; Roker and Eden 2002; Fahmy 2006).  
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2:DYH7ZRDQGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶3ROLWLFDO$OLHQDWLRQ 
The second wave of research produced, therefore, a rich characterisation of the 
Millennials as political actors, one that to an extent challenged the first wave 
view of them as largely politically apathetic, inactive citizens. They were 
viewed as less interested in, knowledgeable of and active in formal politics 
than their elders and previous young generations. At the same time, however, 
there was evidence of them maintaining an active interest in and awareness of 
political issues which affected their lives, as well as being active in informal 
politics and through alternative means of accessing and acting on political 
information, and exhibiting a broader transition in the way they viewed 
themselves as democratic citizens. This more optimistic view of the 
Millennials did not, however, undermine the concerns of many about what 
their low formal political participation might mean for Western democracy if it 
did indeed become a lifelong habit. Several scholars highlighted the negative 
consequences for democratic representation, legitimacy and the efficiency of 
policy-making from having substantial chunks of the electorate not participate 
in formal politics ± especially elections ± DQGDUJXHGWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
participation in informal politics would not offset this problem (Farthing 2010; 
Whiteley 2012; Martin 2012; Head 2011; Sloam 2012a). Furthermore, scholars 
were left with a paradox: if the Millennials were sufficiently interested in and 
knowledgeable of politics to engage with and participate in it through informal 
means, and still valued formal political participation, why were they so inactive 
in formal politics?  
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By far the most common solution to this paradox was the theory that the 
Millennials were uniquely alienated from formal politics. Their alienation, it 
was argued, was the obstacle which prevented their interest in politics from 
being realised through participation in formal political processes. Henn et al. 
(2005), for instance, assessed whether an unprecedented level of political 
DSDWK\RUSROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQFRXOGEHWWHUH[SODLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
generationally distinct lack of formal political participation, and concluded that 
³DWWKHKHDUWRI\RXQJSHRSOH¶V«GLVHQFKDQWPHQWZLWK:HVWPLQVWHUSROLWLFVLVD
VWURQJVHQVHRISROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQ´+HQQet al. 2005, p.574). Similarly, Henn 
DQG)RDUGFRQFOXGHGWKDW³\RXQJSeople remain serious and discerning 
(sceptical) observer-SDUWLFLSDQWVRIWKHHOHFWRUDOSURFHVVUDWKHUWKDQ«DSDWKHWLF
RQORRNHUV´+HQQDQG)RDUGSZKLOH6ORDPVXJJHVWHGWKDW
WKH³SUREOHPLVOHVVSROLWLFDODSDWK\«WKDQWKHGLVFRQQHFWLRQRIyoung people 
IURPWKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVV´6ORDPS1RWDOOVWXGLHVGLUHFWO\XVHG
WKHWHUPµSROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQ¶but the theory that some form of active 
GLVHQFKDQWPHQWH[SODLQHGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRIIRUPDOSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
rather than a lack of interest was widespread.  
The expression of this alienation varied from one study to another, as did its 
proposed cause. Second wave scholars developed a wide range of theories 
which could conceivably explain why the Millennials were alienated from 
politics to an extent not seen by either previous young generations or their 
elders. Henn and Foard (2012), Utter (2011), Delli Carpini (2000) and Fahmy 
SRLQWHGWRZDUGVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRIFRQILGHQFHLQWKHLURZQ
political knowledge and understanding, suggesting that this undermined their 
confidence in their capacity to effectively participate in politics and promote 
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their interests. Henn and Foard (2012), for instance, found that 46% of British 
Millennials did not feel confident in their knowledge of politics, and 47% felt 
that they did not know enough about politics in general. Similarly, the Hansard 
Society (2012) also showed that just over one in three under 25s in Britain felt 
at all politically knowledgeable, compared with almost half of over 55s, and 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKLVUHODWHGWRWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KDYLQJOLWWOHFRQILGHQFHLQWKHLU
knowledge of politics because political knowledge correlates so strongly with 
RQH¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIKRZNQRZOHGJHDEOHWKH\DFWXDOO\DUH 
Others suggested that the Millennials exhibited a particularly limited faith in 
the responsiveness of the formal political system to their influence. Sloam 
(2012b; 2014), for instance, suggested that the electoral system in countries 
such as Britain or the US ± i.e., majoritarian systems which undermined the 
support of new or small political parties ± discouraged the Millennials from 
participating because they felt that their demands could not be represented by 
the traditional mainstream parties. Similarly, Wattenberg (2002) suggested that 
the American political system was so complicated that it undermined young 
$PHULFDQV¶IDLWKLQWKHLUFDSDFLW\WRLQIOXHQFHLW Other scholars pointed 
WRZDUGVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKWKHRSHUDWLRQRIWKHSROLWLFDO
system, rather than its structure. For example, Mycock and Tonge (2012), 
Fahmy (2006) and Marsh et al. (2007) suggested that the adversarial nature of 
British party politics discouraged young people from engaging with political 
parties and elections.  
Both of these arguments were challenged, however, by extensive evidence that 
the Millennials, for all their negative views of political parties and politicians, 
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exhibited strong support for their democratic system. Henn et al. (2005), for 
example, who strongly argued that British Millennials were alienated from 
formal politics, showed that only 26% of them were dissatisfied with British 
democracy (see also Henn and Foard 2012; Martin 2012; Pattie et al. 2004; 
Whiteley 2012; Dalton 2013). 
A related theory was that the way the media presented politics ± with its focus 
on conflict, personalities and partisan division ± was what discouraged the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶IURPHQJDJLQJZLWKIRUPDOSROLWLFVUDWKHUWKDQWKHSUDFWLFHRI
politics itself. Wayne et al. (2010), for instance, examined BrLWLVK0LOOHQQLDOV¶
perceptions of political news media and found that it was largely negative, and 
that the politics presented to them through the media was not something they 
wanted to be part of. Evans and Sternberg (1999) found a similar trend among 
AusWUDOLDQ0LOOHQQLDOVFRQFOXGLQJWKDW³GXHODUJHO\WRWKHQHZVPHGLD¶V
presentation, politics, democracy and citizenship have developed a bad 
UHSXWDWLRQZLWK\RXQJSHRSOH´Evans and Sternberg 1999, p.109; also Soule 
(2001) for American Millennials). Evans and Sternberg (1999) also argued that 
the media depictions of young people as politically apathetic and inactive ± 
based partly on academic research conducted during the first wave ± was a 
further alienating force in that young people felt compelled to conform to this 
stereotype out of resentment, i.e., it became a self-fulfilling prophecy (Evans 
and Sternberg 1999; Russell 2004). Similarly, the YCC (2009) suggested that 
the British media plays a substantial role in alienating young people not just 
from polLWLFVEXWIURPVRFLHW\PRUHZLGHO\WKURXJKµGHPRQLVLQJ¶\RXWKDQG
presenting it as a societal problem, a conclusion Benyon (2012) shared in light 
of the media coverage of young people involved in riots in England in 2011. 
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Another common theory was that the Millennials were alienated by the failure 
of politicians and political parties to adequately represent their interests and 
agendas. 7KLVZDVPDLQO\VDLGWRVWHPIURPSROLWLFLDQV¶LQDELOLW\WRUHODWHWR
\RXQJSHRSOH¶VGDLO\OLYHVDQGFRQFHUQVUDWKHUWKDQD deliberate ignorance of 
their issues (Henn et al. 2005; White et al. 2000; Furlong and Cartmel 2012; 
Sheerin 2007; Sloam 2012b; Print et al. 2004; Delli Carpini 2000; ICR 2006; 
Soule 2001; Moffett and Albowicz 2003; Mellor and Kennedy 2003). Some 
scholars suggested, however, that the Millennials had a distinct political agenda 
which politicians were not prepared to prioritise for fear of upsetting older 
citizens who were more likely to vote (Soule 2001; Henn et al. 2005; Dalton 
2013), although others argueGWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
agenda and that of the wider electorate of which they were a part were 
negligible (Marsh et al. 2007; Evans and Sternberg 1999; Mellor and Kennedy 
2003; Sheerin 2007; Gauthier 2003). 
Another potential source of alienation was a lack of trust in politics or some 
aspect of the formal political arena (such as political parties or elections). 
Several studies showed that many Millennials felt that participating in politics 
was a waste of time because they had so little faith that politicians would keep 
their promises or promote their interests (Martin 2012; Marsh et al. 2007; Henn 
and Foard 2012; Henn et al. 2005; Furlong and Cartmel 2012; Fahmy 2006; 
Sloam 2014a; Pattie et al. 2004). Furlong and Cartmel (2012), for example, 
pointed to a particularly poignant example in the case of British Millennials, in 
which they were alienated by the Liberal Democrats¶ decision to renege on 
their pledge to vote against tuition fee increases upon entering government in 
2010. Henn and Foard (2012) linked such events to a broader lack of trust 
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among British Millennials LQSROLWLFLDQV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRFDUHDERXWZKDWWKH\
thought (only 54% felt politicians cared what they thought) and to treat them 
fairly in government (less than half felt they were treated fairly).  
This theory was challenged, however. Dalton (2004), for example, showed that 
political trust in general was in decline throughout Western society, and so the 
Millennials would not be special for having low levels of political trust. Others 
suggested that while the young certainly had less trust than their elders, the 
difference between them was so small it was unlikely to account for the large 
differences between their respective political participation (Pattie et al. 2004; 
Whiteley 2012; Hansard Society 2012). 
For the most part, attempts by second wave scholars to explain the unusually 
low formal political participation of the Millennials were based around some 
form of alienation from the formal political system. Some also linked 
alienation from formal politics with higher levels of engagement in cause-
oriented politics exhibited by the Millennials, suggesting that they were 
compelled to influence political outcomes through informal means because 
they had so little faith in formal processes, actors and institutions (e.g., Dalton 
2013; Henn and Foard 2012; Sloam 2014).  
Nonetheless, there were some who challenged the dominance of political 
DOLHQDWLRQEDVHGH[SODQDWLRQVIRFXVVLQJPRUHRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFXODUO\
profound lack of interest in and knowledge of formal politics and suggesting 
that they were indicative of an unprecedented level of apathy towards politics 
in all arenas rather than alienation. Phelps (2012), for example, argued that 
WKHUHPXVWEH³VRPH MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUFDOOLQJWRGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOHDSDWKHWLF«
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[DVWKH\@VHHPDSDWKHWLFZKHQLWFRPHVWRFRQYHQWLRQDOSROLWLFV«GHVSLWHthere 
EHLQJPRUHRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRSDUWLFLSDWHQRZWKDQWKHUHHYHUKDGEHHQ´3KHOSV
2012, p.295). 
There were two main theories behind this argument. The first related to the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRIHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWUDGLWLRQDOQHZVPHGLDDQGVXJJHVWHG
that their engagement with new forms of political media (such as online blogs 
or social media) did not compensate for the loss of information resulting from 
their rejection of traditional media sources intended for larger and more diverse 
audiences (Wattenberg 2012; Buckingham 1999; McLeod 2000; Soule 2001). 
This effectively meant that even though the Millennials were engaging with 
political information through new media, they were still consuming less 
information ± and so getting a weaker stimulus to engage with politics and 
developing less political knowledge ± than previous generations. 
7KHVHFRQGWKHRU\UHIOHFWHG3XWQDP¶V1995; 2000) work on social capital. 
Several studies suggested that in addition to an unprecedented reluctance to 
engage with formal politics the Millennials were also exhibiting an 
unprecedented reluctance to engage with their local communities and develop 
social and community networks (Putnam 2000; Macedo et al. 2005; Gray and 
Caul 2000; Smith 1999). This was depriving them of an essential resource ± 
social capital ± through which they could acquire and debate political 
information, develop an interest in and knowledge of political issues and 
processes, and develop a sense of political efficacy through being able to 
collectively influence the formal political process in their area (Putnam 2000; 
Verba et al. 1995; Smith 1999; Grey and Caul 2000). 
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Overall, therefore, there were eight theories which were suggested to explain 
the distinct political participation of the Millennials, and primarily their lack of 
participation in formal politics. Six suggested that they were politically 
alienated, by a lack of confidence in political knowledge, low external efficacy, 
dissatisfaction with democratic politics, unpleasant media reporting and 
stereotyping, and lack of political trust. Two suggested that the Millennials 
were distinctly apathetic, either because of their lack of engagement with 
traditional media or their lack of social capital.  
2.7 Challenges to the Second Wave 
Within the present literature, there are several challenges, disputes and 
unanswered questions which represent gaps in our current understanding about 
how and why the Millennials participate in politics. Several of these challenges 
provide the justification for this thesis. The first relates to the lack of consensus 
UHJDUGLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWRU\FKDUDFWHULVWLFV:KLOHWKHUHLVOLWWOH
question that the Millennials are among the least active generations in formal 
politics to have entered Western electorates, there remains much dispute about 
their participation in informal political activity. The review above showed that 
there are essentially two sides to this debate. On one side is the view that the 
Millennials are disproportionately active in certain areas of informal politics, 
such as cause-oriented politics, to the extent that they may even be more active 
than previous young generations (e.g., Sloam 2012a; 2012b; 2014; Norris 
2001; Martin 2012; Dalton 2013). On the other side is the view that while the 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQLQIRUPDOSROLWLFVDQGWKDW
of their elders is smaller than that for formal politics, they are nonetheless less 
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active in this area than both their elders and previous generations (Wattenberg 
2012; Putnam 2000). 
The cause of this disagreement is unclear, though there are several potential 
explanations. One is that the differences reflect variations in WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
behaviour across national contexts. Sloam (2014) for example, showed that 
while the basic trend of declining formal participation and increasing informal 
participation is apparent among Millennials throughout Europe and America, 
there are nonetheless substantial national differences ± such as British 
Millennials being significantly less active in cause-oriented politics than their 
German and American counterparts. While this review has shown that the 
majority of research from countries throughout Western democracies points 
towards similar characteristics exhibited by Millennials, as have cross-national 
comparative studies such as Dalton (2013), Wattenberg (2012) and Fieldhouse 
et al. (2007), there are nonetheless differences such as those highlighted by 
Sloam (2014) which may account for some of the disparities. 
A further contributor is the relatively new nature of the study of forms of 
political participation the Millennials are suggested to be unusually active in. 
For example, Bakker and de Vreese (2011) have argued that determining the 
QDWXUHRI\RXQJSHRSOH¶VRQOLQHSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVFKDOOHQJLQJEHFDXVH
the research methods for studying online participation are still in their infancy. 
A further challenge is that many citizens do not necessarily see their 
HQJDJHPHQWLQDFWVFRQVLGHUHGµSROLWLFDO¶E\VRFLDOUHVHDUFKHUVVXFKDV
political consumerism or engaging with trans-national policy networks) as 
political activity, meaning that they do not identify themselves as being 
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politically active through such acts in surveys (Marsh et al. 2007; White et al. 
:KLOHWKHSUREOHPRIDVVXPLQJDFRPPRQFRQFHSWLRQRIµSROLWLFDO
EHKDYLRXU¶EHWZHHQUHVHDUFKHUDQGSDUWLFLSDQWLVDSUREOHPZLWKDOOVRFLDO
research, in areas outside of formal poOLWLFVZKHUHWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµWKH
SROLWLFDO¶FDQEHFRPHPRUHVXEMHFWLYHDQGYDULHGLWLVSDUWLFXODUO\SURIRXQG
(Marsh et al. 2007; Henn et al. 2002). Both of these problems make measuring 
political participation outside of the formal political arena problematic, and 
FRXOGHDVLO\DFFRXQWIRUGLIIHUHQFHVLQFRQFOXVLRQVDERXWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
behaviour.  
Finally, the problem may reflect different conceptions and measures of 
µSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶HPSOR\HGE\VFKRODUV$VWKHDERYHGLVFXVVLRQ
highlighted, there was considerable debate around the turn of the millennium 
DERXWKRZµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶VKRXOGEHGHILQHGDQGPHDVXUHGLQOLJKWRI
the impact of social evolution on the opportunities for Western citizens to 
participate in politics. While there was widespread agreement that the first 
wave definition based almost entirely around elections was inadequate, there 
was less agreement about how that definition should be expanded. Some, such 
as Marsh et al. (2007), argued that political participation needed to be defined 
on the basis of how individuals SHUFHLYHGLWWKURXJKWKHLUµOLYHGH[SHULHQFHV¶
Others, such as Whiteley (2012), suggested that while political participation 
was certainly about more than voting in elections, formal political activity 
should still lie at the heart of the concept. The result of these various 
DSSURDFKHVLVWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVVWXGLHGLQGLIIHUHQW
ways and using different tools, which could account for the differences in 
conclusions about their behaviour.  
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A related criticism regards how scholars conceptualise political participation, 
and in particular how they view the distinction between formal and 
informal/cause-oriented political activity. Many scholars implicitly assume a 
two-dimensional structure: political activity either occurs within the formal, 
institutionalised arena of politics and so is dominated by traditional political 
institutions and processes (such as elections or political parties); or it occurs 
outside of that arena and is more varied (such as protests or political 
consumerism) (e.g., Sloam 2014; Norris 2001). Very few studies consider how 
political participation can be conceptualised beyond this two-dimensional 
outline, nor do they provide empirical evidence to inform it. An established 
literature has shown that political participation can be considered to be multi-
dimensional, and that assuming that all forms of formal and informal 
participation are essentially similar is misguided (Verba and Nie 1972; Parry et 
al. 1992; Pattie et al. 2004). Furthermore, this research has shown that most 
citizens tend to µspecialise¶ in different dimensions which are more appealing 
to them and the time and resources they can and wish to dedicate to politics 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Parry et al. 1992). The liWHUDWXUHRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
participation, including that which has argued that µSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶
should be redefined and reconceptualised in light of social change, has largely 
failed to engage with this body of research. No attempt has been made to 
empirically verify the distinction between formal and cause-oriented political 
participation, or to justify the assumption that all political acts fit within one of 
these two broad categories. This also means that lessons which can be learned 
based on LQGLYLGXDOV¶SUHIHUHQFHs for certain dimensions of participation along 
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the lines of those identified by Verba and Nie (1972) and Parry et al. (1992) 
cannot be explored in the context of the Millennials. 
The second major weakness in this literature relates to how the concepts of 
political apathy and alienation are defined and measured. It is clear from both 
the above discussion and Chapter One that the concepts are central to current 
academic and public understandings of how and why the Millennials 
participate in politics, as well as to policy efforts to increase their engagement 
with formal politics. Yet both remain very poorly understood in the literature; 
there are no attempts to provide a clear definition or conceptualisation of either 
apathy or alienation, and the two are employed in variable ways from one study 
to the next. There are existing literatures on both concepts from which lessons 
on defining and measuring them can be drawn, which also provide detail 
regarding their relationship with political behaviour and attitudes. Yet this 
UHVHDUFKLVDOPRVWHQWLUHO\DEVHQWIURPWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
political participation. Even those studies which directly engage with the 
competing views that apathy or alienation explains WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVtinct 
behaviour fail to offer a clear definition of either concept (e.g., Henn et al. 
2005; Marsh et al. 2007). Consequently, there can be very little confidence in 
the accuracy or empirical validity of the claims that the Millennials are 
unusually apathetic or politically alienated, and that either characteristic plays 
any role in explaining their distinct political participation. Furthermore, the 
causal role of processes and events which are said to have contributed to either 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQIrom or apathy towards formal politics (such as 
scandals or controversial decisions which undermine their trust in politicians or 
their failure to engage with traditional news media) also remains unclear. Until 
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clear and validated definitions and operationalisations of political apathy and 
alienation have been developed, it is impossible to test causal theories about 
the effects of certain events or trends on the apathy and alienation of the 
Millennials.  
Finally, the last major problem with this research relates to the specific claims 
that the Millennials are a distinct political generation for their political 
participation, their political apathy, or their political alienation. Very few 
studies which have argued that the Millennials are a distinct political 
generation have addressed the various challenges associated with such a claim, 
such as identifying how and why this group of people represent a distinct 
political generation from another. Furthermore, the existing literature has 
barely engaged with research methods capable of estimating cohort effects 
while accounting for the role of period effects and the political life cycle. The 
consequence of this limitation is clearly illustrated in the above review in the 
various disputes about whether characteristics exhibited by the Millennials are 
indicative of life cycle, cohort or period effects. For example, Henn and Foard 
(2012) have argued that there is a distinct lack of political trust among the 
Millennials (i.e., a cohort effect) which inhibits their political participation, 
while Dalton (2004) has argued that lower levels of trust are apparent across all 
age groups in all Western democracies, thereby implying that the trait Henn 
and Foard (2012) document is actually the result of a period effect. Similarly, 
Sloam (2012b; 2014), Norris (2001) and Dalton (2013) argue that there is a 
cohort effect evident in which the Millennials are unusually active in cause-
oriented and civic politics. Wattenberg (2012), on the other hand, suggests that 
the Millennials only appear to be unusually active in these areas because of a 
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SHULRGHIIHFWLQZKLFKDOO:HVWHUQFLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWRU\KDELWVDUHFKDQJLQJ
towards a greater emphasis on informal politics, and argues that this period 
effect is being misinterpreted as a cohort effect.  
Finally, there is a need for greater recognition of the evidence suggesting that 
the political characteristics which are said to differentiate the Millennials from 
other generations are apparent throughout Western society. The evidence 
supporting this claim is clear first in the fact that unrelated research from 
throughout Western democracies which has documented the characteristics of 
the Millennials (particularly in relation to their formal political participation, 
their interest in political issues, and their propensity to participate in cause-
oriented politics) has identified a remarkable consistency across different 
national contexts (e.g., Henn et al. 2002; Henn and Foard 2012; Henn et al. 
2005; Fahmy 2006; Marsh et al. 2007 and Russell et al. 2002 in the UK; 
Sheerin 2007 in New Zealand; Print et al. 2004 and Mellor and Kennedy 2003 
in Australia; ICR 2006 in Ireland; Soule 2001; McLeod 2000; Utter 2011 in the 
US). Furthermore, numerous cross-national comparative studies have 
confirmed that the differences between Millennials in different national 
contexts are far less substantial than the similarities between them (e.g., Sloam 
2014; Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Norris 2001; 2011; Dalton 2013; Wattenberg 
2012; Martin 2012).  
In light of this, when seaUFKLQJIRUH[SODQDWLRQVIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFW
participation the focus needs to be on causal factors which could conceivably 
produce similar effects in the Millennials at similar times throughout Western 
democracies. As Wattenberg (2012) points out, ³>Z@KHQVLPLODUFKDQJHVRFFXU
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in country after country, we need to search for factors that are reshaping the 
SROLWLFDOHQYLURQPHQWHYHU\ZKHUH´:DWWHQEHUJp.2). The alternative is 
WR³conclude that it just so happens that various events in most of tKHZRUOG¶V
HVWDEOLVKHGGHPRFUDFLHVKDYHOHG\RXQJSHRSOHWRVWD\RXWRISROLWLFV´
(Wattenberg 2012, p.2; see also Dalton 2013). Far more likely than a series of 
unrelated coincidences is a Western society-wide process or series of events, 
which have produced common political characteristics in the generation of 
young people who entered those electorates around the turn of the millennium.  
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the academic study of the political participation of 
young people in Western dePRFUDFLHVVLQFHWKHµELUWK¶RIWKHILHOGLQWKH40s, 
focussing particularly on the emergence of the Millennial generation in the late 
1990s and the attempts to explain their distinct political participation. It has 
shown how efforts to explain the distinct political behaviour of young people 
throughout Western democracies have followed a similar trajectory: shifting 
from a focus on the life cycle studied almost exclusively through quantitative 
methods, and which implied that young people were less active because of life 
cycle induced political apathy; to a focus on the generational distinctiveness of 
the Millennials and their unique political characteristics, studied using a wide 
range of methods, and in which explanations are dominated by the theory that 
they are a uniquely alienated generation of citizens.  
Finally, the chapter has offered a critique of this literature, and identified four 
major problems which make the current conventional wisdom highly 
questionable. These relate to: the definition, conceptualisation and 
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PHDVXUHPHQWRIµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶WKHODFNRIFODULW\UHJDUGLQJWKH
definition and manifestation of political apathy and political alienation; the 
LQDELOLW\WRHIIHFWLYHO\H[SODLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶VXSSRVHGDSDWK\DOLHQDWLRQDQG
the limited use of methods capable of estimating what it is about the 
Millennials which makes them generationally distinct as well as limited 
attention to conceptual questions regarding how and why they should be 
considered a distinct political generation. Addressing these problems, and so 
essentially verifying the conventional wisdom, is the focus of the next five 
chapters.  
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Chapter Three: Political Participation and the Millennials in Britain 
Chapter Two showed that there has been a great deal of research into the 
distinct participatory characteristics of the Millennials, though there is nothing 
approaching a consensus. This chapter takes the first steps towards addressing 
the weaknesses in the understanding of how the Millennials participate in 
politics, and identifying how they differ from older and previous generations. 
)LUVWKRZHYHUWKHLVVXHRIZKDWH[DFWO\DµSROLWLFDOJHQHUDWLRQ¶LVDQGKRZWKH
Millennials can be defined as a distinct generation needs to be addressed. This 
FKDSWHUEHJLQVE\RXWOLQLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIDµSROLWLFDOJHQHUDWLRQ¶DQGWhe 
impressionable years theory of political socialisation on which it is based, 
before identifying the generations of the British electorate against which the 
Millennials can be compared. It then considers the definition, conceptualisation 
and measurement RIµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶LQOLJKWRIWKHFULWLFLVPVOHYHOOHG
against recent literature in Chapter Two regarding the impact of social 
evolution on the opportunities for modern citizens to participate in politics. 
Using the Audit of Political Engagement survey series, the chapter outlines a 
four-dimensional conception of political participation, based around formal, 
cause-oriented, civic and issue-specific formal political activity.  
Finally, Chapter Three analyses the political participation of British Millennials 
around the 2010 general election in these four arenas and compares it with that 
of their elders. The data clearly identifies a generation who are not only less 
politically active than their elders in formal politics (which, as Chapter Two 
showed, is expected), but also less active in the other dimensions of political 
participation as well. 
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3.1 Political Generations and the Impressionable Years Theory 
The concept of a political generation has its roots in that of a cohort, which 
refers to a group of individuals who were born around the same time and are 
thought to share common characteristics as a result (Bartels and Jackman 2014; 
Glenn 1977). The members of this cohort age together and move through the 
life cycle at approximately the same time (at least to the extent that that 
passage is dictated by age) (Glenn 1977; Debevec et al. 2013). A political 
generation differs from that of a cohort in that it implies that this group of 
people are bound by more than just being born around the same time, but also 
by their common passage through a historical context which results in their 
developing lasting habits underpinning political attitudes, values and behaviour 
(Mannheim [1928]1944; 1928; Grasso 2014). The way in which people can be 
grouped together into a political generation varies, and identifying appropriate 
criteria is a substantial challenge; some studies link generations to macro 
political and economic contexts during their youth (e.g., Grasso 2014; Becker 
1990), some link them to dramatic political events (such as the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Neundorf 2010)), while others highlight more specific political 
contexts such as periods in which government was dominated by a particular 
party or leader (e.g., Clarke et al. 2004).  
In social research, the identifying characteristic of a given generation is often 
not when its members were born but what their year of birth means for when 
they experienced the early years of their political socialisation ± their 
µIRUPDWLYH\HDUV¶9DQGHU(LMNDQG)UDQNOLQ As Jennings (2007), Dinas 
(2013) and Van der Eijk and Franklin (2009) have showed, during an 
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LQGLYLGXDO¶VIRUPDWLYH\HDUVWKH\are more susceptible to the influence of 
external socialising forces (such as family or school) on their attitudes and 
behaivour. As the individual ages and expresses these attitudes and behaviours 
UHSHDWHGO\WKH\EHFRPHKDELWXDODQGµFU\VWDOOLVH¶(i.e., become resistant to 
change). Barring a particularly dramatic event (such as a war), they tend to 
stick with the individual throughout their lives, changing only slightly in 
UHVSRQVHWRWKDWLQGLYLGXDO¶VRQJRLQJH[SHULHQFHV and the influence of external 
factors (Dinas 2013; Jennings 2007). $QLQGLYLGXDO¶V± RUDQHQWLUHFRKRUW¶V± 
experiences during their formative years, therefore, leave a lasting imprint on 
their attitudes, values and behaviour which can stick with them throughout 
their lives.  
3.2 The Political Generations of the British Electorate 
One of the biggest challenges to studying political generations is determining 
how to classify individuals into generations. Any attempt to do so runs the risk 
RIDSSO\LQJWKHZURQJµFXW-RII¶SRLQWVDQGLQFRUUHFWO\DVVXPLQJWKDWJURXSVRI
people share common socialisation experiences (Grasso 2014). There is also an 
unavoidable loss of data from this categorisation, as studying the theoretical 
assumption that certain groups have similar socialisation experiences (and 
resultant attitudinal and behavioural characteristics) requires assuming that 
they have identical experiences and responses in empirical research (Grasso 
2014; Neundorf and Niemi 2014). Mitigating the risks and justifying this loss 
of information requires, therefore, a convincing case based on as much historic, 
theoretical and empirical evidence as possible that grouping people into these 
somewhat arbitrary groups allows for the scholar to learn and explain more 
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about them than would otherwise be possible (Mannheim 1928; Grasso 2014). 
Furthermore, the case for grouping individuals in the chosen manner (such as 
on the basis of historic circumstances during socialisation) has to be shown to 
be a more informative and effective way of grouping than another potential 
method (such as simply grouping on the basis of year of birth) (Mannheim 
[1928]1944).  
With this difficulty in mind, the political generations studied in this research 
will be identified based on the approach employed by Grasso (2014). Grasso 
(2014) employed a two-stage approach to developing and assuring the validity 
of her generations. First, she categorised survey respondents on the basis of the 
defining political features of the historic period in which they spent the 
majority of their formative years (Grasso 2014; see also Becker (1990; 1992) 
and Mannheim ([1928]1944)). Grasso (2014) assumed that the differences 
between the major historic events/circumstances which defined each period 
were proxies for wider differences in the social, economic and political 
environment facing generations during their formative years, and so which 
could become sources of lasting generational difference. Examples of such 
VDOLHQWSROLWLFDOIHDWXUHVLQFOXGH:RUOG:DU7ZRWKHVXGGHQULVHRIµSURWHVW
SROLWLFV¶LQWKHVDQGVWKH(XURSH-wide recession of the 1970s, and 
WKHVKDUSVKLIWWRZDUGVµ1HZ5LJKW¶SROLWLFVLQWKH1980s (Grasso 2014). The 
formative years were assumed to occur between the ages of 15 and 252, and so 
any individual who spent at least 50% of this period within a particular 
                                                 
2
 7KLVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHµIRUPDWLYHSHULRG¶GHVcribed by most studies in this field, such as 
Van der Eijk and Franklin (2009), Jennings (2007), and Dinas (2013), although there is 
JURZLQJHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIRQH¶VIRUPDWive years could be much sooner (Van Deth 
et al 2011; Bartels and Jackman 2014; Smets and Neundorf 2014). 
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historical context was classified as belonging to the generation defined by that 
context (Grasso 2014; Becker 1990). 
7KHVHFRQGVWDJHRI*UDVVR¶VDSSURDFKZDVWRIROORZWKHH[DPSOHRI
Neundorf (2010) and Tulley (2002) and employ generalised additive modelling 
to provide a novel validity check of her generational classification (see Chapter 
Four and Appendix Seven)$V*UDVVR¶VVWXG\ZDVon political 
participation, and given the substantial empirical evidence she provided to 
support the classification of her political generations in relation to this 
characteristic, her study provides an excellent starting point from which to 
identify the political generations in the British electorate for this research. 
$SSO\LQJ*UDVVR¶VDSSURDFKWRWKH%ULWLVKHOHFWRUDWHWKHUHIRUH
produces six distinct political generations based on the macro social, economic 
and political conditions prevalent during their formative years: 
- The Pre-War Generation (born between 1893 and 1925, experienced 
most of their formative years between 1908 and 1950). Experiencing 
their impressionable years before and during the Second World War, 
this generation grew up experiencing serious threats to their survival 
and poor living standards, meaning that assuring physical and economic 
security was a daily concern (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart 
1990). This was also the time when politics was highly 
institutionalised; participation beyond elections was limited, and took 
place almost entirely within the formal, institutionalised arena 
dominated by mass member political parties (Grasso 2014; Abrams and 
Little 1965a). 
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- The Post-War Generation (born between 1926 and 1945, experienced 
WKHLUIRUPDWLYH\HDUVEHWZHHQDQG6RPHWLPHVFDOOHGµWKH
VLOHQWJHQHUDWLRQ¶)XUORQJDQG&DUWPHOWKLVJHQHUDWLRQDOVR
grew up at a time when politics was highly institutionalised and 
conducted almost exclusively through mass member parties and formal 
institutions (Grasso 2014). Social institutions such as class and religion 
were very influential in determining political allegiances, and by 
extension behaviour, attitudes and preferences (Grasso 2014; Franklin 
et al. 1992; Butler and Stokes 1969). The politics of their formative 
years was dominated by the post-war consensus, with the government 
playing a very active role in the HFRQRP\DVZHOODVLQFLWL]HQ¶s lives 
through the development of the welfare state. Many of these changes 
resulted in a steady improvement in living standards, though trouble 
and insecurity were still common features of the British economy, and 
VRDVVXULQJRQH¶VHFRQRPLFVHFXULW\ZDVVWLOODSULRUity (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005). 
- The 60s-70s Generation (born between 1946 and 1957, experienced 
most of their formative years between 1961 and 1982). This generation 
closely corresponds to that RIWHQLGHQWLILHGDVµWKH%DE\%RRPHUV¶
(Furlong and Cartmel 2012). Their formative years were marked by 
³ULVLQJVRFLDODIIOXHQFHWKHERRPRIPDVVSURGXFWLRQDQGWKH
H[SDQVLRQRIKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQ´*UDVVRSSURGXFLQJDVRFLDO
and political optimism which they are suggested to have reflected 
throughout their lives (Furlong and Cartmel 2012). Their formative 
\HDUVZHUHDOVRPDUNHGE\WKHULVHRI³SROLWLFDOPLOLWDQF\DQG
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LGHRORJLFDOSRODULVDWLRQ´*UDVVR, p.67), and a growth of political 
participation outside of the formal political arena, particularly protest 
politics. Radical left-wing parties gained support, and the student and 
youth protest movements saw young citizens become a major political 
force for the first time (Ranade and Norris 1981).  Despite rising living 
standards throughout this period, the British economy was nonetheless 
dominated by economic problems throughout most of the 1970s, which 
left a lasting impression on citizens¶ faith in the government to assure 
WKHQDWLRQ¶VHFRQRPLFVHFXULW\'HEHYHFet al. 2013).  
- The 80s Generation (born between 1958 and 1968, and experienced 
most of their formative years between 1973 and 1993). This generation 
LVRIWHQNQRZQDVµ7KDWFKHU¶V&KLOGUHQ¶DVWKH\H[SHULHQFHGWKHLU
political socialisation almost entirely during the Thatcher governments 
(Clarke et al. 2004). Their formative years were dominated by the rise 
of the New Right and the dominance of the Thatcher government, the 
economic and industrial crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
the end of the period of affluence and security which characterised their 
SUHGHFHVVRUJHQHUDWLRQ¶VIRUPDWLYH\HDUV)XUORQJDQG&DUWPHO
Grasso 2014). This period was also marked by a tumultuous time in 
British politics more broadly, which saw the Thatcher government end 
the post-war consensus and the commitment to high or full 
employment, reduce the welfare state, and privatise many state 
industries. There were also heightened phases of civil unrest, such as 
that seen during the 1984/85 miners strikes, protests organised by the 
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Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the mass protests against the 
Community Charge (i.e., WKHµ3ROO7D[¶). 
- The 90s Generation (born between 1969 and 1981, experienced most 
formative years between 1984 and 2006). During their formative years, 
the 90s generation experienced several recessions and periods of 
economic insecurity, followed by the beginning of a period of sustained 
economic growth. They also grew up enjoying an unprecedented 
standard of living, with access to healthcare and education being more 
developed and widespread than ever (Dalton 2013; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005). They witnessed the end of the Cold War and the 
symbolic victory of market capitalism over socialism (Grasso 2014). 
Left-wing parties either fell out of favour altogether or were forced to 
embrace a reformist view of market capitalism, and abandon grand 
ideological narratives (Grasso 2014) ± the evolution of the British 
/DERXU3DUW\LQWRµ1HZ/DERXU¶LVRQHRIWKHPRVWSRLJQDQW
illustrations of this shift. This cohort also experienced the gradual 
decline of faith in Thatcherite ideology and government, beginning with 
DUHFHVVLRQDWWKHHQGRIWKHVDQG0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶VUHPRYDODV
Prime Minister, following through the unpopular John Major 
government of 1992-1997, and culminating in the landslide victory of 
7RQ\%ODLU¶V1HZ/DERXULQ. 
- The Millennial Generation (born since 1982, experiencing the majority 
of their formative years since 1997). In Britain, this generation 
experienced their formative years almost entirely under the New 
Labour government, and the unprecedented period of economic growth 
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that accompanied most of it. Their access to education and the 
integration of technology into their daily lives was unprecedented 
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Dalton 2013), with some studies 
suggesting that this is the key distinguishing feature of this generation 
(Norris 2001; Debevec et al. 2013; Wattenberg 2012). Unlike older 
generations, their formative experiences of formal politics were not 
dominated by a fierce ideological struggle between Left and Right, but 
rather a more consensual period in which there was little disagreement 
over what the major parties wanted to achieve (Debevec et al. 2013; 
Clarke et al. 2004; Whiteley et al. 2013). Their experiences were 
GRPLQDWHGKRZHYHUE\WKHULVHRIµQHZ¶SROLWLFDOLVVXHVVXFKDVJOREDO
ZDUPLQJDQGFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGWKHµ:DURQ7HUURU¶'HEHYHFet al. 
2013). The Millennials also witnessed the financial crisis in 2008 which 
WKUHDWHQHGWRXQGHUPLQHJOREDOFDSLWDOLVPIROORZHGE\WKHµ*UHDW
5HFHVVLRQ¶of 2009. This brought a sudden and dramatic end to a 
prevailing assumption of economic growth and security, with studies 
such as Welzel (2007) suggesting that this is likely to have left a lasting 
impression upon their faith in government. 
3.3 'HILQLQJµ3ROLWLFDO3DUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ 
Chapters One and Two argued that one of the major weaknesses in extant 
research was the lack of clarity surrounding the detail of WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ 
participatory characteristics, particularly in relation to informal political 
activity. This is in part WKHUHVXOWRIDODFNRIDWWHQWLRQJLYHQWRKRZµSROLWLFDO
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶VKRXOGEHGHILQHGDQGPHDVXUHGSDUWLFXODUO\LQVWXGLHVRIWKH
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Millennials, ZKRDUHVXJJHVWHGWREHGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\DFWLYHLQµQHZ¶IRUPV
of political activity. 
Traditionally, studies of political participation defined the concept primarily in 
terms of activity within the formal arena of politics, with only limited 
recognition of informal activity (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 
1972; Parry et al. 1992) . A review of the definitions employed in studies of 
British political participation since the 1950s, for example, showed that the 
concept was defined largely in terms of activity within, or at least intending to 
directly influence actors or institutions within, the formal arena of politics (Fox 
2014). Recently, however, research has demonstrated that such a formal-heavy 
focus is insufficient to capture the ways in which modern citizens can and do 
participate in politics in light of the effects of rapid social and technological 
evolution on the opportunities for them to do so (Norris 2002; Dalton 2013; 
Marsh et al. 2007; Stolle et al. 2005; Fox 2014). 
This research identifies three related processes of particular importance. The 
first is the development of information and communication technology (ICT) 
and its integration into daily life (Norris 2001). Whereas in the past citizens 
were largely dependent on traditional, hierarchical institutions for political 
information (such as political parties or the mass media), today they can access 
more information and sources of information online 1RUULV2¶1HLOO
2010). Furthermore, they can do so at any time, and with far less constraint 
over who they get information from and who they communicate with (Dalton 
2013; Norris 2001). 
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As well as making citizens more informed about politics, these developments 
have allowed citizens to participate in new ways ± or to make more use of 
existing forms of participation ± which are less dependent on traditional 
political institutions such as political parties (Norris 2001; Theocharis 2012). 
This includes Internet-EDVHGSROLWLFDODFWLYLW\VXFKDVµKDFNWLYLVP¶
(Theocharis 2012), as well as informal and direct forms of activity such as 
consumer boycotts (Stolle et al. 2005) and petition signing (Sloam 2014). 
While the extent to which that potential has been realised is contested (Norris 
2001; 2002; 2011; Theocharis 2012; Di Gennaro and Dutton 2006), there is 
little question that the development of ICT has broadened the potential 
participatory repertoire of the Western citizen. 
The second key aspect of this social evolution is the dramatic improvement in 
the provision of education, which studies such as Dalton (2013) and 
Wattenberg (2012) have suggested has produced more politically sophisticated 
cohorts of citizens. 3ROLWLFDOVRSKLVWLFDWLRQUHIHUVWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\WR
gather and interpret information, to link that information up with a series of 
concepts and ideas, and to use such information in an attempt to realise their 
political objectives (Starling 2014; Dalton 2013; Wattenberg 2012). While 
³WKHUHLVQRWDRQH-to-one relationship between education and political 
VRSKLVWLFDWLRQ´'DOWRQ, p.38), there is a strong correlation, showing that 
the more educated an individual is the more politically sophisticated they are 
likely to be (Dalton 2013; Wattenberg 2012).  
Higher levels of political sophistication have several consequences for political 
participation, not least of which is to make it more common (Dalton 2013; Van 
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der Eijk and Franklin 2009; Wattenberg 2012). It is also associated with the 
broadening of participatory repertoires (Norris 2001; 2004; Marsh et al. 2007; 
Dalton 2013). More politically sophisticated citizens have the skills and 
knowledge to enable them to participate in politics through a range of methods, 
and to do so with less dependence on hierarchical institutions to initiate and 
guide their activity (Dalton 2013; Norris 2011; Wattenberg 2012). Not only 
does this make such citizens more likely to be active regardless of whether a 
political party or similar institution mobilises them, but their activity is less 
constrained to the formal political arena in which such institutions dominate 
(Dalton 2013). Higher levels of political sophistication, therefore, are not only 
expected to produce more active citizens, but citizens more active in informal 
arenas of political activity.  
Finally, several studies have pointed towards the consequences of rising levels 
of individual autonomy for the ways in which people are prepared to 
participate in politics, and for what motivates them to do so (Inglehart and 
:HO]HO:HO]HO,QGLYLGXDODXWRQRP\UHIHUVWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
capacity to express attitudes and behave without constraints from external 
factors, such as social institutions (e.g., gender) or economic concerns (e.g., 
ensuring they have enough money to eat) (Welzel 2007). The influence of such 
external constraints have weakened in Western societies over the last fifty 
years as a result of several changes, including: rising living standards, which 
have reduced constraints relating to ensuring economic and physical security; 
the declining significance of social institutions such as social class and religion, 
which have reduced the constraint over lifestyle choice and activity; and rising 
levels of education, which have weakened constraints based on a lack of skills 
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and information, and on dependence on hierarchical institutions (Welzel 2007; 
Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 2010; Dalton 2013).  
For political participation, rising levels of individual autonomy not only make 
citizens more likely to be active ± because they have more opportunities and a 
greater individual capacity to participate ± but it also affects their political 
agenda by making them more concerned about protecting and promoting the 
individual autonomy of themselves and others (Welzel 2007; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005). This has been linked with citizens employing broader 
participatory repertoires to directly influence institutions besides the 
government which can affect individual autonomy (such as corporations), as 
well as higher levels of community activism and volunteering (Dalton 2013). 
Inglehart (1990) and Norris (2001) have also linked this process with the rise 
RIµQHZ¶SROLtical issues such as environmentalism, as well as support for new 
social movements and trans-national campaign organisations which campaign 
on those issues, and for forms of political participation related to those 
campaigns (such as protests, signing petitions, and political consumerism). 
These three processes ± the rise of ICT, improvements in the provision of 
education, and rising levels of individual autonomy ± have broadened the 
potential participatory repertoire of the modern Western citizen, particularly 
younger citizens who experienced their formative years in this environment. 
There is evidence linking these processes to not only an expansion in the 
number of acts a typical citizen engages in within the formal arena of politics, 
but outside of that arena as well. As the Millennials are the youngest generation 
currently in Western electorates, they most recently experienced their 
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politically formative years in this environment. Consequently, the integration 
of ICT into their daily lives is more extensive than for any generation before 
them (Bakker and de Vreese 2011); they are the most educated generation in 
the history of Western societies (Dalton 2013; Wattenberg 2012; Whiteley 
2012); and they have grown up at a time of unprecedented autonomy from 
traditional forms of constraint from social and economic pressures (such as 
class, religion and economic deprivation) (Dalton 2013; Inglehart and Welzel 
2005; Norris 2001; 2011). The consequences of social evolution for political 
participation, therefore, should be more readily apparent in the political activity 
of the Millennials than any other generation. 
3.4 The Definition of Political Participation in Modern Britain 
In order to account for the implications of social evolution on political 
participation there is a clear need to account for a much broader range of arenas 
of political activity than just the formal. This, in turn, means that the definition 
of political participation needs to recognise political activity outside of the 
formal political arena, and that subsequently data on a wide range of political 
acts needs to be analysed. 
Beyond this revision, the definition for this study can be developed on the basis 
of similar principles found in other studies of British political participation. A 
review (see Fox 2014) of the key articles in this body of research assessed 
these principles and identified five key characteristics around which the 
definitions of political participation were based: 
- Political participation is always active behaviour 
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- It can be engaged in by an individual or a group, with the intention of 
influencing individual or group level political issues 
- It can be instrumental or symbolic 
- It must be voluntary (it cannot be forced, or paid employment) 
- It can be legal or illegal  
Bringing these characteristics together and taking account of the above 
discussion, political participation can be defined as active, voluntary behaviour 
on the part of the citizen with the intent of influencing a societal political 
outcome ± that is, an outcome related to the distribution or application of 
power in the context of societal issues, events or decisions (activity relating to 
the use of power in the workplace or the home is not covered by such a 
definition). The activity can be individual or communal in nature and in scope, 
instrumental or symbolic, legal or illegal, and can be targeted at any individual 
or institution with the power to influence or affect societal level political 
outcomes. 
3.5 The Multi-dimensionality of Political Participation 
The majority of research into political participation assumes that it is multi-
dimensional i.e., that there are different arenas of political activity, with acts 
within given arenas more similar to each other than acts from different arenas, 
and which potentially share attributes which make them more or less common 
among certain sections of the population. The distinction drawn between 
formal and informal, or formal and cause-oriented, political activity is an 
example. Very few studies, however, empirically demonstrate this multi-
dimensionality.  
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Previous research into political participation, however, has explored the 
empirical evidence for a multi-dimensional conception (Verba and Nie 1972; 
Parry et al. 1992; Pattie et al. 2004). This literature has shown that political acts 
can indeed be placed into distinct dimensions, and that citizens are generally 
OLNHO\WRµVSHFLDOLVH¶LQFHUWDLQGLPHQVLRQVi.e., some citizens are more likely to 
engage in clusters of acts associated with one dimension of political 
participation, while others specialise in other clusters relating to other 
dimensions (Verba and Nie 1972; Parry et al. 1992).  
Following the example of Verba and Nie (1972) and Parry et al. (1992), latent 
structure analysis was used to explore the multi-dimensional structure of 
detailed data relating to British political participation from the Audit of 
Political Engagement (APE).3 The APE is an annual survey of a range of 
political attitudes, perceptions and activities among British citizens, and 
contains the most detailed indication of political participation in Britain 
available. Furthermore, the range of participatory acts measured by the APE 
stretches well beyond the formal political arena, and can be related to 
conceptions of cause-oriented political activity (Norris 2001; Sloam 2014) and 
civic political activity (Dalton 2013). 
The drawback to using APE data is its typical sample size. While the APE uses 
a large enough sample to provide representative estimates of the characteristics 
of the British electorate, the samples struggle to sustain statistical estimates 
once respondents have been categorised according to political generation. To 
                                                 
3
 Note that while the approach taken is the same as that of Verba and Nie (1972) and Parry et al 
(1992), the specific method is different. Those studies employed factor analysis to study the 
dimensional structure of political participation, while here Mokken Scale Analysis is used 
because of its greater suitability for working with survey data (Van der Eijk and Rose 2015). 
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overcome this problem, three APE surveys (in 2009, 2010 and 2011) were 
merged into a single dataset and analysed as if they constituted a single cross-
sectional sample.4 Merging these three datasets provides a composite dataset 
with a sample of 3,712 respondents, and measuring a total of 20 acts of 
political participation.  
The specific method used to explore the multi-dimensionality of this data was 
Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA), which is capable of identifying the number of 
latent constructs being indicated by a series of survey items (Van Schuur 2003; 
2011) ± in this case, the acts of political participation in the APE. Table 3.1 
reports the results of the MSA, and details both the 20 specific acts included in 
the analysis and the latent structure of the data identified. The results presented 
in Table 3.1 are the last in a series of refined analyses used to determine the 
best parameters for identifying the latent structure of the political participation 
data.5 The H-Coefficient column in Table 3.UHSRUWVWKH/RHYLQJHU¶V+-
Coefficient which represents how closely a given survey item relates to the 
other items in the identified scale in terms of measuring a common latent 
                                                 
4
 This merging is made possible by the fact that the questions measuring political participation, 
and the appropriate demographic characteristics used in later analyses in this chapter, are 
virtually identical across the three surveys. The sample size for the 2009 survey is 1,156; for 
the 2010 survey is 1,295; and for the 2011 survey it is 1,261, producing a combined sample 
size for the composite dataset of 3,712. 
Obviously, merging the data in this way assumed that the respondents in the 2009 survey are 
qualitatively identical to those in 2010 and 2011, and that the effect of taking the survey in 
DQGKDVQRHIIHFWRQDJLYHQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ:KLOHWKHUH
ZHUHVHYHUDOHYHQWVLQWKLVSHULRGZKLFKFRXOGKDYHLQIOXHQFHGUHVSRQGHQWV¶SROLWLFDO
participation, not least the 2010 general election, there is little reason to think that any of these 
events had a big impact on the participatory characteristics of some respondents but not others, 
to the extent that the analysis of the differences in political participation, or of the nature of 
political participation more broadly, would be unduly affected.  
In order to minimise any such period effects, in regression analyses examining generational 
differences in political participation, a year variable is included as a control. Such a step cannot 
be taken in the MSA of the multi-dimensional structure of the political participation data; 
therefore, the MSA was first conducted on the composite dataset, and then the results 
confirmed for each individual survey dataset to ensure there are no substantial survey-specific 
or time-specific differences. 
5
 The full range of analyses are reported in Appendix Two. 
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construct. The Scale H-Coefficient column reports the same coefficient but for 
the overall scale. If the H-Coefficient of the overall scale is 0.45 or greater, and 
each of the items within the scale has an H-Coefficient of 0.45 or greater, that 
cluster of items is accepted as a composite indication of a latent construct ± in 
this case, a dimension of political participation.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The typical threshold at which an individual item and cluster of items is said to acceptably 
represent a common latent construct is an H-Coefficient of 0.3 (Van Schuur 2003; 2011). 
However, in the case of this data, such a threshold simply confirms that all 20 survey items are 
measuring the same broad, latent construct ± political participation. Increasing the threshold to 
0.45 allows for the identification of sub-clusters of survey items corresponding to sub-
dimensions of political participation. Appendix Two details the process by which this threshold 
was determined.  
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Table 3.1: MSA on Modes of Political Participation 
Formal Political Participation Mean H Coef Scale Obs 
      H Coef   
Urged someone to contact MP or Cllr 0.13 0.52 0.54 3686 
Urged someone outside family to vote 0.17 0.53     
Voted in last general election 0.56 0.52     
Voted in last local election 0.54 0.56     
Stood for public office 0.01 0.53     
Taken an active part in a political  0.03 0.55     
campaign     
Discussed politics or political  0.36 0.53     
news with someone else     
Cause-Oriented Political Mean H Coef Scale Obs 
Participation     H Coef   
Donated or paid membership fee to 
charity 0.36 0.51 0.52 3686 
or campaign organisation        
Expressed political opinion online 0.07 0.51     
Boycotted products 0.13 0.56     
Signed a petition 0.31 0.53     
Taken part in a demonstration,  0.04 0.49     
march or rally     
Civic Participation Mean H Coef Scale Obs 
      H Coef   
Helped with fund-raising 0.18 0.46 0.48 3686 
Made a speech to an organised group 0.10 0.45     
Been an officer of a club or organisation 0.09 0.50     
Done voluntary work 0.24 0.51     
Issue-Specific Formal Participation Mean H Coef Scale Obs 
      H Coef   
Presented views to Cllr or MP 0.15 0.51 0.51 3686 
Attended a political meeting 0.05 0.51     
Un-scaled Items Mean H Coef Scale Obs 
 
  H Coef  
Written a letter to an editor  0.05  N/A N/A  3686 
Donated or paid a membership fee  
to a political party  0.04       
Source: Mokken Scale Analysis of Audit of Political Engagement 2009, 2010 and 2011 data 
and the APE composite dataset. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. MSA conducted using the Stata msp and loevh modules designed by Dr Jean-
Benoit Hardouin, available for download at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s439401.html 
(Accessed 21st March 2014). 
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The MSA identified four latent structures within the data, which represent four 
sub-dimensions of political participation. 18 of the participatory acts fit into 
this structure, while two (writing to an editor, and donating or paying a 
membership fee to a political party) did not. Looking at the mean scores for 
these two items in Table 3.1 (which correspond to the proportion of APE 
respondents reporting engaging in the acts), this may at least in part reflect the 
fact that so few people report either writing to a newspaper editor or donating 
money to a political party.  
The four dimensions correspond broadly to those outlined in similar research 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Parry et al. 1992). The first dimension (at the top of 
Table 3.1) consists of acts which occur within the formal arena of British 
politics, such as voting in elections or standing for public office. This 
dimension is taken to represent formal political participation. All of the acts 
either imply direct interaction between the actor and the institutional 
framework of British democracy or between the actor and another with the 
intent of influencing their actions within this environment. 
7KHVHFRQGGLPHQVLRQUHODWHVWRWKHFRQFHSWLRQVRIµFDXVH-oriented political 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶RXWOLQHd by Norris (2001) and Sloam (2014). The acts in this 
dimension vary substantially in terms of the costs they imply for the actor and 
the range of causes they could be used to influence, but share two important 
features: i) they occur outside of the institutionalised arena of British politics 
(i.e., there is no institutionalised framework specifying the role of such acts in 
the process of citizen-government/elite interaction within British democracy), 
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and ii) they usually (though there will be exceptions) are engaged in with 
regard to single, specific political issues rather than in relation to broader 
ideologies. When an individual signs a petition, for example, or attends a 
protest, there is usually a very clear stated objective for that act (such as 
opposing a war or protesting against a particular policy); in contrast, some of 
the acts in the formal arena of politics can be far broader and more symbolic in 
scope. Voting in an election, for instance, could potentially be done in relation 
to a single issue, EXWPRUHFRPPRQO\UHSUHVHQWVYRWHUV¶YLHZVLQUHODWLRQWRD
broad programme for government, or the ideology that programme represents 
(Whiteley et al. 2013; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2009). All of the acts in the 
cause-oriented political participation dimension are more likely to be 
conducted in relation to a single, specific political objective.  
The third dimension resembles notions of civic or community-based 
participation outlined by Dalton (2013) and Putnam (2000). All of the acts 
occur outside of the institutionalised arena of British democracy, but are not 
necessarily as issue-specific as those in the cause-oriented politics dimension. 
For example, standing to be an officer in a club or organisation could imply a 
desire to influence a range of issues in which the organisation takes an interest, 
or could imply a determination to address or change a single specific issue.  
The key feature of these acts is that they occur within the arena of a community 
in which the individual takes an interest or is a pDUW7KHWHUPµFRPPXQLW\¶LV
not solely dictated by geography in this context, but refers to the wide range of 
communities to which modern citizens can belong which can be based on 
various characteristics, including geography, values, political ideology, 
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interests, sport, and religious belief (Sloam 2007; Giddens 1991; Norris 2001; 
Marsh et al. 2007; YCC 2009; Macedo et al. 2005). Indeed, several studies 
KDYHVKRZQWKDWJHRJUDSKLFFRQFHSWLRQVRIµFRPPXQLW\¶DUHRIOLPLWHGXVHIRU
the study of young people, who often lack attachments to local communities 
and are instead drawn to issue-specific communities which utilise, among other 
things, ICT (YCC 2009; Macedo et al. 2005). With this conception of 
community, it is clear that the participatory acts within the third dimension in 
Table 3.FDQEHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµFLYLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶± political activity 
intended to influence, and involving interaction with, RQH¶VFRPPXQLW\
(Putnam 2000; Macedo et al. 2005; Dalton 2013). 
The final dimension in Table 3.1 is represented by just two acts and 
corresponds to what Verba and Nie (1972) and Parry et al. (1992) identified as 
µSDUWLFXODULVHG¶RUµFRQWDFWLQJ¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ7KRVHVWXGLHVIRXQGWKDW
small groups of citizens limited their participation beyond voting to contacting 
their elected representatives in relation to specific issues (Parry et al. 1992; 
Verba and Nie 1972). The act of presenting views to an elected representative 
clearly fits this description, and research by the Hansard Society (2010 ± see 
alsR$SSHQGL[7ZRZKLFKVKRZVWKDWWKHWHUPµSROLWLFDO¶LVLQWHUSUHWHGE\WKH
majority of citizens as referring to the formal arena of politics, suggests that the 
DFWRIDWWHQGLQJDµSROLWLFDO¶PHHWLQJFRXOGDOVREHYLHZed by respondents as a 
context in which they present their views or listen to information about a 
specific issue relating to the issues or processes of formal politics. This final 
GLPHQVLRQLVLGHQWLILHGWKHUHIRUHDVµLVVXH-VSHFLILFIRUPDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶
activity within the formal arena of politics intended to influence or in relation 
to a specific issue.  
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The political participation of the Millennials, therefore, can be examined and 
characterised in terms of four distinct dimensions of political activity. Formal 
political participation occurs within the formal, institutionalised arena of 
British democracy, dominated by hierarchical institutions such as the mass 
media and political parties. The relationship between the individual and these 
institutions will, therefore, be very influential in explaining how active they are 
in this arena. The acts within this dimension vary from addressing specific 
political issues to broad government agendas and political ideologies.  
Cause-oriented political participation occurs outside the formal political arena, 
and is generally used to address specific and clearly identifiable political 
issues. Given the weaker presence of traditional institutions such as political 
SDUWLHVLQWKLVDUHDWKHDFWRUV¶UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHPZLOOEHOHVVLPSRUWDQWLQ
dictating KRZDFWLYHWKH\DUH0RUHLPSRUWDQWZLOOEHWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶
motivation to engage in relation to a political issue in the first place, and their 
capacity and access to resources to do so (Sloam 2007; 2012b; 2014; Dalton 
2013).  
Civic participation takes place within the context of WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
community, whether it is based on locality, interest, values, beliefs or 
experiences. The acts within it can be issue-specific or broader in scope ± the 
defining characteristic is that they are intended to influence issues relating to 
the community. The important characteristics which to dictate how active an 
LQGLYLGXDOLVLQWKLVDUHQDDUHOLNHO\WRUHODWHWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQWHUHVWLQ
engaging with their community in the first place, as well as the resources they 
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possess to facilitate them doing so, such as skills, time, money and social 
capital (Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995; Macedo et al. 2005). 
Finally, issue-specific formal participation is similar to formal participation in 
that it occurs within the institutionalised arena of British democracy and is 
OLNHO\WREHKHDYLO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKRVH
institutions (such as their party identification). Given that these activities can 
imply a greater cost (in terms of skills, time and money) for the actor than 
some of the acts in the formal participation dimension (particularly voting), 
KRZHYHUWKHDFWRU¶VDFFHVVWRLQGLYLGXDOUHVRXUFHVDQGSHUVRQDOPRWLYDWLRQDUH
likely to be more influential in dictating how active they are here. 
3.6 The Political Participation of the Millennials in Modern Britain 
The analyses below employ the definition and conceptualisation of political 
participation developed above to explore the participatory characteristics of the 
Millennials and compare them with those of the older generations. The survey 
indicators which corresponded to the latent dimensions of political 
participation identified above were merged into a single variable representing 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKDWSROLWLFDODUHQD; the higher the µVFRUH¶WKH
more active the respondent was. This produced a formal political participation 
variable with a range of 0-7, a cause-oriented participation variable with a 
range of 0-5, a civic participation variable with a range of 0-4, and an issue-
specific formal participation variable with a range of 0-2.  
The respondents in the APE composite dataset were divided into the political 
generations outlined above, and the average scores for their participation in 
each dimension were calculated (representing the average number of acts 
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associated with each dimension participated in in the 2009-11 period).7  
Regression analyses were then used to allow for other factors which influence 
political participation to be controlled for, so as to identify differences which 
could reflect generation-specific factors as much as possible. 
3.6.1 Average Participation 
Figure 3.1 shows the average participation score for each generation in each of 
the four participatory GLPHQVLRQV7KHILJXUHDOVRLQFOXGHVDµIRUPDO
participation PLQXVYRWLQJ¶PRGH. This is because voting in elections is a 
unique political act (in terms of the social pressure and media attention given to 
it, and the notions of civic responsibility associated with it) and one in which 
there are fewer differences between citizens because it is comparatively so 
common (Whiteley 2012; Miller and Shanks 1996; Martin 2012). Using the 
UHYLVHGµIRUPDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶YDULDEOHDOORZVWKHUHIRUHIRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH
formal political arena beyond that of the distinctive act of voting to be 
examined.  
The political generations are presented in Figure 3.1 from left to right in order 
of ascending age. The participatory dimensions are also presented from left to 
right for each generation in descending order of popularity across the entire 
sample i.e., formal political participation is the most common throughout the 
sample, and so is displayed on the far left of each generational block. This 
                                                 
7
 1RWHWKDWGXHWRWKHOLPLWHGQXPEHURIUHVSRQGHQWVLQWKHµ3UH-:DUJHQHUDWLRQ¶LQWKH$3(WR
be classified as belonging to this generation, respondents would have to have been aged at least 
84), the Pre and Post-War generations have been merged into a single category. This produces 
5 generation categories in the APE data; the Millennials (n = 726); the 90s (n=768); the 80s 
(n=655); the 60s/70s (n=665); the Pre/Post-War (n=861). 
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allows for the popularity of each mode in the entire sample as well as for each 
particular generation to be viewed simultaneously. 
 
Figure 3.1: Average Participation for Political Generations by 
Participatory Mode 
Source: Audit of Political Engagement composite dataset. Data is weighted using probability 
weights provided in APE datasets. 
 
While only a handful of respondents (16%) were completely inactive, most 
British citizens appear not to be particularly active in politics: the average 
number of acts engaged in across all four dimensions was 3.7, and this fell to 
2.6 if voting in elections was removed. With the exception of formal political 
participation for the oldest three generations, the average number of acts 
engaged in for any particular dimension barely rose above 1. 
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There is a clear hierarchy of popularity for the four dimensions which is almost 
replicated across all five generations. Formal political participation was by far 
the most common, with the average respondent engaging in 1.9 acts in this 
dimension. Demonstrating the significance of voting in elections as an 
unusually common act, this fell to 0.8 if voting in elections was removed. The 
second most common dimension was cause-oriented participation, with 
respondents typically engaging in 1 act of cause-oriented activity, although this 
became the most common once voting in elections was discounted. Third was 
civic participation, with respondents typically participating in 0.6 acts, and the 
least popular was issue-specific formal participation, with respondents 
typically engaging in just 0.2 acts. The most common means through which 
British citizens seek to influence political outcomes, therefore, is through acts 
associated with the formal political process. That said, they are also clearly 
active in other areas, particularly through issue-specific forms of activity 
outside of the formal political arena.  
Figure 3.1 also suggests that there were some substantial generational 
differences, though these relate primarily to the overall levels of political 
participation rather than its qualitative nature (i.e., which dimensions of 
activity were the most common for different generations). The Millennials 
were found to be the least politically active overall, and were the least active in 
each specific dimension as well. For example, the Millennials were found to 
have typically engaged in 2.5 acts of participation across all dimensions, 
compared with an average of 3.4 for the 90s generation, 4.3 for the 80s, 4.7 for 
the 60s-70s, and 3.9 for the Pre/Post-War generations.  
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While the claims that the Millennials are more active outside of formal politics 
than older generations were not supported, the suggestion that the difference 
between their participation and that of their elders is smaller outside of formal 
politics than within it is. Typically, Millennials were found to have engaged in 
1 act of formal participation, compared with an average of 2 for the older 
generations. This difference of 1 compared with a gap of 0.3 for formal politics 
not including voting and for cause-oriented politics, 0.16 for civic 
participation, and 0.14 for issue-specific formal participation. The extent of the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶UHODWLYHLQDFWLYLW\LQIRUPDOSROLWLFV± and in voting in particular ± 
is highlighted by the fact that once voting in elections was discounted, the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶ZHUHVKRZQWREHPRUHVOLJKWO\DFWLYH in civic politics than formal 
politics, a magnitude of change not apparent for any of the older generations. 
Rather than reflecting an unusually high level of activity in civic politics, this 
PRUHOLNHO\UHIOHFWVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\ORZOHYHOVRIDctivity in formal 
politics, as their civic participation appears to be typical within the context of 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZHURYHUDOOOHYHOVRISDUWLFLSDWLRQFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHLU
elders.  
3.6.2 Regression Analysis 
Exploring these differences using regression analysis allows for the influence 
of individual characteristics which are known to affect political participation to 
be controlled for. These included education, gender, ethnicity and social class 
(Whiteley et al. 2013; Clarke et al. 2004; Verba et al. 1995; Verba and Nie 
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1972).8 $µ\HDU¶YDULDEOHUHSUHVHQWLQJWKH\HDULQZKLFKWKHWKUHH$3(VXUYH\V
which make up the composite dataset was also included to control for potential 
differences resulting from historic context. By including these control variables 
and accounting for the potential influences of these individual characteristics 
and external contexts, the participatory differences which could reflect 
generation-specific traits could be more confidently identified. 
Table 3.2 reports the results of the regression analyses; Table 3.2a reports the 
results using only the generation variable, and 3.2b reports the results which 
included the controls. The Millennials were the reference category against 
which the other generations were compared. 
                                                 
8
 The details of these control variables can be found in Appendix One. Normally an age 
variable would also be included in such an analysis, however this variable would be collinear 
with the political generation variable.  
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Table 3.2a: Regression Analysis of Political Generation and Participatory Modes 
Dimension 
 
 
Formal 
 
Formal minus vote 
 
Cause oriented Civic 
 
Issue specific 
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials)                
90s 0.38*** 0.07 0.32** 0.10 0.28** 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.57** 0.18 
80s 0.66*** 0.07 0.55*** 0.09 0.45*** 0.08 0.36*** 0.10 0.64*** 0.18 
60s - 70s 0.78*** 0.06 0.72*** 0.09 0.5*** 0.07 0.38*** 0.10 1.01*** 0.17 
Pre/Post-War 0.65*** 0.06 0.34*** 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.19* 0.10 1.02*** 0.16 
                 
Year (2009)                
2010 0.14*** 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.11* 0.06 -0.25** 0.07 -0.08 0.10 
2011 -0.01 0.04 -0.19** 0.06 -0.32*** 0.06 -0.47*** 0.07 -0.46*** 0.11 
                 
Constant 0.05 0.07 -0.64*** 0.09 -0.15* 0.07 -0.42*** 0.08 -2.07*** 0.17 
Obs 3675   3675   3675   3675   3675   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Source: Negative Binomial Regression of APE Composite dataset. Data is weighted using probability weights provided in APE datasets. * - coefficient has 
p-value of <0.05; ** - p-value of <0.01; *** - p-value of <0.001. 
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Table 3.2b: Regression Analysis of Political Generation and Participatory Modes with Control Variables 
Dimension 
 
Formal Formal minus vote Cause Oriented Civic Issue Specific 
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials)                
90s 0.35*** 0.07 0.27** 0.09 0.22** 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.54** 0.19 
80s 0.61*** 0.06 0.49*** 0.09 0.36*** 0.07 0.3** 0.1 0.62** 0.19 
60s - 70s 0.75*** 0.06 0.69*** 0.09 0.42*** 0.07 0.3** 0.1 1*** 0.18 
Pre/Post-War 0.75*** 0.06 0.53*** 0.1 0.23** 0.08 0.33** 0.1 1.2*** 0.17 
                 
Education 0.15*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.02 0.22*** 0.02 0.22*** 0.02 0.22*** 0.04 
Social Class 0.1*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 0.21*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.04 
Ethnicity  -0.28*** 0.05 -0.38*** 0.08 -0.55*** 0.08 -0.47*** 0.1 -0.27* 0.14 
Gender -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.09* 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.11 0.09 
Year (2009)                
2010 0.1** 0.04 -0.06 0.06 -0.18** 0.05 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.13 0.1 
2011 -0.02 0.04 -0.2** 0.06 -0.31*** 0.05 -0.44*** 0.07 -0.47*** 0.11 
                 
Constant -0.77*** 0.08 -2.00*** 0.12 -1.47*** 0.1 -1.9*** 0.14 -3.26*** 0.23 
Obs 3633   3633   3633   3633   3633   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Source: Negative Binomial Regression of APE Composite dataset. Data is weighted using probability weights provided in APE datasets. * - coefficient has 
p-value of <0.05; ** - p-value of <0.01; *** - p-value of <0.001 
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The regression analyses lead to similar conclusions to those reached based on 
Figure 3.1. The generational coefficients, both with and without control 
variables, show that the Millennials were the least active across all dimensions 
of political activity, and that the difference was statistically significant in each 
case. The only exceptions include first the difference between the Millennials 
and the 90s generation for civic participation; the coefficient suggests that the 
90s generation were slightly more active on average, but the effect is not 
significant. Second, the Pre/Post-War generation coefficient for cause-oriented 
participation is 0.12 but non-significant. 
As with Figure 3.1, the coefficients also suggested a somewhat curvilinear 
relationship between generation and political participation which mirrors the 
theoretical expectation of the relationship between the life cycle and political 
participation i.e., the youngest generation (the Millennials) was the least active, 
and the middle aged generation (the 60s-70s) was the most active. Whether or 
noWWKLVHIIHFWDFWXDOO\GLGUHIOHFWWKHJHQHUDWLRQV¶YDULRXVVWDJHVLQWKHSROLWLFDO
life cycle or reflected a curvilinear cohort effect cannot be ascertained with this 
data and will be analysed in Chapter Four.  
Table 3.2b shows that most of the control variables had significant effects on 
political participation, and that the nature of those effects was identical across 
all four participatory dimensions. Education and social class, for example, both 
RIZKLFKUHODWHWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOresources and political 
sophistication, had a positive and significant effect in all dimensions. Ethnicity 
was also important, with respondents from a minority ethnic background being 
significantly less active across all dimensions except issue-specific formal 
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participation. Finally, gender had a fairly minor effect, with the only significant 
effect apparent for cause-oriented politics in which women were found to be 
slightly more active than men.  
Once the control variables were accounted for, the differences between the 
Millennials and the older generations remained very similar to those in Table 
3.2a, suggesting that differences in political and social resources, ethnicity and 
gender played only a minor role in explaining generational differences in 
political activity. The exception is the coefficient for the Pre/Post-War 
generation. Including the control variables increases the coefficient for this 
generation for all four dimensions of political participation e.g., according to 
Table 3.2a the Pre/Post-War generation typically engaged in 0.65 acts more of 
formal participation than the Millennials, 0.19 acts more of civic participation, 
and 1 act more of issue-specific formal participation, with an insignificant 
coefficient for cause-oriented participation. With the controls included, these 
coefficients increased to 0.75, 0.33 and 1.21 respectively, and the coefficient 
for cause-oriented participation becomes a statistically significant 0.23. 
Differences in education, social class and demographic characteristics appear 
to account for more of the difference between the Pre/Post-War generation and 
the wider electorate than is the case for other generations, and once these 
differences were controlled for the Pre/Post-War generation were found to be 
even more active than initially estimated.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began by fleshing out some of the theoretical concepts central to 
this research, specifically that of political generations and the impressionable 
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years socialisation theory. It also addressed one of the recurring weaknesses in 
the study of the political participation of the young, namely by considering 
KRZµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶VKRXOGEHGHILQHGDQGFRQFHSWXDOLVHGLQOLJKWRI
the impact of social and technological evolution on the way in which modern 
citizens can participate in politics.  
In contrast with the two-dimensional (formal versus cause-oriented) conception 
of political participation often found in the literature, this analysis resulted in a 
four-dimensional conception in which political acts were found to occur either 
within the formal, informal or civic political arenas, and could be further 
differentiated on the basis of the scope of the issues they were intended to 
influence (i.e., a specific, single issue or a broader agenda).  
The second half of the chapter was devoted to exploring the participatory 
characteristics of the Millennials in modern Britain through this four-
dimensional structure, and comparing it with that of older generations. In 
contrast with the characterisation so often presented in academic studies and 
the media (see Chapters One and Two), there was no indication that the 
Millennials were a generation exhibiting dramatically different participatory 
behaviour from their elders. There was no sign, for example, of them being 
unusually active in informal arenas of politics, or of them leading the way in 
embracing issue-specific political activity and rejecting that associated with 
broad political agendas and/or ideological narratives. Generally speaking, the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWicipatory characteristics are similar to those of their elders, 
with the main exception of their typically lower levels of participation overall, 
and particularly in the specific act of voting.  
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The finding that the Millennials stand out for being unusually inactive in 
formal politics and/or voting in particular is consistent with many conclusions 
found in the literature. It is particularly consistent with studies such as Henn 
and Foard (2012), Sloam (2012b), Phelps (2012), Wattenberg (2012) and 
Putnam (2000) who have argued ± in relation to Millennials throughout 
Western democracies ± that the difference between their participation and their 
elders is far larger for formal political activity than other forms. An 
unanswered question on this point is whether the smaller gap between the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶LQIRUPDOi.e., cause-oriented and civic) political activity and that 
of their elders represents a greater propensity to participate in such acts among 
the Millennials (with their lower levels of activity at present being explained by 
their current stage in the political life cycle), as suggested by studies such as 
Sloam (2012b) and Norris (2011; 2001), or represents an unusually profound 
reluctance on their part to participate in formal politics, as suggested by 
Wattenberg (2012) and Putnam (2000). The fact that ± within the context of the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZHUOHYHOVRISROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRYHUDOO± their cause-oriented 
and civic political participation was not unusual suggests that the latter 
argument may be true and that it is in their rejection of formal political 
participation that the Millennials are particularly distinct. Addressing this 
TXHVWLRQGHILQLWLYHO\DVZHOODVLGHQWLI\LQJZKHWKHUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZHU
levels of participation reflect generational effects, or are a function of either 
SHULRGHIIHFWVRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶FXUUHQWVWDJHLQWKHSROLWLFDOOLIHF\FOH
requires a longitudinal perspective and the use of age-period-cohort regression 
analyses. These are employed in Chapter Four, where these remaining 
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TXHVWLRQVDERXWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWLYHSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQDUH
addressed. 
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Chapter Four: Political Participation in Longitudinal Perspective 
British Millennials, around the 2010 general election, were the least politically 
active generation in the electorate. What is not yet clear, however, is whether 
this reflects their current stage in the political life cycle, period effects affecting 
the entire electorate, or is a feature of their generational distinctiveness (i.e., 
reflects a cohort effect). This chapter brings a longitudinal perspective to the 
study of WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ Using data from the British Election 
Study (BES) and the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), this chapter 
presents age-period-cohort analyses (APC) to isolate and estimate the effect of 
these three factors simultaneously, and identify as far as possible the features 
RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQZKLFKPDUNWKHPDVDJHQXLQHO\
distinct political generation.   
The chapter begins by outlining the APC method, and discussing some of the 
drawbacks to the approach and the steps taken to overcome them. It then 
presents the results of APC analyses examining age, period and cohort effects 
apparent in relation to political acts indicative of the four participatory 
dimensions identified in Chapter Three. The chapter concludes by arguing that 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZHUOHYHOVRISROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQUHIOHFWERWKOLIHF\FOHDQG
cohort effects; part of the reason they are typically less active than their elders 
is because of their life circumstances and priorities, but another part is that they 
have developed generationally distinct habits of political participation which 
ultimately make them less likely to be active than older generations. 
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4.1 Age-Period-Cohort Analysis 
Differences between groups of people of different ages can essentially result 
from one or more of three factors: age effects, period effects, or cohort effects. 
Age effects reflect the influence of being a particular age on the characteristic 
of interest. These can reflect both biological factors (such as cognitive 
development) and social factors (such as those relating to RQH¶VVWDJHLQWKH
political life cycle) (Glenn 1977). Age effects affect everybody, but different 
groups of people experience them at different times. Period effects reflect the 
influence of historic or contextual circumstances (such as living through a 
war). They affect all members of a population at the same time, but not 
necessarily in the same way (Glenn 1977; Neundorf and Niemi 2014). Finally, 
FRKRUWHIIHFWVDUHWKHUHVXOWRIGLIIHUHQFHVLQJURXSV¶SROLWLFDOVRFLDOLVDWLRQ
usually stemming from them experiencing their formative years in different 
social or political climates, or experiencing different influences from important 
socialising institutions (such as their parents) (Grasso 2014; Neundorf and 
Niemi 2014; Glenn 1977). Cohort effects can persist throughout LQGLYLGXDOV¶ 
adult lives, once the habits developed during their formative years have 
crystallised and become more resistant to change (Grasso 2014; Dinas 2013).  
In most survey data, separating these effects so that their impact on a given 
characteristic can be estimated is a statistical impossibility because all three are 
measured in the same unit, namely years (i.e., age is measured in years, the 
time the survey was taken is usually measured in years, and cohort is identified 
on the basis of year of birth). The three are linear functions of each other and 
so cannot be estimated independently (Glenn 1977). If age and period are 
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known, then cohort can be calculated; if age and cohort are known, period can 
be calculated; and if period and cohort are known, age can be calculated 
(Neundorf and Niemi 2014). This LVNQRZQDVWKHµLGHQWLILFDWLRQSUREOHP¶
(Grasso 2014; Rutherford et al. 2010; Neundorf and Niemi 2014; Smets and 
Neundorf 2014; Glenn 1977; Yang and Land 2013). 
To overcome the identification problem, the linear dependency of the three 
effects has to be broken. Several methods for doing this have been developed, 
but because the process of breaking this linearity necessarily implies several 
assumptions and arbitrary decisions, none are perfect and all have drawbacks 
(Yang and Land 2013; Neundorf and Niemi 2014). On the basis that obtaining 
even an imperfect estimate of the effects of age, period and cohort is preferable 
to obtaining no estimate at all ± and bearing in mind that a functional APC 
regression model allows for control variables to be included both to isolate the 
effects of age, period and cohort further and to test explanatory theories 
(Neundorf 2010; Grasso 2014; Rutherford et al. 2010; Fienberg and Mason 
1979) ± it is still worth making the attempt, though steps need to be taken to 
minimise these drawbacks as much as possible. It is essential, however, to bear 
in mind that APC analyses produce tentative estimates of age, period and 
cohort effects at best which must be interpreted with caution (Yang and Land 
2013; Neundorf and Niemi 2014).  
The method to overcome the identification problem in this study is what Yang 
DQG/DQGUHIHUWRDVWKHµFRHIILFLHQWFRQVWUDLQW¶DSSURDFK7KLV
essentially involves constraining one of the three variables ± age, period or 
cohort ±, in this case by categorising it and converting it from an interval 
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variable which shares linear dependency with the other two to a categorical 
variable which does not (Yang and Land 2013; Neundorf 2010; Grasso 2014). 
Most analysts apply this constraint to the cohort variable, categorising survey 
respondents into groups based on year of birth, such as political generations 
(Grasso 2014) or five-year birth cohorts (Fienberg and Mason 1979). The 
drawback to this approach is that the categorisation is necessarily arbitrary; 
WKHUHLVQRZD\RIHPSLULFDOO\LGHQWLI\LQJDµSHUIHFW¶FRQVWUDLQWWKDWZLOO
produce a valid result (Grasso 2014). Furthermore, it inevitably leads to a loss 
of data from assuming that the value of the constrained variable is equal for all 
respondents in each category (Grasso 2014; Glenn 1977; Spitzer 1973). 
The only way of justifying such a constraint, therefore, is through the use of 
theory or side information which can guide the categorisation (Yang and Land 
2013; Spitzer 1973), and/or with empirical information from other analyses 
which allow the cohort effect to be estimated non-parametrically, such as 
generalised additive modelling (though such analyses must still apply a 
constraint somewhere to overcome the identification problem) ± although 
ideally both approaches should be used (Grasso 2014; Neundorf 2010; Tulley 
2002; see Appendix Seven). 
While overcoming the identification problem is a major challenge for APC 
analysts and which highlights the need for caution in interpreting the results, it 
is not the only difficulty pertinent to this research. Another is that while the 
effects of age, period and cohort can be estimated independently of each other 
(within the confines outlined above), they cannot be isolated from 
unidentifiable survey-specific sources of variation in the dependent variable. 
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These can include challenges common in survey research, such as 
measurement error or sample bias, as well as those specific to longitudinal 
analyses of cross-sectional surveys, such as differences in weighting 
procedures or methodology over time, or changes in societal sources of bias 
(Glenn 1977; Yang and Land 2013).9 As with the identification problem, these 
difficulties cannot be perfectly overcome. In some cases, a loss of information 
is the only way around such obstacles (such as avoiding the use of survey 
weights) (Glenn 1977; Yang and Land 2013), while in others, the only defence 
is large sample sizes and analyses well rooted in theory and supported with 
side information (Glenn 1977; Grasso 2014; Yang and Land 2013).  
With these challenges in mind, the analyses in this chapter follow the example 
of Grasso (2014) in constraining the cohort variable into the political 
generations detailed in Chapter Three.10 This categorisation is supported by the 
empirical evidence provided by Grasso (2014) and the evidence in favour of 
generational differences based on historical contexts discussed in Chapter 
Three. While generalised additive modelling is not used to validate the cohort 
classification for the analyses in this chapter, it is used to validate the APC 
analyses in Chapter Eight which examine cohort effects in apathy and 
alienation, and provides more evidence to support generational distinctions 
along the lines suggested in Chapter Three and applied here (see Appendix 
Seven).   
                                                 
9
 For example, social desirability bias can take a different form over time. For example, the 
bias relating to not wanting to appear racist or homophobic in Western democracies is far 
stronger today owing to modern attitudes towards those characteristics than it was in the 1950s.  
10
 The sample size for each generation for each year, for both the BES and BSA surveys, is 
provided in Appendix 3. 
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The theoretical expectations for the APC analyses of political participation are 
relatively straight-forward. Previous research suggests that there should be a 
life cycle effect apparent for all four dimensions, in which the youngest 
respondents should be less active and the middle-aged respondents the most 
active (Clarke et al. 2004; Smets 2008; Jankowski and Strate 1995). There may 
also be period effects though their nature is harder to predict. Clarke et al. 
(2004), for example, identified a period effect in electoral turnout around the 
2001 general election, because the contest was a foregone conclusion and so 
many voters did not bother to vote. Furthermore, studies such as Blais and 
Rubenson (2013) and Whiteley (2012) suggest that a broader period effect 
should be apparent in which electoral turnout has declined in Britain since the 
late 1990s. Norris (2001) and Sloam (2014) have also identified period effects 
in acts associated with cause-oriented political participation ± such as political 
consumerism and signing petitions ± in which such activity has become more 
common throughout Western electorates. 
Finally, there are studies which suggest cohort effects should also be apparent. 
Blais and Rubenson (2013), Clarke et al. (2004) and Whiteley (2012) suggest 
that there is a cohort effect in electoral turnout in which the younger 
generations ± in this case the Millennials and 90s generation ± should be less 
likely to vote than their elders. In addition, Norris (2001) and Sloam (2014) 
argue that there are cohort effects apparent in the uptake of acts associated with 
cause-oriented politics, in which the 90s and particularly Millennial 
generations should be more active. 
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4.2 Political Participation over Time 
The participation of British political generations over time was examined using 
a combination of data from the British Election Study (BES) and the British 
Social Attitudes Survey (BSA). Owing to data limitations, it was not possible 
to construct composite variables relating to each dimension of political 
participation as was done in Chapter Three; instead, a selection of individual 
acts relating to those dimensions were examined to give an impression of how 
participation in them has changed over time. Formal political participation was 
represented by voting in general and local elections; cause-oriented 
participation was represented by taking part in protests and signing petitions; 
civic participation was represented by trade union membership and raising 
issues in organisations of which respondents were a member; and issue-specific 
formal participation was represented by contacting MPs. Figure 4.1 shows how 
participation in these acts has changed over time, with respondents categorised 
into political generations.11
                                                 
11
 The data in Figure 4.1 shows two of the three effects in the APC analyses ± cohort and 
period. It is not possible to illustrate age, period and cohort effects in a single two-dimensional 
graph; separate figures can be produced to illustrate age and cohort and age and period. For 
purposes of space these have not been produced here, however they were examined and found 
to imply similar trends as those shown in Figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.1: Political Participation of Political Generations over Time 
  
Voting in a general election  Voting in a local election  
Signing a Petition Protesting 
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Union Membership  
Note: In some cases when the youngest generations were being surveyed 
for the first time the sample of respondents was too small (i.e. well below 
100) to sustain a reasonable estimate of the typical activity of that 
generation. In such cases, the data has been omitted to avoid misleading 
interpretations. In some instances, the y-axis has been limited to less than 
the full 0-100% range to make trends visually discernible. 
Source: British Election Study face to face, post-wave surveys, Feb 1974 ± 
2010 (excl. Oct 1974); British Social Attitudes Survey 1983 - 2011 
  
Raising Issues in an Organisation 
Contacting MPs 
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4.3 Formal Political Participation: Voting in Elections 
The first graph in Figure 4.1 shows the average turnout for each generation in 
each general election between February 1974 and 2010 (excluding October 
1974), while Table 4.1 reports the results of the equivalent APC regression 
analyses.12 Figure 4.1 suggested that there is indeed a generational effect in 
which turnout has declined in Britain, with the Millennials the least likely to 
vote. In 1974, for example, around 90% of the Pre- and Post-War generations 
voted, along with around 80% of the 60s-70s generations. When the 80s 
generation entered the electorate, there was already evidence of a generational 
decline, with only 70% of that generation voting in 1979, and the figure never 
exceeding that of the older generations up to 2010. The proportion of 90s 
generation voters in their first election was slightly higher - at 75% - but their 
turnout was still lower than that of the older generations and remained so 
throughout the series. Finally, the most dramatic sign of a generational effect 
was apparent with the first data on the Millennials in 2005, when only 44% of 
them voted. While their turnout increased in 2010, it remained considerably 
lower than that of the older generations. 
                                                 
12
 The October 1974 general election was omitted because the aim was to capture as much as 
SRVVLEOHWKHµQRUPDO¶EHKDYLRXURIUHVSRQGHQWVKDYLQJWZRJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQVLQ a single year is 
KLJKO\XQXVXDOZKLFKPD\KDYHKDGDQLPSDFWRQUHVSRQGHQWV¶EHKDYLRXUVXFKDVPDNLQJ
them more likely to vote in October because they knew the election was going to be close 
(Franklin 2004)).  
Note that the period variable was entered as a factor variable so as to allow for any non-linear 
relationships between time and the dependent variable to be modelled (see Neundorf 2010). In 
addition, the age variable was accompanied by an age-squared variable, so as to capture the 
curvilinear relationship between age and political participation (see Clarke et al 2004; Smets 
2008).  
The details of the control variables for both the BES and BSA data are provided in Appendix 
One. While including ethnicity would have been preferable, the earlier surveys in the BES and 
BSA series did not include appropriate measures of ethnicity and so the variable had to be 
omitted. 
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The APC analyses supported this conclusion. Table 4.1 shows that the age and 
age-squared (age2) variables indicated ± as expected ± a curvilinear life cycle 
effect, in which the middle aged respondents were the most likely to vote, and 
the youngest and oldest less so. The year variables also suggested several 
period effects, with turnout fluctuating since the 1970s, as well as a sustained 
decline in the 2000s. Finally, the generation coefficients suggested that once 
the life cycle and period effects were controlled for, there was a cohort effect in 
which every generation to enter the electorate since the 60s-70s generation did 
so with a lower likelihood of voting that the Pre- and Post-War generations. 
There was no indication of a significant difference between the oldest 
generations ± the Pre-War coefficient was non-significant and suggests barely 
any difference between them and the Post-War generation (the reference 
category).13 The 60s-70s generation coefficient, however, was statistically 
significant and negative (-0.3), suggesting a significantly lower likelihood of 
voting than the Post-War generation. So too is that of the 80s generation (-0.6), 
the 90s generation (-0.9) and the Millennials (-1.25). The increasing magnitude 
of the coefficients shows an almost linear decline in vote likelihood with each 
successive generation that entered the electorate, and which identified the 
Millennials as the least likely to vote since the War.  
The model reported in the far right column of Table 4.1 included control 
variables for political and social resources, gender, and party identification. It 
showed that accounting for these factors had little impact on the estimated life 
                                                 
13
 The Post-War generation was used as the reference category for the APC analyses because it 
is consistently well represented throughout the time series, whereas the Millennial generation ± 
which served as the reference category in Chapter Three ± has a very limited sample size by 
comparison, and is not represented at all in most of the surveys. 
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cycle and generational effects. Both the age and generation coefficients were of 
almost identical magnitude and implied the same relationship as the first 
model, suggesting that while factors such as political and social resources are 
important determinants of individual political participation, they make a 
limited contribution to explaining differences based on the life cycle and 
political socialisation. The period effect was slightly different, with the 
magnitude of the statistically significant coefficients being larger (suggesting 
that changes in control variables over time help explain the period decline in 
turnout somewhat), but the general trend of a persistent post-2000 decline was 
still apparent. All of the control variables themselves had a positive and 
significant impact on turnout, with more political and social resources and 
political sophistication, identifying with a political party and being female 
increasing the likelihood of having voted in an election.  
Finally, the Pseudo r-squared statistics in Table 4.1 show that these two models 
only explain a limited amount of variance in turnout.14 The initial model, 
accounting only for period, age and cohort effects, has a Pseudo r-squared of 
0.06, suggesting only a very small amount of variance is explained. Including 
the controls improves the explanatory power of the model but only marginally 
± to 0.09.  
 
 
                                                 
14
 7KLVLVWKH0F)DGGHQ¶V3VHXGRU-squared. All Pseudo r-squared statistics throughout this and 
UHPDLQLQJFKDSWHUVDUH0F)DGGHQ¶V3VHXGRU-squared unless otherwise stated.  
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Table 4.1: APC Analysis, General Election Turnout 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Pre-War -0.02 0.09 -0.08 0.10 
(Post-War) 
 
  
 
  
60s-70s -0.27*** 0.07 -0.28*** 0.08 
80s -0.57*** 0.10 -0.55*** 0.12 
90s -0.94*** 0.14 -0.92*** 0.16 
Millennials -1.25*** 0.19 -1.24*** 0.25 
  
 
  
 
  
Age 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
Age2 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
     
Year (1974) 
 
  
 
  
1979 -0.13 0.09 -0.21* 0.11 
1983 -0.22** 0.08 -0.37*** 0.09 
1987 0.05 0.09 -0.09 0.10 
1992 0.22* 0.10 0.06 0.12 
1997 -0.36*** 0.10 -0.60*** 0.12 
2001 -0.69*** 0.11 -0.93*** 0.13 
2005 -0.55*** 0.12 -0.79*** 0.15 
2010 -0.25 0.13 -0.87*** 0.16 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  0.12*** 0.02 
Social Class 
 
  0.17*** 0.02 
Gender 
 
  0.12** 0.04 
Party Identification 
 
  1.46*** 0.06 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 0.86*** 0.29 -1.33*** 0.26 
  
 
  
 
  
Obs 29320   21611   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.06   0.09   
Source: Logistic regression analysis of data from British Election Study post-election face to 
face survey, Feb 1974 ± 2010 (excl Oct 1974). * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-
value <0.001 
 
Table 4.2 reports the APC analyses for voting in local elections. Figure 4.1 
shows that turnout in local elections is generally lower than that for general 
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elections, but suggests that there remains evidence of a generational decline. 
The Pre-War and Post-War generations were virtually identical, averaging a 
turnout above 80% throughout the series. The 60s-70s generation exhibited 
consistently lower turnout throughout much of the series, rarely rising above 
80%. The 80s generation were less likely still to vote, with a turnout of 70% in 
1979, followed by a slight increase to 74% in 1997, and then a fall to below 
70% up to 2010. The 90s generation were even less likely to vote, with a peak 
turnout of 68% in 1997 but an average between 1997 and 2010 of below 60%. 
Finally, the Millennials, as with general elections, were consistently the least 
likely to vote and appear to have entered the electorate with a weaker 
propensity to vote in local elections than their elders; in 2005 their turnout was 
44%, which rose to 49% in 2010. 
The APC analyses in Table 4.2, however, suggest that while there is evidence 
of a generational decline in turnout comparable to that described above, the 
effect is not statistically significant. The 60s-70s generation, for instance, had a 
coefficient of -0.03, the 80s of -0.3, the 90s of -0.42, and the Millennials of -
0.39, all of which showed a lower likelihood of voting than the Post-War 
generation, particularly for the 90s and Millennial generations, but none of 
which were significant. This suggests that other effects are likely to be more 
important in explaining the differences between the generations ± specifically 
the life cycle effect and potentially period effects. As with voting in general 
elections, there was evidence of a curvilinear life cycle effect, as well as a 
notable period effect in which turnout declined after 1997. 
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The control variables had similar effects to those for voting in general 
elections; higher levels of resources and political sophistication, identifying 
with a political party, and being female all make respondents more likely to 
vote in local elections. Accounting for these factors had a notable impact on the 
period effect, in that they all became more negative and the 1997 coefficient 
became significant (suggesting that the decline in voting in local elections was 
even sharper once changes in party identification, education, social class and 
potentially gender have been taken into account). The life cycle effect also 
became marginally stronger. The generational coefficients were slightly 
changed following the inclusion of the controls, but remained insignificant. 
There was no evidence, therefore, of a generational decline in local election 
turnout, but rather of life cycle and period effects ± as well as potentially 
differences in political and social resources and party identification ± which 
help explain why the Millennials are less active in this area than their elders. 
The Pseudo r-squared statistics were marginally higher than those in Table 4.1 
± at 0.07 and 0.11 ± but continued to show that age, period and cohort effects, 
even with control variables, explained little of the variance in local election 
turnout.  
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Table 4.2: APC Analysis, Local Election Turnout 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Pre-War 0.04 0.17 -0.02 0.20 
(Post-War)       
60s-70s -0.03 0.13 0.03 0.16 
80s -0.30 0.19 -0.11 0.23 
90s -0.42 0.26 -0.17 0.32 
Millennials -0.39 0.35 -0.24 0.45 
        
Age 0.07*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.02 
Age2 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
Year (1979)       
1997 -0.21 0.15 -0.53** 0.18 
2001 -0.87*** 0.17 -1.21*** 0.20 
2005 -0.75*** 0.19 -1.12*** 0.24 
2010 -0.75*** 0.21 -1.47*** 0.27 
        
Education   0.13*** 0.03 
Social Class   0.16*** 0.03 
Gender   0.21** 0.07 
Party Identification   1.35*** 0.13 
        
Constant -0.24 0.40 -2.93*** 0.54 
        
Obs 7515  5184   
Prob > Chi2 0.00  0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.07   0.11   
Source: Logistic regression analysis of data from British Election Study post-election face to 
face survey, Feb 1979, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-
value <0.001 
 
The two analyses imply, therefore, a mixed picture for explaining why the 
Millennials were less active in formal politics. There is evidence of both period 
effects suggesting that participation in formal politics may be becoming less 
common, as well as life cycle effects suggesting that at their current stage of 
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the life cycle the Millennials would be expected to be less active. Both of these 
effects are consistent with theoretical expectations. There was also evidence, 
however, of a cohort effect in which the Millennials were at the most extreme 
edge of a generational decline in the propensity to participate in formal politics, 
but this only appears to apply to some acts associated with this dimension. 
Precisely why there would be evidence of such an effect for some acts and not 
others is unclear; the unique nature of the social pressure and media coverage 
surrounding voting in a general election may mean that there were processes 
making the Millennials less likely to perform it which were not apparent for 
other acts. Or the fact that turnout in local elections was comparatively so low 
to begin with may mean that generational declines in participation were less 
apparent. Either way, there was clear evidence of life cycle and period effects 
driving changes in formal political participation, alongside evidence of cohort 
effects for certain formal political acts though not all. Where there was a cohort 
effect, it suggested that the Millennials were the least likely to be active in 
formal politics.  
4.4 Cause-Oriented Political Participation: Protests and Petitions 
Looking next at petition signing as an indication of cause-oriented activity, 
Figure 4.1 reports the proportion of BSA respondents who signed a petition in 
response to what they felt was an unjust government decision. Consistent with 
the findings of Sloam (2014), Dalton (2013) and Norris (2001; 2011), there is 
clear evidence of a period effect in which this act became more common since 
the 1980s, although this was not a constant increase; more of a peak in the 
early 1990s followed by stabilisation at a higher level than that seen in the 
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1980s. The graph also suggests there may be a curvilinear generational effect, 
with the Pre-War and Millennial generations being the least likely to sign 
petitions, and the other generations in between. For example, on average 23% 
of the Pre-War generation signed petitions between 1983 and 2011. The 
activity was more common among the Post-War generation, and peaked in 
popularity among the 60s-70s, of which an average of 45% signed between 
1983 and 2011. The 80s and 90s generations were slightly less likely to sign 
petitions, with an average of 42% between 1983 and 2011, and 41% between 
1989 and 2011 respectively, and they were followed by the Millennials who 
averaged 33% between 2002 and 2011. 
Table 4.3 shows that the regression analyses gave a similar impression. The 
year coefficients confirmed the evidence of a period effect in which signing 
petitions became more common after the 1980s, with a peak in the 1990s. The 
age variables also suggested a curvilinear life cycle effect comparable to that 
seen for formal political participation, with the youngest the least active and 
the middle aged the most active. Finally, the generational coefficients provided 
further evidence of a curvilinear cohort effect. 
There was no evidence of a significant difference between Pre-War, Post-War, 
80s and 90s generations; the Pre-War coefficient was a non-significant -0.14, 
and the 80s and 90s generations had non-significant coefficients of -0.04 and -
0.24 respectively. While the direction of these coefficients suggest that all were 
less active than the Post-War generation (and the 60s-70s generation), the 
effects were not statistically significant. The most active generation appeared 
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to be the 60s-70s, with a significant coefficient of 0.14, and the least active was 
the Millennials, with a significant coefficient of -0.44.  
The control variables were all found to have a significant effect on petition 
signing. Higher levels of political sophistication and resources, as well as 
identifying with a political party and being female, all increased the likelihood 
of signing petitions. Accounting for these effects, however, had little 
discernible impact on either the life cycle or period effects identified in the first 
model. There was more of an impact, however, on the generational effect, with 
the coefficient for the 60s-70s generation becoming non-significant, and the 
coefficient for the 90s generation becoming a significant -0.34. The magnitude 
of the Millennial coefficient was also marginally increased to -0.47. This 
suggested that once differences in resources, party identification and possibly 
gender were accounted for, there was little difference between the Pre-War to 
80s generations, but there was evidence of the 90s generation and the 
Millennials entering the electorate with successively weaker propensities to 
sign petitions than their elders.  
Finally, the Pseudo r-squared statistics for these two models suggest that age, 
period and generational effects explain a very small amount of variance in 
petition signing; the first model had a Pseudo r-squared statistic of 0.05, and 
even with the controls this only increased to 0.07.  
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Table 4.3: APC Analysis, Signing Petitions 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Pre-War -0.14 0.09 -0.13 0.09 
(Post-War)       
60s-70s 0.14* 0.07 0.10 0.07 
80s -0.04 0.10 -0.12 0.11 
90s -0.24 0.14 -0.34* 0.15 
Millennials -0.44* 0.20 -0.47* 0.21 
        
Age 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.00 
Age2 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
        
Year (1983)       
1986 1.67*** 0.10 1.65*** 0.11 
1989 1.98*** 0.10 1.94*** 0.11 
1991 2.53*** 0.10 2.52*** 0.11 
1994 1.89*** 0.11 1.86*** 0.12 
2000 2.05*** 0.11 2.04*** 0.12 
2002 2.14*** 0.11 2.12*** 0.12 
2003 2.09*** 0.11 2.06*** 0.12 
2005 1.89*** 0.12 1.85*** 0.12 
2011 1.98*** 0.13 1.94*** 0.14 
        
Education    0.13*** 0.01 
Social Class    0.13*** 0.02 
Gender    0.14*** 0.03 
Party Identification    0.40*** 0.04 
        
Constant -3.42*** 0.16 -4.39*** 0.19 
        
Obs 20501   19250   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.05   0.07   
Source: Logistic regression analysis of data from British Social Attitudes Survey data, 1983, 
1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2011. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; 
*** - p-value <0.001 
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Table 4.4 reports the APC analyses for protest activity, based on the proportion 
of BSA respondents who reported protesting against an unjust government 
decision. The graph in Figure 4.1 shows that protesting was consistently a less 
common act of participation than petition signing among British citizens, with 
no more than 18% of any of the generations protesting at any point in the 1983-
2011 series. Within this context, however, trends in protest activity were 
similar to those seen for signing petitions; there was a steady growth in its 
popularity since the 1980s, with a peak in the early 2000s, and there is 
evidence of a curvilinear cohort effect. For example, an average of 2.7% of the 
Pre-War generation protested between 1983 and 2011; the activity became 
more common among the Post-War generation and peaked among the 60s-70s 
generation, of which an average of 11.5% participated in that time, closely 
followed by the 80s generation with an average of 11.3%. There was then a 
decline in propensity for protesting, with an average of 9% of the 90s 
generation protesting between 1989 and 2011, and just 6% of Millennials 
between 2002 and 2011. 
The data in Table 4.4 suggests similar effects. The year coefficients showed a 
period effect in which protesting became more common after the 1980s, 
peaking in popularity in the early 2000s. Perhaps surprisingly, given the well-
established literature suggesting that the young are typically more likely to 
protest (e.g., Barnes et al. 1979; Abrams and Little 1965b), there was no 
indication of a life cycle effect (the age variable was non-significant). The 
generational coefficients suggested a similar pattern to that seen for signing 
petitions and suggested in Figure 4.1. The most active generation was the 60s-
70s (with a significant coefficient of 0.29). The Pre-War, 80s and 90s 
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coefficients were all negative, suggesting that they were less active than the 
Post-War and 60s-70s generations, but all were also insignificant. The 
Millennials were suggested to be the least active, with a significant coefficient 
of -1.07. 
The controls all had a significant effect, with political sophistication and 
resources and party identification being positively associated with protest. 
Gender also had a significant effect, but unlike that for signing petitions it 
suggested than men were more active than women. Accounting for these 
effects had a small impact on the magnitude of the period coefficients 
(reducing all of them), but they continued to show an increase in protest since 
the 1980s with a peak in the 2000s. There continued to be no indication of a 
life cycle effect. The generation coefficients were affected, with the coefficient 
for the 60s-70s generation becoming non-significant, but that for the 
Millennials remained significant and increased in magnitude (to -1.12).  
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Table 4.4: APC Analysis, Protesting 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Pre-War -0.25 0.19 -0.19 0.20 
(Post-War)       
60s-70s 0.29* 0.12 0.23 0.12 
80s -0.01 0.18 -0.60 0.19 
90s -0.49 0.25 -0.48 0.26 
Millennials -1.07** 0.36 -1.12** 0.40 
        
Age 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Age2 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 
        
Year (1983)       
1986 1.10*** 0.22 0.99*** 0.23 
1989 1.65*** 0.21 1.48*** 0.22 
1991 1.71*** 0.21 1.57*** 0.22 
1994 1.84*** 0.22 1.66*** 0.23 
2000 1.94*** 0.22 1.78*** 0.23 
2002 2.18*** 0.22 1.95*** 0.24 
2003 2.10*** 0.23 1.91*** 0.24 
2005 2.02*** 0.23 1.78*** 0.24 
2011 1.92*** 0.26 1.59*** 0.28 
        
Education    0.28*** 0.02 
Social Class    0.10*** 0.03 
Gender      -0.13* 0.05 
Party Identification    0.53*** 0.06 
        
Constant -3.80*** 0.45 -5.56*** 0.50 
        
Obs 20501   19250   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.04   0.08   
Source: Logistic regression analysis of data from British Social Attitudes Survey data, 1983, 
1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2011. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; 
*** - p-value <0.001 
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Both sets of analyses imply comparable period and generational effects for 
cause-oriented political participation. As studies such as Sloam (2014) have 
argued, cause-oriented political activity has become more common in Britain 
since the 1980s, although this appears to reflect a surge in popularity which 
stabilised around the late 1990s/early 2000s rather than a consistent increase. 
The generational effects implied a weak curvilinear relationship, with the 60s-
70s generation the most likely to participate in cause-oriented politics and the 
Millennials the least likely. The greater likelihood of the 60s-70s generation to 
participate appears to be largely explained by differences between them and the 
Pre-War, Post-War, 80s and 90s generation in terms of their relationships with 
political parties, demographic characteristics, and political sophistication and 
resources. These effects do not appear to explain, however, the Millennials¶ 
unprecedented reluctance to participate in cause-oriented politics. In direct 
contrast to the arguments of studies such as Sloam (2014; 2012b), Norris 
DQG'DOWRQDPRQJRWKHUVWRGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOHDUHQRWD
distinct generation for their propensity to participate in issue-specific, informal 
forms of political participation. These activities have certainly become more 
common among all members of the British electorate over the last few decades, 
but the Millennials are distinctly unlikely to participate in them compared with 
their elders. This also means that there is no indication of the MillennLDOV¶
being distinct for rejecting formal political participation in favour of a new 
embrace of cause-oriented activity; instead, the evidence suggests that they are 
distinct for being less likely to participate in both arenas. Finally, it is once 
again clear that despite the substantial differences between generations in terms 
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of cause-oriented activity, cohort effects along with age and period effects 
explain very little of the variance in this form of participation. 
4.5 Civic Participation: Unions and Raising Issues in Organisations 
Table 4.5 reports the APC analyses for union membership, which is a form of 
civic political participation. Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of BES 
respondents who were members of a trade union between 1979 and 2010. 
There is evidence of what could be several effects; union membership became 
less common after the 1980s which could reflect a period effect, but it also 
became more common among the 60s-70s, 80s, 90s and Millennial generations 
after 2005 which could be indicative of either period, life cycle or generational 
effects. The data does suggest, however, that the Millennials and the 90s 
generation were typically less likely to be union members regardless of the 
year. 
The APC analyses in Table 4.5 showed that there was indeed a period effect in 
which union membership declined after 1979. The age and age-squared 
variables also suggest a curvilinear life cycle effect, with the middle aged more 
likely to be members than the oldest citizens, and even more so than the 
youngest. There was also evidence of a curvilinear cohort effect. The Pre-War 
generation were the least likely to join a union, with a significant coefficient of 
-0.36. The Post-War generation were shown to be more likely to be union 
members than the Pre-War, but less so than the 60s-70s and 80s generations, 
which had significant coefficients of 0.26 and 0.34 respectively. The 
coefficients for the 90s and Millennial generations were positive (0.17 and 0.13 
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respectively), but non-significant, suggesting no substantial difference between 
their likelihood of joining a union and that of the Post-War generation. 
The control variables suggested similar effects to those found for other forms 
of participation: higher levels of political sophistication and resources, 
identifying with a political party and being male made respondents more likely 
to join unions. With these effects accounted for, there was a modest impact on 
the period, life cycle and generational coefficients. The period effect continued 
to imply a decline in union membership, though its magnitude was larger. The 
life cycle effect barely changed. The only significant change in the generational 
coefficients was that of the 80s generation which became non-significant, 
resulting in the 60s-70s generation being most likely to join a union, with the 
Post-War, 80s, 90s and Millennial generations behind them, and the Pre-War 
generation the least likely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: APC Analysis, Union Membership 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Pre-War -0.36*** 0.10 -0.36** 0.11 
(Post-War)       
60s-70s 0.26** 0.08 0.21* 0.09 
80s 0.34** 0.12 0.25 0.13 
90s 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.19 
Millennials 0.13 0.27 0.29 0.31 
        
Age 0.11*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.01 
Age2 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
        
Year (1979)       
1987 -0.32*** 0.07 -0.68*** 0.08 
1992 -0.45*** 0.08 -0.79*** 0.10 
1997 -0.64*** 0.10 -0.98*** 0.10 
2001 -0.69*** 0.11 -1.05*** 0.12 
2005 -0.71** 0.14 -0.95*** 0.17 
2010 -0.84*** 0.15 -1.26*** 0.16 
        
Education    0.10*** 0.02 
Social Class    0.07** 0.02 
Gender    -0.57*** 0.04 
Party Identification    0.30** 0.09 
        
Constant -2.96*** 0.28 -2.75*** 0.33 
        
Obs 18170   14604   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.04   0.07   
Source: Logistic regression analysis of data from British Election Study post-election face to 
face survey, Feb 1979, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value 
<0.01; *** - p-value <0.001 
 
Table 4.6 reports the APC analyses examining the raising of issues in 
organisations of which the respondent was a member ± in other words, active 
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membership of associations and organisations. Figure 4.1 shows that this is a 
particularly rare form of political participation, with fewer than 1 in 10 
respondents ever reporting having done so. There is little evidence of 
substantial period or generational effects in Figure 4.1, with the exception of an 
indication of a very slight generational effect in which the Millennials were 
less likely to engage in this act than their elders. In 2002, the year in which this 
act was most common and the first year for which data on the Millennials is 
available, fewer than 2% raised an issue in an organisation of which they were 
a member, lower than the 3% of 90s generation who did so, 6% of the 80s 
generation, 11% of the 60s-70s generation, 9% of the Post-War generation, and 
5% of the Pre-War generation. 
The APC analyses provided evidence of period, generation and life cycle 
effects. Raising issues in organisations was more common throughout the 
1990s and 2000s than in the 1980s, but rather than a continuous increase the 
coefficients suggested that 1983 was an unusually quiet year for this form of 
participation. The age coefficients once again showed a curvilinear relationship 
in which the middle-aged are the most active in this form of participation, 
followed by the older citizens and then the youngest. 
The generational coefficients identified a cohort effect in which the 80s, 90s 
and Millennial generations entered the electorate less likely to engage in this 
act than their elders. The Pre-War and 60s-70s generation both had non-
significant coefficients of 0.17 and -0.18 respectively, suggesting that the three 
oldest generations had comparable likelihoods of raising issues in their 
organisations. The significant coefficients for the 80s, 90s and Millennial 
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generations (-0.65, -1.05, and -1.74 respectively), however, showed a 
generational decline in the likelihood of doing so with its most extreme 
manifestation in the Millennials. 
The controls had almost the same effect as that seen for union membership; 
higher levels of political sophistication and resources, as well as identifying 
with a political party and being male, made respondents more likely to raise 
issues. The magnitude of the period effect was reduced somewhat once these 
effects were accounted for (though still suggested that 1983 was an unusual 
year), while the magnitude of the life cycle effect increased slightly (i.e., the 
age coefficient increased from 0.06 to 0.09). The generational coefficients were 
changed somewhat, with those of the 80s, 90s and Millennial generations 
reducing in magnitude (particularly that of the Millennials), but implied the 
same trend: that the oldest generations had a comparable propensity for raising 
issues in organisations, while the likelihood of doing so fell with the successive 
arrival of the 80s, 90s and Millennial generations. 
Finally, the Pseudo r-squared statistic for the APC only model was 0.03, 
suggesting that barely any variance in this political activity was explained by 
age, period or cohort effects. Including the control variables increased this to 
0.10, showing that the controls were more influential, though even combined 
with APC effects there was still a great deal about this political act 
unaccounted for in this model. 
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Table 4.6: APC Analysis, Raising Issues in Organisation 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Pre-War 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.21 
(Post-War)        
60s-70s -0.18 0.14 -0.23 0.15 
80s -0.65** 0.23 -0.67** 0.34 
90s -1.05** 0.33 -0.99** 0.34 
Millennials -1.74** 0.52 -1.23* 0.56 
         
Age 0.06** 0.02 0.09*** 0.02 
Age2 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
         
Year (1983)        
1986 1.00*** 0.21 0.82*** 0.22 
1989 0.78*** 0.22 0.53* 0.23 
1991 1.05*** 0.22 0.77** 0.23 
1994 0.65* 0.26 0.31 0.26 
2000 1.13*** 0.23 0.78** 0.24 
2002 1.63*** 0.24 1.23*** 0.24 
2003 0.87*** 0.25 0.46 0.26 
2005 1.17*** 0.25 0.72** 0.26 
2011 1.60*** 0.29 1.08*** 0.30 
         
Education    0.33*** 0.03 
Social Class    0.29*** 0.04 
Gender    -0.28*** 0.07 
Party Identification    0.62*** 0.09 
         
Constant -4.78*** 0.61 -7.68*** 0.69 
         
Obs 20501  19250   
Prob > Chi2 0.00  0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.03   0.10   
Source: Logistic regression analysis of data from British Social Attitudes Survey data, 1983, 
1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2011. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; 
*** - p-value <0.001 
 
The analyses of these two forms of civic participation reached somewhat 
different conclusions. There was evidence of different period effects for both 
acts; while union membership fell after the 1980s, the likelihood of raising 
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issues in organisations increased. The effect of the life cycle appears to be the 
same for both acts, and the same as that found for most other acts examined so 
far, in that the middle aged tend to be the most active.  
The generational effects for the two were also quite different. The 60s-70s and 
80s generations appeared to be unusually active when it came to union 
membership (although for the 80s generation this is largely explained by 
factors indicated by the control variables), while the Pre-War generation was 
the least likely to join unions, and the Post-War, 90s and Millennial generations 
were somewhere in between. For raising issues in organisations, however, the 
Millennials were suggested to be at the extreme edge of a generational decline 
in the likelihood of doing so, apparent from the 80s generation. As with the 
differences between the effects found for the acts related to formal 
participation, it is unclear why there would be such different generational 
effects for two related acts of political activity; the difference may reflect the 
unique nature of the acts examined, or indicate that despite the fact they are 
both indicative of civic political participation there are nonetheless differences 
in the way that various processes (such as the impact of social change on 
political socialisation) affect them. What is clear is that while the Millennials 
were the least active generation in civic political activity (as confirmed both by 
the data presented above and in Chapter Three), this does not entirely reflect 
their uniqueness as a political generation. The difference between their 
participation and that of their elders, therefore, may reduce as they move 
through the life cycle and they become more likely to engage in at least some 
forms of civic political participation. Finally, the low Pseudo r-squared 
statistics show that the APC models ± with or without controls ± were similar 
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to those looking at formal and cause-oriented political activity in explaining 
only a limited amount of the variance.  
4.6 Issue-Specific Formal Participation: Contacting MPs 
Table 4.7 presents the APC analyses for the final act of participation ± 
contacting MPs, which represents issue-specific formal political activity. 
Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of BSA respondents who reported contacting 
their MP in response to an unjust government decision between 1983 and 2011. 
The graph suggests that this was not a particularly common form of political 
participation, with no more than 1 in 4 respondents ever reporting having done 
so. There is evidence of a period effect, however, in which this form of 
participation became more common after the 1980s. The graph also suggests a 
potential life cycle or generational effect, indicating a curvilinear relationship 
in which the oldest and youngest generations appeared least likely to contact 
their MPs. For example, an average of 12% of the Pre-War generation 
contacted their MP between 1983 and 2011, compared with 19% of the 60s-70s 
generation, and 4.4% of Millennials (since 2002).  
Table 4.7 also showed a period effect in which contacting MPs became more 
common after the 1980s, with a peak in the early 2000s. This could well reflect 
technological advances increasing the opportunities for individuals to contact 
their elected representatives, such as through email or social media. The APC 
analyses also suggested a life cycle effect, in which the middle aged 
respondents were the most likely to contact their MPs and the youngest the 
least likely.  
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The generational coefficients implied a comparable generational trend to that 
suggest by Figure 4.1. There was no evidence of a significant difference 
between the Pre-War, Post-War and 60s-70s generations (the Pre-War 
generation had an insignificant coefficient of 0.02, and the 60s-70s of -0.08), 
but the 80s generation appeared to be at the leading end of a generational 
decline: the 80s generation coefficient was -0.34, the 90s was -0.8, and the 
Millennials was -1.4, and all were statistically significant. The three youngest 
generations, therefore, were less likely to have contacted their MPs than the 
older generations, with the Millennials the least likely of all.  
Once again, the analyses suggested that higher levels of political sophistication 
and resources, and identifying with a political party, increased the chances of 
someone contacting their MP. Unlike the other acts examined above, gender 
had no significant effect. Accounting for these influences had no appreciable 
impact on the life cycle effect; although the magnitude was reduced, it still 
implied a curvilinear relationship, with the middle aged respondents the most 
active. The period coefficients were similarly only marginally affected, and 
continued to suggest that this form of participation became more common in 
Britain after the 1980s. Finally, there was also a minor effect on the 
generational coefficients, but the overall impression remained the same: the 
80s, 90s and Millennial generations appeared to have entered the electorate 
with successively lower likelihoods of contacting their MPs. The Pseudo r-
squared figures for both analyses were very similar to those above, and 
suggested that these models had only limited success in explaining variance in 
issue-specific formal participation.  
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Table 4.7: APC Analysis, Contacting MPs 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Pre-War 0.02 0.11 -0.05 0.12 
(Post-War)       
60s-70s -0.08 0.09 -0.13 0.09 
80s -0.34* 0.14 -0.43** 0.14 
90s -0.79*** 0.19 -0.91*** 0.21 
Millennials -1.38*** 0.32 -1.40*** 0.35 
        
Age 0.09*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.01 
Age2 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
        
Year (1983)       
1986 1.43*** 0.16 1.33*** 0.17 
1989 1.75*** 0.16 1.65*** 0.17 
1991 1.95*** 0.16 1.88*** 0.17 
1994 1.78*** 0.17 1.62*** 0.18 
2000 2.05*** 0.17 1.90*** 0.18 
2002 2.13*** 0.17 1.91*** 0.18 
2003 2.05*** 0.17 1.86*** 0.18 
2005 1.86*** 0.18 1.62*** 0.19 
2011 2.16*** 0.19 1.90*** 0.2 
        
Education    0.25*** 0.02 
Social Class    0.22*** 0.02 
Gender    -0.07 0.04 
Party Identification    0.39*** 0.05 
        
Constant -5.47*** 0.39 -7.03*** 0.42 
        
Obs 20501   19250   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.05   0.09   
Source: Logistic regression analysis of data from British Social Attitudes Survey data, 1983, 
1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2011. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; 
*** - p-value <0.001
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Table 4.8: Summary  
  Formal    Cause-oriented Civic    
Issue-
specific 
  Vote in Vote in Sign a Protest Union Raise  Contact 
  General Local  Petition   Member Issue MP 
Millennials significantly different? Ļ - Ļ Ļ - Ļ Ļ 
with controls? Ļ - Ļ Ļ - Ļ Ļ 
Millennials lowest coefficient? Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
with controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Model Pseudo r-squared 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Model Pseudo r-squared w/controls 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Chapter Three suggested that the Millennials were the least active generation in 
the British electorate around the time of the 2010 general election; regardless 
of whether the focus was on formal, cause-oriented, civic or issue-specific 
formal participation, the Millennials were less active than their elders. This 
chapter has used APC analyses to explore whether these differences reflect life 
cycle, period or cohort effects, with a particular interest in whether or not the 
cohort effects identify the Millennials as a distinct political generation. Table 
4.8 summarises the key findings of the above analyses in relation to this issue.  
Owing to data limitations, the range of participatory acts examined was smaller 
than that in Chapter Three, which has resulted in several questions about the 
way in which acts within a given participatory dimension relate to each other in 
light of different conclusions regarding life cycle, period and cohort effects. 
For formal political participation, for instance, the analyses found that while 
the Millennials were less active than their elders, for voting in general elections 
this reflected a cohort effect and for voting in local elections there was no 
evidence of such an effect. Whether this reflects differences in the nature of the 
participatory acts (implying that there could be substantial variation between 
acts even within the same participatory dimension) or in the nature of the 
impact of political socialisation on the way the generations participate in 
different acts, or simply data limitations (perhaps because the range of data for 
local election voting was more limited than that for general election voting) is 
unclear, but suggests there is room for further study about the way in which 
participatory acts within a given dimension relate to each other.  
140 
 
What is clearly illustrated in Table 4.8, however, is that there is evidence of 
cohort effects for at least one act for each participatory dimension which 
suggests that the Millennials are the least active generation to have entered the 
electorate since World War Two. While there are life cycle effects apparent for 
all four participatory dimensions which mean the Millennials will most likely 
became marginally more active as they age, the cohort effects suggest that they 
will nonetheless be typically less active than the older generations in the 
electorate throughout their adult lives. There is clear evidence, therefore, that 
the Millennials are a distinct political generation in terms of their political 
participation, and in most cases this implies that they are less active than their 
elders. That said, the low Pseudo r-squared statistics for all of the APC 
analyses above shows that while there are significant and at times substantial 
GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQSROLWLFDOJHQHUDWLRQV¶SURSHQVLW\WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQSROLWLFV
differences in political participation are only marginally accounted for by 
differences in generations, period effects or life cycle effects.  
Relating these findings to the existing literature, they provide support for 
several arguments and challenge several others. Regarding the former, these 
conclusions echo the arguments of Grasso (2014), Wattenberg (2012) and 
Putnam (2000), who suggested that the Millennials were being socialised into 
an environment which would ultimately depress their interest in and 
participation with many aspects of politics ± not just formal politics. While all 
three point to GLIIHUHQWIDFWRUVZLWKLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶IRUPDWLYH years which 
explain this trend, they all suggest that there should be a cohort effect apparent 
in which the Millennials are typically less active than their elders comparable 
to that identified above.  
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The main challenge of these findings is to the suggestion that the Millennials 
are at the leading edge of a transformation of political participation in which 
formal participation is in decline as young people embrace issue-specific 
activity instead (Dalton 2013; Martin 2012; Norris 2001; Inglehart and Welzel 
2005; Sloam 2014). This argument generally takes one of two forms; either 
WKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOVDUHPRUHDFWLYHWKDQROGHUJHQHUDWLRQVLQWKHµQHZ¶IRUPV
of political activity (e.g., Martin 2012; Norris 2001); alternatively that they are 
currently less active because of the life cycle but have the potential to become 
even more active than their elders as they age (in other words that there is a 
cohort effect in which the Millennials are starting with a greater propensity to 
engage in this form of participation) (Sloam 2014; Dalton 2013).  
At least part of the difference between the conclusions of this chapter and this 
body of research will represent the different sources of data employed and 
contexts in which the conclusions were suggested to apply, and identifying 
whether or not those differences reflect the impact of various national contexts 
will require a cross-national comparative study beyond the scope of this 
research. However, as Chapters One and Two argued, these studies suffer from 
the under-utilisation of methods capable of estimating and controlling for life 
cycle, period and cohort effects, such as APC analyses. Consequently, they are 
forced to interpret trends in political behaviour with less evidence to 
disentangle and estimate the three, meaning they run a greater risk of 
misinterpretation. In the case of the MillenQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ 
especially cause-oriented activity, it is possible that these studies have 
interpreted a period effect as a cohort effect; that is, the fact that the 
Millennials are more active in cause-oriented politics than older generations 
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were at the same age appears to be the result of a rising propensity among all 
citizens to engage in cause-oriented activity, rather than a cohort effect in 
which the Millennials are even more active than their predecessors.  
Without a direct re-examination of the data used by these studies it is 
impossible to be certain that this is the case. Nonetheless, only here have APC 
analyses been employed to examine this question and so this chapter is 
uniquely able to simultaneously estimate and control for age, period and cohort 
effects. This means that the risk of misinterpreting those effects, while not non-
existent, is substantially lower, and so there can be greater confidence in the 
validity of these findings. Contrary to the image of a generation who are 
shifting away from traditional political activity in the formal political arena and 
towards new dimensions of political engagement more focussed on issues, this 
chapter suggests that the Millennials are a distinct generation for their lack of 
political participation across the board. The extent of their disengagement 
varies from dimension to dimension, and from act to act within those 
dimensions, but nonetheless there is substantial evidence to suggest that they 
are likely to be the least active generation to have entered the British electorate 
since the Second World War. 
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Chapter Five: Defining and Measuring Political Apathy and Political 
Alienation 
The concepts of political apathy and alienation are an integral component of 
the study and public discourse surrounding the political engagement of young 
people in Western democracies. The majority of academics, journalists and 
politicians who contribute to the debate tend to reach conclusions suggesting 
that either political alienation or political apathy is responsible for the lack of 
electoral engagement of young people, and so ultimately for the threat that lack 
of engagement poses to the stability of Western democracies. Seldom have 
such important concepts been so poorly understood in the academic literature, 
however. Despite their centrality to the academic and public understanding of 
\RXQJSHRSOH¶VSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQWKHFRQFHSWs RIµDSDWK\¶DQGµDOLHQDWLRQ¶
are under-theorised, poorly defined and inconsistently applied. In this chapter, 
this problem will be rectified and clear definitions, conceptualisations and 
operationalisations of political apathy and alienation will be developed.  
The chapter begins by briefly revisiting WKHOLWHUDWXUHRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
participation which suggests that they are apathetic or alienated, and identifies 
the key ways in which the terms are defined. It then engages with the literature 
on political apathy and political alienation which has been almost entirely 
ignored in this field, and uses it to develop a definition and conceptualisation of 
both concepts in the context of formal politics. Finally, the chapter develops an 
operationalisation of formal political apathy and alienation, and validates those 
measures by examining their impact on political behaviour.  
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5.1 Apathy, Alienation and the Millennials in the Literature 
As Chapter One discussed, conventional wisdom holds that the Millennials are 
a distinctly alienated generation, and that it is both inaccurate and unjust to 
describe them as politically apathetic. This alienation from the formal political 
arena ± and the actors and institutions within it ± is thought to explain why the 
Millennials exhibit an active interest in politics and political issues while being 
so reluctant to participate in the formal processes through which those issues 
might be affected.  
7KHXVHRIERWKWKHWHUPVµDSDWK\¶DQGµDOLHQDWLRQ¶LQWKHDFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUH
however, has severe short-comings because of the lack of clarity regarding 
their definition and measurement. Instead of theoretically clear and empirically 
verifiable concepts, apathy and alienation are more commonly used as 
summary terms; as ways of describing a variety of characteristics exhibited by 
Millennials which either mean they lack the motivation to engage with politics 
(apathy), or that they have the motivation but are in some way discouraged 
from acting on it (alienation) (e.g., Henn et al. 2005; Russell et al. 2002; 
Fahmy 2006; Marsh et al. 2007; Russell 2004; Henn and Foard 2012). As 
Chapter Two showed, the suggested source of this discouragement can vary 
from one study to the next, with six broad characteristics most commonly cited 
WRUHSUHVHQWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQ 
i) Low internal political efficacy, stemming from the 0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFN
of confidence in their knowledge of politics (e.g., Henn and Foard 
2012; Fahmy 2006; Delli Carpini 2000) 
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ii) Low external efficacy, reflecting their lack of faith in the 
responsiveness of the political system (e.g., Sloam 2014; 
Wattenberg 2002; Henn et al. 2005; White et al. 2000; Soule 2001) 
iii) Lack of trust in either the willingness or capability of politicians 
and/or parties to fairly represent them (e.g., Martin 2012; Henn et 
al. 2005; Marsh et al. 2007; Furlong and Cartmel 2012) 
iv) Lack of appeal of the adversarial and conflictual nature of the 
political process (e.g., Mycock and Tonge 2012; Marsh et al. 2007; 
Fahmy 2006) 
v) Lack of appeal based on negative reporting of politics in the media 
and/or undue focus on personality and conflict rather than issues 
(e.g., Wayne et al. 2010) 
vi) Negative stereotyping of the young as apathetic (e.g., Russell 2004; 
Evans and Sternberg 1999) 
This is not to say that these are not valid and accurate descriptions of the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQ. The problem is that the assertion or implication that 
WKHVHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVUHIOHFWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQDQGWKDWWKH\KDYHWKH 
suggested causal effects on their participation (i.e., depressing their formal 
participation, and according to some increasing their informal participation), 
KDVQRWEHHQDFFRPSDQLHGE\DFOHDUFRQFHSWXDORXWOLQHRIµSROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQ¶
nor of the effect it has on political behaviour. The link between the proposed 
FDXVHRIDOLHQDWLRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶H[SUHVVLRQRIWKDW alienation, and the 
subsequent impact on their political behaviour is assumed, not demonstrated. 
146 
 
5.2 The Definition and Conceptualisation of Formal Political Alienation 
There is a large extant literature on political alienation, which can be used as a 
starting point for developing a concept to explore its manifestation in the 
Millennials. This literature primarily originated in studies of the political 
alienation of young Americans in the 1950s and 1960s, in response to many 
renouncing their American citizenship and/or engaging in violent protest 
against their government and political system (Ranade and Norris 1981). The 
seminal study is that of Finifter (1970), based on data from the US in the 1950s 
gathered by Almond and Verba (1963). Finifter (1970) defined political 
alienation as an orientation which implied long-standing feelings of 
HVWUDQJHPHQWIURPVRPHDVSHFWRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSROLWLFDOHQYLURQPHQW
suggesting that it could be thought of as being on a continuum the opposite end 
of which implied feelings of attachment, identification and integration (see also 
Nachimas 1974; Aberdach 1969; Southwell 2012; Schwartz [1973]2009). 
Citrin et al. (1975) suggested this orientation was associated with feelings of 
DFWLYHµQRQ-LGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶DQGWKHperception that this aspect of the political 
environment was in some way alien to the individual, which would prompt 
feelings of scepticism, cynicism and weariness towards it (see also Dermody et 
al. 2010; Gamson 1968; Olsen 1969; Aberdach 1969). 
This literature also identified several characteristics which political alienation 
as a concept was said to either exhibit or be related to. The first is that 
alienation is not an attitude ± Finifter (1970) deliberately refers to it as an 
µRULHQWDWLRQ¶7KLVGLVWLQFWLRQUHIOects the view that alienation is a long-
VWDQGLQJWUDLWPRUHDODVWLQJFRPSRQHQWRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSROLWLFDOSHUVRQDOLW\
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than a temporary attitudinal perception or opinion (Finifter 1970; Citrin et al. 
1975; Gniewosz et al. 2009). This means that political alienation is more the 
UHVXOWRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VIRUPDWLYHH[SHULHQFHVGXULQJWKHLUSROLWLFDO
socialisation than it is their opinions on day-to-day experiences or events 
(unless they are particularly dramatic) (Gniewosz et al. 2009; Sherrod et al. 
2002; Damico et al. 2000; Verba et al. VHH&KDSWHU7KUHH¶VGLVFXVVLRQRQ
political socialisation).  
Second, political alienation is an active orientation i.e., the alienated individual 
necessarily has at least some cognitive awareness of what it is they are 
alienated from and of the perceptions, values or opinions which lie at the heart 
of that alienation (Citrin et al. 1975; Dermody et al. 2010; Gamson 1968). This 
distinguishes political alienation from what Citrin et al. (1975) identify as 
µSDVVLYH¶RUµV\PEROLF¶DOLHQDWLRQLQZKLFKDQLQGLYLGXDOFODLPVWREH
politically alienated either because there is a social desirability bias to do so or 
they feel that doing so is an important symbolic expression of their political 
identity (such as a Labour voter may feel when the Conservative Party is in 
office, for example), or because they find such a characterisation more 
appealing and socially acceptable than revealing that they have no interest in 
politics. 
A related characteristic is that political alienation necessarily produces 
identifiable behavioural consequences (Citrin et al. 1975). A long-standing 
orientation towards politics which indicates that an individual feels estranged 
from the political system or perceives that it is alien to them should produce 
behavioural consequences i.e., an alienated person should, all other things 
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being equal, behave in exactly the same way as an identical un-alienated 
SHUVRQLIWKHLUDOLHQDWLRQZDVUHPRYHG7KLVLVLQFRQWUDVWZLWKµV\PEROLF¶RU
µSDVVLYH¶DOLHQDWLRQ, which does not represent lasting orientations towards the 
political system or some aspect of it, but is simply an expression of another 
characteristic (such as party identification or political apathy) (Citrin et al. 
1975). These forms of alienation would not be direct causes of certain 
EHKDYLRXULQWKHLQGLYLGXDOEXWDUHUDWKHUµV\PSWRPV¶RIthat other 
FKDUDFWHULVWLF$Q\FKDQJHLQWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIWKLVµDOLHQDWLRQ¶ZRXOGQRW
necessarily, therefore, produce a change in political behaviour.  
The third characteristic of political alienation is its multi-dimensionality. In the 
same way that political participation was described in Chapter Three as a 
concept within which there were several discernible sub-dimensions, political 
alienation is expected to consist of several related but distinct dimensions as 
well (Finifter 1970; Southwell 2003; 2012; Nachimas 1974; Denters and 
Geurts 1993; Olsen 1969; Weatherford 1991). The dimensions represent 
different manifestations of political alienation, and may have different 
relationships with other characteristics (such as political behaviour or 
demographic attributes), but all represent a lasting, active orientation towards 
some aspect of the political environment denoting feelings of estrangement and 
non-identification (Finifter 1970; Southwell 2012). 
The literature identified four dimensions of political alienation which could 
UHODWHWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKWKHIRUPDODUHQDRISROLWLFV15 
                                                 
15
 An additional dimension, political isolation, was also identified as a theoretical possibility 
(Finifter 1970; Nachimas 1974; Citrin et al 1975), however this dimension refers to an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VGHVLUHWRDFWLYHO\LVRODWHWKHPVHOYHVIURPWKHLUSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\DVLOOXVWUDWHG
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i) Political Powerlessness: this UHIOHFWV³DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VIHHOLQJWKDWKH
cannot affect the actions of the government«>and that] the heart of 
WKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVV«LVQRWVXEMHFWWRKLVLQIOXHQFH´)LQLIWHU
p.390). The alienated individual feels that political decisions are 
imposed upon them rather than taken in a manner which includes 
their input (Olsen 1969). This dimension is closely linked to 
perceptions of political efficacy (Gniewosz et al. 2009; Kabashima 
et al., 2000) 
ii) Political Normlessness: this is ³WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUFHSWLRQWKDWWKH
norms or rules intended to govern political relations have broken 
GRZQDQGWKDWGHSDUWXUHVIURPSUHVFULEHGEHKDYLRXUDUHFRPPRQ´
(Finifter 1970, p.390). This is closely related to political trust in that 
LWUHIOHFWVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHUXOHVDQGRUFRQYHQWLRQVRI
political interaction are not being adhered to, and that they are or 
would be treated unfairly as a result (Dermody et al. 2010; Gamson 
1968). An individual who feels that politicians are corrupt, for 
instance, would be characterised as exhibiting normlessness 
alienation. 
iii) 3ROLWLFDO0HDQLQJOHVVQHVVWKLV³UHIHUVERWKWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
perception of the political process as lacking an easily intelligible 
SDWWHUQ«WKDWDOORZVWKHFLWL]HQWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHHIIHFWVRIKLV
choice, and to his feelings that such choices are essenWLDOO\IXWLOH´
(Denters and Geurts 1993, p.447; Nachimas 1974). In other words, 
                                                 
WKURXJK\RXQJ$PHULFDQV¶YROXQWDU\UHQXQFLDWLRQRIWKHLUFLWL]HQVKLSRUVHSDUDWLVWPRYHPHQWV
in Scotland or Spain). This is not, however, a manifestation of alienation said to distinctly 
apply to the Millennials or to explain their behaviour, and so is not examined here.  
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LWUHIOHFWVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODFNRIFRQILGHQFHLQWKHLUFDSDFLW\WR
understand the political process and so interact with it in a way 
which can promote their agenda (Finifter 1970; Gniewosz et al. 
2009; Kabashima et al. 2000). 
iv) Political Deprivation: this UHIHUVWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUFHSWLRQWKDW
the political system is structurally organised in a manner which 
prevents them from receiving their just desserts (Thompson and 
Horton 1960; Citrin et al. 1975). In contrast to normlessness, the 
individual does not believe that they are treated unfairly because of 
corrupt officials, but because the system itself is organised in a way 
that disadvantages them. Thompson and Horton (1960) suggested 
that this could be a common form of alienation among people of 
lower social class, for example.  
The final characteristic which specifically relates to the concept of alienation 
developed for this research is that it is focussed exclusively on the formal arena 
of politics and/or the institutions, actors or processes within it. It is, of course, 
possible to be alienated from other dimensions of politics, such as one¶VORFDO
community, or from other aspects of life involving politics, such as the 
workplace. The theory this thesis is testing, however, is that at the heart of the 
conventional wisdom that it is alienation from the processes, institutions and/or 
actors of formal British politics which alienates the Millennials and which is 
subsequently responsible for their distinctive behaviour. The concept of 
alienation developed here, therefore, refers specifically to alienation from the 
formal political arena.  
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Bringing these characteristics together, formal political alienation refers to a 
lasting and relatively stable orientation denoting feelings of estrangement from 
or non-identification with some aspect of the formal political system, arena or 
process. It is an active orientation which implies clear behavioural 
consequences, and in which the individual has at least some cognitive 
awareness of the object and manifestation of their alienation. It can manifest 
itself in a number of ways, and this is reflected in its various dimensions.   
5.3 The Definition and Characteristics of Formal Political Apathy 
There is a far less extensive literature on the nature of political apathy, and it 
has rarely been directly defined and conceptualised. Most references to the 
concept ± LQFOXGLQJWKRVHLQWKHILHOGRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
± impl\WKDWLWUHIHUVWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRWLYDWLRQWRHQJDJHZLWKSROLWLFV
(Dalton 2013; Wattenberg 2012; Henn et al. 2005; Marsh et al. 2007). This 
implication, however, strongly overlaps with the conception developed in the 
few studies which did directly address how political apathy should be defined 
and measured.  
Dean (1960) and Rosenberg (1954), for example, defined political apathy as 
UHIHUULQJWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODFNRIGHVLUHIRUSHUVRQDOLQYROYHPHQWZLWK
politics. This could refer to their participation in politics, or their engagement 
with it (Dean 1960; Rosenberg 1954). Similarly, Thompson and Horton (1960) 
summarised apathy as a generalised indifference towards politics; the apathetic 
individual has little awareness of politics, only needing enough to know it is 
not something they are motivated to engage with.  
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Linking these definitions with the focus on formal politics (since, as with 
DOLHQDWLRQLWLVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\WRZDUGVIRUPDOSROLWLFVZKLFKLVRI
interest), formal political apathy can EHGHILQHGDVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODFNRI
motivation for personal involvement with formal politics. This could mean that 
they lack a desire for limited engagement (such as taking an interest in a 
political issue) or for participation (such as discussing politics, or voting). Like 
alienation, it can be thought of as a continuum rather than an absolute, in that 
more apathetic individuals have a weaker motivation for personal involvement, 
and the opposite end of the continuum is defined by the expression of an active 
interest in politics and a strong motivation for personal involvement with it. It 
is important to note that this conception of political apathy differs from that 
often implied in the media and public discourse, in which apathy is taken to 
refer to a lack of interest in politics (i.e., an attitude) and a lack of political 
participation (i.e., behaviour) simultaneously (e.g., Mason 2013; Evans et al. 
2015). In this research, the concept refers specifically to an attitudinal 
orientation, which is posited to have a causal effect on political behaviour: i.e., 
political apathy and a lack of political participation is not the same thing; the 
latter is caused by the former.  
The limited nature of the study of political apathy means that there is less 
information available about the characteristics the concept may exhibit. Some 
characteristics can be identified, however, through contrasting apathy with 
alienation. First, based on studies which have suggested that political interest is 
relatively stable once individuals have passed through their politically 
formative years (though it does still change over time as a result of the life 
cycle, but not dramatically), formal political apathy can, like alienation, be 
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thought of as a relatively stable political orientation (Smets 2008; Neundorf et 
al. 2013; Prior 2010; Jankowski and Strate 1995).  
Second, in contrast with political alienation, political apathy is not an active 
orientation i.e., WKHUHLVQRH[SHFWDWLRQRIDFRJQLWLYHDZDUHQHVVRIRQH¶V
political apathy or iWVFDXVHVDSDWK\LVE\GHILQLWLRQDUHIOHFWLRQRIRQH¶VODFN
of cognitive awareness of and interest in politics (Thompson and Horton 1960). 
Political apathy is still expected to be associated with behavioural 
consequences, but they are less the direct consequences of an active orientation 
than the reflection of a lack of motivation to do anything else. This means that 
the behavioural consequences of political apathy are straight-forward to 
identify; higher levels of apathy imply lower levels of motivation for personal 
involvement with politics, which in turn implies lower levels of political 
participation (Thompson and Horton 1960; Dalton 2013).   
Finally, in contrast with political alienation, political apathy is expected to be a 
uni-dimensional concept. There is no expectation that apathy has several 
manifestations which could constitute different dimensions; it is a single 
GLPHQVLRQUHSUHVHQWLQJDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRWLYDWLRQWRLQYROYHWKHPVHOYHVZLWK
politics, or in this case, formal politics. 
5.4 The Multi-Dimensional Structure of Formal Political Apathy and Formal 
Political Alienation 
The multi-dimensionality of political alienation has been widely discussed 
(Southwell 2003; 2012; Kabashima et al. 2000; Gniewosz et al. 2009; Finifter 
1970; Weatherford 1991). The uni-dimensional structure of political apathy is 
assumed to be so uncontentious that it has barely been remarked upon in the 
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extant literature. Both, however, are lacking in empirical verification; no 
studies have examined the dimensional structure of political apathy, and the 
only study in the vast literature on political alienation to have done so was 
Finifter (1970). Following Finifter (1970) ± who concluded that of the 
dimensions of alienation outlined above only powerlessness and normlessness 
were empirically identifiable, the others were theoretically possible but not 
empirical realities ± almost every study of political alienation since has adopted 
the same structure. This is true even for studies in very different contexts to 
)LQLIWHU¶V0) (which was based on 1950s America), including different 
historic periods or different countries (Southwell 2003; 2012; Southwell and 
Everest 1998; Dermody et al. 2010; Kabashima et al. 2000; Gniewosz et al. 
)ROORZLQJKHUDQDO\VLV)LQLIWHU¶V1970) conceptualisation quickly 
became uncritically accepted as a conventional wisdom, to the extent that 
Wright (1976) suggested that the issue of its dimensional structure was settled. 
As Weatherford (1991) argued, assuming a universal dimensional structure for 
political alienation, which holds across time and space, is highly questionable, 
particularly in light of the fact that Finifter (1970) herself did not study the 
stability or universality of her structure. It is easy to imagine, for example, that 
political alienation in as different a context from 1950s America as Britain 
around 2009 (Dermody et al. 2010), Japan in the late 1990s (Kabashima et al. 
2000), or America in the 2000s (Southwell 2003; 2012), could be expressed 
very differently by citizens living in and being socialised into such 
dramatically different social, economic and political environments. 
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)XUWKHUPRUH)LQLIWHU¶VPHWKRGIRUHPSLULFDOO\LGHQWLI\LQJKHUVWUXFWXUH
of alienation can also be criticised. Finifter (1970) employed principal 
components analysis on a range of attitudinal survey variables, and concluded 
that they loaded onto two factors ± one relating to powerlessness and the other 
to normlessness. However, Van der Eijk and Rose (2015) have argued that 
principal components analysis is poorly suited for analysing the latent structure 
of survey data because a) such methods have a tendency to over-estimate the 
number of latent dimensions, and b) the methods assume that survey 
respondents do not vary in terms of the characteristics being measured, but 
instead assume that the survey items themselves are the only thing that vary. 
This is a highly contentious assumption for social survey data, which is 
designed to identify and elicit as much variance based on differences between 
individuals as possible. Van der Eijk and Rose (2015) suggest that methods 
from the item response theory family ± such as the Mokken Scale Analysis 
(MSA) presented in Chapter Three ± are more appropriate.  
5.5 Identifying the Dimensional Structure of Formal Political Apathy and 
Formal Political Alienation 
Given these concerns, there is a need to analyse the latent structure of formal 
political alienation and apathy to confirm the expectations of multi-
dimensional and uni-dimensional latent structures respectively as outlined 
above. Data from the 2010 British Election Study (BES) will be used, as it 
contains a wide range of variables relating to both political apathy and 
alienation referring quite explicitly to the formal processes and arena of British 
politics. The 2010 BES also contains a series of indicators of political 
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participation which can be used to explore the relationship between apathy, 
alienation and participation ± and to determine whether apathy and/or 
alienation explain generational differences in participation ± in the next 
chapter.  
MSA was used to determine the latent structure of first formal political apathy 
and then formal political alienation. Variables measuring characteristics which 
were conceptually consistent with the definitions of political apathy and 
alienation (as well as the specific dimensions of alienation) outlined above 
were identified, and recoded so that in all cases a higher score implied a greater 
level of apathy or alienation.16 The clusters of variables identified were taken 
to be indicative of sub-dimensions of the overall concept of political apathy or 
political alienation (the full results of both MSA are reported in Appendix Four 
for presentational purposes).  
The first MSA examined formal political apathy, and included variables 
relating to interest in politics and political affairs (including general interest in 
politics, interest in the 2010 election, and attention to politics), and to political 
knowledge (including true or false questions about various aspects of British 
formal politics). The variables relating to political interest were obvious 
choices on the basis of them essentially measuring the opposite of political 
apathy. The knowledge variables were included on the basis that an individual 
with no motivation for personal involvement with politics would be unlikely to 
be particularly knowledgeable about it.  
                                                 
16
 Responses which could not be meaningfully interpreted in this context ± VXFKDVµGRQ¶W 
NQRZ¶RUµQD¶± were omitted 
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The MSA found that the three indicators of political interest reflected a 
common latent construct, and were accompanied by several political 
knowledge variables. Two other dimensions of political knowledge were also 
identified, but disregarded as without some variable relating to political 
interest, they would be impossible to link to the concept of political apathy. 
The scale of items was recoded into a composite indication of formal political 
apathy, with a potential score range of 3 (implying the lowest level of apathy) 
to 23 (the most apathetic). The average score for this variable in the BES 
sample was 11.  
The second MSA examined formal political alienation and included a total of 
22 variables relating to a range of characteristics indicative of alienation. These 
included variables measuring political trust, political efficacy, perceptions of 
the gap between life expectations and experiences, life satisfaction, and 
FRQILGHQFHLQSROLWLFDONQRZOHGJH,QFRQWUDVWZLWK)LQLIWHU¶VILQGLQJV
the analysis identified a total of five dimensions.  
The first scale consisted of variables measuring political trust, perceptions of 
whether or not the government treated the respondent fairly, and democratic 
satisfaction. These indicators relate to perceptions of how much faith the 
individual has in the political system itself and in the various institutions and 
actors within it (including political parties, Parliament, and politicians). This 
scale represents, therefore, political normlessness.  
The second scale consisted of two items both measuring trust in other people 
rather than some specific aspect of politics. This was not indicative of any 
dimension of political alienation outlined above, but rather of social trust. 
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Given the overlap between political and social trust (Newton 2007), this 
variable should be included in regression analyses involving political 
normlessness.  
The third scale consisted of five items, alOUHIOHFWLQJUHVSRQGHQWV¶FRQILGHQFHLQ
their political knowledge based on their willingness to answer questions about 
their knowledge of politics. This corresponds to political meaninglessness. The 
fourth scale consisted of two items measuring political efficacy, capturing 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶YLHZVDERXWWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRISROLWLFDODFWLYLW\IRUREWDLQLQJ
benefits. However, a survey item which was not related to these two ± 
PHDVXULQJUHVSRQGHQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIKRZPXFKLQIOXHQFHWKH\had on 
politics ± more closely relates to the dimension of political powerlessness 
detailed above, and so this single variable was selected to represent it instead. 
Finally, the fifth scale consisted of variables measuring life satisfaction and 
assessments of the gap between life expectations and receipts. This 
corresponds well with political deprivation. 
All of the variables identified to correspond to each dimension of political 
alienation were recoded into single, composite variables (except for 
powerlessness which was measured by a single variable) to measure each 
dimension, with an additional variable measuring social trust. In each case, 
higher scores implied higher levels of political alienation. The final four 
variables are summarised in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of Formal Political Alienation Measures 
Dimension Variables Score Range Mean 
Powerlessness Influence on politics 0 - 11 8.27 
Normlessness Democratic satisfaction 3 - 39 22.78 
  Feels govt treats people like     
  respondent fairly     
  Trust in Parliament     
  Trust in Parties     
  Trust in MPs     
Meaninglessness Recoded Political  0 - 5 1.17 
  knowledge variables     
Deprivation Life satisfaction 2 - 9 5.29 
  
Feels gap between 
expectations     
  and what they get     
Source: British Election Study 2010, face to face post-election wave 
 
5.6 Dimensions or Separate Concepts? 
While the analyses outlined above identified four dimensions of political 
alienation, they do not alone provide empirical justification for considering 
political alienation as a multi-dimensional construct. Conceptually, this 
justification is straight-forward; each dimension represents a distinct 
manifestation of alienation from formal politics, based on different attitudes 
and potentially having different behavioural consequences. There is no 
empirical justification in the above analyses, however, and nor was one 
provided in previous studies of alienation, including Finifter (1970).   
A straight-forward way of examining the empirical relationship between them 
is to look at their correlation coefficients. If they are dimensions of the same 
construct, they could be expected to be significantly and positively correlated, 
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which could imply that they positively reinforce each other. If the dimensions 
are not at all correlated, however, it may suggest that there is little empirical 
reason for considering them to be sub-dimensions of the same concept. 
Table 5.2 shows a correlation matrix for the four dimensions. It suggests that 
while they are correlated ± all positively and all of the coefficients are 
statistically significant ± that relationship is quite weak. The strongest 
coefficient is between normlessness and deprivation, but even this is only 
moderately strong at 0.31. The next strongest is powerlessness and 
normlessness at 0.25, while all the other coefficients are below 0.2 and so 
suggest a very weak association (with that between powerlessness and 
deprivation as low as 0.1). The data suggests, therefore, that not all of the 
dimensions are substantially correlated, but not all of them are uncorrelated 
either. 
 
Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix for Alienation Dimensions  
  Normlessness Meaninglessness Deprivation 
Powerlessness 0.25 0.12 0.10 
Normlessness   0.13 0.31 
Meaninglessness     0.15 
Source: BES 2010, post-election face to face wave; all coefficient statistically significant at 
95% confidence level (p<0.001) 
 
The weak association poses a challenge to their being conceptualised as 
dimensions of the same concept ± but the fact that several are moderately 
correlated suggests that the notion is not entirely without merit either. There is 
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clearly scope to explore the ways in which these dimensions are related further, 
making use of structural equation modelling to explore the causal relationships 
between them, as well as extensive regression analyses to see if empirical 
justification could come from them sharing common causes or consequences. 
Such a study would substantially advance the understanding of formal political 
alienation, but is beyond the scope of this research. For the remainder of the 
thesis, formal political alienation will be assumed to have a multi-dimensional 
structure.  
5.7 Valid Measures of Apathy and Alienation? 
In this section, the measures of apathy and alienation will be validated by 
examining their effect on political behaviour to ensure that it is consistent with 
theoretical expectations. This is another step that has not been taken in extant 
literature on apathy or alienation, which has assumed that the variables were 
valid representations of the concepts based on theory, but never with empirical 
justification.  
As both are indicators of an orientation towards formal politics, they were 
validated on the basis of their effect on formal political participation ± 
specifically voting in a general election. Voting is the best choice for two 
reasons: first, it is the most common form of political participation, meaning 
that if apathy or alienation do have an impact on formal political behaviour it 
should be readily apparent here (Martin 2012; Whiteley 2012); and second, 
voting in elections is the participatory act around which the majority of the 
FODLPVDERXWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQDQGDSDWK\DUHEDVHGVHH&KDSWHUV
One and Two). 
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The expected consequences of formal political apathy are straight-forward: the 
FRQFHSWUHSUHVHQWVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODFNRIPRWLYDWLRQIRUSHUVRQDOLQYROYHPHQW
with formal politics, and so it should be associated with a substantially lower 
likelihood of them participating in it. Higher levels of political apathy should, 
therefore, be associated with a lower likelihood of voting in an election.  
The expected consequences of political alienation are slightly more complex, 
not least because the characteristic has been associated with many behavioural 
traits (see Chapter Two; also Ranade and Norris 1981; Citrin et al. 1975; 
Schwartz [1973]2009), and because it is conceivable that the different 
dimensions of alienation could affect different forms of political behaviour in 
different ways (Aberdach 1969). That said, LQWHUPVRI+LUVFKPDQ¶V
research, there are in essence only two behavioural options open to an 
individual who is politically alienated in terms of formal politics: ³:KHQDQ
individual is faced with an external situation that is perceived as undesirable, 
he is presented with two options: (1) take remedial action, or; (2) exit the 
VFHQH´6RXWKZHOODQG(YHUHVWS,QWKHFRQWH[WRIYRWLQJLQ
elections, this implies that the alienated individual will either refuse to vote at 
all (exit the scene), or vote for a candidate or party proposing substantial 
change to the status quo (take remedial action). In the case of a general 
election, this would imply voting for a non-mainstream party that proposed 
substantial changes to the dominant makeup of the political elite or policy 
status quo. Individuals who vote for such candidates rarely do so out of a 
genuine expectation that they will win, or that their party will form the next 
government, and they may not even consider such an outcome desirable 
(Southwell 2012; Citrin et al. 1975); they do so to either express support for the 
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change they advocate, or to express dissatisfaction with the status quo 
supported by the mainstream parties (Southwell 2003; 2012). This can be 
FDOOHGµQRQ-PDLQVWUHDPYRWLQJ¶)Rr each proposed measure of political 
alienation, therefore, there should be a clear association with either a lower 
likelihood of voting at all, or a greater likelihood of voting for a non-
mainstream political candidate, or both. 
The tests were conducted using two vote behaviour variables from the 2010 
BES; one measuring whether or not the respondent voted at all, and the other 
(for respondents that did vote) identifying which party they voted for.17 
Logistic regression analysis was used to examine the effects of the proposed 
indicators on voter behaviour, and a series of control variables were also 
included to account for other characteristics shown to affect turnout and/or vote 
choice, including: education, age, gender, social class, income, ethnicity, and 
(for turnout only) the belief that voting is a civic duty (Clarke et al. 2004; 
Whiteley et al. 2013; Verba et al. 1995; Verba and Nie 1972).18 
                                                 
17The first is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the respondent voted, with 
µGRQ¶WNQRZ¶DQGVLPLODUO\XQFODVVLILDEOHUHVSRQVHVRPLWWHG7KHVHFRQGYDULDEOHLVDOVR
dichotomous, scoring respondents who voted for any non-mainstream party in the 2010 
election (i.e. the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the British National Party 
%13WKH*UHHQ3DUW\RUDQ\FDQGLGDWHFRGHGDVµRWKHU¶Dµ¶DQGWKRVHZKRYRWHGIRUWKH
Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Scottish Nationalist (SNP) or Plaid Cymru parties 
VFRUHGDµ¶5HVSRQGHQWVUHIXVLQJWRDQVZHURUUHVSRQGLQJµGRQ¶WNQRZ¶ZHUHRPLWWHG9RWHV
IRUWKH613DQG3ODLG&\PUXZHUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGµQRQ-PDLQVWUHDPYRWLQJ¶LQWKLVFRQWH[W
While these parties advocate a dramatic change to the status quo as far as the political 
community is concerned ± with both supporting separation from the United Kingdom ± their 
other policies do not constitute such a dramatic change. As political isolation ± the form of 
alienDWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHGHVLUHWRUHMHFWRQH¶VSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\± is not being 
examined in this analysis, voting for parties representing that form of alienation was not 
FRQVLGHUHGµQRQ-PDLQVWUHDPYRWLQJ¶ 
18
 The details of these control variables are provided in Appendix One.  
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5.8 Validity Test of Formal Political Apathy 
Table 5.3 reports the analyses which examined the effect of formal political 
apathy on the likelihood of voting in the 2010 general election. The effect of 
the apathy variable alone (reported in the first analysis in the middle column) 
was significant and negative, as expected (with a coefficient -0.23). With the 
control variables included, the effect of apathy persisted and remained 
significant, though of less magnitude (with the coefficient falling to -0.17). 
Higher scores on the formal political apathy variable, therefore, were 
associated with a lower likelihood of voting in the general election, both with 
and without control variables, and so it can be accepted as a valid measure. It is 
also worth noting the Pseudo r-squared figure for the models, which show that 
the formal political apathy measure makes an impressive contribution to 
explaining variance in turnout: in the apathy only model, the figure was 0.18, 
and once the controls were included this rose to 0.3. 
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Table 5.3: Effect of Formal Political Apathy on Vote Likelihood  
Voted in 2010 Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
Apathy -0.23*** 0.01 -0.17*** 0.02 
        
Age    0.02 0.02 
Age2    0.00 0.00 
Education    0.07 0.05 
Social Class    0.09 0.05 
Income    0.09*** 0.02 
Gender    0.37** 0.13 
Ethnicity    -1.01*** 0.19 
Civic Duty    0.68*** 0.06 
        
Constant 4.13*** 0.15 -1.63* 0.66 
        
Obs 3064   2351   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.18   0.30   
Source: Logistic regression analysis on 2010 BES post-election face to face survey wave data. 
Figures rounded to 2 decimal places. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-value 
<0.001 
 
5.9 Validity Test of Formal Political Alienation 
Table 5.4 reports the analyses which examined the effect of the four alienation 
dimensions on the likelihood of respondents voting in the 2010 election. Table 
5.4a shows the effects of the dimensions alone, first individually and then 
collectively (from left to right). The Table 5.4b show the effects of those 
dimensions with the control variables included. 
The analyses showed that on their own, all four indicators had a significant and 
negative effect on the likelihood of an individual voting (powerlessness: -0.21; 
normlessness: -0.09; meaninglessness: -0.55; deprivation: -0.23), though their 
contribution to explaining differences in turnout was very limited (with all four 
166 
 
pseudo r-squared statistics below 0.1). The fifth model shows that when all 
four dimensions of alienation were included, powerlessness (-0.09), 
normlessness (-0.07) and meaninglessness (-0.45) continued to have significant 
and negative effects on vote likelihood, though the magnitude of each was 
reduced.19 Political deprivation, however, no longer had a significant effect. 
The explanatory potential of this model was vastly superior to the individual 
dimension models, with a Pseudo r-squared of 0.12.  
The inclusion of the control variables reduced the individual effects of all of 
the alienation indicators, but those of powerlessness (-0.15), normlessness (-
0.04) and meaninglessness (-0.34) remained statistically significant. The 
political deprivation indicator, however, no longer had a significant effect. The 
composite alienation model showed that including all four alienation 
dimensions with the control variables reduced the magnitude of the effect of 
each dimension on vote likelihood still further, but the effects of powerlessness 
(-0.11), normlessness (-0.04) and meaninglessness (-0.3) continued to be 
significant. The effect of political deprivation continued to be non-significant. 
The Pseudo r-squared for this final model was much better than all of the 
previous models (at 0.28), showing that the composite political alienation 
measure plus the control variables contributes a substantial amount to 
explaining variation in turnout, though it is still inferior to the apathy models. 
                                                 
19
 Note that as the four dimensions are measured on different scales, the regression coefficients 
are not directly comparable 
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Table 5.4a: Effect of Formal Political Alienation Dimensions on Turnout in 2010 (no controls) 
Voted in 2010 Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Powerlessness -0.21*** 0.02          -0.09** 0.03 
Normlessness    -0.09*** 0.01       -0.07*** 0.01 
Meaninglessness       -0.55*** 0.03    -0.45*** 0.04 
Deprivation          -0.23*** 0.03 -0.07 0.04 
                 
Constant 3.01*** 0.22 3.53*** 0.18 2.04*** 0.07 2.51*** 0.18 4.82 0.31 
Obs 3057   2854   3070   3014   2809   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.02   0.06   0.09   0.02   0.12   
Source: Logistic regression analysis BES 2010, face to face survey post-election wave. Figures rounded to 2 decimal places. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-
value <0.001  
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Table 5.4b: Effect of Formal Political Alienation Dimensions on Turnout in 2010 (with controls) 
Voted in 2010 Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Powerlessness -0.15*** 0.03          -0.11** 0.03 
Normlessness    -0.04*** 0.01       -0.04*** 0.01 
Meaninglessness       -0.34*** 0.05    -0.30*** 0.06 
Deprivation          -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 
                 
Age 0.04* 0.02 0.05* 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Age2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Education 0.17** 0.05 0.14** 0.05 0.16** 0.05 0.19*** 0.05 0.11* 0.05 
Social Class 0.15** 0.05 0.16** 0.05 0.11* 0.05 0.16** 0.05 0.13* 0.05 
Income 0.10*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.02 0.09*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.02 
Gender  0.02 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.30* 0.13 
Ethnicity -1.15*** 0.18 -1.21*** 0.19 -0.92*** 0.19 -1.08*** 0.18 -1.10*** 0.20 
Civic Duty 0.80*** 0.06 0.78*** 0.06 0.78*** 0.06 0.83*** 0.06 0.71*** 0.06 
Social Trust    0.02 0.02       0.01 0.02 
                 
Constant -3.97*** 0.63 -4.11*** 0.68 -3.70*** 0.61 -5.20*** 0.64 -2.19** 0.81 
Obs 2347   2214   2354   2331   2192   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.25   0.24   0.26   0.24   0.26   
Source: Logistic regression analysis BES 2010, face to face survey post-election wave. Figures rounded to 2 decimal places. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-
value <0.001 
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Turning to non-mainstream voting, Table 5.5 shows the effects of the four 
alienation indicators on the likelihood of an individual voting for a non-
mainstream candidate in the 2010 election. The data is presented in the same 
format as Table 5.4: Table 5.5a shows the models for the alienation indicators 
only, and Table 5.5b shows those that included the controls. 
Table 5.5a shows that individually neither political powerlessness nor 
meaninglessness had significant effects on non-mainstream voting. 
Normlessness and deprivation, on the other hand, did, with statistically 
significant coefficients of 0.14 and 0.39 respectively. The composite model 
showed similar effects; when controlling for the other dimensions of alienation, 
powerlessness and meaninglessness had no significant impact, while 
normlessness (0.12) and deprivation (0.21) had a significant, positive effect. 
The Pseudo r-squared statistics for these two models show that normlessness 
makes a reasonable contribution to explaining non-mainstream voting (0.10), 
and much higher than it makes to explaining turnout (see Table 5.4a), but 
deprivation makes a more limited contribution (0.04). In the composite model, 
the figure barely increased from that in the normlessness only model, to 0.12.  
Including the controls (Table 5.5b) had only a small impact on these effects. 
Both powerlessness and meaninglessness continued to have non-significant 
effects, individually and in the composite alienation model. Normlessness 
continued to be positively associated with non-mainstream voting, with a 
significant coefficient of 0.11, both when considered alone and once the other 
dimensions of alienation were controlled for. Deprivation had a significant, 
positive effect (0.23) alone, but once the other dimensions of alienation were 
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accounted for, the effect became non-significant. Including the control 
variables made almost no difference to the explanatory power of the models; 
the normlessness plus controls model had a Pseudo r-squared of 0.11, barely 
above that of the normlessness-only model, and the composite model with 
controls actually had a slightly lower figure than that of the composite 
alienation only model ± with a Pseudo r-squared of 0.11 compared with 0.12. 
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Table 5.5a: Effect of Formal Political Alienation on Non-Mainstream Voting (no controls) 
N-M Voting Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Powerlessness 0.06 0.05          -0.03 0.05 
Normlessness    0.14*** 0.02       0.12*** 0.02 
Meaninglessness       0.17 0.09    0.12 0.09 
Deprivation          0.39*** 0.07 0.21** 0.08 
                 
Constant -3.01*** 0.42 -5.80*** 0.43 -2.70*** 0.13 -4.63*** 0.42 -6.56*** 0.63 
Obs 1544   1505   1549   1530   1487   
Prob > Chi2 0.23   0.00   0.06   0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.00   0.10   0.00   0.04   0.12   
Source: Logistic regression analysis BES 2010, face to face post-election wave. Figures rounded to 2 decimal places. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-value 
<0.001  
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Table 5.5b: Effect of Formal Political Alienation on Non-Mainstream Voting (with controls) 
N-M Voting Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std  Er Coef Std Er 
Powerlessness 0.01 0.05          -0.06 0.06 
Normlessness    0.11*** 0.02       0.11*** 0.02 
Meaninglessness       0.14 0.11    0.16 0.11 
Deprivation          0.23** 0.09 0.11 0.09 
                 
Age -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Education -0.17 0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.16 0.09 -0.14 0.09 -0.08 0.09 
Social Class -0.13 0.09 -0.15 0.09 -0.11 0.09 -0.12 0.09 -0.12 0.09 
Income -0.08* 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.08* 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.04 
Gender  -0.39 0.23 -0.32 0.24 -0.48* 0.24 -0.37 0.23 -0.40 0.25 
Ethnicity 0.16 0.45 0.13 0.46 0.13 0.45 0.10 0.45 0.09 0.47 
Social Trust    0.00 0.03       0.02 0.03 
                 
Constant -0.05 0.73 -3.63*** 0.9 -0.31 0.65 -1.75 0.9 -4.38*** 1.18 
Obs 1209   1183   1211   1202   1174   
Prob > Chi2 0.001   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.04   0.11   0.04   0.05   0.11   
Source: Logistic regression analysis BES 2010, face to face post-election wave. Figures rounded to 2 decimal places. * - p-value <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-value 
<0.001  
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The tests showed, therefore, that only the indicators of political powerlessness, 
normlessness and meaninglessness can be taken as valid based on the criteria 
outlined above. Higher levels of political powerlessness and meaninglessness 
are both associated with less chance of an individual voting in a general 
election, but they have no impact on whether or not they will support a non-
mainstream candidate. Higher levels of normlessness alienation both depress 
the chances of an individual voting and increase the chances of them voting for 
a non-mainstream candidate. Finally, higher levels of political deprivation have 
no effect on the likelihood of someone voting, and, once political normlessness 
has been accounted for, no effect on their chances of supporting a non-
mainstream candidate either. This means that the measures of powerlessness, 
normlessness and meaninglessness are accepted as valid as they are all 
associated with at least one of the two expected behavioural outcomes of being 
politically alienated. The measure of political deprivation, however, must be 
rejected as it has no effect on the chances of an individual µH[LWLQJWKHVFHQH¶RU
WDNLQJµUHPHGLDODFWLRQ¶.  
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed clear and empirically informed definitions, 
conceptualisations and measurements suitable for studying formal political 
apathy and formal political alienation in Britain. It has developed the tools, 
therefore, to test the theories that British Millennials are a distinctly alienated, 
as opposed to a distinctly apathetic, political generation, and that this is 
responsible for their unique political behaviour. 
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The assessment has produced a uni-dimensional conception of formal political 
DSDWK\UHODWLQJWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODVWLQJODFNRIPRWLYDWLRQIRUSHUVRQDO
involvement with formal politics. It is measured by indicators relating to 
interest in politics and political affairs, as well as political knowledge, and 
depresses political participation. It has also produced a multi-dimensional 
FRQFHSWLRQRIIRUPDOSROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQUHIHUULQJWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODVWLQJ
active estrangement from the formal political arena and/or particular processes, 
LQVWLWXWLRQVRUDFWRUVZLWKLQLW3ROLWLFDOSRZHUOHVVQHVVUHIHUVWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
perception that they have no influence over political decisions from that arena, 
and is measured by a variable relating to influence on politics. It depresses the 
likelihood of someone participating in formal politics. Political normlessness 
refers to a lack of faith that the norms and conventions of just political conduct 
are being adhered to by actors or institutions within formal politics. It is 
measured by a series of variables relating to political trust, democratic 
satisfaction and perceptions of fair treatment by the government, and has the 
effect of both depressing formal political participation and increasing support 
for non-mainstream candidates. Finally, political meaninglessness refers to an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VODFNRIFRQILGHQFHLQWKHLUNQRZOHGJHDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIIRUPDO
politics, and is measured by variables examining confidence in political 
knowledge. Like political powerlessness, it depresses formal political 
participation but has no effect on support for non-mainstream candidates.  
A fourth dimension of alienation ± political deprivation ± was also examined, 
but ultimately rejected as a valid LQGLFDWRURIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VHVWUDQJHPHQW
from politics because it had no significant impact on formal political 
participation or support for non-mainstream candidates (once political 
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normlessness was accounted for). Whether this means that political deprivation 
is not actually a recognisable manifestation of formal political alienation as 
defined above, or that the indicator of political deprivation selected was 
invalid, is unclear. 
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Chapter Six: Apathy, Alienation and the Political Participation of the 
Millennials 
This chapter uses the measures of formal political apathy and alienation to 
H[DPLQHDWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\DQGDOLHQDWLRQUHODWLYHWRWKHLUHOGHUV¶ at the 
time of the 2010 British general election, and b) what role their apathy and/or 
alienation play in explaining their lower levels of political participation. Using 
the same 2010 British Election Study (BES) data employed in Chapter Five, 
this chapter begins by looking at the differences in the typical expressions of 
apathy and each dimension of alienation between the Millennials and the older 
generations in the British electorate. It then uses data on expected political 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQWRH[SORUHWKHHIIHFWRIDSDWK\DQGDOLHQDWLRQRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
formal and cause-oriented political behaviour, with a particular focus on 
ZKHWKHURUQRWWKH\H[SODLQWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
participation and that of their elders. 
The conclusions challenge the often argued conventional wisdom that the 
Millennials are as interested in formal politics as their elders, identifying them 
as the most apathetic generation in the British electorate. The analyses do find 
evidence to support the assertion, however, that the Millennials are also 
unusually alienated from politics, showing that they are typically more 
alienated by their lack of confidence in their own political knowledge than their 
elders (i.e., political meaninglessness). There is no indication, however, of the 
Millennials being unusually alienated in terms of the other characteristics so 
frequently attributed to them, such as their perception of having no influence 
177 
 
on politics (political powerlessness) or lacking trust in the formal political 
process (political normlessness).  
7KHGDWDDOVRVXJJHVWVWKDWERWKWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWOHYHOVof apathy and 
alienation help explain their unusually low levels of political participation. 
Their alienation depresses their formal and cause-oriented political 
participation, even once the effects of other characteristics (such as political 
sophistication) were accounted for. By far the most substantial effect, however, 
comes from their political apathy. Their alienation is important, but it is the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRIPRWLYDWLRQIRULQYROYHPHQWZLWKIRUPDOSROLWLFVZKLFKEHVW
helps explain their unwillingness to participate in formal or cause-oriented 
politics.  
6.1 Apathy and Alienation in the British Electorate 
This section examines the typical levels of formal political apathy and 
alienation exhibited by the political generations of the British electorate (see 
&KDSWHU7KUHHDQGFRPSDUHVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\DQGDOLHQDWLRQZLWKWKDW
of their elders. Table 6.1 shows the average scores for each generation on the 
apathy and three alienation dimension variables (details on the measures of 
apathy and each dimension of alienation are provided in Chapter Five and 
Appendix Four).20 A t-test was conducted on each score to determine whether 
or not the difference between the Millennials and each of the older generations 
was statistically significant.
                                                 
20
 The Pre-War and Post-:DUJHQHUDWLRQVKDYHEHHQPHUJHGLQWRDVLQJOHµ3UH3RVW-:DU¶
category because the Pre-War category would be too small to sustain reliable analyses.  
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Table 6.1: Average Formal Political Apathy and Formal Political Alienation Score by Generation 
Generation Apathy Powerlessness Normlessness Meaninglessness 
Millennials 13.47 8.11 23.05 2.13 
90s 11.32*** 8.01 22.79 1.24*** 
80s 11.21*** 8.18 23.80 1.07*** 
60s-70s 9.86*** 8.20 22.83 0.80*** 
Pre/Post-War 10.61***  21.93*** 1.11*** 
Source: 2010 BES face to face post-election wave. * relate to test that selected score is lower than that for the Millennials (* - p<0.05; ** - p<0.01; *** - p<0.001).  relate to 
tHVWWKDWVHOHFWHGVFRUHLVJUHDWHUWKDQWKDWIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV- S- S- p<0.001)
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The table shows that the Millennials were typically more apathetic than their 
elders, scoring just over two points higher (at 13.5) than all of the other 
generations (whose scores range from 9.9 for the 60s-70s generation to 11.3 for 
the 90s generation), with all of the differences being statistically significant. 
The figures suggest something of a curvilinear relationship between apathy and 
age similar to that implied by the life cycle theory of the relationship between 
age and political interest (Jankowski and Strate 1995). While this cannot be 
confirmed in cross-sectional data, whatever the cause the fact remains that the 
Millennials were substantially more apathetic than their elders. 
The second column in Table 6.1 shows the average scores for political 
powerlessness. The figures show that the most alienated generation was the 
Pre/Post-War generation, with an average score of 8.7. The other four 
generations had similar and lower levels of alienation, with scores ranging 
between 8 and 8.2. The Millennials ± at 8.1 ± were generally no different from 
WKHZLGHUHOHFWRUDWHQRQHRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DQGWKHLU
elders, except for the Pre/Post-War generation, were statistically significant. 
The third column shows the scores for political normlessness. This time, the 
Pre/Post-War generation were the least alienated, with a score of 21.9, while all 
the other generations had similar and higher levels of alienation, scoring 22.8 
DQG7KH0LOOHQQLDOV¶VFRUHof 23.1 was not significantly different from 
any of the others apart from the Pre/Post-War, showing that, as with 
powerlessness, they did not stand out from most of the wider electorate for 
being alienated. Finally, the fourth column shows the scores for 
meaninglessness alienation and suggests that the Millennials were significantly 
more alienated than the wider electorate. Their average score was 2.1, 
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significantly higher than those of all the older generations, whose scores ranged 
between 0.8 and 1.2.  
6.2 Regression Analysis of Apathy and Alienation in the British electorate 
Past research on political apathy and alienation and the traits indicative of them 
suggests that there are several individual characteristics which could influence 
how apathetic or alienated a given individual may be. These include political 
and social resources, social capital, political sophistication, gender and 
ethnicity (Dalton 2013; Clarke et al. 2004; Finifter 1970; Verba et al. 1995; 
Persson 2013; Citrin et al. 1975; Putnam 2000; Southwell 2003; 2012). 
Differences in these characteristics, therefore, may explain the differences in 
DSDWK\DQGDOLHQDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DQGWKHLUHOGHUVLGHQWLILHG
above.  
Table 6.2 reports the results of regression analyses used to examine the 
differences between the political generations in terms of apathy and alienation 
further and to determine whether those differences could be explained by other 
characteristics.21 Table 6.2a shows the data for political apathy, and the initial 
analysis (i.e., without controls) unsurprisingly corresponds to the data in Table 
6.1, suggesting that the Millennials were the most apathetic generation and the 
60s-70s generation the least apathetic (with all of the differences between the 
Millennials and the older generations being statistically significant). 
Adding in the control variables had a substantial impact on the relationship 
between apathy and generation. As expected, higher levels of political and 
                                                 
21
 The control variables are identical to those used in Chapter Four. Details can be found in 
Appendix One.  
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social resources and political sophistication (measured by education, social 
class and income) were associated with lower levels of apathy, as were higher 
levels of social capital (measured by social trust), and being male. Ethnicity 
had no significant effect. With these effects controlled for, the magnitude of the 
differences between the Millennials and the 90s, 80s and 60s-70s generations 
were reduced (with the 90s generation coefficient shifting from -2.14 to -1.08; 
the 80s shifting from -2.25 to -1.46; and the 60s-70s shifting from -3.61 to -
3.09), but all remained statistically significant and continued to suggest that the 
Millennials were more apathetic. The magnitude of the difference between the 
Millennials and the Pre/Post-War generation, however, increased (from -2.86 
to -3.29), suggesting that this was the least apathetic generation once 
differences represented by the control variables were accounted for.
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Table 6.2a: Regression Analysis of Formal Political Apathy by Generation 
Apathy Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials)        
90s -2.14*** 0.32 -1.08** 0.33 
80s -2.25*** 0.33 -1.46*** 0.34 
60s-70s -3.61*** 0.32 -3.09*** 0.35 
Pre/Post-War -2.86*** 0.31 -3.29*** 0.35 
         
Education     -0.65*** 0.07 
Social Class     -0.51*** 0.07 
Income     -0.15*** 0.03 
Gender     1.78*** 0.17 
Ethnicity     0.19 0.29 
Social Trust     -0.13*** 0.02 
         
Constant 13.47*** 0.26 18.38*** 0.43 
Obs 3053   2346   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.04   0.25   
Adj R-squared 0.04   0.25   
Source: 2010 BES face to face post-election wave. OLS regression analysis, missing observations removed through list wise deletion. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - 
p-value for coefficient <0.01; *** - p-value for coefficient <0.001 
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Table 6.2b: Regression Analysis of Political Powerlessness by Generation 
Powerlessness Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials)           
90s -0.10 0.15 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.18 
80s 0.07 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.28 0.19 
60s-70s 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.19 
Pre/Post-War 0.56*** 0.14 0.40* 0.19 0.69*** 0.20 
            
Normlessness        0.08*** 0.01 
Meaninglessness        0.10* 0.04 
Education     -0.19*** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.04 
Social Class     -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Income     -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Gender     0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
Ethnicity     -0.36* 0.15 -0.23 0.16 
Social Trust     -0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.01 
            
Constant 8.11*** 0.12 9.08*** 0.23 6.03*** 0.34 
Obs 3046   2341   2210   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.01   0.05   0.10   
Adj R-squared 0.01   0.04   0.10   
Source: 2010 BES face to face post-election wave. OLS regression analysis, missing observations removed through list wise deletion. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - 
p-value for coefficient <0.01; *** - p-value for coefficient <0.001 
184 
 
Table 6.2c: Regression Analysis of Political Normlessness by Generation 
Normlessness Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Generation (Millennials)           
90s -0.26 0.50 0.67 0.54 0.76 0.53 
80s 0.75 0.51 1.62** 0.55 1.53** 0.54 
60s-70s -0.22 0.5 0.03 0.56 0.13 0.56 
Pre/Post-War -1.12* 0.48 -1.37* 0.57 -1.54** 0.56 
            
Powerlessness        0.68*** 0.06 
Meaninglessness        0.18 0.12 
Education     -0.59*** 0.11 -0.44*** 0.10 
Social Class     -0.09 0.11 -0.07 0.10 
Income     -0.18*** 0.04 -0.16*** 0.04 
Gender     0.02 0.27 -0.12 0.27 
Ethnicity     -2.37*** 0.46 -2.15*** 0.45 
Social Trust     -0.45*** 0.04 -0.43*** 0.04 
            
Constant  23.05*** 0.42  31.49*** 0.69 24.93*** 0.90 
Obs 2843   2216   2210   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.01   0.14   0.19   
Adj R-squared 0.01   0.14   0.19   
Source: 2010 BES face to face post-election wave. OLS regression analysis, missing observations removed through list wise deletion. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - 
p-value for coefficient <0.01; *** - p-value for coefficient <0.001 
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Table 6.2d: Regression Analysis of Political Meaninglessness by Generation 
Meaninglessness Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials)           
90s -0.89*** 0.09 -0.50*** 0.09 -0.47*** 0.09 
80s -1.06*** 0.09 -0.74*** 0.09 -0.68*** 0.09 
60s-70s -1.34*** 0.09 -1.02*** 0.1 -0.89*** 0.10 
Pre/Post-War -1.02*** 0.08 -0.90*** 0.1 -0.80*** 0.10 
            
Powerlessness        0.02* 0.01 
Normlessness        0.01 0.00 
Education     -0.09*** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 
Social Class     -0.14*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.02 
Income     -0.04*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
Gender     0.62*** 0.05 0.58*** 0.04 
Ethnicity     0.41*** 0.08 0.43*** 0.08 
Social Trust     -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
            
Constant 2.13*** 0.07 2.85*** 0.12 2.18*** 0.18 
Obs 3059   2349   2210   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   
R-squared 0.07   0.25   0.22   
Adj R-squared 0.07   0.24   0.22   
Source: 2010 BES face to face post-election wave. OLS regression analysis, missing observations removed through list wise deletion. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - 
p-value for coefficient <0.01; *** - p-value for coefficient <0.001
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Table 6.2b reports the analyses for political powerlessness. The initial analysis 
once again confirmed the finding of Table 6.1; that the most alienated were the 
Pre/Post-War generation, and the other four generations (including the 
Millennials) were less alienated and did not substantially differ from each 
other. Adding in the first set of control variables (i.e., those relating to the 
characteristics specified above, not the other dimensions of political alienation) 
had only a limited impact on the generational differences; the difference 
between the Millennials and the 90s, 80s and 60s-70s generations remained 
non-significant and very small, while the coefficient for the Pre/Post-War 
generation reduced from -0.56 to -0.4 but remained statistically significant. The 
controls themselves only had a small impact on powerlessness; education 
(relating to political sophistication) depressed powerlessness (coefficient of -
0.19), as did higher levels of social capital (-0.03) and being from a minority 
ethnic background (-0.36). None of the other controls had a significant effect.  
Once the other dimensions of political alienation were also controlled for, the 
effect of social capital and ethnicity on powerlessness became non-significant; 
education was the only control variable which continued to have a significant 
effect (coefficient of -0.13). Both normlessness (0.08) and meaninglessness 
(0.1) were significantly and positively associated with powerlessness 
alienation, reflecting the fact that the three are slightly positively correlated 
(see Chapter Five) and suggesting that they may be reinforcing i.e., someone 
who is alienated through one dimension has a greater likelihood of also being 
alienated through another. In this model, the differences between the 
Millennials and the 90s, 80s and 60s-70s generations increase in magnitude but 
remain non-significant. The coefficient for the Pre/Post-War generation 
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increased to 0.69, suggesting that differences in other dimensions of alienation 
are important to explaining generational differences in political powerlessness, 
further supporting the suggestion that they may be mutually reinforcing.  
Table 6.2c shows the data for political normlessness. Once again, the initial 
coefficients suggested a similar relationship to that found in Table 6.1, in 
which the Pre/Post-War generation were the least alienated, and there was no 
significant difference between the remaining generations, although the 
coefficients did suggest that the 80s generation may have stood out for being 
unusually alienated. Introducing the controls had a notable impact on the 
generational coefficients: the magnitude of the Pre/Post-War generation 
coefficient increased to -1.37 from -1.12, suggesting that differences in the 
control variables helped explain why the oldest respondents were so much less 
likely to be alienated than the younger generations. There continued to be no 
significant difference between the Millennials and either the 90s or 60s-70s 
generations, but the coefficient for the 80s generation increased to a 
statistically significant 1.62, suggesting that they were typically the most 
alienated generation in the electorate. The control variable coefficients 
suggested that political sophistication (education), income, being from a 
minority ethnic background and social capital all depressed normlessness 
alienation, with the biggest impact from ethnicity, and there was no significant 
effect from either gender or social class.  
Adding in the controls for the other dimensions of alienation suggested that 
meaninglessness alienation had no significant effect on normlessness, but 
powerlessness had a positive, significant effect (coefficient of 0.68). The 
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magnitude of the Pre/Post-War coefficient increased still further to -1.54, and 
that of the 80s generation fell slightly to 1.53. The differences between the 
Millennials and the 90s and 60s-70s generations ± while implying lower levels 
of alienation among the Millennials ± continued to be non-significant. 
Finally, Table 6.2d reports the analyses for political meaninglessness. The 
initial coefficients identified the Millennials as the most alienated, at the lowest 
end of a curvilinear effect comparable to that seen for political apathy in Table 
6.2a, in which the 60s-70s generation were the least alienated. The second 
model showed that all of the control variables had a significant effect on 
meaninglessness alienation: higher levels of political sophistication and 
political and social resources, and of social capital, as well as being male and 
being white British were all associated with lower levels of meaninglessness. 
Controlling for these factors reduced the magnitude of the generational 
coefficients, but the overall pattern was the same: the Millennials were the 
most alienated, followed by the 90s generation (-0.5), then the 80s (-0.74), then 
the Pre/Post-War (-0.9), and finally the 60s-70s (-1.0). Adding in the controls 
for the other dimensions of alienation suggested that normlessness had no 
significant effect on meaninglessness, but powerlessness had a small, positive 
impact (with a significant coefficient of 0.02). All of the other control variables 
continued to exert a comparable impact on meaninglessness as suggested in the 
previous model, and the generational coefficients implied a similar 
relationship, with the only difference being that the magnitude of the effects 
was slightly reduced. 
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6.3 Summary 
The data above shows that, in contrast to the somewhat categorical nature of 
WKHµDSDWK\YHUVXVDOLHQDWLRQ¶ debate as it is sometimes conducted in the 
literature and/or public discourse (see Chapter One), at the time of the 2010 
election the Millennials were both the most apathetic generation in the 
electorate and ± in terms of political meaninglessness ± the most alienated. In 
other words, the Millennials exhibited the weakest motivations for personal 
involvement with formal politics, and the lowest levels of confidence in their 
own political understanding. There is no indication, however, that they were 
particularly alienated in terms of political powerlessness or normlessness.   
The analyses presented above also shed some light onto the causes of this 
generational distinction. Political sophistication, political and social resources 
and social capital were all shown to have a significant impact on political 
apathy and alienation in at least one dimension, with education and social 
capital affecting all four. Gender and ethnicity were also important, but made 
less of a contribution to explaining generational differences. The data showed 
that differences between the Millennials and their elders in terms of primarily 
social capital, income, social class and education helped to explain ± though 
not entirely ± their unusually high levels of apathy and/or meaninglessness 
alienation. This finding is consistent with many of the arguments in the 
literature (see Chapter Two) regarding the consequences of WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
unusually low levels of social capital (Putnam 2000; Macedo et al. 2005), their 
unique habits of media consumption (Wattenberg 2012), their lack of 
identification with political parties and other political institutions (Dalton 2013; 
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Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Whiteley 2012), and the pressures of their 
current stage of the political life cycle (Stoker 2006; Smets 2008), all of which 
KDYHEHHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KDYLQJOHVVLQWHUHVWLQSROLWLFVRU
being less knowledgeable ± or being less confident in their knowledge ± about 
it.  
Finally, the Pseudo r-squared statistics in the models show that differences in 
political generation play a very limited role in explaining differences in 
political apathy and alienation. Generational differences alone were shown to 
account for the most variance in political meaninglessness, for which the 
generation-only model had a Pseudo r-squared of 0.07. For apathy, 
powerlessness and normlessness, the equivalent figures were 0.04, 0.01 and 
0.01 respectively. Only with the inclusion of the control variables did these 
figures markedly improve: the final model for apathy had a Pseudo r-squared 
of 0.25, for powerlessness of 0.10, for normlessness of 0.19 and for 
meaninglessness of 0.22. While there are clearly substantial differences 
between political generations in terms of apathy and each dimension of 
alienation, as with political participation, these analyses suggest that it is 
differences in political and social resources, social capital and (in some 
instances) individual demographic characteristics that are much more 
influential.  
6.4 The Effects of Apathy and Alienation on Political Participation 
7RH[SORUHZKHWKHUWKHVHGLIIHUHQFHVKHOSH[SODLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZOHYHOV
of political participation, data on expected political participation from the 2010 
BES was used. These indicators are not the same as those measuring previous 
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political participation analysed in Chapters Two and Three, but are the only 
variables in the 2010 BES capable of exploring tKHHIIHFWVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
apathy and alienation on a wide range of political acts.22 Respondents were 
asked how likely they were to participate in a total of nine acts, on a scale from 
0 (meaning not at all likely) to 10 (meaning very likely), including: voting in 
the next local election; voting in the next European election; boycotting or 
µbuycotting¶ (i.e., deliberately purchasing rather than refusing to purchase) a 
product for political reasons; taking part in a rally or demonstration; working 
with a group to solve a common problem; discussing politics with friends 
and/or family; campaigning for a political party; and donating money to a 
political party.  
Replicating the processes reported in Chapter Three, latent structure analysis 
was conducted on this data to identify the dimensions of political participation 
to which these nine acts corresponded (this analysis is reported in Appendix 
Five). The results showed that two of the dimensions outlined in Chapter Three 
were indicated: formal political participation and cause-oriented political 
participation. While data relating to the civic and issue-specific formal 
participation dimensions would have been preferable, none was available in 
this dataset. That said, an analysis of formal and cause-oriented participation is 
VXIILFLHQWWRWHVWWKHWKHRU\WKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQRUDSDWK\LV
responsible for their unusually low levels of political participation both inside 
                                                 
22
 Appendix Five discusses the potential drawbacks of using measures of expected rather than 
previous political participation, and also examines the similarities between the two, confirming 
that they are sufficiently similar for this study.  
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and outside of the formal political arena, and that their alienation increases 
their cause-oriented activity. 
6.5 Expected Political Participation in the British Electorate 
This section presents analyses exploring the differences between the 
Millennials and their elders in terms of the expected formal and expected 
cause-oriented political participation measures developed in Appendix Five, so 
that the role of political apathy and each dimension of alienation in explaining 
those differences can be identified. Table 6.3 shows the differences between 
the generations for both expected formal and cause-oriented participation, and 
then shows those differences while controlling for political and social 
resources, political sophistication, ethnicity, gender and social capital.23 
 
                                                 
23
 The detail of these variables is provided in Appendix One. 
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Table 6.3: Expected Political Participation by Generation 
Expected Formal 
Participation Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Expected Cause-oriented 
Participation Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  (Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
90s 2.76*** 0.70 1.55* 0.77 90s 2.39*** 0.68 2.37** 0.78 
80s 2.68*** 0.72 1.75* 0.79 80s 2.09** 0.69 2.43** 0.80 
60s-70s 4.48*** 0.71 4.43*** 0.81 60s-70s 1.24 0.68 2.43** 0.82 
Pre/Post-War 2.93*** 0.68 4.27*** 0.81 Pre/Post-War -2.63*** 0.66 -0.32 0.82 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  1.30*** 0.16 Education 
 
  1.09*** 0.16 
Social Class 
 
  0.84*** 0.16 Social Class 
 
  0.80*** 0.16 
Income 
 
  0.30*** 0.06 Income 
 
  0.07 0.06 
Gender 
 
  -1.05** 0.39 Gender 
 
  0.24 0.40 
Ethnicity 
 
  0.98 0.68 Ethnicity 
 
  -0.55 0.68 
Social Trust 
 
  0.33*** 0.05 Social Trust 
 
  0.20*** 0.06 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
 
  
Constant 18.65*** 0.58 6.30*** 1.00 Constant 13.42*** 0.56 3.30** 1.01 
Obs 2927   2267   Obs 2961   2294   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   Prob > F 0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.01   0.16   r-squared 0.04   0.11   
Adj r-squared 0.01   0.16   Adj r-squared 0.04   0.11   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; *** - p-value <0.001
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The initial analyses without controls showed that the generational pattern 
corresponds to that identified in Chapter Three: the Millennials expect to be the 
least active in formal politics, typically scoring between 2.7 and 4.5 points 
lower than their elders on the 0-50 variable. The middle-aged 60s-70s 
generation expect to be the most active (coefficient: 4.48), with the Pre/Post-
War, 90s and 80s generations expecting similar levels of activity (with 
significant coefficients of 2.93, 2.76 and 2.68 respectively). 
Accounting for the control variables produced almost the same conclusions as 
those in Chapter Three, with higher levels political sophistication, political and 
social resources, and social capital, as well as being male, UDLVLQJUHVSRQGHQWV¶
expectations of formal political activity (ethnicity had no significant impact). 
The effect of controlling for these factors was to reduce the magnitude of the 
VDQGVJHQHUDWLRQV¶FRHIILFLHQWVWRDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\), 
suggesting that differences in these characteristics help explain why the 
Millennials are slightly less active than these two generations, and had almost 
no impact on the 60s-70s generation coefficient, suggesting that differences in 
these characteristics play little role in explaining why this generation is so 
much more active than the Millennials. It also increased the coefficient of the 
Pre/Post-War generation to 4.27. The data confirms, therefore, that even with 
differences in political sophistication and resources, as well as social capital, 
gender and ethnicity accounted for, the Millennials continue to expect to be the 
least active in formal politics.  
Table 6.3 suggests that the situation is slightly different for expected cause-
oriented participation. The generational coefficients in the initial model 
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suggested that the Pre/Post-War generation expect to be the least active rather 
than the Millennials (with a significant coefficient of -2.6), and there was no 
significant difference between the Millennials and the 60s-70s generation (with 
an insignificant coefficient of 1.24). The 80s and 90s generations expect to be 
the most active, with significant coefficients of 2.09 and 2.39 respectively. The 
coefficients suggested, therefore, that the Millennials were in the middle of the 
pack for expected cause-oriented activity; they expected to be more active than 
the Pre/Post-War generation, as active as the 60s-70s, and less active than the 
80s and 90s. 
Accounting for the control variables changed this picture somewhat. In contrast 
with expected formal participation, only political sophistication and certain 
aspects of political and social resources, along with social capital, had a 
significant and positive effect (education, social class and social trust had 
significant effects, but income did not). Furthermore, there was no significant 
difference between men and women or white and non-white British 
respondents. With these effects accounted for, the Millennials were found to 
expect to be the least active generation along with the Pre/Post-War (the 
coefficient for which shifted to an insignificant -0.32). There was no 
identifiable difference between the 90s, 80s or 60s-70s generations. 
6.6 Effects of Apathy and Alienation on Expected Political Participation 
This section explores the impact of formal political apathy and alienation on 
expected political participation, and particularly on the differences in expected 
participation between the Millennials and their elders. Table 6.4 begins with 
analyses examining the effect of formal political apathy on expected formal 
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political participation, both with and without the controls. It also reports the 
analyses presented in Table 6.3 for ease of comparison. 
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Table 6.4: Effect of Formal Political Apathy on Expected Formal Political Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials)                 
90s 2.76*** 0.70 -0.4 0.51 1.55* 0.77 -0.09 0.60 
80s 2.68*** 0.72 -0.67 0.53 1.75* 0.79 -0.32 0.62 
60s-70s 4.48*** 0.71 -0.83 0.53 4.43*** 0.81 -0.04 0.65 
Pre/Post-War 2.93*** 0.68 -1.48** 0.50 4.27*** 0.81 -0.68 0.65 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Apathy 
 
  -1.49*** 0.03 
 
  -1.43*** 0.04 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.30*** 0.16 0.35** 0.13 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.84*** 0.16 0.15 0.12 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.30*** 0.06 0.09 0.05 
Gender 
 
  
 
  -1.05** 0.39 1.46*** 0.32 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  0.98 0.68 1.10* 0.53 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.33*** 0.05 0.14** 0.04 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 18.65*** 0.58 38.56*** 0.57 6.30*** 1.00 32.54*** 1.04 
Obs 2927   2923   2267   2265   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.01   0.48   0.16   0.49   
Adj r-squared 0.01   0.48   0.16   0.49   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.001
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The second model shows that political apathy has, as expected, a significant 
and negative effect on expected formal participation, with a one-point increase 
in apathy depressing expected participation by roughly 1.5 points. The effect of 
accounting for political apathy on the generational coefficients was dramatic. 
Whereas the coefficients in the first model suggested that the Millennials 
expected to be less active than all of their elders, once political apathy was 
controlled for these differences disappeared; the coefficients for the 90s, 80s 
and 60s-70s generations all became non-significant and negative. The 
Millennials were shown to expect to be even more active than the Pre/Post-War 
generation (who had a significant coefficient of -1.48). This suggests, 
therefore, that formal political apathy could almost entirely explain the 
GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DQGWKHLUHOGHUV¶IRUPDOSROLWLFDO
participation. The importance of political apathy to differences in formal 
participation is reinforced by the r-squared statistic in the second model: 0.48, 
compared with 0.01 for the generations only model. 
Introducing the control variables (the fourth model in Table 6.4) had only a 
slight impact on the effect of apathy, reducing the coefficient from -1.49 to -
1.43, suggesting that political apathy has a largely independent effect on 
expected formal participation. It also increases the r-squared figures to 0.49; 
barely different from the apathy-only model. Controlling for apathy meant that 
several of the control variables no longer had significant effects (as illustrated 
by comparing the third and fourth models). The effects of education and social 
capital remained significant and positive, though both were substantially 
reduced, and the effects of social class and income became non-significant. 
This suggests that much of the difference in expected participation explained 
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by political and social resources is actually accounted for by the effect of those 
characteristics on political apathy, and that once apathy is accounted for it is 
social capital and political sophistication that are the more important. 
Furthermore, the effect of ethnicity in this model became statistically 
significant to the extent that non-white British respondents expected to be more 
active (by 1.1 points), and the effect of gender was reversed, with women 
expecting to be more active than men (by 1.46 points), suggesting that gender 
differences in political participation actually reflect gender differences in the 
motivation to engage with formal politics.  
In this final model, the magnitude of all of the generation coefficients was 
reduced and none of the differences were found to be statistically significant 
(though the Pre/Post-War coefficient did still imply that they expected to be 
less active than most). This suggests, therefore, that once differences in apathy, 
political and social resources, social capital and demography are accounted for, 
there are no generational differences in anticipated formal participation left to 
explain. The r-squared for the final model was 0.49 ± barely higher than the 
apathy-only model. Differences in political apathy are extremely important for 
explaining differences in anticipated formal participation, and dwarf the 
influence of generational differences and individual demographic 
characteristics and resources. 
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Table 6.5: Effect of Formal Political Apathy on Expected Cause-Oriented Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.39*** 0.68 0.70 0.63 2.37** 0.78 1.51* 0.73 
80s 2.09** 0.69 0.31 0.64 2.43** 0.80 1.23 0.75 
60s-70s 1.24 0.68 -1.75** 0.64 2.43** 0.82 -0.04 0.78 
Pre/Post-War -2.63*** 0.66 -4.90*** 0.61 -0.32 0.82 -2.93*** 0.79 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Apathy 
 
  -0.86*** 0.04 
 
  -0.80*** 0.05 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.09*** 0.16 0.57*** 0.15 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.80*** 0.16 0.39** 0.15 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.06 
Gender 
 
  
 
  0.24 0.40 1.64*** 0.38 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  -0.55 0.68 -0.45 0.64 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.20*** 0.06 0.09 0.05 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 13.42*** 0.56 24.81*** 0.69 3.30** 1.01 17.94*** 1.26 
Obs 2961   2957   2294   2292   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.04   0.20   0.11   0.22   
Adj r-squared 0.04   0.20   0.11   0.22   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.001
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Table 6.5 reports the analyses for expected cause-oriented political activity. 
The second model showed that apathy towards formal politics was also 
associated with lower levels of cause-oriented political participation, with a 
one point increase in apathy associated with a 0.86 point decrease in expected 
participation. Accounting for differences in apathy reduced all of the 
generational coefficients i.e., UDLVHGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶expected participation 
UHODWLYHWRWKHLUHOGHUVVKRZLQJWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZHUH[SHFWDWLRQVWKDQDW
least some of their elders of participating in cause-oriented activity are heavily 
influenced by their apathy. The coefficients for the 90s and 80s generations 
both become insignificant, and the magnitude of both the 60s-70s and Pre/Post-
War coefficients increased (to a statistically significant -1.75 and -4.9). Once 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KLJKOHYHOVRIDSDWK\ZHUHFRQWUROOHGIRUWKHUHIRUHWKH\ZHUH
found to expect to be even more active than the oldest generations. That said, 
while apathy is clearly very important it is much less influential in explaining 
differences in expected cause-oriented participation than formal participation; 
the r-squared statistic in the second regression model was 0.2.  
As was found for expected formal participation, accounting for political apathy 
produced marked changes in the effects of the control variables. Both 
education and social class continued to have significant, positive effects on 
cause-oriented activity, but their magnitude was reduced substantially. Social 
capital no longer had a significant impact, while income and ethnicity 
continued to be insignificant. The magnitude of the effect of gender was 
substantially increased ± to a coefficient of 1.64 from 0.24 ± showing that with 
political apathy controlled for, women expect to be more active in cause-
oriented politics than men. As was also shown in Table 6.4, including the 
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controls had only a minor effect on the magnitude of political apathy, with its 
coefficient falling from -0.86 to -0.8; apathy appears to have a substantial 
negative impact on cause-oriented participation which is mostly independent 
from that of the other factors represented in the model.  
Controlling for apathy in this model produced marked changes in the 
relationship between cause-oriented activity and political generations. With 
only the other control variables included (as shown in the third model), the 
Millennials were found to expect to be significantly less active than the 90s, 
80s and 60s-70s generations, and about as active as the Pre/Post-War 
JHQHUDWLRQ2QFHWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KLJKOHYHOV of apathy are accounted for, the 
differences between them and the 60s-70s (coefficient -0.04) and the 80s 
(coefficient 1.23) became insignificant. The 90s generation continued to expect 
to be more active, with a significant coefficient of 1.51, identifying them as 
expecting to be the most active in the electorate. Finally, the Pre/Post-War 
generation were shown to expect to be significantly less active than the 
Millennials and the wider electorate, with a significant coefficient of -2.93. 
Including the control variables in the model produced only a tiny increase in its 
explanatory power compared with the apathy-only model ± the r-squared 
statistic of the fourth model was 0.22, up from 0.2 for the second model.  
This data showed, therefore, that once political apathy has been controlled for, 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶W\SLFDOO\H[SHFWWREHDVDFWLYHDVWKHVDQGVJHQHUDWLRQV
and slightly more active than the oldest generations. However, there are other 
important factors, relating to political sophistication and social resources, in 
ZKLFKGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHJHQHUDWLRQVHVVHQWLDOO\GHSUHVVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
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expected participation relative to their elders. While political apathy is 
certainly important in explaining differences in cause-oriented activity, 
therefore, its significance is weaker than that found for formal political 
participation, with political sophistication and social class playing a substantial 
role. 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present the same series of analyses for political 
powerlessness. Table 6.6 shows the analyses for expected formal participation. 
The second model shows that, as expected (see Chapter Five), higher levels of 
political powerlessness depress expected formal participation, with a 1 point 
increase in powerlessness associated with a 1.8 unit decrease in expected 
formal activity. Comparing the generation coefficients in the first and second 
models shows that there was little impact on the relationship between 
generation and formal political activity from accounting for powerlessness, 
although there was a marked increase in the magnitude of the coefficients for 
the 60s-70s and Pre/Post-War generations, suggesting that powerlessness has 
more of an effect on their participation than that of the younger generations. 
The coefficients for the 90s (2.61), 80s (2.75), 60s-70s (4.66) and Pre/Post-War 
generations (3.97) remained significant and positive, and continued to identify 
the Millennials as substantially less active than their elders.  
Comparing the third and fourth models showed that there was similarly little 
impact from accounting for powerlessness once the controls were included. 
With controls the magnitude of powerlessness was decreased somewhat, with 
the coefficient falling to -1.54, although the effect remained significant. This 
suggested that the effect of powerlessness was largely independent of the 
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controls, and similarly the effects of the controls appeared to be largely 
independent of powerlessness. The generation coefficients in the fourth model 
were very similar to those in the third model, with only slight increases in 
magnitude apparent for the 80s and Pre/Post-War generations; all the 
coefficients remained positive and significant and implied WKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
were the least active. While powerlessness has a significant effect on formal 
participation, WKHUHIRUHLWH[SODLQVOLWWOHRIZK\WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DUHW\SLFDOO\
less active than their elders. Finally, the r-squared statistics show that 
powerlessness plays an important role in explaining differences in expected 
formal participation; the second model had an r-squared of 0.16, compared 
with 0.01 for the generation-only model. While its influence is less substantial 
than that of political apathy, political powerlessness is still more important than 
generational differences.
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Table 6.6: Effect of Political Powerlessness on Expected Formal Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
 (Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.76*** 0.70 2.61*** 0.65 1.55* 0.77 1.57* 0.72 
80s 2.68*** 0.72 2.75*** 0.66 1.75* 0.79 2.07** 0.74 
60s-70s 4.48*** 0.71 4.66*** 0.65 4.43*** 0.81 4.48*** 0.76 
Pre/Post-War 2.93*** 0.68 3.97*** 0.63 4.27*** 0.81 4.82*** 0.76 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Powerlessness 
 
  -1.80*** 0.08 
 
  -1.54*** 0.09 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.30*** 0.16 1.00*** 0.15 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.84*** 0.16 0.85*** 0.15 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.30*** 0.06 0.27*** 0.05 
Gender 
 
  
 
  -1.05** 0.39 -1.00** 0.37 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  0.98 0.68 0.35 0.64 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.33*** 0.05 0.28*** 0.05 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 18.65*** 0.58 33.24*** 0.84 6.30*** 1.00 20.28*** 1.21 
Obs 2927   2918   2267   2261   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.01   0.16   0.16   0.27   
Adj r-squared 0.01   0.16   0.16   0.26   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.001 
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Table 6.6 shows the effect of powerlessness on expected cause-oriented 
participation. Powerlessness had a significant negative effect (-1.31) on cause-
oriented participation, but accounting for it had only a marginal effect on the 
generational differences. The coefficients for the 60s-70s and Pre/Post-War 
generations both became more positivHUHODWLYHWRWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ and the 60s-70s 
generation coefficient became statistically significant (1.44), suggesting that 
powerlessness alienation has more of a role in depressing the participation of the 
older generations than the young. The overall impression of the generational 
relationship is, therefore, similar; the Millennials expect to be less active than the 
90s, 80s and 60s-70s generations in cause-oriented politics, but more active than the 
Pre/Post-War generation. 
As was also shown in Table 6.5, accounting for powerlessness and the control 
variables in the same model had little impact on their respective effects; the 
magnitude of the powerlessness coefficient in the final model fell to -1.2, and the 
magnitude of the significant controls variables ± education, social class and social 
trust ± also fell slightly. Ethnicity, income and gender continued to be insignificant. 
The effect of controlling for powerlessness on the generational coefficients identified 
in the third model was very small; the magnitude of the 90s, 80s and 60s-70s 
JHQHUDWLRQV¶FRHIILFLHQWVLQFUHDVHGVOLJKWO\WR and 2.56 respectively), 
while that of the Pre/Post-War generation became positive as opposed to negative 
(0.21) but remained non-significant. Collectively, therefore, these models suggest 
that political powerlessness depresses the cause-oriented participation of the oldest 
generations and helps explain why they may be less active than the Millennials, but 
LWVUROHLQH[SODLQLQJZK\WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶H[SHFWWREHOHVVDFWLYHWKDQWKHVDQG
80s generations is minimal, with differences in political sophistication, social class 
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and social capital being more influential. Finally, as with political apathy, political 
powerlessness is less influential in explaining differences in expected cause-oriented 
participation than formal participation; the r-squared for the final model was 0.18. 
Nonetheless, this was a substantial improvement on the 0.04 for the original 
generation-only model. 
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Table 6.7: Effect of Political Powerlessness on Expected Cause-Oriented Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.39*** 0.68 2.34*** 0.65 2.37** 0.78 2.46** 0.75 
80s 2.09** 0.69 2.24** 0.66 2.43** 0.80 2.76*** 0.77 
60s-70s 1.24 0.68 1.44* 0.66 2.43** 0.82 2.56** 0.79 
Pre/Post-War -2.63*** 0.66 -1.78** 0.63 -0.32 0.82 0.21 0.80 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Powerlessness 
 
  -1.31*** 0.08 
 
  -1.20*** 0.09 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.09*** 0.16 0.86*** 0.15 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.80*** 0.16 0.78*** 0.15 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Gender 
 
  
 
  0.24 0.40 0.30 0.38 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  -0.55 0.68 -0.94 0.66 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.20*** 0.06 0.16** 0.05 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 13.42*** 0.56 23.97*** 0.84 3.30** 1.01 14.19*** 1.27 
Obs 2961   2951   2294   2287   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.04   0.12   0.11   0.18   
Adj r-squared 0.04   0.12   0.11   0.17   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.001
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Table 6.8 shows the analyses for political normlessness on expected formal 
participation. As shown in the second model, normlessness has a significant 
negative effect, with a 1 point increase in normlessness associated with a -0.49 
point decrease in expected participation. Despite the data in Table 6.1 showing 
that there were few differences between the generations in terms of 
normlessness ± apart from the Pre/Post-War generation standing out for being 
unusually un-alienated ± the effect of controlling for normlessness on the 
relationships between generation and formal participation was notable. With 
normlessness accounted for, the expected participation of all the older 
JHQHUDWLRQVZDVUHGXFHGUHODWLYHWRWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶WKHFRHIILFLHQWIRUWKHV
JHQHUDWLRQIHOOWRWKHV¶IHOOWRWKHV-V¶IHOOWRDQd the 
Pre/Post-War fell to 1.23 and became non-significant. Political normlessness, 
therefore, accounts to some extent for the fact that the Millennials expect to be 
less active than their elders in formal politics.  
The fourth model suggested that the effect of normlessness on expected formal 
participation was largely independent of that of the other controls. The 
magnitude of the normlessness effect fell to -0.35 and remained significant, 
while the magnitude of all of the other controls also fell, and all remained 
significant (apart from ethnicity which was non-significant to begin with). The 
effect of including all of these controls on the generational differences was 
mixed; the difference between the Millennials and 90s and 80s generations 
increased (with their respective coefficients increasing to 1.8 and 2.08 
respectively), and that between the Millennials and the 60s-70s and Pre/Post-
War generations fell (with their respective coefficients falling to 3.7 and 3.1 
respectively). This suggests that differences in political normlessness help 
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explain why the Millennials expect to be less active than particularly the older 
generations, but that there are also differences based on political sophistication 
and resources, social capital and gender which widen the gap between them. 
The role of political normlessness in explaining differences in expected formal 
participation overall is more limited than that of powerlessness or apathy; in 
the normlessness-plus-generation model, the r-squared statistic was 0.12, while 
for the final model including controls it was 0.19.  
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Table 6.8: Effect of Political Normlessness on Expected Formal Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.76*** 0.70 1.94** 0.69 1.55* 0.77 1.80* 0.78 
80s 2.68*** 0.72 1.96** 0.71 1.75* 0.79 2.08** 0.80 
60s-70s 4.48*** 0.71 2.89*** 0.70 4.43*** 0.81 3.70*** 0.82 
Pre/Post-War 2.93*** 0.68 1.23 0.67 4.27*** 0.81 3.10*** 0.83 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Normlessness 
 
  -0.49*** 0.03 
 
  -0.35*** 0.03 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.30*** 0.16 0.95*** 0.16 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.84*** 0.16 0.86*** 0.15 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.30*** 0.06 0.19** 0.06 
Gender 
 
  
 
  -1.05** 0.39 -0.79* 0.39 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  0.98 0.68 -0.02 0.68 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.33*** 0.05 0.15** 0.06 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 18.65*** 0.58 31.38*** 0.03 6.30*** 1.00 18.67*** 1.4 
Obs 2927   2741   2267   2151   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.01   0.12   0.16   0.19   
Adj r-squared 0.01   0.12   0.16   0.19   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.001
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Table 6.9: Effect of Political Normlessness on Expected Cause-Oriented Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.39*** 0.68 1.65* 0.72 2.37** 0.78 1.92* 0.82 
80s 2.09** 0.69 1.43 0.73 2.43** 0.80 1.93* 0.84 
60s-70s 1.24 0.68 0.1 0.72 2.43** 0.82 1.54 0.86 
Pre/Post-War -2.63*** 0.66 -3.60*** 0.70 -0.32 0.82 -1.24 0.87 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Normlessness 
 
  -0.12*** 0.03 
 
  0.01 0.03 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.09*** 0.16 1.01*** 0.16 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.80*** 0.16 0.80*** 0.16 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 
Gender 
 
  
 
  0.24 0.4 0.41 0.41 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  -0.55 0.68 -0.41 0.71 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.20*** 0.06 0.21*** 0.06 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 13.42*** 0.56 17.34*** 0.87 3.30** 1.01 4.16** 1.48 
Obs 2961   2773   2294   2172   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.04   0.05   0.11   0.11   
Adj r-squared 0.04   0.05   0.11   0.10   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.001
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Table 6.9 shows the analyses of normlessness on expected cause-oriented 
participation. The second model showed that normlessness alienation depresses 
expected cause-oriented activity, by -0.12 points for every 1 point increase in 
normlessness, which is perhaps surprising given the relationship between 
normlessness and non-mainstream voting identified in Chapter Five. Despite its 
relatively small effect on cause-oriented activity, controlling for normlessness 
had a notable effect on the generational differences, essentially raising the 
expected participation of the Millennials relative to the older generations. The 
90s generation coefficient fell to 1.65 (though remained significant), that of the 
80s generation fell to 1.43 (and became insignificant). The 60s-70s generation 
coefficient remained insignificant and fell to 0.1, while the Pre/Post-War 
generation coefficient continued to suggest that they were significantly less 
likely to be active than the Millennials, falling to -3.6. A further surprising 
point is that variations in normlessness have so little impact on variations in 
expected cause-oriented activity: the r-squared for the second model was 0.05, 
barely different from the 0.04 for the generation-only model. Normlessness 
appears to be the only dimension of alienation in which its contribution to 
explaining overall variation in expected cause-oriented behaviour is smaller 
than that of political generations, and yet its role in accounting for generational 
differences in expected activity is quite substantial.  
Once the other control variables were included, normlessness no longer had a 
significant effect (with a non-significant coefficient of 0.01). The magnitude of 
the control variables was barely affected, with political sophistication, social 
class and social capital continuing to be positively associated with cause-
oriented politics. Controlling for normlessness in this model did, however, still 
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have a notable effect on generational differences, as was found in the second 
model in Table 6.9UDLVLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶expected participation relative to 
the wider electorate. The coefficients for the 90s and 80s generations fell to 
1.92 and 1.93 respectively, though remained significant, while the coefficients 
for the 60s-70s and Pre/Post-War generations fell to 1.54 and -1.24 and both 
were insignificant. Overall, therefore, while normlessness had no direct effect 
on expected cause-oriented activity once differences in political sophistication, 
resources and social capital were controlled for, and appeared to explain 
virtually no variance in overall cause-oriented activity, controlling for it 
nonetheless helps to explain why the Millennials expect to be less active in 
cause-oriented politics than the 60s-70s, 80s and 90s generations. 
Table 6.10 reports analyses of the effect of meaninglessness on expected 
formal participation. The second model showed that meaninglessness 
alienation had a substantial effect both on formal participation ± reducing 
expected formal activity by 3 points for every 1 point increase in 
meaninglessness, and increasing the r-squared from 0.01 to 0.15 ± and in 
explaining generational differences. With meaninglessness controlled for, all of 
the generational coefficients fell substantially in magnitude and become non-
VLJQLILFDQWVXJJHVWLQJQRVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
expectations of formal political activity and that of the wider electorate.  
Including the other control variables reduced the effect of meaninglessness to -
2.38, though it remained statistically significant. The magnitude of most of the 
control variables was slightly reduced, but they too remained significant. The 
exception was ethnicity, the coefficient for which increased from 0.98 to 1.8 
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and became statistically significant. The generational coefficients in the final 
model were also quite different from those in the third. All of the coefficients 
were reduced in magnitude, confirming that meaninglessness alienation is an 
LPSRUWDQWH[SODQDWRU\IDFWRUEHKLQGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZHUOHYHOVRIIRUPDO
political participation. The coefficients for the 90s and 80s generations fell to 
0.36 and -0.02, and both became non-significant. The coefficients for the 60s-
70s and Pre/Post-War generations fell to 1.99 and 2.07 respectively, but 
remained significant. This suggests that while meaninglessness alienation is 
important in explaining differences in formal participation between the 
generations, there is an important role for political sophistication and resources, 
social capital and demography as well.
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Table 6.10: Effect of Political Meaninglessness on Expected Formal Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.76*** 0.70 0.20 0.66 1.55* 0.77 0.36 0.74 
80s 2.68*** 0.72 -0.46 0.68 1.75* 0.79 -0.02 0.77 
60s-70s 4.48*** 0.71 0.54 0.68 4.43*** 0.81 1.99* 0.80 
Pre/Post-War 2.93*** 0.68 -0.16 0.65 4.27*** 0.81 2.07* 0.80 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Meaninglessness 
 
  -3.01*** 0.14 
 
  -2.38*** 0.17 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.30*** 0.16 1.09*** 0.15 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.84*** 0.16 0.54*** 0.15 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.30*** 0.06 0.21*** 0.06 
Gender 
 
  
 
  -1.05** 0.39 0.40 0.39 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  0.98 0.68 1.80** 0.66 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.33*** 0.05 0.26*** 0.05 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 18.65*** 0.58 24.87*** 0.61 6.30*** 1.00 13.00*** 1.08 
Obs 2927   2927   2267   2267   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.01   0.15   0.16   0.23   
Adj r-squared 0.01   0.15   0.16   0.22   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.001
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Table 6.11 reports the analyses of meaninglessness on expected cause-oriented 
participation. Meaninglessness was found to have a significant, negative effect 
on cause-oriented activity (-2.12), and controlling for it had a notable effect on 
the generational coefficients. The coefficients for the 80s and 90s generations 
fell (to -0.06 and 0.59 respectively) and both became non-significant. The 
coefficient for the 60s-70s generation reversed in sign and became significant 
(at -1.51), while the magnitude of the Pre/Post-War coefficient increased to -
4.68 and remained significant. Controlling for meaninglessness alienation, 
WKHUHIRUHUDLVHGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQUHODWLYHWRWKHLUHOGHUV The r-
squared statistic for the second model also confirmed that meaninglessness 
alienation is important for explaining differences in expected cause-oriented 
activity, at 0.11 compared with 0.04 in the first model.  
With the control variables included the effect of meaninglessness fell to -1.72, 
but remained significant. The magnitude of the control variables was also 
marginally changed, with political sophistication, social class and social capital 
continuing to have positive, significant impacts. There was a large change in 
the effect of gender, however, the magnitude of which increased from an 
insignificant 0.24 to a significant 1.3; once the fact that women were typically 
more alienated than men was controlled for, they were found to expect to be 
more active in cause-oriented politics.  
Finally, the final model found no significant differences between the 
Millennials and either the 90s, 80s or 60s-70s generations (with them having 
non-significant coefficients of 1.53, 1.2 and 0.74 respectively). The coefficient 
for the Pre/Post-War generation fell from -0.32 in the third model to -1.84, and 
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became statistically significant. This data suggests that political 
PHDQLQJOHVVQHVVH[HUWVDVLJQLILFDQWQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶FDXVH-
oriented participation such that controlling for it removes much of the 
difference between them and their elders. Significant differences do persist, 
however, reflecting the importance of further variations between the 
Millennials and particularly the oldest generations in terms of social capital and 
political and social resources. Finally, the r-squared statistic of the fourth 
model ± 0.15 ± shows that meaninglessness had a substantial and independent 
role in explaining variance in expected cause-oriented activity, though it was 
less substantial than that seen for political apathy or political powerlessness.
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Table 6.11: Effect of Political Meaninglessness on Expected Cause-Oriented Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.39*** 0.68 0.59 0.67 2.37** 0.78 1.53 0.77 
80s 2.09** 0.69 -0.06 0.68 2.43** 0.80 1.20 0.79 
60s-70s 1.24 0.68 -1.51* 0.68 2.43** 0.82 0.74 0.82 
Pre/Post-War -2.63*** 0.66 -4.68*** 0.65 -0.32 0.82 -1.84* 0.82 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Meaninglessness 
 
  -2.12*** 0.14 
 
  -1.72*** 0.18 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education 
 
  
 
  1.09*** 0.16 0.94*** 0.16 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.80*** 0.16 0.57*** 0.16 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.07 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Gender 
 
  
 
  0.24 0.40 1.30** 0.40 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  -0.55 0.68 0.15 0.67 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.20*** 0.06 0.15** 0.05 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 13.42*** 0.56 17.80*** 0.61 3.30** 1.01 8.13*** 1.10 
Obs 2961   2961   2294   2294   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.04   0.11   0.11   0.15   
Adj r-squared 0.04   0.11   0.11   0.14   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.00
220 
 
The final two tables report analyses exploring the effects of all the dimensions 
of political alienation on expected political participation simultaneously; in 
other words, they examine whether the effects on formal and cause-oriented 
participation identified above persist once the other dimensions of political 
alienation are controlled for. Table 6.12 shows the analyses for expected 
formal participation. The second model showed that all three dimensions of 
political alienation were associated with lower levels of formal participation, 
and that they all had an independent effect similar to those found in the models 
above. Every 1 point increase in powerlessness depressed expected formal 
participation by 1.31 points, with the equivalent effects for normlessness being 
-0.33 and for meaninglessness being -2.32. With the three alienation 
dimensions accounted for, there were no significant differences between the 
generations, suggesting that once alienation is accounted for the MillHQQLDOV¶
expect to be as active as the wider electorate. While the composite alienation 
model explains a substantial amount of variance in expected formal 
participation, it was still inferior to the political apathy model, with an r-
squared of 0.23 compared with 0.48. 
The magnitudes of the alienation effects were very similar in the final model 
including the control variables; the coefficients for powerlessness, 
normlessness and meaninglessness were -1.25, -0.24 and -2.0 respectively, and 
all remained statistically significant. The effects of the control variables were 
all reduced notably; education, social class, income and social trust all 
continued to have positive and significant, if weaker, effects, while the effect 
of gender was no longer significant (and the effect of ethnicity continued to be 
non-significant). The generational differences were larger in the final model 
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than the second model, emphasising once again the fact that at least part of the 
H[SODQDWLRQIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZHUOHYHOVRISROLtical participation lie not in 
alienation (or apathy) but in differences based on political and social resources, 
political sophistication and social capital. In the final model, the coefficients 
for the 80s and 90s generations were 0.84 and 0.83 respectively, but both were 
insignificant, while the coefficients for the 60s-70s and Pre/Post-War 
generations were 2.03 and 2.19 respectively and were significant. With 
alienation and the control variables accounted for, therefore, the 60s-70s and 
Pre/Post-War generations were found to be the most active, and the youngest 
three generations similarly inactive by comparison. This model performed well 
in explaining generational differences in participation ± with an r-squared of 
0.31 ±, therefore, but was still inferior to the apathy model (with an r-squared 
of 0.49), and even the apathy model without any controls (0.48).  
Finally, Table 6.13 shows the effects of all three alienation dimensions on 
expected cause-oriented participation. Controlling for all three dimensions 
collectively reduced their individual effects, with single point increases in 
powerlessness and meaninglessness depressing expected cause-oriented 
activity by -1.16 and -1.77 points respectively, and normlessness no longer 
having a significant impact. Accounting for all three dimensions together had a 
similar effect to that seen in the meaninglessness and normlessness only 
models above, in that the expected activity of the Millennials was raised 
relative to their elders. The coefficients for the 90s and 80s generations fell to 
0.46 and 0.09 respectively and both became insignificant, while that for the 
60s-70s generation fell to -1.47 and became significant. The coefficient for the 
Pre/Post-War generation fell to -4.04 and remained significant; overall, 
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therefore, this model suggested that the most active were the Millennial, 90s 
and 80s generations (with little difference between them), followed by the 60s-
70s and then the Pre/Post-War. 
The effects of the three alienation dimensions once the other control variables 
were included were complex and contradictory. Powerlessness and 
meaninglessness continued to depress expected cause-oriented activity, though 
with slightly reduced (but still significant) coefficients of -1.18 and -1.42 
respectively. The effect of normlessness was positive and significant, at 0.12. 
This suggested that once differences in political and social resources, social 
capital, demography and other forms of alienation were accounted for, higher 
levels of normlessness alienation made respondents more likely to engage in 
informal, direct political action. The generational coefficients still suggested 
that the Millennials expected to be slightly less active than the 90s and 80s 
generations, and more active than the Pre/Post-War generation, a similar 
pattern to that found in the third model in Table 6.12, but with differences in 
alienation accounted for there were no longer any significant differences 
between the generations. Overall, therefore, these analyses suggest that 
differences in particularly political normlessness and meaninglessness, as well 
as in political and social resources and social capital, help to explain why the 
Millennials expect to be less active than many of the elders (though not the 
Pre/Post-War generation) in cause-oriented politics. Finally, the contribution of 
the composite alienation model and the composite model plus controls to 
explaining variation in expected cause-oriented activity was greater than that of 
the individual models above (with r-squared statistics of 0.16 and 0.19 
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respectively), though they were still less substantial than the political apathy 
models (which had r-squared statistics of 0.20 and 0.22 respectively).
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Table 6.12: Effect of Political Alienation on Expected Formal Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.76*** 0.70 0.30 0.64 1.55* 0.77 0.84 0.72 
80s 2.68*** 0.72 -0.02 0.65 1.75* 0.79 0.83 0.75 
60s-70s 4.48*** 0.71 0.71 0.65 4.43*** 0.81 2.03** 0.77 
Pre/Post-War 2.93*** 0.68 0.34 0.63 4.27*** 0.81 2.19** 0.78 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Powerlessness 
 
  -1.31*** 0.08 
 
  -1.25*** 0.08 
Normlessness 
 
  -0.33*** 0.02 
 
  -0.24*** 0.03 
Meaninglessness 
 
  -2.32*** 0.14 
 
  -2.00*** 0.17 
Education 
 
  
 
  1.30*** 0.16 0.64*** 0.14 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.84*** 0.16 0.64*** 0.14 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.30*** 0.06 0.14** 0.05 
Gender 
 
  
 
  -1.05** 0.39 0.38 0.37 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  0.98 0.68 0.46 0.63 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.33*** 0.05 0.11* 0.05 
Constant 18.65*** 0.58 42.21*** 0.90 6.30*** 1.00 31.18*** 1.45 
Obs 2927   2733   2267   2145   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.01   0.28   0.16   0.31   
Adj r-squared 0.01   0.27   0.16   0.31   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.00
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Table 6.13: Effect of Political Alienation on Expected Cause-Oriented Participation 
  
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
(Millennials) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
90s 2.39*** 0.68 0.46 0.69 2.37** 0.78 1.33 0.79 
80s 2.09** 0.69 0.09 0.71 2.43** 0.80 1.27 0.81 
60s-70s 1.24 0.68 -1.47* 0.70 2.43** 0.82 0.51 0.84 
Pre/Post-War -2.63*** 0.66 -4.04*** 0.68 -0.32 0.82 -1.59 0.85 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Powerlessness 
 
  -1.16*** 0.08 
 
  -1.18*** 0.09 
Normlessness 
 
  0.02 0.03 
 
  0.12*** 0.03 
Meaninglessness 
 
  -1.77*** 0.15 
 
  -1.42*** 0.19 
Education 
 
  
 
  1.09*** 0.16 0.74*** 0.16 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  0.80*** 0.16 0.62*** 0.16 
Income 
 
  
 
  0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
Gender 
 
  
 
  0.24 0.40 1.31** 0.40 
Ethnicity 
 
  
 
  -0.55 0.68 -0.02 0.68 
Social Trust 
 
  
 
  0.20*** 0.06 0.18** 0.06 
Constant 13.42*** 0.56 26.59*** 0.97 3.30** 1.01 15.00*** 1.57 
Obs 2961   2764   2294   2166   
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
r-squared 0.04   0.16   0.11   0.19   
Adj r-squared 0.04   0.15   0.11   0.19   
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey, post-election wave. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value is <0.01; *** - p-value is <0.00
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Table 6.14: Summary 
  Apathy with Power. with  Norm. with Mean. with Alien. with 
    controls   controls   controls   controls   controls 
Expected Formal Participation                
Account for Millennial ¥¥ ¥¥ x ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥¥ ¥ ¥¥ ¥ 
distinctiveness?           
            
Adj r-squared (Generation only 
model: 0.01) 0.48 0.49 0.16 0.27 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.28 0.31 
Expected Cause-oriented 
Participation           
Account for Millennial ¥¥ ¥ x ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥¥ ¥¥ ¥¥ ¥¥ 
distinctiveness           
            
Adj r-squared (Generation only 
model: 0.04) 0.20 0.22 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.19 
¥± indicates that accounting for apathy/alienation in the model helped explain the difference between the Millennials DQGWKHLUHOGHUV¥¥± indicates that accounting for 
apathy/alienation completely the explained the difference (i.e., made the coefficient non-significant).
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6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that at the time of the 2010 British general election, the 
Millennial generation was both significantly more apathetic about formal 
politics and alienated from it ± in terms of their lack of confidence in their 
understanding and knowledge of politics ± than the wider electorate. At least 
part of this difference was explained by differences between the Millennials 
and their elders in terms of political sophistication, access to political and 
social resources, and social capital. Even with these factors accounted for, 
however, there remained significant differences between the generations which 
identified the Millennials as distinct. 
As the summary in Table 6.14 shows, bRWKWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KLJKHUOHYHOVRI
apathy and meaninglessness alienation were shown to play an important role in 
explaining why they were less active in both formal and cause-oriented politics 
than their elders. Once again, differences between the generations in terms of 
their political sophistication, resources and social capital were important, but 
with these effects controlled for there was nonetheless a substantial impact 
from apathy and meaninglessness alienation. Furthermore, even though there 
was no evidence of a substantial difference between the Millennials and their 
elders in terms of normlessness alienation ± with the exception of the Pre/Post-
War generation, who stood out for being the least alienated in the electorate ± 
normlessness alienation was also found to help explain generational differences 
and to be depressing the MillenniDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSROLWLFV 
These significant generational effects notwithstanding, it is also once again 
clear that generational differences only account for a limited degree of 
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variation in expected political participation; as Table 6.14 shows, the 
regression models including political generations produced r-squared statistics 
of 0.01 for expected formal participation, and 0.04 for expected cause-oriented 
participation. Accounting for the various dimensions of political alienation 
substantially boosted these figures, as did controlling for political and social 
resources, demography and social capital. By far the most influential, however, 
was political apathy; differences in political apathy were shown to account for 
almost half of the variance in expected formal participation, and just over a 
fifth in expected cause-oriented participation. There are clearly substantial and 
significant differences between political generations in these characteristics; 
but their scope is dwarfed by the importance of differences between individuals 
in terms of their motivation to associate with formal politics. 
The conventional wisdom that it is political alienation rather than political 
apathy, therefore, which explains why the Millennials are less active in formal 
politics than their elders, and more active in informal politics, was found to be 
only partly right. Political alienation ± specifically meaninglessness and 
normlessness ± LVGHILQLWHO\LPSRUWDQWLQGHSUHVVLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
participation in formal politics, but their apathy towards formal politics is not 
only far more important for explaining their distinct participatory habits, but 
for explaining differences in expected participation more broadly. In addition, 
FRQWUDU\WRWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOH[SHFWDWLRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQZDVIRXQG
to depress their cause-oriented political activity rather than increase it. 
Whatever causes the Millennials to feel estranged from the processes, 
institutions and/or actors of formal British politics does not, as some have 
argued, push them towards other channels of political expression in the 
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informal political arena, but rather depresses their political activity more 
broadly.  
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Chapter Seven: Apathy, Alienation and Social Evolution 
When trying to explain the (supposed) unprecedented alienation of young 
people, many commentators tend to point towards controversial political 
events, such as the financial crisis, the Iraq War or the Parliamentary expenses 
scandal, arguing that such events confirm to the Millennials that the political 
system is untrustworthy and does not serve their interests. Such an argument 
ignores, however, the fact that the political characteristics which are said to 
differentiate the Millennials from older generations ± including their apathy 
and/or alienation ± are shown to be apparent in Millennials throughout Western 
democracies. As Chapter Two argued, this means that the search for 
H[SODQDWLRQVIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\DQGRUDOLHQDWLRQVKRXOGEHJLQIURP
the premise that it is the result of a process affecting all Western societies at a 
similar time and in a similar way.  
This chapter outlines a potential causal process in the form of the social 
evolution of Western democracies, summarised by social modernisation theory 
which suggests that social change and evolution is linked to generational 
changes in political attitudes, values and behaviour because of its effect on 
political socialisation. This chapter focusses on two specific aspects of social 
modernisation which are suggested in the literature to be particularly important 
in explaining the MilOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKHULVHRISRVW-
materialist social and political values, and the fragmentation of media 
consumption patterns. These two theories and their role in driving changes in 
political engagement and participation are discussed, before specific 
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hypotheses regarding their expected effects on political apathy and each 
dimension of political alienation are outlined.  
7.1 Social Modernisation Theory 
The idea that social evolution ± such as that resulting from technological 
development or economic growth ± affects change in the political attitudes, 
values and behaviour of democratic citizens has been widely studied by a field 
RIOLWHUDWXUHWKDWFDQEHEURDGO\ODEHOOHGµVRFLDOPRGHUQLVDWLRQWKHRU\¶$WLWV
heart, the theory suggests thDW³socioeconomic development brings major 
VRFLDOFXOWXUDODQGSROLWLFDOFKDQJHV´,QJOHKDUWDQG:HO]HOS, which 
alter the experiences and contexts of the political socialisation of young 
generations to the extent that they develop different habits of political 
engagement and participation from those of previous generations (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005; 2009; 2010; Inglehart 1990). The theory is strongly inter-
twined with the impressionable years theory of political socialisation; while the 
effects of social modernisation can be felt by all in a given society at a given 
time, it is most profound for those who are still living through their politically 
formative years, and the consequences will be expressed by that cohort 
throughout their adult lives (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 2010). Relating this to 
the distinct political characteristics of the Millennials, therefore, social 
modernisation theory suggests that Western socio-economic development has 
been so dramatic over the past thirty years that the political and social 
environment which faced the Millennials during their formative years was 
substantially different from that which faced their predecessors, to the extent 
that they have developed substantially different political characteristics (Van 
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Deth et al. 2011; Wattenberg 2012; Dalton 2013; Norris 2002; 2011; Sloam 
2014). 
While this process lies at the heart of social modernisation theory, there is no 
single social modernisation argument to speak of when it comes to explaining 
the distinct characteristics of the Millennials. This partly reflects the fact that 
social evolution takes many forms and has many different impacts on various 
DVSHFWVRIOLIH5DWKHUWKHUHDUHVHYHUDOµVXE-WKHRULHV¶ZKLFKWHQGWRIRFXVRQ
the consequences of specific aspects of social evolution for the Millennials. 
They share the view that social evolution (or some aspect of it) is responsible 
for the emergence of the Millennials as a distinct political generation, but focus 
on different aspects of that evolution and highlight different attitudinal and/or 
behavioural consequences. One important such sub-theory relates to the rise of 
post-materialism, which takes an optimistic view of the consequences of social 
evolution and suggests that in the Millennials it has resulted in a politically 
sophisticated, engaged and active generation. Another is the media 
fragmentation theory, which takes a more pessimistic view and suggests that 
the Millennials are the most uninformed, uninterested and unengaged 
generation in modern history.  
7.2 Post-Materialism  
Both the post-materialism and media fragmentation theories share the view that 
social modernisation has produced a distinct political generation in the 
Millennials, but disagree regarding the consequences of social change. This 
disagreement often mirrors that outlined in Chapter Two regarding the exact 
participatory characteristics expressed by the Millennials, particularly in 
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relation to informal political activity. Studies arguing that the Millennials are 
unusually active in informal and civic politics tend to take the optimistic view 
of the consequences of social evolution outlined by the post-materialism 
theory. 
Broadly, the post-materialism theory argues that social evolution has had a 
SRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOengagement, suggesting that they 
have the potential to be the most politically sophisticated and engaged 
generation in modern history once they reach a stage of the life cycle more 
conducive to political engagement (Dalton 2013; Sloam 2014; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005). While the theory acknowledges that the Millennials are less 
active than their elders in formal politics, it suggests that they are 
disproportionately active in other political arenas, such as through cause-
oriented politics (Sloam 2012a; 2012b; 2014; Dalton 2013; 2007; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; Norris 2002; Martin 2012). 
The cause is said to lie in the consequences of three different aspects of recent 
Western social evolution: i) the enhancement of individual autonomy; ii) 
improvements in education; and iii) technological development. Enhanced 
individual autonomy stems from the consequences of socio-economic 
development well documented in research on the shift from materialist to post-
materialist political values (e.g., Inglehart 1971; 1990; 2007; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; 2009; 2010; Welzel 2007). The central argument is that as 
societies become more economically and technologically developed, and as the 
provision of education improves, the social values and priorities of citizens 
shift so that fewer constraints on individual autonomy based around social 
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institutions and economic concerns ± such as class, religion, gender, sexuality, 
or concerns of ensuring economic and physical security ± are apparent.  
For example, the development of the welfare state and economic growth in 
Western societies following the Second World War meant that fewer citizens 
faced a daily challenge to ensure their material needs (such as food and 
shelter), meaning that constraints over their daily activities and priorities 
relating to economic security were weakened (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005). This was compounded by the evolution of domestic and 
international politics which has dramatically reduced the prospect of crime and 
war, meaning that physical security is also more assured (Inglehart 1990; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Furthermore, citizens today face fewer constraints 
over their lifestyle and daily choices from the influence of, or discrimination 
based on, social institutions such as gender, class or sexuality, because social 
DQGSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQWKDVFKDQJHGSHRSOH¶VYDOXHVWRZDUGVSODFLQJJUHDWHU
emphasis on individual freedom and choice (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 
Franklin et al. 1992; Welzel 2007). Finally, improvements in the provision of 
education alongside developments in technology have meant that constraints 
over life choices and lifestyle stemming from a lack of skill, information or 
human capital have also been undermined (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Dalton 
2013; Norris 2004). 
The result of the weakening of such constraints over daily life, lifestyle, social 
interactions and human capital is that Western citizens live in an environment 
of increased individual autonomy. They live in a society in which they are free 
to act, believe, interact, and value to an unprecedented extent (Welzel 2007; 
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,QJOHKDUWDQG:HO]HO,QJOHKDUW$VDUHVXOW³>S@HRSOH
EHFRPH«LQWHOOHFWXDOO\PRUHDXWRQRPRXVDQGVRFLDOO\PRUHLQGHSHQGHQW«
>WKH\@H[SHULHQFHDJUHDWHUVHQVHRIKXPDQDXWRQRP\´,QJOHKart and Welzel 
2005, p.24). New generations socialised into this environment develop habits 
which both reflect and seek to advance that autonomy. This has substantial 
consequences for the political values these generations develop, with greater 
levels of aXWRQRP\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDSURSHQVLW\WRZDUGVµVHOI-H[SUHVVLRQ¶
values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2007). 
Post-materialistic values are one aspect of self-expression values which have 
important consequences for political engagement (Inglehart 2007). At their 
heart is a fierce concern with protecting and advancing individual autonomy, as 
well as with promoting the political agenda which accompanies it (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005; 2010; Norris 2002). This produces a lack of interest in, or in 
some cases direct hostility towards, hierarchical social and political institutions 
ZKLFKFRQVWUDLQDXWRQRP\OHVVLQWHUHVWLQµPDWHULDOLVW¶SROLWLFDOLVVXHVVXFK
as those relating to economic security (which new generations are more likely 
to habitually take for granted); an emphasis on social tolerance and equality, as 
well as individual rights and freedoms (which promote individual autonomy); 
an embrace of social change and evolution (to bring further autonomy); and 
demands for democratic involvement and participation (through which 
individual autonomy can be expressed and protected, and agendas reflecting 
that autonomy pursued) (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart 2007; Welzel 
2007; Norris 2002; Dalton 2004; 2013; Martin 2012). The post-materialistic 
approach, therefore, suggests that the Millennials experienced their formative 
years in the most socio-economically developed environment Western society 
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has ever known, and so are socialised into an environment of unprecedented 
human autonomy. Their expression of post-materialistic political values, and 
the attitudinal and behavioural characteristics associated with them, therefore, 
is more profound than that seen in any generation before them (Dalton 2013; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2002). 
The second key component of the post-materialism approach is the 
development of the provision of education. In what Wattenberg (2012) 
describes as the most drastic sociological development since the 1940s, 
Western societies have expended vast resources to the improve quality of and 
access to education. The quality of education is now substantially superior to 
that of thirty or even twenty years ago, and new cohorts tend to spend longer 
receiving education and gaining more qualifications than their predecessors 
(Wattenberg 2012; Dalton 2013; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In Britain, for 
example, Whiteley (2012) shows that only 5% of British Election Study 
respondents had a degree in 1974, a figure which increased to over 20% by 
2005. Dalton (2013), Norris (2002), Martin (2012) and Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) highlight comparable trends throughout Western society, in a process 
which has ± in the Millennials ± produced the most educated generation in 
history. 
The post-materialist theory argues that this development has not only 
contributed to the growth of human autonomy in Western society, but it has 
increased levels of political sophistication among Western citizens as well.  
3ROLWLFDOVRSKLVWLFDWLRQUHIHUVWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\WRJDWKHULQWHUSUHWDQG
understand political information, to link that information up into a series of 
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political ideas and concepts, and to use such concepts and information to 
inform their political participation and pursue their goals (Starling 2014; 
Dalton 2013; Wattenberg 2012). 
Greater political sophistication has been strongly associated with greater 
political knowledge (Wattenberg 2012; Dalton 2013; 2007; Verba et al. 1995). 
It is also related to broader participatory repertoires ± such as a propensity to 
participate in politics through alternative arenas to the formal ± (Sloam 2014; 
Norris 2002; 2011; Verba et al. 1995; Dalton 2013), greater political interest 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Sloam 2014), and both the capacity 
and willingness to participate in politics without the support of, or without 
being associated with, hierarchical political institutions such as political parties 
(Dalton 2013; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995; Norris 2002). The more educated a 
citizen is, therefore, the more politically sophisticated they are likely to be, and 
so the more politically knowledgeable, interested, active and independent they 
are likely to be. As the Millennials are the most educated generation in history, 
therefore, they also have the potential to be the most politically sophisticated, 
meaning they have the potential to be the most knowledgeable, active, engaged 
and independent citizens to have entered Western electorates.  
The third and final component of the post-materialism theory is the 
development of information and communication technology (ICT), particularly 
the Internet. The effects of the Internet and social media on political 
engagement are still fairly poorly understood, and whether or not they increase 
the engagement of under-represented citizens or merely replicate existing 
political inequalities remains unclear (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Norris 
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2¶1HLOO'L*HQQDURDQG'XWWRQ7KHRFKDULV
However, there is little question that the growth of the Internet and social 
media, alongside new forms of existing media (such as newspaper websites and 
24-hour news channels) has made political information more accessible than 
ever, and has also made disseminating political views and information less 
costly and dependent on institutions like the media or political parties (Norris 
2001; 2002; 2011; Dalton 2013; Casero-5LSROOHV2¶1HLOO). 
As Norris (2001) points out, political information is a vital resource for any 
political actor; it is ³WKHSULPDU\FRLQDJHRIWKHUHDOP«WKHUHVRXUFHWKDW
SHUVXDGHVWKDWLQIOXHQFHV´ DQGLVYLWDOIRUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHQVHRISROLWLFDO
efficacy, trust, confidence in their ability to reach informed decisions, and so 
ultimately, their political participation (Norris 2001, p.19). Any change in 
access to political information, therefore, can be expected to have a substantial 
impact on political engagement and behaviour (Norris 2001; 2002; Dalton 
2013; Martin 2012). 
The Millennials have been socialised into an environment in which the Internet 
and social media are more accessible and integrated into daily life than ever, 
and in which using them are skills developed from an early age (Ward and de 
Vreese 2011; Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Russell 2004; Wattenberg 2012). 
The post-materialist theory argues that ± alongside other changes to the media 
(such as the proliferation of 24-hour news channels) ± this has resulted in them 
being socialised into an environment in which political information, and the 
capacity to access and disseminate it, is greater than ever. Consequently, they 
have the capacity to be more politically informed than previous generations, 
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more confident in their ability to influence and understand politics, and so 
ultimately more politically active (Dalton 2013; Norris 2001).  
The post-materialist theory, therefore, argues that the Millennials have been 
socialised into a social, economic, political and technological environment 
which has resulted in them developing unprecedented levels of human 
autonomy as well as stronger post-materialistic values predisposing them 
towards political engagement and participation, and which has given them 
access to more political information than any generation has ever seen. 
Consequently, they have the potential (once they reach a stage of the life cycle 
more conducive to political engagement and participation) to be the most 
politically sophisticated, informed and active generation in history.  
Proponents of the post-materialism theory suggest that this process is apparent 
LQDZLGHUDQJHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKURXJKZKLFKWKey 
are suggested to differ substantially from their elders. For instance, post-
materialistic values, increased political sophistication, and greater access to 
political information have been associated with: i) a broader political agenda, 
in which issues such as environmentalism, gender and sexual equality, 
individual freedom, democratic rights and participation, and global politics 
play a more prominent role (Inglehart 1990; 2007; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 
2010; Norris 2002; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995; Dalton 2007; 2013; Stoker 
2006); ii) greater expectations of government (partly reflecting the broader 
agenda) (Stoker 2006; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995), and greater cynicism 
towards and dissatisfaction with political elites that fail to meet those 
expectations (Dalton 2004; 2013; Stoker 2006; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 
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2010); iii) less interest in and attachment to more traditional sources of 
community identity and political conflict (such as social class or religion) 
(Franklin et al. 1992; 2009; Dalton 2013; Inglehart and Welzel 2005); and iv) a 
VKLIWIURPµGXW\EDVHG¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIFLWL]HQVKLSWRZDUGVPRUHLQGLYLGXDOLVWLF
and instrumental conceptions (Dalton 2013; Norris 2002; Sloam 2007; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005). All of these characteristics, this theory argues, are 
DSSDUHQWLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWRU\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGSROLWLFDODJHQGDV 
Three further important consequences are particularly relevant in the context of 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ)LUVWO\SRVW-materialistic values imply a 
desire to express and advance individual autonomy, which leads to a greater 
motivation to engage with politics (Dalton 2013; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 
Sloam 2014). This has been linked with the Millennials¶DFWLYHLQWHUHVWLQ
specific political issues (if not formal politics), and also with the prediction that 
they will become a particularly engaged political generation as they age (Sloam 
2007; 2012b; Dalton 2013; 2012; 2007; Norris 2002; Martin 2012). Second, 
post-materialistic values imply a lack of interest in, if not an active hostility 
towards, institutions which could constrain human autonomy. This leads to the 
Millennials being less likely to associate with many of the traditional social and 
political institutions which have been central to democratic politics in Western 
democracies for decades, such as social institutions including class, religion or 
local communities, and political institutions including trade unions or political 
parties (Dalton 1984; 2013; Norris 2002; 2011; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 
Franklin et al. 1992; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995; Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000; Sloam 2014; Martin 2012).  
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Finally, they are consequently expected to avoid forms of participation which 
necessitate involvement with, or are associated with identification with, such 
institutions (such as many acts of formal political participation including voting 
in elections or joining and/or campaigning for political parties) (Dalton 2013; 
Norris 2001; 2002; Sloam 2014; Martin 2012). Instead, they embrace a broader 
participatory repertoire. They actively seek ways of influencing political actors 
and institutions in order to advance their agenda, and do not feel constrained to 
waiting for formal occasions or processes (such as elections) to do so (Dalton 
2013; Sloam 2014; Norris 2002). They are prepared to engage with a wide 
range of institutions and actors to influence the political outcomes they care 
about, and employ a wide range of participatory acts, either individually or as 
part of a group, which are more suited to influencing institutions with no 
formalised channels of citizen communication, to do so (Norris 2002; Dalton 
2013). This evolution of political participation ± in which the targets and 
repertoires of participation are expanded beyond those associated solely with 
formal politics ± is associated with the rise of cause-oriented political activity 
(Norris 2002; 2004; Sloam 2014; Martin 2012; Marsh et al. 2007).  As the 
Millennials are the most post-materialistic generation in Western society, 
therefore, they should be the ones who are most likely to exhibit this evolution 
in political participation, increasingly rejecting formal political activity in 
favour of cause-oriented political acts (Sloam 2012b; 2014; Dalton 2013; 
Norris 2002; 2011; Marsh et al. 2007).  
The overlap between the expectations of the post-materialism theory and the 
characteristics identified in the literature in Chapter Two as being uniquely 
expressed by the Millennials is extensive, and illustrates the success of the 
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theory in explaining their behaviour. The post-materialist theory expects the 
Millennials to reject the notion that voting is a civic duty, not to identify with 
political parties, to be more cynical about political elites, and to have a weaker 
commitment to formal political engagement and participation. It also expects 
that they will have an active interest in and knowledge of political issues 
relevant to their daily lives (if not necessarily formal politics). The overlap, 
however, between the characteristics identified within the Millennials in the 
literature and those expected by the post-materialism theory is not complete, 
and this forms the basis of criticisms of the theory. 
First, while there is little disagreement that the Millennials have the potential to 
be one of the most sophisticated and informed political generations owing to 
their access to education and technology, several studies challenge the claim 
that they are particularly interested in or knowledgeable about politics as a 
result. Wattenberg (2012), Putnam (2000), the Hansard Society (2012), Utter 
(2011) and Blais and Rubenson (2013) suggest that the Millennials are quite 
uninterested in politics compared with previous generations, regardless of 
whether formal politics or other spheres of political life are considered. 
Similarly, the Hansard Society (2012), Wattenberg (2012), Roker et al. (1999) 
and Buckingham (1999) suggest that the Millennials are not well informed 
about politics, with Wattenberg (2012) describing American Millennials as 
³WKHOHDVWSROLWLFDOO\NQRZledgeable generation ever in the history of survey 
UHVHDUFK´:DWWHQEHUJ, p.5). These criticisms relate more to matters of 
data and interpretation than a flaw in the logic of the theory, but nonetheless 
constitute a substantial challenge: if the Millennials are and remain among the 
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least politically interested and knowledgeable of political generations, how can 
a theory which predicts the opposite be sustainable? 
The second challenge relates to the view that the Millennials are particularly 
active in cause-oriented politics, and that this supplements or may even replace 
their formal political participation. For example, Wattenberg (2012) and 
Putnam (2000) argue that with the exception of volunteering, the Millennials 
are less active in most forms of political activity, including those associated 
with cause-oriented participation, than previous generations. The Hansard 
Society (2012) supports this argument, and also points out that there is little 
indication that citizens (Millennials or otherwise) who are inactive in the most 
common forms of formal participation, such as voting in elections, compensate 
for this by being disproportionately active in other areas (see also Oser et al. 
2013). Finally, Chapters Three and Four disproved the claim that the 
Millennials are more active than their elders in other modes or dimensions of 
political participation, showing that a) the Millennials are less active in all 
spheres of politics than their elders, and b) that they appear to have a lower 
propensity to participate in all dimensions of politics, even once period effects 
and the life cycle have been taken into account. Once again, therefore, the 
challenge is that in light of evidence suggesting that the Millennials are the 
least active generation ever to have entered the British electorate, how can a 
theory which predicts the opposite be accepted? 
7.3 Media Fragmentation 
The media fragmentation theory agrees with many of the arguments of the 
post-materialist theory regarding the consequences of socioeconomic 
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development for the Millennials¶VRFLDOLVDWLRQ. It agrees that they are the best 
educated generation in history, and, because of advances in information 
technology, that they have access to more political information than ever and 
are more comfortable engaging with the media to access it than their elders. 
The theory also broadly agrees with the process set out by the post-materialism 
approach by which the Millennials are said to have become more individually 
autonomous and more likely to exhibit post-materialistic political values and 
habits. The key argument of the media fragmentation theory, however, is that 
while the Millennials have the potential to be the most politically interested, 
sophisticated and active generation in Western society, they are not realising 
that potential. The explanation for this lies in another distinctive characteristic 
stemming from the formative socialisation of the Millennials: their unique 
habits of political news media consumption. As a result of the way they interact 
with and consume political news media, the Millennials do not access political 
information in a way which facilitates political interest or knowledge. This, in 
turn, means they participate in politics less than their elders, and so are 
ultimately likely to be less engaged and active throughout their adult lives.  
While the post-materialism theory suggests that changes to the media and 
information technology have made political information and news more 
accessible, the media fragmentation approach points WRWKHDGDJHWKDWµ\RXFDQ
WDNHDKRUVHWRZDWHUEXW\RXFDQ¶WPDNHLWGULQN¶,WDUJXHVWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV
are not taking advantage of the opportunities open to them to engage with 
political information because they have no motivation to do so. Consequently, 
they are less interested in and informed about politics because of their lack of 
exposure to it³0RUHDFFHVVWRKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQKDVSURYLGHGUHFHQW
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generations with the ability to learn more about politics than their grandparents 
were able to. But MXVWEHFDXVHWKHSRWHQWLDOLVWKHUHGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWVRPHRQH
will use it. Without reading a daily newspaper, watching the TV news, or 
otherwise following current events, even the best-educated people will 
probably not pick up much knowledge about the poliWLFDOZRUOG´:DWWHQEHUJ
2012, p.69). 
This argument is based on the view that news consumption is habitual 
(Wattenberg 2012; Graber 2002; Buckingham 1999; Putnam 2000). Once 
citizens get into the habit of reading newspapers or watching television news 
during their formative years, they are likely to do so for the rest of their adult 
lives, even as technology and the means through which that news can be 
accessed continues to evolve (Wattenberg 2012). Wattenberg (2012), for 
example, shows that 42% of the American cohort born between 1953/57 read a 
newspaper every day in the 1970s, and that 38% continued to do so in the 
2000s despite the proliferation of news media channels and the spread of the 
Internet. 
More recent generations, however, have been increasingly less likely to 
develop such habits. Of the 1968/72 US cohort, only 22% reported reading a 
daily newspaper in the 1980s, and only 20% of the 1978/82 birth cohort did so 
in the 2000s (Wattenberg 2012; Graber 2002). Fewer and fewer members of 
recent generations have developed habits of reading newspapers, and the same 
is also true for listening to news on the radio and watching news on television 
(Wattenberg 2012; Buckingham 1999; McLeod 2000; Graber 2002). While 
more members of recent generations report using the Internet and social media 
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on a daily basis (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Norris 2001), most do not use it 
as a source of political news and information (Di Gennaro and Dutton 2006; 
Gibson et al. 2005), and even those that do are less likely to consume as much 
political information as they would through reading a newspaper or watching 
broadcast news (Wattenberg 2012; Baumgartner and Morris 2010). Internet 
news consumption is not, therefore, a like for like replacement for more 
traditional forms of media, meaning that habits of consuming political news 
through the Internet are not a like for like replacement for habits of consuming 
it through traditional media. The Millennials, therefore, are developing habits 
which either mean that they consume less political information than did 
previous generations, or that they consume political information which is less 
likely to foster interest in or knowledge of politics; consequently, they are a 
distinctly uninterested and uninformed political generation (Wattenberg 2012; 
Buckingham 1999; Soule 2001; McLeod 2000; Casero-Ripolles 2012). 
Through its impact on political interest and political knowledge, consuming 
political news is an important facilitator of political participation by making 
citizens both more aware of and more informed about political events and what 
they can do to influence them (Buckingham 1999; Casero-Ripolles 2012; 
Wattenberg 2012). In addition, increased exposure to and knowledge of 
political events makes people more likely to discuss them with friends and 
peers, which in turn develops political interest and sophistication, and so 
ultimately participation (Buckingham 1999; Wattenberg 2012; Van Deth et al. 
2011; Soule 2001). This also helps people to develop habits of thinking about 
and debating political issues which facilitates their doing so again in the future 
(Roker et al. 2009). Furthermore, consuming political news endows people 
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with a greater sense of political efficacy as a result of their knowledge of the 
political process and political issues (Wattenberg 2012; McLeod 2000). 
Finally, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) and Wattenberg (2012) show that the 
habitual consumption of news media can support conceptions of citizenship 
which emphasise voting as a civic duty. This is partly a result of receiving 
messages promoting such a view through the media itself, and partly as a result 
of the habit of political news consumption and engagement spilling over into a 
habit of political participation (Wattenberg 2012; Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996).  
Through developing habits of consuming political news, therefore, citizens 
develop greater political interest, knowledge, sophistication and efficacy, and 
also conceptions of citizenship which emphasise political participation. As a 
result, developing habits of consuming political news facilitates habits of 
political participation and ultimately make citizens more active in politics, both 
inside and outside of the formal political arena (Wattenberg 2012; Roker et al. 
2009; McLeod 2000; Soule 2001; Buckingham 1999).  With regard to the 
Millennials, the key argument of the media fragmentation theory is that they 
are not developing these habits of news consumption, or that they are 
developing habits which are not conducive to the development of political 
interest, knowledge, sophistication and efficacy, nor to conceptions of 
citizenship which emphasise political participation, to the same extent as those 
of previous generations. 
This is said to be the result of two processes associated with social 
modernisation: the proliferation of media outlets, and the fragmentation of 
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media consumption. The proliferation of media outlets is primarily the result of 
technological advancement. The rapid development of the Internet and social 
media, as well as the arrival of hundreds of new television and radio channels, 
has provided more media outlets for people to choose from than ever 
(Wattenberg 2012; Wayne et al. 2010; Casero-Ripolles 2012; Baumgartner and 
Morris 2010). Before, people were restricted to watching (or listening to) a 
small number of channels and/or to reading newspapers for their news and 
entertainment media (Wattenberg 2012; Putnam 2000). These media sources 
ZHUHµEURDGFDVWHUV¶LQWHQGHGWRDSSHDOWRDVZLGHDQDXGLHQFHDVSRVVLEOHVR
they had a wide range of programmes, including those providing political news 
(Wattenberg 2012). People who consumed such media ± which was almost 
everybody through one form or another ± were highly likely to come into 
contact with political news at some point during their day (Wattenberg 2012). 
This was true even if they were not interested in politics; rather than switch off 
the television or radio, people would sit through the news until a more 
appealing programme appeared (Putnam 2000). 
This effect was compounded by the fact that media consumption used to be a 
family affair. Before the 1990s, it was common for families to sit and watch 
television or listen to the radio together (Putnam 2000). As a result, whatever 
happened to be broadcast on the channel the family was viewing would be 
watched by all members of the household (Wattenberg 2012). Even if the 
younger members of the family were uninterested in politics, they were likely 
to at least accidentally consume some political news media as they watched or 
listened to the channels preferred by their parents (Wattenberg 2012). 
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This pattern of media consumption, alongside the limited range of available 
media outlets to choose from, meant that political news was quite hard to 
avoid. Unless people were willing to avoid media altogether, or resist social 
and family pressure to watch television/listen to the radio together, they would 
be likely to see or hear or read some political news at some point during their 
day (Wattenberg 2012). The seeds of a habit of news consumption that 
included at leasWDOLWWOHSROLWLFDOQHZVZRXOGEHVRZQGXULQJPRVWSHRSOH¶V
formative years, and that would underpin a habit of news consumption 
conducive to political engagement and participation in their later years when 
they were likely to be more interested in politics (Wattenberg 2012; 
Buckingham 1999). 
The rapid rise of the Internet and social media, the proliferation of television 
and radio channels, and the fragmentation of family media consumption habits 
means that this is no longer the case. Political news is far easier to avoid for 
WRGD\¶V\RXQJJHQHUDWLRQWKDQLWZDVIRUWKHLUSDUHQWVRUJUDQGSDUHQWV7KHUH
are many media outlets to choose from, and people do not have to tolerate 
watching programmes they do not like while waiting for their favourite 
programme to appear ± they can change the channel, or get out their 
smartphone while they wait (Wattenberg 2012; Buckingham 1999). People no 
longer need to watch channels that contain a range of programmes designed to 
appeal to a broad audience. Instead, ³>V@SRUWVEXffs can watch ESPN; music 
buffs can tune to MTV or VH1; history buffs can glue their dial to the history 
FKDQQHO´:DWWHQEHUJS,QDGGLWLRQWKHQHZDQGSRSXODUIRUPVRI
media ± the Internet and social media ± are inherently flexible (Putnam 2000; 
Baumgartner and Morris 2010). If people do not like the content of a website, 
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they close the browser or go elsewhere. If they are not interested in the content 
of their Twitter or Facebook feed, they unfollow the source of the boring 
content or ignore it. Furthermore, families do not necessarily watch television 
together anymore. Children are more likely to have televisions in their rooms 
and watch what they want rather than joining their parents (Wattenberg 2012; 
Putnam 2000). The young are also more likely to consume the newer, more 
individualistic sources of media in which they have total control (Casero-
Ripolles 2012; Russell 2004; Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Di Gennaro and 
Dutton 2006; Baumgartner and Morris 2010; Norris 2001).  
All of these changes mDNHLWOHVVOLNHO\WKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOVZLOOµDFFLGHQWDOO\¶
come into contact with political news in some form or another. The accidental 
consumption of political news that was central to people developing habits of 
news consumption which facilitated political interest, knowledge, efficacy and 
habits of political engagement in adulthood is a thing of the past (Wattenberg 
2012; Graber 2002; Buckingham 1999). New generations either develop habits 
of news consumption that have a much weaker effect on political sophistication 
and engagement (such as those based around social media and the Internet), or 
do not develop habits of political news consumption at all (Wattenberg 2012; 
Buckingham 1999; Soule 2001; McLeod 2000). Consequently, the Millennials 
± who are at the forefront of this trend, being the least likely to use traditional 
forms of media and the most likely to use the Internet and social media (Evans 
and Sternberg 1999; Wattenberg 2012; Baumgartner and Morris 2010; Russell 
2004; Graber 2002; Norris 2001) ± are less likely to be interested in or 
knowledgeable about politics, or to develop habits and conceptions of 
citizenship which facilitate political participation. 
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One of the strengths of the media fragmentation theory is that it is capable of 
addressing the major challenge to the post-materialist theory, namely by being 
capable of explaining why the Millennials might be less interested in and 
knowledgeable about politics, and less active, than previous generations. There 
are, however, several substantial challenges to its approach. First, the nature of 
the causal relationship between news media consumption and political 
engagement central to the theory is far from clear. Wattenberg (2012) and 
Buckingham (1999), for instance, argue that news consumption is causally 
prior to political interest and knowledge. However, as Putnam (2000) notes, it 
is entirely possible that political interest and knowledge stimulate news media 
consumption. In this case, the media fragmentation theory would be unable to 
explain why the Millennials may be less interested in or knowledgeable about 
politics, as their lack of news media consumption would stem from their lack 
of motivation to engage with political media, not the other way around.  
The second challenge is the same as that levelled at the post-materialism 
theory: the media fragmentation approach cannot explain the evidence which 
goes against its theoretical expectations for the political engagement and 
participation of the Millennials. The theory expects that the Millennials should 
be less interested in and knowledgeable about politics than previous 
generations, and that this in turn makes them less politically active. Studies 
such as Henn and Foard (2012), Henn et al. (2005) and Marsh et al. (2007), 
however, suggest that the Millennials maintain an active interest in politics and 
are knowledgeable about the issues which affect their lives. Similarly, Sloam 
(2012b), Norris (2002; 2011) and Dalton (2013) maintain that while the 
Millennials may be less active in formal politics than their elders, they are 
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disproportionately active in cause-oriented politics. While this claim is in 
serious doubt given the evidence Chapters Three and Four, the media 
fragmentation theory is nonetheless incapable of explaining why the 
Millennials might be unusually inactive in one form of politics (such as the 
formal political arena) but active in another (such as the informal).  
7.4 Social Modernisation and Formal Political Apathy and Alienation 
Most of the consequences of rising post-materialism and media fragmentation 
GLVFXVVHGDERYHUHODWHWRWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ,WLVFOHDU
however, that they could DOVRKDYHVXEVWDQWLDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ 
apathy towards and/or alienation from formal politics. Indeed many of the 
consequences outlined by the two theories can expect to directly express 
themselves through apathy and alienation. The increased motivation to engage 
with politics suggested by the post-materialist theory, for example, should 
express itself in lower levels of political apathy among more recent 
generations. These expectations will be tested in Chapter Eight; in this section, 
the detail of and justification for those expectations is laid out.  
7.4.1 Post-materialism, Apathy and Alienation 
The post-materialism theory suggests that social evolution should have a varied 
impact on apathy and alienation. The increasingly post-materialistic nature of 
the Millennials compared with their elders suggests that they should be less 
apathetic than older generations once the effects of the life cycle (which will 
increase political apathy during youth) have been accounted for. This is 
because: a) they should be more motivated to participate in politics in order to 
defend and promote their individual autonomy; b) they should be more 
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motivated to participate to promote their post-materialistic agenda; c) they 
should be more likely to value political participation as an end in itself; d) they 
should be more politically sophisticated, which in turn facilitates the 
development of political interest; and e) they have access to more political 
information and discussion (through ICT) which should stimulate their political 
interest. The post-materialism theory firmly expects, therefore, that political 
apathy should be lower among the Millennials than older generations once the 
influence of the life cycle has been accounted for.  
The post-materialism theory expects that the Millennials should be mostly less 
alienated than their elders as well. Owing to their political sophistication and 
access to ICT to both access and disseminate political information, post-
materialists should be expected to feel more confident about their ability to 
influence political outcomes. The Millennials, therefore, should be expected to 
feel more powerful than their elders (i.e., exhibit lower levels of 
powerlessness) once any life-cycle effects have been accounted for. They 
should also exhibit lower levels of meaninglessness. Owing to both their 
political sophistication and their access to political information through ICT, 
the Millennials should be more knowledgeable about politics than older 
generations (again, once the life cycle is taken into account). Given that 
SROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHLVVWURQJO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKFRQILGHQFHLQRQH¶VNQRZOHGge 
and understanding of politics (Hansard Society 2012), this should give them 
more confidence in their political knowledge and so lead to lower levels of 
meaninglessness.  
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Finally, the one form of alienation which post-materialism should increase is 
political normlessness. One of the defining characteristics of post-materialists 
is their degree of individual autonomy, something which they fiercely defend 
and seek to promote. This makes them hostile towards institutions which could 
conceivably constrain that autonomy, including political or social institutions 
such as social class, political parties, or the government. One of the ways in 
which this hostility could manifest itself is through lower levels of trust and 
faith in the institutions of the formal political arena i.e., higher levels of 
political normlessness. Furthermore, post-materialists also have higher 
expectations of government, which in part reflects their wider and distinctly 
µSRVW-PDWHULDOLVW¶SROLWLFDODJHQGD6WXGLHVVXFKDV6WRNHU6) and Dalton 
(2004) have suggested that these expectations are often so high as to be almost 
unattainable for the government, and the dissatisfaction and cynicism about 
both the intentions and capabilities of the political elite (as well as associated 
institutions such as political parties) that results could also increase levels of 
political normlessness.  
7.4.2 Media Fragmentation, Apathy and Alienation 
The more sceptical media fragmentation theory predicts an increase in political 
apathy and political meaninglessness among younger generations. As outlined 
above, while the media fragmentation approach does not dispute the potential 
for the Millennials to become more engaged, active and sophisticated etc. as a 
result of social evolution, it argues that this potential is not realised because of 
the increasingly fragmented and individualist patterns of media consumption 
they are developing. This makes it easier for young citizens to avoid political 
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news, at a time in their lives when they are least likely to seek it out, meaning 
that habits develop in which engagement with political news is limited. 
Consequently, the Millennials engage less with political news and information, 
and so develop lower levels of interest in and knowledge of politics. This 
means that the Millennials are expected to exhibit both higher levels of 
political apathy and higher levels of political meaninglessness (reflecting the 
link between actual political knowledge and confidence in political 
knowledge).  
There are no suggestions of a relationship between the fragmentation of news 
media consumption and political powerlessness. While several studies 
(including Wattenberg (2012) and Roker et al. (2009)) suggest that media 
fragmentation could be associated with lower levels of political efficacy, this is 
based on the claim that media fragmentation reduces the political knowledge of 
younger generations and consequently their confidence in their political 
understanding. While these studies relate this with political efficacy (which is 
closely related to political powerlessness), the fact that the perceptions of 
efficacy they outline are based on confidence in political knowledge means that 
this process is related to changes in political meaninglessness. 
There are also no suggestions in this literature for how media fragmentation 
might affect attitudes and perceptions associated with political normlessness 
i.e., political trust, democratic satisfaction and perceptions of fair treatment by 
the government. None of the studies discussed above proposed a link between 
changes in media consumption and any of these characteristics, and so there is 
no reason to expect that media fragmentation will affect political normlessness.  
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the theoretical framework from which distinct 
expressions of formal political apathy and formal political alienation from the 
Millennials, and the subsequent impact on their political participation, can be 
potentially explained. This framework reflects the argument made in Chapter 
Two that the Millennials are a Western society-wide political generation, and 
so are likely to be the result of Western society-wide causal factors and 
processes ± such as social evolution. The chapter has detailed two strands of 
social modernisation theory which focus on different aspects, and their 
respective consequences, of social evolution: the post-materialism theory, 
which focusses on economic, social and technological development and has a 
broadly optimistic view of the implications for the MiOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDO
engagement; and the media fragmentation theory, which focusses on changes 
in media consumption and has a more pessimistic expectation. Both theories, 
while predicting very different attitudinal and behavioural consequences, 
provide a consistent theoretical framework which can potentially explain the 
JHQHUDWLRQDOGLVWLQFWLYHQHVVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDODSDWK\DQGDOLHQDWLRQ
and subsequently their participation. The success of these theories in 
explaining these trends will be tested in Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Eight: The Generational Distinction of the Millennials 
This research has shown that British Millennials are the least politically active 
generation in the electorate, regardless of the political arena examined. Chapter 
Six also showed that at the time of the 2010 general election, the Millennials 
were the most apathetic generation in the electorate, and also the most 
alienated in terms of meaninglessness, and that both of these contributed to 
their lower expectations of participating in politics. This chapter answers two 
UHPDLQLQJTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DSDWK\DQG
alienation, and their political participation: first, are they a distinct political 
generation for their apathy and alienation once the influence of period effects 
and the life cycle have been accounted for; and second, can such a trend be 
explained by the evolution of Western society over the last three decades? 
This chapter begins by using age-period-cohort (APC) analyses to estimate 
age, period and cohort effects in formal political apathy and alienation. 
Attention then turns to exploring the role of social modernisation in driving 
trends in apathy and alienation through incorporating variables indicative of 
post-materialism and media fragmentation into the APC models. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that there is evidence of age, period and cohort effects 
with regard to both formal political apathy and formal political alienation. 
Once life cycle and period effects have been accounted for, there is evidence of 
a cohort effect which suggests that the Millennials are the most politically 
apathetic generation to have entered the British electorate for decades. 
Furthermore, there are similar effects apparent for both political powerlessness 
and normlessness, however they suggest that the Millennials are the least 
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politically alienated generation. In addition, the high levels of meaninglessness 
among the Millennials found in Chapter Six are suggested to reflect their 
current stage in the life cycle; there is no indication of a cohort effect which 
suggests that the Millennials are unusually (un)alienated. Finally, the analyses 
suggest that the two social modernisation theories offer limited insight into the 
causes of these cohort effects. The rise of post-materialism is suggested to help 
explain period effects in political apathy, political normlessness and political 
PHDQLQJOHVVQHVVEXWFDQQRWH[SODLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWDSDWK\DQGODFN
of alienation. The fragmentation of media consumption helps to explain the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\KLJKOHYHOVRISROLWLFDODSDWK\EXWRIIHUVOLWWOHLQWKH
way of explaining trends in political alienation. 
8.1 Data and Indicators 
The data for this chapter comes from the British Social Attitudes survey 
(BSA). The BSA has a range of variables suitable for measuring formal 
political apathy and alienation and for estimating the impact of post-
materialism and media fragmentation. The series does not contain as many 
variables for measuring apathy and alienation as found in the British Election 
Study ± which means that the indicators of these characteristics employed in 
this chapter are less complex and comprise of single variables ± however this is 
compensated for by the fact that the BSA has run for almost every year since 
1983 and many of the variables of interest were measured in almost the same 
way throughout. This makes the BSA ideal for examining trends in apathy and 
alienation. 
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The analyses were conducted using data from those survey years in which 
variables relating to political apathy and each dimension of political alienation 
were present and in the same form: this meant that data from 12 surveys 
covering a period of 26 years between 1986 and 2012 were examined. The 
indicators of apathy and alienation were selected on the basis of their 
correspondence to the constituent variables which made up the composite 
indicators developed in Chapter Five: 
- Political apathy was PHDVXUHGE\ORRNLQJDWUHVSRQGHQWV¶LQWHUHVWLQ
politics, with a potential score from 1 (meaning very little apathy) to 5 
- Political powerlessness was measured by capturing agreement with the 
view that people like the respondent have no say in what the 
government does, with a potential score from 1 (meaning very little 
powerlessness) to 5 
- Political normlessness was measured through looking at trust in the 
government, with a potential score from 1 (meaning very little 
normlessness) to 4 
- Political meaninglessness was measured by a variable representing 
agreement with the view that politics and government is complicated, 
with a potential score from 1 (meaning very little meaninglessness) to 5 
Two further variables were used to measure the effect of post-materialism and 
media fragmentation. Following the commonly used approach of measuring 
post-materialism with a proxy indication of the rHVSRQGHQWV¶OHYHORIHGXFDWLRQ, 
post-PDWHULDOLVPZDVPHDVXUHGEDVHGRQUHVSRQGHQWV¶KLJKHVWTXDOLILFDWLRQ
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(Dalton 2013; Welzel 2007; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).24 While the media 
fragmentation theory refers to a range of processes, all of which could 
theoretically be measured with different variables, the fact that these processes 
are all closely related means that a single variable measuring a single aspect of 
the media fragmentation process can be used. The best variable in the BSA is a 
YDULDEOHPHDVXULQJZKHWKHURUQRWUHVSRQGHQWV¶UHDGDGDLO\QHZVSDSHUDWOHDVW
three times a week; daily newspaper readership is negatively associated with 
both weakening habits of political news consumption and the consumption of 
news media through the Internet, meaning that respondents who do not read a 
newspaper at least three times a week are most likely to exhibit the 
consequences of media fragmentation.25 
The data was analysed using the same method as that seen in Chapter Four: 
graphical representations of trends in apathy and alienation for each political 
generation were used to support the interpretation of estimates of age, period 
and cohort effects from APC analyses. The details of this method and of the 
steps taken to overcome the µLGHQWLILFDWLRQSUREOHP¶DUHSURYLGHGLQ&KDSWHU
Four. Furthermore, additional analyses using generalised additive modelling 
were also conducted to check the validity of the cohort classification used to 
overcome the identification problem, based on the approach used by Grasso 
(2014), Neundorf (2010) and Tulley (2002). These analyses, and a discussion 
of the results which support the validity of the classification of political 
                                                 
24
 The details of this variable are provided in Appendix One. 
25
 The details of this variable are in Appendix One, and a validity check of this assumption is 
provided in Appendix Six.  
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generations used in this research for the estimation of cohort effects in political 
apathy and alienation, are provided in Appendix Seven.  
8.2 Apathy, Alienation and the Millennials 
Figure 8.1 shows the trends in formal political apathy and each dimension of 
formal political alienation for each generation for the 26 years covered by the 
BSA data. Table 8.1 shows the APC regression analyses for each. The 
generation coefficients can be interpreted as estimating the effect of being a 
member of the given generation on the dependent variable compared with 
being a member of the reference generation (the Post-War generation), while 
controlling for the influence of the life cycle (measured through the age and 
age-squared variables) and period effects (measured by survey year).26 
                                                 
26
 The inclusion of a quadratic age function was based on several factors, including previous 
research suggesting a curvilinear relationship between the life cycle and characteristics such as 
political interest and political knowledge (Smets 2008), and comparisons of APC models in 
which the life cycle was modelled using both an µDJH¶YDULDEOHDQGDQµDJH¶SOXVµDJH¶
variable. For apathy, powerlessness and meaninglessness, both of these variables were 
statistically significant and model fit improved (albeit marginally), suggesting a curvilinear 
UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHOLIHF\FOH)RUQRUPOHVVQHVVWKHµDJH¶YDULDEle was insignificant and so 
the life cycle was modelled with the single age variable only. 
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Figure 8.1: Apathy and Alienation in Britain, 1986 - 2012 
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Political Meaninglessness 
 
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Note that the y-axes have been constrained to make visual inspection of trends easier. In some cases where the initial sample of respondents for a 
given generation was too small (i.e., below 100 respondents) they were omitted from the chart for that year.
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Table 8.1a: APC Analysis, Political Apathy and Political Alienation 
  Apathy   Powerlessness 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials 0.36* 0.14 -0.64*** 0.16 
90s 0.20* 0.10 -0.50*** 0.11 
80s 0.13 0.07 -0.36*** 0.08 
60s-70s -0.04 0.05 -0.22*** 0.05 
(Post-War)       
Pre-War 0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.07 
        
Year (1986)       
1991 -0.14* 0.07 -0.41*** 0.07 
1994 -0.23*** 0.06 0.06 0.08 
1996 -0.14* 0.06 -0.10 0.08 
1998 -0.08 0.06 -0.29*** 0.07 
2000 -0.15* 0.07 0.05 0.07 
2002 -0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 
2003 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.07 
2005 -0.28*** 0.07 -0.31*** 0.08 
2010 -0.21* 0.09 -0.09 0.10 
2011 -0.27** 0.08 -0.06 0.09 
2012 -0.27** 0.09 -0.11 0.10 
        
Age -0.06*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
        
Obs 29621   23645   
Prob > chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.01   0.00   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. 
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Table 8.1b: APC Analysis, Political Apathy and Political Alienation 
  Normlessness Meaninglessness 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.47** 0.16 -0.01 0.16 
90s -0.22 0.12 -0.17 0.12 
80s -0.09 0.09 -0.19* 0.09 
60s-70s -0.02 0.06 -0.23*** 0.06 
(Post-War)       
Pre-War -0.16* 0.07 0.06 0.07 
        
Year (1986)       
1991 0.24** 0.07 -0.08 0.07 
1994 0.74*** 0.08 0.17* 0.08 
1996 0.82*** 0.08 0.10 0.08 
1998 0.52*** 0.07 -0.12 0.07 
2000 1.03*** 0.07 0.00 0.07 
2002 0.83*** 0.08 -0.13 0.08 
2003 1.21*** 0.08 -0.24** 0.07 
2005 0.88*** 0.08 -0.32*** 0.08 
2010 1.34*** 0.1 -0.47*** 0.10 
2011 1.24*** 0.1 -0.41*** 0.09 
2012 1.33*** 0.11 -0.29** 0.10 
        
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 
Age2 - - 0.00*** 0.00 
        
Obs 22255   22549   
Prob > chi2 0.00   0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.02   0.01   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. 
 
8.2.1 Political Apathy 
Both the APC analysis reported in Table 8.1a and the data in Figure 8.1 
showed comparable trends for political apathy. Figure 8.1 showed evidence of 
a slight period effect in which apathy declined throughout the British electorate 
after the 1980s; for example, the average score on the 1-5 apathy variable for 
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all the generations represented in the data in 1986 was 3.18, while in 2012 it 
was 3.03. The presence of such an effect was apparent in Table 8.1a, with the 
year variables suggesting that the average level of political apathy fluctuated 
around the 1986 level between 1991 and 2003 (all of the coefficients were 
negative, suggesting lower levels of apathy, but most were not statistically 
significant). From 2005 onwards, however, the coefficients suggested a 
sustained decline in apathy, with the statistically significant coefficients for 
2005, 2010, 2011 and 2012 averaging -0.26 compared with 1986 levels. 
Numerous scholars have suggested that, owing to a number of effects relating 
to social modernisation and changes in the nature of electoral competition, 
political apathy declined in many Western democracies since the early 2000s 
(e.g., Dalton 2013; Whiteley 2012), and this data supports that. 
It is difficult to determine whether there is evidence of a life cycle effect from 
Figure 8.1. However, the data in Table 8.1a suggests that, as expected based on 
the known relationship between the political life cycle and interest in politics 
(Jankowski and Strate 1995), there is a curvilinear relationship between apathy 
and the life cycle, as both the age and age-squared coefficients were 
statistically significant. Apathy is higher among youth, and falls as people 
reach middle age and have more reason to engage with formal politics, before 
rising again in old age.  
Finally, both Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1a show clear evidence of a cohort effect 
indicative of a generational increase in political apathy apparent from the entry 
of the 90s generation into the electorate. Figure 8.1 shows that throughout the 
1986 to 2012 period, there was little difference between the average levels of 
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apathy exhibited by the Pre-War, Post-War and 60s-70s generations, which 
varied only slightly throughout the series; their average apathy scores 
throughout were 3, 2.9 and 2.9 respectively. This impression was supported by 
the cohort coefficients in Table 8.1a; that of the Pre-War cohort was 0.06, and 
that of the 60s-70s generation was -0.04, and both were non-significant. The 
average apathy level of the 80s generation was slightly higher, at 3.2 
throughout the series. The cohort coefficient for the 80s generation supported 
this impression ± at 0.13 ± but was also non-significant.  
The average apathy score for the 90s generation in 1991, however, was 3.3, 
and it remained at this average throughout the series ± notably higher than that 
of the older generations, and the coefficient in Table 8.1a of 0.2 was 
statistically significant. Similarly, the average score for the Millennials when 
they entered the electorate in 2002 was 3.5, and their average for the following 
\HDUVDOVRVWD\HGDURXQGWKHVDPHOHYHO7KH0LOOHQQLDOV¶FRHIILFLHQWLQ7DEOH
8.1a of 0.36 was also statistically significant. Both Table 8.1a and Figure 8.1 
suggest, therefore, that with the arrival of the 90s generation there was 
evidence of a sustained and significant generational increase in political 
apathy, which continued and was more extreme with the Millennial generation. 
The Millennials entered the electorate with the highest level of political apathy 
of all of the generations, and Table 8.1a suggests that while the life cycle 
played a role in explaining this, it was also in part the result of a cohort effect.  
8.2.2 Political Powerlessness 
As opposed to formal political apathy, Figure 8.1 showed no evidence of a 
sustained period effect in political powerlessness; the overall levels of 
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alienation exhibited in the electorate appear to have remained stable between 
1986 and 2012, ranging between 3.5 and 3.8 on the 1-5 powerlessness scale. 
The period coefficients in Table 8.1a give a similar impression; with the 
exception of 1991, 1998 and 2005, none of the remaining year coefficients 
were significant nor suggested much difference from the powerlessness levels 
of 1986. Apart from short-lived falls in normlessness alienation in 1991 (which 
had a significant coefficient of -0.41), 1998 (-0.29) and 2005 (-0.31) there was 
no indication of a sustained period effect in powerlessness. 
The age coefficients show that there is a relationship between the life cycle and 
political powerlessness, with both coefficients being statistically significant. 
The effect was similar to that seen for political apathy; powerlessness is higher 
among youth, and falls as people reach middle age. It then increases again as 
people reach old age. This suggests that similar forces which limit political 
engagement among youth (e.g., not having a career or family home and so 
having less motivation to engage with politics) and the elderly (e.g., being 
SK\VLFDOO\XQDEOHWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQSROLWLFVDOVRGHSUHVVSHRSOH¶VH[SHFWDWLRQV
of being able to influence political outcomes.  
The evidence between Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1a diverges somewhat in relation 
to cohort effects. Figure 8.1 suggested only very limited evidence of a cohort 
effect: the powerlessness scores of the Pre-War, Post-War, 60s-70s and 80s 
generations in 1986 were 3.7, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 respectively. The score for the 
90s generation in 1991 was 3.4, though this was in the context of a drop in 
SRZHUOHVVQHVVIRUDOOJHQHUDWLRQVLQWKDW\HDU7KH0LOOHQQLDOV¶VFRUHLQ
was 3.5, lower than those of their elders which ranged from 3.6 (for the 60s-
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70s and 80s) to 3.8 (for the Pre- and Post-War). Similarly, the average scores 
for the Millennials throughout the entire series was 3.5, compared with 3.6 for 
90s, 80s and 60s-70s, and 3.7 for the Post-War and Pre-War generations. These 
figures suggested that there was a very slight fall in powerlessness apparent in 
the younger generations compared with the oldest.  
Table 8.1a, however, shows that once the political life cycle and period effects 
had been accounted for, the cohort effects were more substantial. The 
coefficients suggested an almost linear generational decline in powerlessness 
alienation beginning with the arrival of the 60s-70s generation into the 
electorate. The Pre-War coefficient was not significantly different from that of 
the Post-War, at -0.13. The 60s-70s generation, however, were significantly 
less alienated than the Post-War, with a significant coefficient of -0.22. They 
were followed by the 80s generation ± with a coefficient of -0.36 ± then the 90s 
± with a coefficient of -0.5 ± and finally the Millennials ± with a coefficient of 
-0.64, all of which were also significant. In short, therefore, the analysis 
showed that once the life cycle and period effects were controlled for, the 
Millennials were at the leading edge of a generational decline in powerlessness 
alienation, and so ± once they age ± are likely to feel more influential in 
politics throughout their adult lives than their elders.  
8.2.3 Political Normlessness 
Figure 8.1 clearly suggested the presence of a period effect in which the entire 
British electorate has become more alienated by their lack of faith in the 
integrity and fairness of formal politics since the 1980s. In 1986, the average 
overall normlessness level was 2.7; by 2012, it had risen to 3.1. Figure 8.1 did 
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not suggest the rise was dramatic, but it was fairly constant. This impression is 
supported by the data in Table 8.1b, in which all of the year coefficients were 
positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients grew larger 
(though not constantly) over time. This suggests that once other factors ± 
namely the (non-significant) effect of the life cycle and cohort effects ± were 
controlled for, there was still evidence of a clear rise in political normlessness 
throughout the electorate. 
Table 8.1b suggested that there was no evidence of a life cycle effect for 
political normlessness, with the age variable being non-significant. This is 
consistent with expectations in that there are no suggestions that there should 
be a relationship between the life cycle and normlessness alienation either in 
the political alienation literature, or research relating to political trust or young 
people. Table 8.1b did suggest, however, that there was evidence of a 
significant cohort effect which was not apparent in Figure 8.1. Figure 8.1 
suggested that there was little difference between the alienation exhibited by 
the different generations; the average normlessness scores for each on the 1-4 
variable throughout the series ranged between 2.9 and 3.0. Furthermore, in 
1986 the normlessness levels of the Pre-War, Post-War, 60s-70s and 80s 
generations were between 2.6 and 2.7; when the 90s generation entered the 
electorate in 1991 their figure was 2.9, and for the Millennials in 2002 it was 
also 2.9, neither of which appear surprising nor unusual in light of the period 
effect.  
The coefficients in Table 8.1b, however, suggested that the Millennials and the 
Pre-War generation were significant for exhibiting lower levels of alienation 
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than the others. The coefficients for the 60s-70s (-0.02), 80s (-0.09) and 90s (-
0.22) generations suggested that they may be slightly less alienated than the 
Post-War generation, but the differences were not statistically significant. The 
Pre-War coefficient, however, was significant at -DQGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
was more dramatically different at a statistically significant -0.47. Essentially, 
the coefficients implied a lob-sided curvilinear relationship between generation 
and normlessness, in which the oldest and particularly the youngest generations 
were significantly less alienated, once the period effect and life cycle were 
accounted for, than the rest of the electorate. The Millennials, therefore, appear 
to be the least alienated generation in terms of their trust in formal politics.  
8.2.4 Political Meaninglessness 
Figure 8.1 suggested evidence of a similar period effect for political 
meaninglessness as that seen for political apathy, though less dramatic: a 
steady decline throughout the electorate between 1986 and 2012. For example, 
the average meaninglessness score across all of the generations in 1986 was 
3.6, which fell to 3.5 in 2012, though was closer to 3.4 between 2005 and 2011. 
Table 8.1b similarly suggested such an effect; there was evidence of minor and 
usually insignificant fluctuations (except for 1994, which saw a slight but 
significant spike in meaninglessness) between 1986 and 2002, but from 2003 
there was evidence of a sustained, but not constant, decline with all of the year 
coefficients being negative and significant and ranging between -0.24 (in 2003) 
and -0.47 (in 2010). This decline was very similar to that seen for political 
apathy, and also supportive of the arguments of studies such as Dalton (2013) 
and Whiteley (2012), who suggest that Western electorates are becoming more 
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politically knowledgeable and confident as a result of access to the Internet and 
rising levels of education.  
Table 8.1b suggests that there is also a curvilinear life cycle effect apparent for 
meaninglessness, in which alienation is greater among the young and the old, 
with the middle-aged being less alienated. The cause of this effect is unclear, 
however it seems likely that as people have more contact with formal politics 
through having a greater incentive to engage with it, they end up being more 
knowledgeable about it and so are more confident in their understanding of 
political issues and the political process.  
Both Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1b suggested that there was a cohort effect 
apparent, but not one which suggested the Millennials were particularly 
unusual. Instead, the data suggested that the Millennials, 90s, Post-War and 
Pre-War generations had similar levels of meaninglessness alienation, with the 
80s and 60s-70s generations being significantly less alienated. For example, the 
average meaninglessness score for the 80s and 60s-70s generations throughout 
the series displayed in Figure 8.1 was 3.4, compared with 3.7 for the Pre-War 
generation, 3.6 for the Post-War, 3.5 for the 90s generation and 3.6 for the 
Millennials. The coefficients in Table 8.1b suggested a similar relationship, 
with the coefficients for the Pre-War (0.06), 90s (-0.17) and Millennial 
generations (-0.01) being non-significant, while those for the 80s and 60s-70s 
generations were -0.19 and -0.23 respectively and both significant. The data 
suggested, therefore, that once the life cycle and period effects were accounted 
for, the Millennials were quite typical for their levels of meaninglessness 
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alienation; it was the 80s and 60-70s generations that stood out for being less 
alienated than the wider electorate.  
8.2.5 Summary 
The data examined above has shown evidence of age, period and cohort effects 
behind trends and differences between political generations in terms of formal 
political apathy and alienation. In three instances ± apathy, powerlessness and 
normlessness ± these effects identified the Millennials as distinct. While there 
ZDVFOHDUHYLGHQFHRIDOLIHF\FOHHIIHFWZKLFKZRXOGLQFUHDVHWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
political apathy at their relatively early stage of adulthood, there was 
nonetheless evidence of a cohort effect which suggested that they are the most 
apathetic generation about formal politics to have entered the British electorate 
since the Second World War. Based on the evidence provided in Chapter Six, 
this data suggests that the fact that the Millennials have entered the electorate 
with a typically higher level of political apathy than their elders is a substantial 
part of the explanation for their unusually low levels of political participation. 
)XUWKHUPRUHDVDWOHDVWVRPHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KLJKOHYHOVRIDSDWKy is the 
result of a cohort effect, they are likely to remain unusually apathetic 
throughout their adult lives. This, in turn, suggests that they are likely to 
exhibit unusually low levels of political participation throughout their adult 
lives as well.  
The data for political powerlessness and normlessness suggested a different 
picture, and poses a substantial challenge to the conventional wisdom 
discussed in Chapter One. There was evidence of a life cycle effect for 
powerlessness which would suggest that, given their stage in the life cycle, the 
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Millennials should be more alienated than their elders. However, with this 
effect accounted for, there was also evidence of a cohort effect which 
suggested that the Millennials were at the most extreme edge of a generational 
decline in powerlessness. In other words, successive generations of British 
citizens have tended to feel more influential in formal politics, and the 
Millennials are the latest and most extreme. Contrary to the suggestions of the 
Millennials as a generation alienated by their perception that they cannot 
influence formal politics, this evidence suggests that they feel unusually 
influential in the formal political process, and that this is likely to remain a 
feature of this generation throughout their adult lives.  
There was no evidence of a life cycle effect for political normlessness; the 
most apparent trend in Figure 8.1 was the steady increase in this form of 
alienation throughout the British electorate since the 1980s. There were no 
spikes in normlessness to coincide with controversial political events or 
scandals ± such as the cash for honours scandal in 2006, or the expenses 
scandal of 2009 ± suggesting that this reflects longer running trends in the way 
that British citizens relate to their political system rather than the cumulative 
effect of various political events. With this effect controlled for, there was also 
evidence of a cohort effect which suggested that the Pre-War and especially the 
Millennial generations were less alienated than the wider electorate. This is 
also contrary to the description of the Millennials as an alienated generation, in 
this case reflecting their lack of trust in politicians or the formal political 
process more broadly, and instead suggests that the Millennials will, on 
average, be a more trusting generation throughout their adult lives. The 
combined effects RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ lower than average levels of both 
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powerlessness and normlessness ± based on the analyses in Chapter Six ± 
should be to increase their political participation relative to their elders. Rather 
WKDQEHLQJSDUWRIWKHH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\ORZSROLWLFDO
participation, therefore, their alienation from politics, or rather their lack of it, 
should be expected to make them more active than their elders.  
Finally, there was no suggestion of a cohort effect which showed the 
Millennials as unusually alienated in terms of political meaninglessness. They 
were similar to the wider electorate, with their elders in the 80s and 60s-70s 
generations standing out for being unusually un-alienated. There was evidence, 
however, of a life cycle effect in which the Millennials would be expected to 
be more alienated than the wider electorate because of their stage in the 
political life cycle. It is this effect which most likely explains the finding in 
&KDSWHU6L[UHODWLQJWRWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶PHDQLQJOHVVQHVVDOLHQDWLRQDWWKHWLme 
of the 2010 general election: while at that time they were more alienated than 
the wider electorate, and this did help explain why they expected to be less 
active in both formal and cause-oriented politics, this reflected the fact that 
they were young and had had little contact with formal politics at that time. As 
the Millennials age and exhibit greater engagement with politics, their 
meaninglessness alienation can be expected to decline. Overall, therefore, quite 
FRQWUDU\WRWKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOZLVGRPWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
alienation from formal politics only partially helps to explain why they were 
less active in politics around the 2010 election, and offers no explanation as to 
why that participation can be expected to stay lower than their elders 
throughout their adult lives. In fact, the cohort effects in political 
powerlessness, normlessness and meaninglesVQHVVVXJJHVWWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
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political alienation (or lack of it) can be expected to make them more active in 
politics in time7KHVWURQJDQGODVWLQJGHSUHVVLQJHIIHFWRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
political activity appears not to come from their alienation, but from their 
apathy towards formal politics.  
8.3 The Role of Social Modernisation 
In this section, the indicators of post-materialism and media fragmentation are 
used to explore the role of social modernisation in driving the trends in apathy 
and alienation identified above. The detail of these two theories, as well as a 
discussion of their expected impact on political apathy and political alienation, 
is provided in Chapter Seven. To aid with interpretation and assessment, a brief 
recap of those expected impacts is provided here.  
Rising post-materialism is expected to increase the motivation of younger 
generations to engage with politics, in order to protect and promote their 
individual autonomy and promote their political agenda. Higher levels of post-
materialism, therefore, should be associated with lower levels of political 
apathy among the youngest generations in the British electorate. Greater post-
materialism is also associated with greater political sophistication, which in 
turn increases both poOLWLFDONQRZOHGJHDQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶YLHZVDERXWWKHLU
potential to affect the political process. Higher levels of post-materialism 
should also, therefore, be associated with lower levels of alienation in the form 
of powerlessness and meaninglessness among the younger generations. Finally, 
owing to the greater expectations post-materialists have of their government, as 
well as the weaker habitual loyalty they express towards political elites, higher 
levels of post-materialism should be associated with lower levels of political 
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normlessness among younger generations. As rising post-materialism is almost 
exclusively realised through successive cohorts entering Western society, the 
consequences of post-materialism should always be more apparent among the 
more post-materialist generations i.e., the younger generations.27 
The various processes associated with the fragmentation of media consumption 
are expected to increase levels of political apathy, again among the younger 
generations, because new habits of consuming political news lead to people 
generally consuming less political information. This should increase political 
apathy because without political information people receive less of a stimulus 
to take an interest in political issues, but it should also increase political 
meaninglessness because those same people have lower levels of political 
knowledge. This, in turn, means that those individuals will have less 
confidence in their understanding of the political process, and so greater 
meaninglessness alienation. There is no expected effect from the processes 
associated with media fragmentation for either levels of political powerlessness 
or political normlessness, so there should be no effect on trends in those 
dimensions of alienation from the incorporation of media fragmentation 
indicators into the APC models.  
The effects of post-materialism and media fragmentation on the trends in 
political apathy and alienation were examined in several ways through their 
being accounted for in the APC regression models. First, the direct effect of 
each indicator on formal political apathy and each dimension of alienation was 
examined, and then the effect of controlling for that indicator on the estimates 
                                                 
27
 This generational pattern is apparent in the post-materialism variable, as shown in Appendix 
Six. 
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of age, period and cohort effects. If the post-materialism/media fragmentation 
indicator had the expected effect on the dependent variable, and if once it was 
included the generational coefficients identified in Table 8.1 were substantially 
reduced and/or rendered statistically insignificant, this was taken as evidence 
that rising post-materialism/media fragmentation could help explain that trend 
as a result of the processes outlined in Chapter Seven.  
8.3.1 Political Apathy 
Table 8.2 presents a range of APC analyses examining the impact of social 
modernisation on trends in formal political apathy. Model I was a replica of 
that presented in Table 8.1 above, for ease of comparison; Model II introduced 
the education variable to measure the effect of post-materialism; Model III 
added control variables for gender and social and political resources; Model IV 
added the media fragmentation variable to the original APC model, and Model 
V added the control variables to that model; Model VI shows a composite 
social modernisation APC model, including both the post-materialism and 
media fragmentation indicators, and Model VII added the control variables to 
that model.28 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 The details of the control variables are presented in Appendix One  
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Table 8.2a: Social Modernisation and Apathy, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model II - PM I Model III - PM II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials 0.36* 0.14 0.47** 0.14 0.30* 0.15 
90s 0.20* 0.10 0.45*** 0.10 0.35** 0.11 
80s 0.13 0.07 0.32*** 0.07 0.26** 0.08 
60s-70s -0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 
(Post-War)          
Pre-War 0.06 0.06 0.20** 0.06 0.20** 0.06 
           
Year (1986)          
1991 -0.14* 0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.12 0.07 
1994 -0.23*** 0.06 -0.11 0.06 -0.15* 0.07 
1996 -0.14* 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
1998 -0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07 
2000 -0.15* 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.07 
2002 -0.08 0.07 0.20** 0.07 0.18* 0.07 
2003 -0.04 0.07 0.27*** 0.07 0.27*** 0.07 
2005 -0.28*** 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 
2010 -0.21* 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.10 
2011 -0.27** 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.09 
2012 -0.27** 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.10 
           
Age -0.06*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
           
Education (No 
qual)          
CSE or equiv    -0.49*** 0.04 -0.37*** 0.04 
O-level or equiv    -0.94*** 0.03 -0.79*** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv    -1.45*** 0.04 -1.19*** 0.04 
Higher ed < deg    -1.44*** 0.04 -1.15*** 0.04 
Degree or higher    -2.23*** 0.04 -1.82*** 0.04 
           
Social Class       -0.25*** 0.14 
Gender       0.47*** 0.02 
       
Obs 29621   28607   27483   
Pseudo2 0.01   0.06   0.07   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Table 8.2b: Social Modernisation and Apathy, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model IV - MF I Model V - MF II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials 0.36* 0.14 0.28* 0.14 0.08 0.15 
90s 0.20* 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.10 
80s 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
60s-70s -0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.05 
(Post-War)          
Pre-War 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.06 
           
Year (1986)          
1991 -0.14* 0.07 -0.17* 0.07 -0.21** 0.07 
1994 -0.23*** 0.06 -0.28*** 0.06 -0.27*** 0.06 
1996 -0.14* 0.06 -0.20** 0.06 -0.19** 0.06 
1998 -0.08 0.06 -0.15* 0.06 -0.12 0.07 
2000 -0.15* 0.07 -0.22** 0.07 -0.17* 0.07 
2002 -0.08 0.07 -0.17* 0.07 -0.07 0.07 
2003 -0.04 0.07 -0.12 0.07 0.00 0.07 
2005 -0.28*** 0.07 -0.38*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.07 
2010 -0.21* 0.09 -0.34*** 0.09 -0.19* 0.10 
2011 -0.27** 0.08 -0.41*** 0.08 -0.25** 0.09 
2012 -0.27** 0.09 -0.40*** 0.09 -0.21* 0.10 
           
Age -0.06*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
           
Read paper x3 per 
wk    -0.45*** 0.02 -0.39*** 0.02 
           
Social Class       -0.54*** 0.01 
Gender       0.43*** 0.02 
           
Obs 29621   29615   28397   
Pseudo2 0.01   0.02   0.05   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Table 8.2c: Social Modernisation and Apathy, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model VI - SM I Model VII - SM II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials 0.36* 0.14 0.39** 0.15 0.23 0.15 
90s 0.20* 0.10 0.36*** 0.10 0.28** 0.11 
80s 0.13 0.07 0.25** 0.07 0.20** 0.08 
60s-70s -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 
(Post-War)          
Pre-War 0.06 0.06 0.16* 0.06 0.16* 0.06 
           
Year (1986)          
1991 -0.14* 0.07 -0.10 0.07 -0.14* 0.07 
1994 -0.23*** 0.06 -0.16* 0.06 -0.19** 0.07 
1996 -0.14* 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.06 
1998 -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.07 
2000 -0.15* 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.07 
2002 -0.08 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 
2003 -0.04 0.07 0.19** 0.07 0.20** 0.07 
2005 -0.28*** 0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.07 0.07 
2010 -0.21* 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.10 
2011 -0.27** 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 
2012 -0.27** 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.10 
           
Age -0.06*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
           
Education (No qual)          
CSE or equiv    -0.47*** 0.04 -0.35*** 0.04 
O-level or equiv    -0.93*** 0.03 -0.78*** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv    -1.44*** 0.04 -1.19*** 0.04 
Higher ed < deg    -1.44*** 0.04 -1.14*** 0.04 
Degree or higher    -2.24*** 0.04 -1.82*** 0.04 
Read paper x3 per 
wk    -0.46*** 0.02 -0.40*** 0.02 
Social Class       -0.25*** 0.02 
Gender       0.43*** 0.01 
       
Obs 29621   28601   27477   
Pseudo2 0.01   0.06   0.07   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Model II showed that post-materialism had a substantial effect on political 
apathy, with greater post-materialism (indicated by higher educational 
qualifications) depressing apathy as expected. The effect ranges from that of 
having CSEs or equivalent reducing apathy by -0.47 points compared to the 
average apathy score of an individual with no qualifications, and the effect of 
having a degree or higher reducing relative apathy by -2.24 points. Accounting 
for post-materialism had a notable effect on the period and cohort effects 
reported in Model I, but had almost no impact on the life cycle effect. The 
period effect in Model I was almost entirely absent from Model II, with only 
one or two year coefficients standing out for being significant and suggesting 
minor fluctuations in apathy from one year to the next. The trend of declining 
apathy in the British electorate illustrated in Figure 8.1, therefore, would seem 
to be almost entirely explained by the increasingly post-materialistic nature of 
the British electoUDWHDQGLWVHIIHFWRILQFUHDVLQJFLWL]HQV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRHQJDJH
with formal British politics.  
The cohort effect in Model I was also affected, with the difference between the 
90s and Millennial generations and the wider electorate becoming even larger. 
The coefficient for the 90s generation increased to 0.45, almost 
indistinguishable from that of the Millennials, which increased to 0.47. The 
coefficient for the 80s generation also increased from an insignificant 0.13 to a 
significant 0.32, implying that they, too, were significantly more apathetic 
towards formal politics than the older generations once the depressing effect of 
post-materialism on apathy was controlled for. The data suggested, therefore, 
that the greater post-materialism of the 80s, 90s and Millennial generations 
relative to the three older generations depressed their relative political apathy. 
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In short, if the younger generations were not more post-materialistic, they 
would be even more apathetic compared with their elders. Post-materialism 
helps to explain why the Millennials (as well as the 90s and 80s generations) 
were not even more apathetic than they already appeared to be, therefore, but it 
cannot explain why they had such high levels of apathy in the first place.  
Model III examined whether or not the effect of post-materialism remained 
once other characteristics were accounted for, namely gender and social class 
(indicating demographic characteristics and social and political resources). The 
age and year coefficients were barely different from those found in Model II, 
but the cohort effect was again altered, with the differences between the 80s, 
90s and Millennial generations and the Post-war generation shrinking (the 
coefficients fell to 0.26, 0.35 and 0.3 respectively, but all remained statistically 
significant). In addition, the coefficient for the Pre-War generation became 
significant, at 0.2, implying that they too were more apathetic than the Post-
War generation. This suggests that differences in demography and social and 
political resources help to explain the greater levels of apathy seen amongst the 
oldest and youngest generations relative to the Post-War and 60s-70s 
generations.  
Models IV and V analysed the effect of media fragmentation on political 
apathy, and the newspaper readership coefficient in Model IV showed that (as 
expected) a lack of engagement with broadcast print media is associated with 
greater political apathy (with a significant coefficient -0.45). Comparing the 
coefficients in Model IV with Model I showed that accounting for media 
fragmentation has a notable impact on both the period and cohort effects, and 
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little to no impact on the life cycle effect. The year coefficients in Model IV 
were of a greater magnitude (i.e., more negative) than those in Model I, 
suggesting that once newspaper readership was controlled for the decline of 
political apathy in the British electorate was even more substantial. This 
suggested that, as expected, trends in media fragmentation are exacerbating 
political apathy in Britain, as controlling for the effect on the apathy of reading 
newspapers exacerbates the period effect.  
The cohort effects in Model IV were of less magnitude than those in Model I; 
the coefficient for the 90s generations was reduced to 0.12 and became 
insignificant, and that for the Millennials fell to 0.28 but remained significant. 
This suggested that media fragmentation does help to explain the unusually 
high apathy of the younger generations; they are less likely to engage with 
traditional print media, and so are more politically apathetic as a result. Model 
V added the control variables and showed that the magnitude of the period 
effect was reduced compared to that in Model IV, with several of the year 
coefficients becoming non-significant. This suggested that trends in social and 
political resources over time were important in explaining the decline in apathy 
and to some extent mitigated the effects of media fragmentation in increasing 
it. Furthermore, the cohort effect in Model V was notably different, with all the 
generation coefficients being similar and non-VLJQLILFDQWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
coefficient, for example, fell to a non-significant 0.08 from 0.28 in Model IV). 
This also confirmed that differences in social and political resources (and 
potentially demography) were important in explaining generational differences 
in apathy, and complemented the effect of media fragmentation.  
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Finally, Models VI and VII provided a test of the overall social modernisation 
theory outlined in Chapter Seven and included the media fragmentation and 
post-materialism variables together. In both models, the effects of the post-
materialism and media fragmentation variables was largely the same as that 
seen in Models II and IV respectively; post-materialism and newspaper 
readership had significant and negative impacts on political apathy, neither of 
which was encapsulated by the other.  
Accounting for the two theories together had no notable impact on the age 
effects estimated in Models VI and VII compared with those in Model I, 
suggesting that the life cycle has a substantial impact on political apathy 
independent of processes associated with social modernisation. The period 
effects in Models VI and VII are almost identical to those in Models II and III 
i.e., most of the year coefficients were statistically insignificant once post-
materialism had been accounted for. Finally, the composite model produced 
different estimates of the cohort effect from those found in other models. In 
Model VI, the cohort effect was similar to that in Model II, but with smaller 
coefficients (thH0LOOHQQLDOV¶FRHIILFLHQWZDVIRUH[DPSOHFRPSDUHGZLWK
0.47 in Model II), though those for the 80s, 90s and Millennial generations 
remained significant and suggested that they were more apathetic than the 
Post-War generation. The coefficients were still larger, however, than those in 
Model I, suggesting that both post-materialism and media fragmentation affects 
the differences in apathy between the generations, and are having contradictory 
impacts. The increasingly post-materialistic nature of the younger generations 
UHGXFHVWKHLUSROLWLFDODSDWK\UHODWLYHWRWKHLUHOGHUV¶EXWWKHLUODFNRI
engagement with traditional forms of media exacerbates it.  
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With the controls for gender and social class added, the cohort coefficients in 
Model VII were smaller than those in Model VI, with the greatest reduction 
apparent in the coefficient of the Millennials, whose relative apathy was 
suggested to fall below that of the 90s generation (their coefficients fell to a 
non-significant 0.23 from 0.39, and to a still significant 0.28 from 0.36 
respectively). The lack of significance suggested that the differences between 
the Millennials and the Post-War generation was explained by a combination 
of differences in social resources, post-materialism and media fragmentation, 
however the coefficient (which was larger than that of the 80s generation, 
whose coefficient remained significant) still suggested that the Millennials 
were more apathetic so this result must be interpreted with caution.  
It is clear, therefore, that social modernisation plays an important role in 
explaining generational differences in political apathy. The fragmentation of 
media consumption alongside differences in access to social and political 
resources helps to explain why the Millennials were suggested to be more 
apathetic than their elders. Post-materialism cannot explain the unusually high 
apathy of the younger generations, but it appears that if they were not so post-
materialistic they would have been found to be even more apathetic. That said, 
post-materialism and generational differences play a limited role in explaining 
overall differences in political apathy. In all seven regression models reported 
above, for example, the Pseudo r-squared statistic never rose above 0.07. 
8.3.2 Political Powerlessness 
Table 8.3 presents the same series of regression models with political 
powerlessness as the dependent variable. 
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Table 8.3a: Social Modernisation and Powerlessness, 1986 - 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model II - PM I Model III - PM II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.64*** 0.16 -0.60*** 0.16 -0.44** 0.17 
90s -0.50*** 0.11 -0.36** 0.12 -0.28* 0.12 
80s -0.36*** 0.08 -0.26** 0.08 -0.18* 0.09 
60s-70s -0.22*** 0.05 -0.16** 0.06 -0.11 0.06 
(Post-War)          
Pre-War -0.13 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.12 0.08 
           
Year (1986)          
1991 -0.41*** 0.07 -0.39*** 0.07 -0.47*** 0.07 
1994 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.08 -0.11 0.08 
1996 -0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.29** 0.08 
1998 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.19** 0.07 -0.37*** 0.08 
2000 0.05 0.07 0.17* 0.07 -0.16* 0.08 
2002 0.10 0.07 0.24** 0.08 -0.01 0.08 
2003 -0.03 0.07 0.13 0.07 -0.26** 0.08 
2005 -0.31*** 0.08 -0.16* 0.08 -0.46*** 0.08 
2010 -0.09 0.10 0.06 0.10 -0.32** 0.11 
2011 -0.06 0.09 0.10 0.09 -0.25* 0.10 
2012 -0.11 0.10 0.04 0.10 -0.37** 0.11 
           
Age -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
           
Education (No qual)          
CSE or equiv    -0.15** 0.05 -0.09 0.05 
O-level or equiv    -0.37*** 0.04 -0.19*** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv    -0.65*** 0.04 -0.34*** 0.05 
Higher ed < deg    -0.72*** 0.04 -0.38*** 0.05 
Degree or higher    -1.21*** 0.04 -0.65*** 0.05 
           
Normlessness       0.64*** 0.02 
Meaninglessness       0.32*** 0.01 
Social Class       -0.06*** 0.02 
Gender       -0.24*** 0.03 
           
Obs 23645   22812   20512   
Pseudo2 0.00   0.02   0.05   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
290 
 
 
Table 8.3b: Social Modernisation and Powerlessness, 1986 ± 2012 
 
  
Model I - APC Model IV - MF I Model V - MF II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.64*** 0.16 -0.63*** 0.16 -0.46** 0.17 
90s -0.50*** 0.11 -0.49*** 0.11 -0.32** 0.12 
80s -0.36*** 0.08 -0.35*** 0.08 -0.21* 0.09 
60s-70s -0.22*** 0.05 -0.21*** 0.05 -0.11 0.06 
(Post-War)          
Pre-War -0.13 0.07 -0.12 0.07 -0.18* 0.07 
           
Year (1986)          
1991 -0.41*** 0.07 -0.41*** 0.07 -0.48*** 0.07 
1994 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 -0.16 0.08 
1996 -0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.08 -0.33*** 0.08 
1998 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.28*** 0.07 -0.40*** 0.07 
2000 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.22** 0.08 
2002 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.05 0.08 
2003 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.33*** 0.08 
2005 -0.31*** 0.08 -0.30*** 0.08 -0.51*** 0.08 
2010 -0.09 0.10 -0.08 0.10 -0.36** 0.10 
2011 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.28** 0.10 
2012 -0.11 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.39*** 0.11 
           
Age -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.26*** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
           
Read Paper x3 per wk    0.06* 0.02 0.09** 0.03 
           
Normlessness        0.65*** 0.02 
Meaninglessness        0.36*** 0.01 
Social Class       -0.15*** 0.01 
Gender       -0.24*** 0.03 
            
Obs 23641   21233   22808  
Pseudo2 0.00   0.05   0.02  
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01. 
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Table 8.3c: Social Modernisation and Powerlessness, 1986 - 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model VI - SM I Model VII - SM II 
Generation Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.64*** 0.16 -0.59*** 0.16 -0.42* 0.17 
90s -0.50*** 0.11 -0.35** 0.12 -0.26* 0.12 
80s -0.36*** 0.08 -0.25** 0.08 -0.17 0.09 
60s-70s -0.22*** 0.05 -0.16** 0.06 -0.10 0.06 
(Post-War)       
Pre-War -0.13 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.12 0.08 
        
Year (1986)       
1991 -0.41*** 0.07 -0.39*** 0.07 -0.47*** 0.07 
1994 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.08 -0.10 0.08 
1996 -0.10 0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.28** 0.08 
1998 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.18 0.07 -0.35*** 0.08 
2000 0.05 0.07 0.18* 0.07 -0.15 0.08 
2002 0.10 0.07 0.25** 0.08 0.01 0.08 
2003 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.07 -0.25** 0.08 
2005 -0.31*** 0.08 -0.15* 0.08 -0.45*** 0.08 
2010 -0.09 0.10 0.07 0.10 -0.30** 0.11 
2011 -0.06 0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.23* 0.10 
2012 -0.11 0.10 0.05 0.10 -0.35** 0.11 
        
Age -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
        
Education (No qual)       
CSE or equiv   -0.15** 0.05 -0.09 0.05 
O-level or equiv   -0.37*** 0.04 -0.19*** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv   -0.65*** 0.04 -0.34*** 0.05 
Higher ed < deg   -0.72*** 0.04 -0.38*** 0.05 
Degree or higher   -1.22*** 0.04 -0.65*** 0.05 
Read Paper x3 per wk 0.09** 0.03 0.06* 0.03 0.08** 0.03 
Normlessness 0.65*** 0.02   0.64*** 0.02 
Meaninglessness 0.36*** 0.01   0.32*** 0.01 
Social Class -0.15*** 0.01   -0.06*** 0.02 
Gender -0.24*** 0.03   -0.23*** 0.03 
       
Obs 23645  22808  20508  
Pseudo2 0.00  0.02  0.05  
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Model II shows that post-materialism had the expected impact on 
powerlessness of depressing it; the more educated (i.e., post-materialist) a 
respondent, the more influential they felt in politics. The effect ranged from 
having a CSE or equivalent depressing powerlessness by -0.15 compared with 
someone with no qualifications, to that of -1.21 from having a degree or higher. 
Comparing Model II with Model I showed, however, that this effect had little 
impact on the age, period and cohort effects estimated in the original APC 
model. The age coefficients were slightly reduced (suggesting that some of the 
life cycle effect on powerlessness reflected education and post-materialism). 
The year coefficients were all more positive than in Model I, but most 
remained non-significant (with only those for 2000 and 2002 becoming 
significant). They continued to show short-lived fluctuations in powerlessness 
between 1986 and 2012 rather than a sustained trend such as that seen for 
political apathy.  
The effect of accounting for post-materialism on the cohort coefficients was to 
reduce their magnitude i.e., to reduce the differences between the Post-War 
generation and the others. Essentially this implied that by controlling for post-
materialism, the generational decline in political powerlessness was less 
pronounced; it was, however, still clear and continued to imply that the 
Millennials were the least powerlessnessly alienated generation in the 
electorate. Rising levels of post-materialism, therefore, help to explain the 
generational decline in political powerlessness, but only marginally.  
As was found in Chapter Five, higher levels of social and political resources 
and being female tended to reduce powerlessness, and Model III also 
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confirmed that the other dimensions of alienation were positively associated. 
With the controls included, the magnitude of the generational coefficients was 
reduced; with the Millennial, 90s, 80s and 60s-70s generations coefficients 
falling to -0.44, -0.28, -0.18 and -0.11 respectively and, in the case of the 60s-
70s generation, becoming non-significant. Some of the generational differences 
in political powerlessness, therefore, reflected differences in social and 
political resources and other dimensions of alienation, but there remained a 
distinct difference between the powerlessness alienation of the three younger 
generations and their elders, and the Millennials were still identified as the 
least alienated in the electorate. The most notable impact of accounting for the 
controls was on the year coefficients; while Models I and II suggested no 
sustained period effect in political powerlessness, almost all of the year 
coefficients in Model III were negative and significant. They did not suggest a 
constant decline, more of a sustained fall after the 1980s with the occasional 
increase in powerlessness in 1994 and 2002 (the coefficients for which were 
non-significant). This suggests that trends in either social and political 
resources or another dimension of political alienation had exacerbated political 
powerlessness since the 1980s.   
Turning to media fragmentation, Model IV shows that ± contrary to 
expectations ± there is a significant effect from media fragmentation on 
political powerlessness, with newspaper readership increasing alienation (with 
a significant coefficient of 0.06). This suggests that the shifts away from 
traditional forms of media associated with the media fragmentation theory, 
while they might be exacerbating political apathy, are leading to citizens 
feeling (albeit marginally) more influential in the formal political process. This 
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does not, however, offer much by way of an explanation for the life cycle, 
cohort and period effects identified in Model I; the coefficients for the age, 
year and generation variables were virtually identical between the two models. 
Adding the control variables to the media fragmentation model (Model V) 
resulted in a similar model to Model III; normlessness and meaninglessness 
were positively associated with powerlessness, and gender and social class 
were negatively associated with it. Model V also showed a sustained decline in 
political powerlessness after the 1980s, with year coefficients almost the same 
as those in Model III. There was no substantial effect on the cohort or age 
effects from including the control variables compared with the effects 
identified in Model III, confirming the suggestion above that it was differences 
in other dimensions of alienation and/or social and political resources which 
helped to explain ± but did not fully account for ± generational differences in 
powerlessness.  
The composite social modernisation models (Models VI and VII) support the 
conclusion that social modernisation had little impact on trends in 
powerlessness. The coefficients in Model VI for age, year and generations are 
almost identical to those in Models II and IV. While post-materialism and 
media fragmentation had significant, negative effects on powerlessness, neither 
accounts for generational differences in it. Similarly, the age, year and 
generation coefficients are almost identical in Models VII, III and V, 
suggesting that the control variables rather than post-materialism or media 
fragmentation have the substantial effect on powerlessness. Finally, the Pseudo 
r-squared statistics throughout all of the models once again point to political 
generations, the life cycle, period effects and social modernisation accounting 
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for a limited degree of variance in powerlessness alienation; the initial APC 
model (Model I) had a statistic of smaller than 0.01, while the most successful 
models (Models III, IV and VII) had statistics of 0.05. 
8.4.3 Political Normlessness 
Table 8.4 presents the models for political normlessness, with Model II 
showing the effect of post-materialism. Contrary to expectations, rising levels 
of post-materialism were associated with lower levels of normlessness, with 
the effect ranging from -0.12 for respondents with a CSE compared to those 
with no qualifications, to -0.71 for those with a Degree or higher. The data did 
not support the theoretical expectation, therefore, that rising levels of post-
materialism were associated with higher levels of cynicism and dissatisfaction 
with political elites that manifested themselves through political normlessness.  
Accounting for the effect of post-materialism in Model II had almost no impact 
on the generational coefficients (the 0LOOHQQLDOV¶FRHIILFLHQWIRULQVWDQFH
shifted from -0.47 to -0.48), suggested that rising levels of post-materialism 
DPRQJ\RXQJHUJHQHUDWLRQVGRHVQRWH[SODLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\ORZ
normlessness. Accounting for post-materialism did have, however, a notable 
impact on the period effect, increasing the magnitude of all of the year 
coefficients. This suggests, therefore, that rising levels of post-materialism 
have arrested the rise of normlessness alienation somewhat, and that if the 
British electorate was not becoming more post-materialist then overall levels of 
normlessness alienation would be even higher. The age coefficient had a 
statistically significant and slightly negative effect (of -0.01) in this model, as 
opposed to having no significant effect in Model I, implying that with post-
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materialism accounted for there was evidence of a relationship between age 
and political normlessness, in which older respondents were less likely to be 
alienated. Why controlling for post-materialism would lead to the identification 
of a relationship between age and normlessness was unclear. 
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Table 8.4a: Social Modernisation and Normlessness, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model II - PM I Model III - PM II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.47** 0.16 -0.48** 0.16 -0.35* 0.17 
90s -0.22 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.10 0.12 
80s -0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 
60s-70s -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 
(Post-War)          
Pre-War -0.16* 0.07 -0.18* 0.07 -0.19* 0.07 
           
Year (1986)          
1991 0.24** 0.07 0.26*** 0.07 0.37*** 0.08 
1994 0.74*** 0.08 0.80*** 0.08 0.80*** 0.08 
1996 0.82*** 0.08 0.88*** 0.08 0.93*** 0.08 
1998 0.52*** 0.07 0.59*** 0.07 0.67*** 0.08 
2000 1.03*** 0.07 1.10*** 0.08 1.12*** 0.08 
2002 0.83*** 0.08 0.93*** 0.08 0.92*** 0.08 
2003 1.21*** 0.08 1.33*** 0.08 1.39*** 0.08 
2005 0.88*** 0.08 1.00*** 0.08 1.10*** 0.09 
2010 1.34*** 0.10 1.43*** 0.11 1.47*** 0.11 
2011 1.24*** 0.10 1.35*** 0.10 1.38*** 0.10 
2012 1.33*** 0.11 1.48*** 0.11 1.57*** 0.11 
           
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
           
Education (No qual)          
CSE or equiv    -0.12* 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
O-level or equiv    -0.23*** 0.04 -0.12** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv    -0.44*** 0.05 -0.23*** 0.05 
Higher ed < deg    -0.44*** 0.04 -0.20*** 0.05 
Degree or higher    -0.71*** 0.04 -0.30*** 0.05 
           
Powerlessness       0.44*** 0.01 
Meaninglessness       0.05*** 0.01 
Social Class       -0.04* 0.02 
Gender       0.10*** 0.03 
           
Obs 22255   21473   20512   
Pseudo2 0.02   0.02   0.05   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Table 8.4b: Social Modernisation and Normlessness, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model IV - MF I Model V - MF II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.47** 0.16 -0.48** 0.16 -0.39* 0.16 
90s -0.22 0.12 -0.23 0.12 -0.14 0.12 
80s -0.09 0.09 -0.1 0.09 -0.02 0.09 
60s-70s -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 
(Post-War)           
Pre-War -0.16* 0.07 -0.16* 0.07 -0.16* 0.07 
            
Year (1986)           
1991 0.24** 0.07 0.24*** 0.07 0.36*** 0.08 
1994 0.74*** 0.08 0.74*** 0.08 0.78*** 0.08 
1996 0.82*** 0.08 0.82*** 0.08 0.91*** 0.08 
1998 0.52*** 0.07 0.52*** 0.07 0.64*** 0.08 
2000 1.03*** 0.07 1.02*** 0.07 1.10*** 0.08 
2002 0.83*** 0.08 0.82*** 0.08 0.89*** 0.08 
2003 1.21*** 0.08 1.20*** 0.08 1.34*** 0.08 
2005 0.88*** 0.08 0.87*** 0.08 1.06*** 0.08 
2010 1.34*** 0.10 1.32*** 0.1 1.46*** 0.11 
2011 1.24*** 0.10 1.22*** 0.1 1.35*** 0.10 
2012 1.33*** 0.11 1.32*** 0.11 1.49*** 0.11 
            
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Read Paper x3 per wk     -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
            
Powerlessness        0.45*** 0.01 
Meaninglessness        0.07*** 0.01 
Social Class        -0.09*** 0.01 
Gender        0.09** 0.03 
            
Obs 22255   22251   21233   
Pseudo2 0.02   0.02   0.05   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Table 8.4c: Social Modernisation and Normlessness, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model VI - SM I Model VII - SM II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.47** 0.16 -0.49** 0.16 -0.35* 0.17 
90s -0.22 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.11 0.12 
80s -0.09 0.09 -0.03 0.09 0.02 0.09 
60s-70s -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 
(Post-War)       
Pre-War -0.16* 0.07 -0.19** 0.07 -0.19* 0.07 
        
Year (1986)       
1991 0.24** 0.07 0.26*** 0.07 0.37*** 0.08 
1994 0.74*** 0.08 0.79*** 0.08 0.80*** 0.08 
1996 0.82*** 0.08 0.87*** 0.08 0.92*** 0.08 
1998 0.52*** 0.07 0.59*** 0.07 0.67*** 0.08 
2000 1.03*** 0.07 1.10*** 0.08 1.12*** 0.08 
2002 0.83*** 0.08 0.92*** 0.08 0.92*** 0.08 
2003 1.21*** 0.08 1.33*** 0.08 1.38*** 0.08 
2005 0.88*** 0.08 0.99*** 0.08 1.09*** 0.09 
2010 1.34*** 0.10 1.42*** 0.11 1.46*** 0.11 
2011 1.24*** 0.10 1.34*** 0.10 1.38*** 0.10 
2012 1.33*** 0.11 1.47*** 0.11 1.56*** 0.11 
        
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Age2 - - - - - - 
        
Education (No qual)       
CSE or equiv   -0.12* 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
O-level or equiv   -0.23*** 0.04 -0.12** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv   -0.43*** 0.05 -0.23*** 0.05 
Higher ed < deg   -0.43*** 0.04 -0.20*** 0.05 
Degree or higher   -0.71*** 0.04 -0.30*** 0.05 
Read Paper x3 per wk   -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
Normlessness     0.44*** 0.01 
Meaninglessness     0.05*** 0.01 
Social Class     -0.04* 0.02 
Gender     0.09** 0.03 
       
Obs 22255  21469  20508  
Pseudo2 0.02  0.02  0.05  
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Model III included the control variables for the other alienation dimensions as 
well as social class and gender, and showed that the controls were more 
successful in explaining generational differences in normlessness than post-
materialism.29 The coefficient for the Millennials was reduced to -0.35 and 
remained statistically significant, while that for the Pre-War generation also 
remained significant but was largely unchanged (at -0.19). The coefficients for 
the other generations were similar to those in Model II and continued to imply 
no significant differences between them and the Post-War generation. The 
control coefficients showed that being male and having more social and 
political resources reduced normlessness, while powerlessness and 
meaninglessness were positively associated. Controlling for these effects had a 
small impact on the period effect as well as the cohort effect, with the 
magnitude of the year coefficients increasing to varying degrees; this suggested 
that the rise of normlessness in the British electorate could be even more 
pronounced if not for the influence of social and political resources and the 
depressing effect on normlessness of other dimensions of political alienation.  
Model IV shows the effect of media fragmentation on political normlessness, 
and as expected it had no significant effect. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there 
were few differences between the age, period and cohort effects identified in 
the media fragmentation models (Models IV and V) and those in Model I, nor 
between those in the composite social modernisation models (VI and VII) and 
those in the post-materialism models (II and III). The fragmentation of media 
                                                 
29
 Note that ideally, a control variable for social trust would be included in this analysis, as it 
was in analyses of political normlessness in Chapters Five and Six, to account for the 
relationship between political trust and social trust. Unfortunately, there is not a social trust 
variable available for all the year variables considered in this BSA series. 
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consumption makes almost no contribution to explaining either the 
increasingly normlessnessly alienated nature of the British electorate, nor the 
unusually low levels of normlessness exhibited by the Millennials. In fact, 
given that post-materialism was shown to contribute to such an explanation to 
only a limited extent (the Pseudo r-squared statistics of the post-materialist 
model was 0.02, and with the controls included was 0.05), the data in Table 8.4 
suggests that the processes associated with these two social modernisation 
theories have little to do with trends in political normlessness at all.  
8.3.4 Political Meaninglessness 
Table 8.5 shows the APC analyses for political meaninglessness. Model II 
showed that ± as expected ± rising levels of post-materialism are associated 
with lower levels of meaninglessness. Having a degree, for example, was 
VKRZQWRGHSUHVVRQH¶VDYHUDJHPHDQLQJOHVVQHVVVFRUHE\MXVWRYHUWZRSRLQWV
(with a significant coefficient of -2.14) compared with someone with no 
qualification, while having a CSE or equivalent had a smaller but still 
significant effect of -0.37. Political meaninglessness is the only dimension of 
alienation for which the Millennials were not found to stand out from the older 
generations, and controlling for post-materialism did nothing to change that. 
Controlling for post-materialism made all of the generation coefficients more 
positive (reinforcing the view that post-materialism reduces meaninglessness), 
and reduced the difference between the Post-War generation and the 60s-70s 
and 80s generations. The coefficient for the 60s-70s generation fell from -0.23 
in Model I to -0.11, and that of the 80s generation fell from -0.19 to -0.02, and 
both became insignificant. The coefficient for the Pre-War generation 
302 
 
increased from 0.06 to 0.21 and became significant, while the coefficients for 
the Millennial and 90s generations were made more positive but remained non-
significant. This suggests, therefore, that the unusually low levels of political 
meaninglessness exhibited by the 80s and 60s-70s generations were the result 
of the increasingly post-materialist nature of those generations compared to the 
Pre- and Post-War generations. The coefficients for the 90s and Millennial 
generations suggested that their post-materialism was also depressing their 
meaninglessness, but not to such an extent that they were significantly different 
from the Post-War generation; it appears that something else, therefore, was 
increasing their meaninglessness at the same time that their post-materialism 
was depressing it.  
There was no discernible impact on the estimated life cycle effect on 
meaninglessness, but there was a substantial change in the period effect once 
post-materialism was accounted for. The year coefficients ± which in Model I 
suggested a sustained drop in meaninglessness after 2002 ± all became more 
positive, and all but those for 1994, 1996, and 2000 (all of which suggested 
unusually high levels of meaninglessness alienation) became non-significant. 
The electorate-wide decline in meaninglessness shortly after the turn of the 
millennium, therefore, appears to have been caused by rising levels of post-
materialism and political sophistication among British citizens. 
Including the control variables (Model III) had little impact on either the life 
cycle, period or cohort effects estimated in Model II. Women were shown to be 
typically more alienated than men, while higher levels of resources depressed 
meaninglessness. Political powerlessness and normlessness both had positive 
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and significant effects.  With these controls included the magnitude of the post-
materialism variable was reduced but continued to suggest that greater post-
materialism reduced meaninglessness, but the age, year and generation 
coefficients were virtually identical to those in Model II.  
Model IV included the media fragmentation variable and showed that, as 
expected, media fragmentation is increasing political meaninglessness. 
Reading a newspaper regularly reduced meaninglessness alienation by -0.2 
points. There were some effects on the age, year and cohort coefficients from 
accounting for media fragmentation. The estimated life cycle effect was 
increased compared to that in Model I (with the age coefficient falling to -
0.04). The year coefficients all became slightly more negative, albeit to varying 
degrees, suggesting that media fragmentation has contributed to falling levels 
of meaninglessness throughout the electorate. The generational coefficients 
also became slightly more negative, though still only those of the 60s-70s (-
0.25) and 80s (-0.22) generations were statistically significant.  
Including the control variables (Model V) reduced the magnitude of the media 
fragmentation coefficient (to -0.14) but it remained significant. The effects of 
the control variables was similar to those in Model III ± lower levels of social 
and political resources, being female, and greater powerlessness and 
normlessness increased meaninglessness alienation. In Model V the estimated 
life cycle effect was weaker (the age coefficient fell to -0.02) but remained 
significant, while the magnitude of the period effect was also slightly reduced. 
The impression of a sustained drop in meaninglessness after 2003, however, 
was still clear. Finally, the generational coefficients were for the most part very 
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similar to those seen in Model I. The most notable impact was that the 
coefficient for the 80s generation fell to -0.15 and became non-significant, and 
the coefficient for the 60s-70s generation fell to -0.16 but remained significant. 
The media fragmentation model, therefore, does help to explain why the 80s 
and 60s-70s generations were found to be less alienated than their elders.  
Finally, the composite social modernisation models (Models VI and VII) 
showed that media fragmentation and rising post-materialism had significant 
effects on meaninglessness. The magnitude of those effects was very similar to 
those seen in Models IV and II respectively, suggesting that their effects were 
largely independent of each other. The period effect in Model VI was largely 
the same as that in Model II (i.e., the post-materialism model), though the 
coefficients were more negative meaning that while post-materialism largely 
accounts for the fall in meaninglessness after 2003, the impact of media 
fragmentation in decreasing it at the same time was still clear. The life cycle 
effect was suggested to be essentially the same as those estimated in the other 
models. The generational coefficients in Model VI suggested that the 
composite social modernisation model can help explain generational 
differences in meaninglessness and to a greater extent than the previous 
models. All of the coefficients were more positive in Model VI, with that of the 
60s-70s generation continuing to suggest that they were unusually un-alienated 
(at -0.13 and significant) and that of the Pre-War generation suggesting that 
they were unusually alienated (at 0.19 and significant). The other coefficients, 
including that of the Millennials, remained non-significant.  
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Including the control variables into the composite model rendered the 60s-70s 
generation coefficient non-significant (reducing it -0.1), though the coefficient 
for the Pre-War generation remained almost unchanged at a significant 0.19. 
This suggested, therefore, that the unusually low meaninglessness of the 80s 
and 60s-70s generations identified in Model I was largely the result of their 
increasingly post-materialistic nature compared with their elders. Part of the 
reason why the 90s and Millennial generations were not less alienated still than 
the 80s and 60s-70s generations, despite being more post-materialistic (see 
Appendix Six), appeared to lie in the effects of media fragmentation alongside 
those of differences in social and political resources and potentially other forms 
of political alienation. As would be expected, controlling for gender, social 
class and the other alienation dimensions reduced the magnitude of the post-
materialism and media fragmentation effects, but they remained significant. 
The life cycle effect was barely changed (though it was slightly lower than that 
estimated in Model VI, with a coefficient for age of -0.02), and the year 
coefficients were also very similar. 
Overall, therefore, these analyses suggested that social modernisation plays a 
fairly important role in explaining trends in political meaninglessness. While it 
helps to explain period and generational effects, however, the Pseudo r-squared 
statistics show that even the most successful model ± the composite social 
modernisation model with controls (Pseudo r-squared of 0.08) ± explained only 
a limited portion of overall variance in meaninglessness. Social modernisation 
is more successful in explaining generational and period trends in 
meaninglessness than overall variation between individuals. 
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The growth of post-materialism is associated with declining meaninglessness 
throughout the British electorate and among younger generations, although its 
impact is mitigated somewhat for the Millennials and the 90s generation by the 
consequences of media fragmentation and factors relating to social and 
political resources. The processes associated with media fragmentation are also 
important in explaining changes in meaninglessness, though primarily in the 
form of offsetting the depressing effect of post-materialism. As for the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQLQSDUticular, these analyses confirm that they appear to 
be fairly typical in terms of meaninglessness, despite theoretical expectations 
to the contrary. The impact of social modernisation on their alienation appears 
to be contradictory, depressing it and exacerbating it at the same time. 
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Table 8.5a: Social Modernisation and Meaninglessness, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model II - PM I Model III - PM II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.01 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.18 
90s -0.17 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.13 
80s -0.19* 0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.09 
60s-70s -0.23*** 0.06 -0.11 0.06 -0.08 0.06 
(Post-War) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Pre-War 0.06 0.07 0.21** 0.07 0.20* 0.08 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Year (1986) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
1991 -0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08 
1994 0.17* 0.08 0.34*** 0.08 0.34*** 0.08 
1996 0.10 0.08 0.27** 0.08 0.26** 0.08 
1998 -0.12 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 
2000 0.00 0.07 0.22** 0.07 0.16* 0.08 
2002 -0.13 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.08 
2003 -0.24** 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.08 
2005 -0.32*** 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
2010 -0.47*** 0.10 -0.16 0.10 -0.25* 0.11 
2011 -0.41*** 0.09 -0.06 0.10 -0.12 0.10 
2012 -0.29** 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.11 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Age -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education (No qual) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
CSE or equiv 
 
  -0.37*** 0.05 -0.21*** 0.05 
O-level or equiv 
 
  -0.74*** 0.04 -0.56*** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv 
 
  -1.26*** 0.05 -0.92*** 0.05 
Higher ed < deg 
 
  -1.34*** 0.04 -0.97*** 0.05 
Degree or higher 
 
  -2.14*** 0.05 -1.60*** 0.05 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Powerlessness 
 
  
 
  0.32*** 0.01 
Normlessness 
 
  
 
  0.10*** 0.02 
Social Class 
 
  
 
  -0.21*** 0.02 
Gender 
 
  
 
  0.63*** 0.03 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Obs 22549   21743   20512   
Pseudo2 0.01   0.05   0.08   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Table 8.5b: Social Modernisation and Meaninglessness, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model IV - MF I Model V - MF II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.01 0.16 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.17 
90s -0.17 0.12 -0.21 0.12 -0.12 0.12 
80s -0.19* 0.09 -0.22** 0.09 -0.15 0.09 
60s-70s -0.23*** 0.06 -0.25*** 0.06 -0.16** 0.06 
(Post-War) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-War 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.08 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year (1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 -0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.08 
1994 0.17* 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.23** 0.08 
1996 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.08 
1998 -0.12 0.07 -0.15* 0.07 -0.05 0.08 
2000 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.08 
2002 -0.13 0.08 -0.17* 0.08 -0.12 0.08 
2003 -0.24** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.07 -0.20* 0.08 
2005 -0.32*** 0.08 -0.35*** 0.08 -0.23** 0.08 
2010 -0.47*** 0.10 -0.52*** 0.10 -0.45*** 0.11 
2011 -0.41*** 0.09 -0.47*** 0.09 -0.37*** 0.10 
2012 -0.29** 0.10 -0.35** 0.10 -0.21 0.11 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age -0.03*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Read Paper x3 per 
wk   -0.20*** 0.03 -0.14*** 0.03 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Powerlessness 
 
 
 
 0.38*** 0.01 
Normlessness 
 
 
 
 0.12*** 0.02 
Social Class   
 
 -0.46*** 0.01 
Gender   
 
 0.60*** 0.03 
    
 
 
 
 
Obs 22549  22545  21233  
Pseudo2 0.01  0.01  0.06  
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Table 8.5c: Social Modernisation and Meaninglessness, 1986 ± 2012 
  
Model I - APC Model VI - SM I Model VII - SM II 
  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials -0.01 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.18 
90s -0.17 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.13 
80s -0.19* 0.09 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.09 
60s-70s -0.23*** 0.06 -0.13* 0.06 -0.10 0.06 
(Post-War) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Pre-War 0.06 0.07 0.19* 0.07 0.19* 0.08 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Year (1986) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
1991 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.08 
1994 0.17* 0.08 0.32*** 0.08 0.33*** 0.08 
1996 0.10 0.08 0.25** 0.08 0.24** 0.08 
1998 -0.12 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.08 
2000 0.00 0.07 0.19* 0.07 0.14 0.08 
2002 -0.13 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 
2003 -0.24** 0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.08 
2005 -0.32*** 0.08 -0.08 0.08 -0.06 0.09 
2010 -0.47*** 0.10 -0.21* 0.10 -0.28* 0.11 
2011 -0.41*** 0.09 -0.12 0.10 -0.16 0.10 
2012 -0.29** 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.11 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Age -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Education (No qual) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
CSE or equiv 
  
  -0.36*** 0.05 -0.20*** 0.05 
O-level or equiv 
  
  -0.73*** 0.04 -0.55*** 0.04 
A-Level or equiv     -1.25*** 0.05 -0.91*** 0.05 
Higher ed < deg     -1.33*** 0.04 -0.97*** 0.05 
Degree or higher     -2.13*** 0.05 -1.60*** 0.05 
Read Paper x3 per wk    -0.20*** 0.03 -0.14*** 0.03 
Normlessness    
 
  0.33*** 0.01 
Meaninglessness    
 
  0.10*** 0.02 
Social Class    
 
  -0.21*** 0.02 
Gender    
 
  0.62*** 0.03 
   
 
   
Obs 22549   21739   20508   
Pseudo2 0.01   0.06   0.08   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-
value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001. Prob > chi2 for each model = <0.01 
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Finally, Table 8.6 summarises the key findings from the above analyses, 
focussing on the extent to which accounting for social modernisation helps 
explain the generational distinctiveness of the Millennials in terms of apathy 
and alienation. The table shows whether the social modernisation variables 
help explain the difference between the Millennials and the reference 
generatioQE\UHGXFLQJWKHFRHIILFLHQW¥RUH[SODLQVRPXFKRIWKDW
GLIIHUHQFHWKDWLWLVQRORQJHUVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQW¥¥ 
 
Table 8.6: Summary 
  Apathy Power. Norm. Mean. 
Millennials different? ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Pseudo r2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
Most/Least? Most Least Least Average 
      
Post-materialism explain? x ¥ x - 
Pseudo r2 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 
with controls? ¥ ¥ ¥ - 
Pseudo r2  0.07 0.05 0.05  0.08  
         
Media fragmentation 
explain?  ¥ x x  -  
Pseudo r2  0.02 0.05  0.02  0.01 
with controls?  ¥¥ ¥ ¥  -  
Pseudo r2  0.05 0.02  0.05  0.06 
         
Social modernisation 
explain? x  ¥ x  -  
Pseudo r2  0.06 0.02  0.02  0.06 
with controls?  ¥¥ ¥  ¥  - 
Pseudo r2  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.08 
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8.4 Conclusion 
These analyses conducted a detailed examination of the role of social 
modernisation ± in the form of rising post-materialism and media 
fragmentation ± in driving changes in formal political apathy and alienation 
through age, period and cohort effects. The results suggested that its impact 
was varied, in some instances making a substantial contribution to explaining 
those trends and in others playing a minor role. Furthermore, the analyses 
confirmed that the impact and significance of post-materialism and media 
fragmentation was variable from one analysis to the next, confirming the 
argument made in Chapter Seven that different aspects of social modernisation 
can have very different implications for political characteristics, which may 
sometimes even work against each other. 
Regarding the generational distinction of the Millennials in terms of formal 
political apathy and alienation, as Table 8.6 shows, social modernisation plays 
a limited role. The Millennials were identified as the most politically apathetic 
generation to have entered the British electorate since World War Two. Their 
particularly post-materialistic nature had little to do with this (in fact it merely 
meant that they were less apathetic than they otherwise might be), but the 
fragmentation of media consumption ± of which the Millennials are among 
those leading the way (see Appendix Six) ± is clearly important. The 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶ODFNRIHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWUDGLWLRQDODQGEURDGFDVWPHGLDKDVOHG
to them developing a weaker motivation to engage with formal politics than 
their elders. While their engagement with other sources of media to get 
political information may offset this effect somewhat, the evidence in this 
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research supports :DWWHQEHUJ¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWQHZIRUPVRIPHGLDGR
not provide sufficient information so as to compensate for the lack of 
engagement with more traditional forms. It is also important to note, however, 
that alongside this cohort effect was a clear and significant life cycle effect, 
meaning that while the Millennials can be expected to exhibit a higher average 
level of political apathy than older generations throughout their adult lives, 
their apathy will nonetheless decline at least a little as they reach middle age.  
Perhaps surprisingly, and in direct challenge to the conventional wisdom 
UHJDUGLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHnation from formal politics, they were found to 
be the least alienated generation in terms of both political powerlessness and 
political normlessness. Regarding the former, the evidence suggests that the 
Millennials are at the leading edge of a generational decline in powerlessness 
alienation as successive generations of the electorate feel more influential in 
formal politics. There is also evidence of a life cycle effect which suggests that 
powerlessness is lower among the middle aged than the young and old, 
meaning that the Millennials may well become even less alienated as they age. 
Social modernisation made virtually no contribution to explaining this 
distinction ± although both post-materialism and media fragmentation were 
found to depress powerlessness. Instead, the control variables were found to 
help ± though not completely ± explain the generational decline in 
powerlessness, suggesting that trends primarily in social and political resources 
and other dimensions of alienation are important.  
The MilleQQLDOV¶ODFNRIQRUPOHVVQHVVDOLHQDWLRQZDVOHVVDUHIOHFWLRQRID
generational decline and more indicative of a lob-sided curvilinear effect, in 
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which the oldest (Pre-War) and youngest (Millennial) generations were 
generally less alienated than the wider electorate. Consistent with expectations, 
media fragmentation was found to have no substantial impact on political 
normlessness, while post-materialism depressed it. While rising levels of post-
materialism in the British electorate were related to the period effect of rising 
normlessness (arresting that increase), it was not related to the generational 
distinction of the Millennials (or the Pre-War generation). The more substantial 
contribution came from the control variables, particularly for social class and 
the other dimensions of alienation. The fact that the Millennials are evidently 
so un-alienated in terms of political powerlessness, therefore, may also be 
related to why they are so un-alienated in terms of normlessness, based on the 
fact that the two are moderately correlated. These analyses have not, however, 
identified a potential common cause for this relationship, and this is an avenue 
identified for further study in Chapter Nine.  
Finally, political meaninglessness was the only dimension of political 
alienation in which the Millennials did not stand out from the wider electorate. 
The distinction attributed to the Millennials in Chapter Six to this effect 
appeared to actually be the result of the political life cycle, which was shown 
above to have a comparable relationship with meaninglessness to that found for 
SROLWLFDODSDWK\7KH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQLVOLNHO\WRIDOOVOLJKWO\DVWKH\JHW
older as a result, but there is no indication that they will exhibit persistently 
higher or lower levels of meaninglessness throughout their lives. That said, 
there was evidence that the processes associated with rising post-materialism 
DQGPHGLDIUDJPHQWDWLRQZHUHKDYLQJFRQWUDGLFWRU\HIIHFWVRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
meaninglessness. The regression analyses confirmed that post-materialism 
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depressed meaninglessness, and was largely responsible for the distinction of 
the 80s and 60s-70s generations in being unusually un-alienated compared with 
the wider electorate. The fact that the Millennials (and the 90s generation) are 
the most post-materialistic suggests that they should be among the least 
alienated as a result. However, media fragmentation was shown to be 
exacerbating meaninglessness alienation, and the 90s and Millennial 
generations are also at the leading edge of that trend. While more detailed 
analyses would be needed to explore this question in more detail, the evidence 
above suggests WKDWZKLOHWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SRVW-materialism has resulted in 
them being less alienated in terms of meaninglessness than they otherwise 
might be, the fact that they are not engaging with traditional forms of news 
media is counteracting this effect. The result is that, against the theoretical 
expectations of both the post-materialism and media fragmentation theories, 
the Millennials are somewhere in the middle of the road for their 
meaninglessness alienation stemming from their lack of confidence in their 
political knowledge. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
In the run up to the 2015 general election, the familiar arguments, theories, 
worries ± and, of course, conventional wisdoms ± DERXWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIµWKH
\RXWKYRWH¶ and the relationship that British young people had with politics 
once again became a prominent feature of the news media: would young 
people vote? If not, why not? What would it mean for British politics if once 
DJDLQDVL]HDEOHFKXQNRIWKHµ\RXWKYRWH¶IDLOHGWRWXUQRXW"The 2015 election 
injected new life into the public profile of the conventional wisdom which 
dominates both our public and academic understanding of how and why 
WRGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOHSDUWLFLSDWHLQSROLWLFVWKH\RXQJWKHZLVGRPWHOOVXVDUH
unusually inactive in formal politics while simultaneously expanding the 
frontiers of political participation in other arenas, and this is driven not by their 
apathy towards formal politics, but by their alienation from it.  
This thesis has interrogated the academic literature behind this conventional 
wisdom, based around answering three research questions and through 
focussing on Britain as an illustrative example of a Western democracy in 
which this wisdom is widespread: i) to what extent do British Millennials 
constitute a distinct political generation in terms of their political participation, 
in formal politics and beyond; ii) to what extent are they a distinct generation 
in terms of their apathy towards and alienation from formal politics, and does 
either characteristic explain their political participation; and iii) reflecting the 
assumption (outlined in Chapters One and Two) that the Millennials constitute 
a Western society-wide cohort whose emergence is linked to Western society-
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wide processes, has Western societal evolution FDXVHGWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
generational distinction in terms of apathy and/or alienation?  
These research questions not only form the basis of an empirical interrogation 
of the conventional wisdom underlying contemporary understanding of how 
and why young people participate in politics, but are also framed so as to 
resolve four major problems with the academic literature which underpins that 
conventional wisdom detailed in Chapter Two. First, the current understanding 
RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWRU\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGZKHWKHUWKHGLVWLQFWLRQVLQ
those characteristics are driven by age, period or cohort effects, is limited. This 
is primarily the result of a failure to employ methods capable of distinguishing 
between the three in empirical analyses. Second, and compounding the issue of 
EHLQJXQFOHDUDERXWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWRU\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKere is also a 
lack of clarity about how µSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶VKRXOGEHFRQFHSWXDOLVHGLQ
light of the effects of social evolution on the opportunities for Western citizens 
to participate in politics.  
Third, the claim that the Millennials are politically alienated has been subjected 
to little empirical scrutiny because of a failure in the existing literature to 
GHYHORSDFOHDULGHDRIZKDWµSROLWLFDODOLHQDWLRQ¶DFWXDOO\LVKRZLWFDQEH
defined and conceptualised, and how it should be measured. Finally, the failure 
to develop a clear idea of what alienation or political apathy are and how they 
should be measured has meant that there has been little scope to empirically 
examine the role of potential causal processes behind trends in those 
characteristics. Each of these issues has been resolved while answering the 
317 
 
three research questions above, and the solutions to the specific problems have 
been discussed in detail in the preceding chapters. 
In this concluding chapter, the answers to the research questions and the 
lessons learned in the process are spelled out, and six key arguments about the 
way in which the Millennials participate in politics, the extent to which they 
are apathetic and alienated compared with their elders, the role of apathy and 
alienation in causing their distinct participation, the role of social evolution in 
causing their distinct apathy and alienation, and the importance of political 
generations more broadly for understanding differences in political apathy, 
alienation and participation are outlined. The chapter then turns to consider the 
DFDGHPLFLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKLVUHVHDUFKIRUWKHRQJRLQJVWXG\RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
political participation, apathy and alienation, as well as that of future 
generations of young citizens. It also considers the lessons learned about 
political apathy and particularly political alienation, and what these mean for 
the future study and use of these concepts in future research, as well as the 
implications of the findings regarding the role of social evolution in driving 
trends in these concepts for theories relating to the effect of social 
PRGHUQLVDWLRQRQ:HVWHUQFLWL]HQV¶SROLWLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV 
The chapter then identifies several avenues of further research relating to the 
political participation of the Millennials, the study of political apathy and 
alienation, and the study of the effects of social evolution, which are based 
both on limitations identified to the analyses presented in this thesis, and on 
new and unanswered questions raised by those analyses. Finally, the chapter 
turns to the µSXEOLFIDFLQJ¶DVSHFWRIWKHLVVXHRIWKHSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRI
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young people in Western democracies, and considers the implications of the 
findings of this research for the likely success or failure of policy solutions to 
the issue of low electoral engagement among the young currently being 
considered in Britain, as well as many other Western democracies.  
9.1 The Millennials¶'LVWLQFW Political Participation 
7KHLVVXHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGWKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI
whether or not their participatory habits distinguished them from older 
generations in the British electorate, was addressed in Chapters Three and 
Four. Chapter 7KUHHFRQVLGHUHGWKHZD\LQZKLFKµSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶
should be defined and conceptualised. Building on the arguments outlined in 
Fox (2014), the chapter discussed the need to employ a broad measure of 
political participation which was capable of recognising the breadth of political 
activity in a modern democratic society. It also acknowledged the arguments of 
studies such as Verba and Nie (1972) and Parry et al. (1992) relating to the 
benefits of assessing the multi-dimensional nature of political participation for 
understanding the sorts of political activity certain groups may prefer or avoid 
and why. The result was a four-dimensional conception of political 
participation, consisting of formal political participation, cause-oriented 
political participation, civic political participation, and issue-specific formal 
participation. 
Using a combination of cross-sectional analyses and age-period-cohort 
analyses (APC), Chapters Three and Four collectively demonstrated that the 
Millennials are typically the least politically active generation across all four of 
these dimensions. While the difference between the Millennials and their elders 
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varies depending on the specific act in question, on average they are less active 
in each dimension of political activity. In addition, Chapter Four found 
evidence of substantial cohort effects for acts associated with each dimension, 
which suggested that the Millennials have entered the electorate with the 
lowest propensity to participate in politics in the history of British survey 
research. By far the strongest effects were apparent in analyses of formal 
political participation, and especially voting. While the conventional wisdom 
WKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOVDUHXQXVXDOO\DFWLYHLQµQHZ¶IRUPVRISROLWLFDODFWLYLW\
(such as those associated with cause-oriented or civic politics) is challenged by 
these findings, the assertion that they are unusually inactive in formal politics ± 
and particularly elections ± is supported. 
In addition to cohort effects, Chapter Four also found evidence of significant 
life cycle effects for all four dimensions of political participation. In the case of 
formal politics, this is unsurprising ± an extensive literature has demonstrated 
that the political life cycle has a consistent impact on how likely a given 
individual is to participate in formal politics (Smets 2008; Jankowski and 
Strate 1995). Chapter Four shows, however, that these effects are also apparent 
for other dimensions of political activity as well. This suggests that the 
depressing effects on formal political participation associated with living in the 
early stage of the political life cycle ± such as not yet being established in a 
community, not yet starting a career, having children or owning a home ± are 
also important for informal acts of participation. This not only reinforces the 
need to account for the life cycle in studies of young SHRSOH¶VIRUPDOSROLWLFDO
participation ± both so that a reliable understanding of why they are in/active 
can be developed and to ensure that life cycle effects are not confused with 
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cohort effects (Phelps 2012) ± but demonstrates the need to do so in studies of 
any form of political participation regardless of whether it is within or beyond 
the formal political arena.  
Finally, Chapter Four also found evidence of period effects in which certain 
forms of political participation (particularly associated with formal politics 
such as voting in elections) have become less common across all generations in 
recent decades, while other forms (such as cause-oriented activity) have 
become more common. This supports theories emphasising the evolution of 
political participation through the rising popularity of informal arenas of 
political activity and to some extent away from traditional, formal arenas (such 
as those made by Sloam (2012b; 2014), Norris (2001; 2011) and Dalton 
(2013)). It also highlights the need to account for such period effects in studies 
RI\RXQJSHRSOH¶VSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQVRWKDWWUHQGVZKLFKDUHDSSDUHQW
throughout the entire electorate at a given time (such as, for example, the 
increasing tendency of British citizens to sign petitions) are not misinterpreted 
as cohort effects in which the younger generation are suggested to stand out.  
There are two broader implications from these findings. The first relates to 
IXWXUHVWXGLHVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQDVZHOODVWKDWRIIXWXre 
generations of young citizens. As Chapters One and Two detailed, scholars 
such as Phelps (2012) have emphasised the need to take account of the political 
OLIHF\FOHLQVWXGLHVRI\RXQJFLWL]HQV¶SROLWLFDODFWLYLW\VRWKDWGLIIHUHQFHV
between young and old are not mistakenly taken to indicate generational 
GLVWLQFWLRQV7KLVUHVHDUFKQRWRQO\VXSSRUWV3KHOSV¶DUJXPHQWEXWVKRZVWKH
need to expand it: in addition to the life cycle, scholars must be sensitive to 
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period effects as well. There is evidence of electorate-wide shifts in political 
participation which are not confined to a particular political generation. Any 
study which ignores such period effects runs the risk of misinterpreting them, 
potentially assigning an unjustified emphasis to the distinctiveness of a given 
generation as a result. Future studies of the political participation of the young 
must, therefore, be sensitive to age, period and cohort effects to at least some 
degree, in order not to confuse the three and mischaracterise a given generation 
of citizens, as has frequently happened in the case of the Millennials (e.g., 
Sloam 2014; Henn and Foard 2012; Henn et al. 2005). 
7KHVHFRQGLPSOLFDWLRQUHODWHVWRWKHIXWXUHWUDMHFWRU\RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ*LYHQWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶unusually low levels of political 
participation at least partly reflect cohort effects, this means their lower 
propensity to participate is likely to be a lasting habit which will endure 
throughout their adult lives. While they are likely become more active relative 
to their current levels as they move through the life cycle, and may become 
more active in certain areas because of electorate-wide shifts in political 
behaviour, they are nonetheless likely to be typically less active than previous 
generations at the same stage of the life cycle and in similar contextual 
circumstances throughout their lives.  
9.2 The MillHQQLDOV¶$SDWK\DQG$OLHQDWLRQ 
Chapter Five focussed on defining, conceptualising and operationalising formal 
political apathy and formal political alienation. Through a review of extant 
literature on the concepts supported by empirical analyses, it developed a clear 
definition, an empirically informed conceptualisation, and an empirically 
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validated operationalisation of apathy and alienation in regard to formal 
politics which could effectively test the theory that either characteristic was 
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWSROLWLFDOEHKDYLRXU7KHUHVXOWZDVD
uni-GLPHQVLRQDOFRQFHSWLRQRIDSDWK\ZKLFKUHIOHFWVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRWLYDWLRQ
for personal involvement with formal politics, and a multi-dimensional 
FRQFHSWLRQRIDOLHQDWLRQZKLFKUHIOHFWVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VHVWUDQJHPHQWIURP
formal politics. This estrangement could take the form of political 
powerlessness (relating DQLQGLYLGXDO¶Vsense of political efficacy), political 
normlessness (reflecting to their faith that the norms governing just political 
interaction are being adhered to) or political meaninglessness (reflecting their 
faith in their knowledge of politics).  
Chapter Six then explored the extent to which the Millennials were distinct 
from older generations in terms of apathy and each dimension of alienation at 
the time of the 2010 British general election, and examined the impact of 
apathy and alienation on differences betweeQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶IRUPDODQG
cause-oriented political participation and that of their elders. The analyses 
showed that at the time of the 2010 election, the Millennials stood out in two 
important ways. First, they were the most apathetic generation in the electorate, 
even with important influences on political interest and knowledge (the 
constituent components of political apathy), such as political sophistication and 
social capital, controlled for. Second, while they did not differ from their elders 
in terms of powerlessness or normlessness, the Millennials did stand out for 
being unusually alienated through meaninglessness. 
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&KDSWHU6L[DOVRVKRZHGWKDWRQFHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶OHYHOV
of apathy and that of the older generations was accounted for, the differences 
between their respective expected political participation were dramatically 
reduced. In other words, the fact that the Millennials are so apathetic about 
formal politics plays a major role in explaining why they are so inactive in it, 
and to a lesser extent informal politics as well. In addition, while powerlessness 
and normlessness played small roles in explaining differences in participation, 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KLJKOHYHOVRIPHDQLQJOHVVQHVVDOLHQDWLRQZHUHDOVR
responsible for substantially depressing their formal, and to a lesser extent their 
cause-oriented, political participation. In short, therefore, the analyses 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWERWKWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KLJKOHYHOVRIDSDWK\DQGPHDQLQJOHVVQHVV
alienation were important in explaining why they were less likely to be active 
in politics than their elders, both within and beyond the formal political arena. 
&KDSWHU(LJKWFRQVLGHUHGWKHVRXUFHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWOHYHOVRI
apathy and alienation, and used APC analyses to determine whether they 
reflected the political life cycle, period effects, or generational differences. The 
analyses showed that for both apathy and alienation, there was evidence of life 
cycle effects which to some extent accounted for differences between the 
Millennials and their elders, as well as period effects in which the typical 
expressions of apathy and certain forms of alienation have changed throughout 
the British electorate over the past thirty years.  
With these effects controlled for, however, there was clear evidence of cohort 
effects for both apathy and alienation. The Millennials were shown to have 
entered the electorate with a greater propensity towards political apathy than 
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any of the older generations. This means that the unusually high levels of 
apathy identified in the Millennials in Chapter Six were at least partly the result 
of cohort effects, and so are likely to remain a lasting characteristic of the 
generation throughout their adult lives. The analyses also found evidence of 
cohort effects for both political powerlessness and normlessness, which 
identified the Millennials as the least politically alienated generation to have 
entered the electorate since the Pre-War generation. While expressions of 
powerlessness and normlessness appear to be changing as a result of different 
FDXVDOIRUFHVGLVFXVVHGIXUWKHUEHORZLQERWKFDVHVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ZHUH
shown to have typically lower levels than their elders once period effects and 
the life cycle were accounted for. This suggests that a propensity towards lower 
levels of powerlessness and normlessness alienation may accompany a 
propensity towards a typically higher level of political apathy in being a lasting 
characteristic of the Millennials.  
Finally, there was no evidence of a cohort effect relating to the Millennials in 
meaninglessness alienation once the life cycle and period effects were 
controlled for. The life cycle effect implies that higher levels of 
meaninglessness are to be expected during youth, with levels falling once 
people reach middle age. This suggests, therefore, that the unusually high level 
of meaninglessness alienation identified in the Millennials in Chapter Six is 
actually the result of a life cycle, rather than a cohort, effect. The Millennials 
are unlikely, therefore, to exhibit a lasting propensity towards unusually high 
or low levels of meaninglessness alienation. As they age and move through the 
life cycle, their meaninglessness alienation can be expected to broadly mimic 
the pattern seen among older generations. 
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Collectively, therefore, Chapters Six and Eight suggest that the Millennials are 
a particularly distinct political generation for their unusually high levels of 
political apathy, and their unusually low levels of powerlessness and 
normlessness alienation. 0RUHRYHUWKH\VXJJHVWWKDWLWLVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
apathy which plays the more substantial role in explaining their unusually low 
levels of political participation. Apathy was shown to significantly depress 
both formal and cause-oriented participation, suggesting that a lack of desire 
for personal involvement with formal politics overlaps to some extent with a 
similar lack of desire for involvement with other forms of politics outside the 
IRUPDOSROLWLFDODUHQDDVZHOO7KH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\KLJKDSDWhy, 
therefore, is suggested to be an important driving force behind their lack of 
participation in politics, be it in the formal, informal or civic arenas.   
7KH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\ORZOHYHOVRISRZHUOHVVQHVVDQGQRUPOHVVQHVV
alienation appear to play little role in explaining their low participation. In fact, 
the analyses in Chapter Six would suggest that their lack of alienation 
compared with their elders should make them relatively more active. While this 
may well be the case, the positive effect from their lack of alienation is 
unlikely to offset the depressing effect on their participation from their political 
DSDWK\7KHRQHIRUPRIDOLHQDWLRQZKLFKGHSUHVVHVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
participation (and so compounds the effect of their political apathy, at least 
temporarily) is meaninglessness. The effect of meaninglessness, however, is 
expected to weaken as the Millennials move through the life cycle.  
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9.3 The Role of Social Evolution 
Chapter Seven considered a potential theoretical explanation for cohort effects 
in political apathy and alienation in the form of social modernisation theory, 
i.e., the impact of social, economic, political and technological evolution in 
Western society on the way Western citizens are socialised into engaging with 
politics. Two sub-theories of this approach were focussed on: the rise of post-
materialism, which emphasises the development of post-materialistic political 
values with a major focus on enhancing and protecting individual autonomy; 
and media fragmentation, which focusses on the consequences of shifts in 
habits of media consumption in light of social change for the way in which 
people acquire political information. 
Chapter Eight then examined the role of these two processes in producing the 
cohort effects discussed above in political apathy and political alienation, with 
a particular focus on whether either post-materialism or media fragmentation 
FRXOGH[SODLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWDSDWK\WRZDUGVDQGODFNRIDOLHQDWLRQ
from formal politics. The growth of post-materialism was shown to be an 
important factor behind period effects in political apathy and meaninglessness 
in the British electorate since the early 2000s. Specifically, the British 
electorate has become gradually less apathetic and less meaninglessnessly 
alienated since the turn of the millennium, and this in large part is a result of 
increasing levels of post-materialism (which implies a greater motivation to 
engage with politics) and political sophistication among British citizens. Rising 
post-materialism was also shown to be supressing a period effect in political 
normlessness: the British electorate has become steadily more alienated since 
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the 1980s as a result of their lack of faith and trust in the integrity of the 
political process and those within it, and if they were not also becoming more 
post-materialistic at the same time this increase would have been even more 
dramatic. 
The fragmentation of media consumption patterns was shown to have several 
consequences in Chapter Seven, but one of the most significant is that it means 
the Millennials were consuming much less political news than did previous 
generations at the same age. This process was found to play an important role 
in explaining the unusually high levels of apathy among the Millennials, 
suggesting that their lack of engagement with traditional political news media, 
or even with any news media at all, was undermining their exposure to political 
issues and events and preventing them from developing a motivation to engage 
with formal politics.  
Media fragmentation was not found to explain the cohort effects relating to 
political alienation, but was suggested to influence period effects. Specifically, 
the shift of media consumption away from traditional sources and towards new 
(i.e., online) media (or towards consuming no political news at all) was shown 
to be offsetting the decline of political apathy and meaninglessness being 
driven by the rise of post-materialism somewhat. In other words, British 
citizens were shown to be becoming less apathetic and less alienated (in terms 
of meaninglessness) as a result of their increasingly post-materialistic nature, 
but this decline was being offset by their lack of engagement with traditional 
sources of political news.  
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The role of social evolution, therefore, at least in terms of rising post-
materialism and the fragmentation of media consumption, in explaining the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQFWDSDWK\DQGDOLHQDWLRQDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WKHLU
participation) is quite limited. The distinctively post-materialistic nature of the 
Millennials is not capable of explaining why they are so apathetic towards 
politics, nor could it account for their low levels of alienation. The media 
IUDJPHQWDWLRQWKHRU\RIIHUVOLWWOHE\ZD\RIH[SODLQLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
distinctive alienation, but is important for their apathy. Part of the reason for 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\KLJKOHYHOVRISROLWLFDODSDWK\DQGVXEVHTXHQWO\
their lack of political participation, is that they consume less political 
information through news media than previous generations. 
9.4 Academic Implications: Study of the Millennials 
The answers to the three research questions at the heart of this thesis have, 
therefore, thrown up some considerable challenges to the conventional wisdom 
of the Millennials as a distinctly alienated generation, disengaging from formal 
politics but leading the way in embracing alternative dimensions of political 
activity. These findings have substantial implications for both the extant 
OLWHUDWXUHRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQDSDWK\DQd alienation, and 
for the future study of those characteristics.  
$V&KDSWHU7ZRVKRZHGWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOZLVGRPUHJDUGLQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
participation is based on a large body of academic literature which has argued, 
albeit in different ways and in different national contexts, that the Millennials 
DUHXQXVXDOO\DFWLYHLQµQHZ¶IRUPVRISROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRXWVLGHWKHIRUPDO
political arena (such as protesting, volunteering or signing petitions) (e.g., 
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Dalton 2013; Martin 2012; Marsh et al. 2007; Norris 2001; 2011; Sloam 2014). 
In addition, some have suggested that this is indicative of a broader transition 
in the nature of political participation away from traditional, institutionalised 
activity and towards issue-specific and community based politics, driven 
primarily by the entry of new cohorts into Western electorates (Sloam 2014; 
Norris 2001; Dalton 2013).  
The findings of this thesis challenge several aspects of this theory. First, 
Chapters Three and Four show that the Millennials are typically less active 
than their elders in every dimension of political participation identified. The 
difference may vary depending on the specific act in question (and it is 
important to acknowledge that one of the key acts around which these 
arguments are based ± volunteering ± could not be analysed in the APC 
analyses in Chapter Four because of data limitations), but nonetheless there is 
no indication that the Millennials are unusually active in informal arenas of 
politics, even once the life cycle has been accounted for. What can be said is 
WKDWWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQIRUPDOSROLWLFVDQG
that of their elders is much larger ± particularly for voting in national elections 
± than that for their participation in other forms of politics. Chapter Four 
showed that this should not be misinterpreted as an unusually high propensity 
to participate in informal arenas of politics on the part of the Millennials, 
however, but as an unusually low propensity on their part to participate in 
formal politics. 
This does not mean, however, that political participation is not transforming in 
the way scholars such as Sloam (2012b; 2014) suggest i.e., with a decline in 
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formal political participation being accompanied by an increase in cause-
oriented participation. It simply means that the mechanism through which this 
transformation is occurring is different. Whereas Sloam (2012b; 2014) and 
Dalton (2013) among others suggest that the change is driven by the entry of 
new cohorts into Western electorates (i.e., a cohort effect), Chapter Four shows 
that it is more likely to be driven by a period effect. Western electorates on the 
whole are becoming more likely to favour informal political activity over 
formal politics, and the shift is not disproportionately apparent among any 
particular political generation. Within this shift, however, there is a cohort 
effect in which the Millennials are exhibiting a weaker propensity to participate 
in politics in all arenas than their elders.  
The second challenge to the dominant position of much of the literature relates 
to the claim that the Millennials are a distinctly alienated generation and that 
this explains their low levels of formal participation, and moreover that they 
maintain a high interest in politics (e.g., Henn et al. 2005; Henn and Foard 
2012; Russell et al. 2002; Marsh et al. 2007; Fahmy 2006). As outlined above, 
Chapters Six and Eight show that such an argument is untenable. While there is 
nothing to suggest that the Millennials exhibit no interest in politics or political 
issues at all, they nonetheless have lower levels of interest than their elders. 
:KLOHDWOHDVWSDUWRIWKLVGLIIHUHQFHFDQEHH[SODLQHGE\WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
current stage in the life cycle, there is strong evidence that part of it is the result 
of a cohort effect and that the Millennials are a distinctly apathetic political 
generation. Furthermore, the analyses in Chapter Six showed that political 
apathy has a substantial negative effect on political participation; the fact that 
the Millennials are so apathetic about formal politics compared with their 
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elders, therefore, plays a substantial role in explaining why they are less 
politically active.  
Furthermore, the suggestion that the Millennials are unusually alienated is also 
challenged. Chapter Eight suggested that there are clear cohort effects apparent 
for both political powerlessness and normlessness in which the Millennials 
exhibit the lowest levels of alienation in the electorate. Far from depressing 
their chances of participating in formal politics, their lack of alienation should, 
if anything, increase their propensity to participate. Moreover, suggestions that 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQZRXOGOHDGWKHPWRVKLIWDZD\IURPIRUPDOSROLWLFV
towards informal politics (e.g., Sloam 2014) are also challenged: on such logic, 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶ORZOHYHOVRIDOLHQDWLRQVKRXOGVHHWKHPKDYHPRUHIDLWKLQWKH
formal political process than their elders and so see less need for informal 
political participation as a result. The only form of alienation in which the 
analyses supported assertions in the literature (such as from Henn et al. 2005; 
Fahmy 2006; Henn and Foard 2012) is in relation to political meaninglessness: 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DUHDFWLYHO\GLVFRXUDJHGIURPSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQERWKIRUPDODQG
informal politics by their lack of faith in their own knowledge of the political 
process. Contrary to Henn et al.¶V)DKP\¶VDQG+HQQDQG
)RDUG¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKLVLVDGLVWLQJXLVKLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKLV
generation, however, the analyses in Chapter Eight suggest that this is likely to 
UHIOHFWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶FXUUHQWVWDJHLQWKHOLIHF\FOH2QFHWKH\DJHDQGPRYH
into later stages of the life cycle, their confidence in their political knowledge 
should increase and they can expect to become more active. 
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In addition to presenting challenges to the extant literature, the conclusions of 
this thesis also imply several lessons to be heeded in future research into the 
political characteristics of the Millennials and future young generations. While 
there is clearly a role for both political apathy and political alienation to 
explain the distinct behaviour of the Millennials, this research has shown that it 
is their apathy towards formal politics that is the far more substantial and so 
needs to be given much more focus in future research. Not only does political 
apathy appear to have a stronger depressing effect on political participation 
than alienation (both inside and beyond the formal political arena ± see Chapter 
6L[EXWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶KLJKOevels of apathy appear to be the result of a 
cohort effect while their high levels of (meaninglessness) alienation appear 
UHIOHFWWKHLUVWDJHLQWKHOLIHF\FOH,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶WHQGHQF\WR
be more apathetic about politics is likely to stick with them throughout their 
adult lives, while their tendency to have less confidence in their political 
knowledge will likely reduce as they age. 
7KLVGRHVQRWRIFRXUVHPHDQWKDWVWXG\LQJWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DOLHQDWLRQDQG
particularly exploring why they appear to be so un-alienated in terms of 
powerlessness and normlessness, would not be a worthy pursuit. It does mean, 
KRZHYHUWKDWLIH[SODQDWLRQVIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶GLVWLQJXLVKLQJSDUWLFLSDWRU\
features ± namely their tendency to be less active than previous generations ± 
are to be explored, the focus needs to shift much more towards political apathy 
than is currently the case. 
In addition, the conclusions of Chapter Eight regarding the role of media 
fragmentation in explaining cohort effects in political apathy suggest that 
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greater attention also needs to be paid to the ways in which young citizens 
develop habits of consuming political information, and subsequently 
developing the motivation to engage with formal politics, during their 
formative years. Supporting the arguments of Putnam (2000), Wattenberg 
(2012) and Buckingham (1999) among others (see Chapters Two and Seven), 
WKLVVWXG\VXJJHVWVWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DUHGHYHORSLQJXQSUHFHGHQWHGOHYHOVRI
political apathy because of their lack of exposure to political stimuli during 
their formative years. This is at least in part a result of their developing habits 
which do not involve the frequent consumption of political news media, or 
which involve the consumption of news media which provides less political 
information (such as many online sources, or political news obtained through 
social media). Without political information to act as both a stimulus to take an 
interest in politics and a source of political knowledge, young people are left 
with higher levels of political apathy (Wattenberg 2012).  
This research suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the ways in 
ZKLFK\RXQJSHRSOH¶VFRQVXPSWLRQRIQHZVPHGLDDIIHFWVWKHLULQWHUHVWLQDQG
knowledge of politics, and what changes could be made to mitigate the loss of 
political information communicated as a result of shifts in typical media 
consumption. It also suggests that other potential sources of political 
LQIRUPDWLRQGXULQJRQH¶VIRUPDWLYH\HDUV± such as education, parental political 
involvement and social capital (Putnam 2000) ± should also be explored to see 
LIWKH\WRRDUHH[SUHVVHGLQDVXIILFLHQWO\GLIIHUHQWZD\DPRQJWRGD\¶V\RXQJ
SHRSOHWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH\H[SODLQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\KLJKOHYHOVRI
political apathy. The tendency to focus on claims that the Millennials are 
politically alienated has led to a tendency to search for sources of that 
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DOLHQDWLRQLQUHFHQWUHVHDUFKLQWR\RXQJSHRSOH¶VSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQe.g., 
Henn and Foard 2012; Sloam 2014; Henn et al. 2005; Marsh et al. 2007), 
meaning that causes of unprecedented levels of political apathy among the 
young are understudied. This thesis suggests that not only is a focus on 
political apathy needed to improve our understanding of why the Millennials 
participate in politics in the way that they do, but this must be accompanied by 
a renewed focus on the causes of that unprecedented apathy.  
The requirement to pay more attention to political apathy overlaps with another 
recommendation for further research and for the wider public discourse: the 
need to abandon the normative connotations attached to the view that young 
people are politically apathetic or politically alienated. As Chapter One 
outlined, since the turn of the millennium the concepts of apathy and alienation 
LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQKDYHEHFRPH
intertwined with normative implications. The suggestion that the young are 
apathetic about formal politics has become associated with deliberate attempts 
to negatively stereotype thePDVGLVHQJDJHGµRQORRNHUV¶+HQQDQG)RDUG 
2012), as well as attempts by politicians to accuse younger voters of apathy to 
divert attention from their own behaviour (Evans et al. 2015). Meanwhile, the 
view of young people as politically alienated implies some form of victim 
VWDWXVLQZKLFKWKH\DUHSROLWLFDOO\DUWLFXODWHµHQJDJHGVFHSWLFV¶0DUVKet al. 
2007; Henn et al. 2005), and their lack of political participation is suggested to 
be the result of the failures and poor judgement of the political elite.  
These normative connotations are neither justified nor helpful. It is unclear 
why suggesting the Millennials are politically apathetic or alienated should 
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necessarily be viewed as ethically appealing or distasteful in the first place. 
One of the arguments of this thesis ± that the Millennials are unusually 
apathetic as a result of the habits of news media consumption they have 
developed ± does not necessarily imply that their political apathy is their fault 
or something they should be negatively judged for. Their unusually low levels 
of powerlessness and normlessness alienation are unlikely to be interpreted as a 
success on the part of the British political elite, nor would doing so seem 
logically appropriate.  
The major problem with these normative connotations, however, is that they 
LQKLELWGHEDWHDERXWZK\WRGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOHDUHOHVVSROLWLFDOO\DFWLYHWKDQ
their elders. In an environment in which suggesting the Millennials are 
unusually apathetic is considered unfair and inappropriate, for instance, 
scholars are discouraged from saying so and politicians are discouraged from 
addressing political apathy as a policy response to low political participation. 
As this study has shown, the Millennials are the most politically apathetic 
generation to have entered the British electorate since the Second World War, 
and this plays a substantial role in depressing their participation in politics. 
Any serious policy attempt to increase the political participation of the young 
must be developed with this fact in mind. 
There are four IXUWKHULPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHRQJRLQJVWXG\RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
political participation from this thesis. First, this research has shown that there 
is evidence of life cycle, cohort and period effects behind trends in political 
participation. These suggest that while the Millennials are indeed a distinct 
political generation in terms of their participation in politics (across all arenas), 
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at least some of the difference between them and their elders, or between the 
Millennials today and young citizens in the past, can be explained by life cycle 
or period effects. Any attempt to explore the generational distinctiveness of the 
0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQRULQGHHGWKHLUDSDWK\DQGRUDOLHQDWLRQPXVWEH
capable of accounting for life cycle and period effects as well. A failure to do 
VRZLOOXQGHUPLQHFRQILGHQFHLQWKHYDOLGLW\RIDQ\µJHQHUDWLRQDOHIIHFWV¶
identified. This means that greater emphasis will have to be placed on 
longitudinal research, with more attention given to analysing pseudo-cohorts in 
repeated cross-sectional datasets (as in this thesis), or panel data. It also means 
that methods capable of estimating age, period and cohort effects (such as APC 
analyses) will need to be used more widely.  
Second, and related to the first, the results of this research show that scholars 
must not get carried away in focussing on the Millennials as a distinct political 
generation. The analyses throughout this study have shown that differences in 
political generation often contribute very little to overall variation in political 
participation, apathy or alienation. While the Millennials are clearly a distinct 
generation in numerous ways, the differences between the Millennials and their 
elders do little to explain why a given individual may be more likely to 
participate in politics, or be more apathetic, or be more alienated than another 
individual. Other factors explored in this research were shown to be much 
more influential. Political apathy, for example, was shown to explain a 
substantial amount of variance in political participation, as was political 
alienation (though to a lesser extent). Differences in political apathy and 
alienation across generations are far more important for explaining variations 
in political participation than differences between generations. Similarly, 
337 
 
differences in social capital, gender and social and political resources had a 
greater impact on differences in political participation than political 
generations. When looking to explain why members of the Millennial 
generation are less active in politics than older people, therefore, this research 
suggests that the focus should be on differences in apathy, alienation, 
GHPRJUDSK\DQGVRFLDOUHVRXUFHVUDWKHUWKDQRQDJLYHQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
membership of a political generation.  
This does not mean, however, that those generational differences are not 
substantial or important, or that analysing differences in behaviour through a 
generational framework cannot help shed light on why a given group of people 
may behave differently from another ± indeed, this thesis has demonstrated the 
utility of such a perspective. In addition, these generational differences are 
particularly important in the context of aggregated societal events, such as 
elections, because they mean that the Millennials contribute less to them than 
other generations. Moreover, they are likely to continue doing so throughout 
their adult lives. Exploring why this is the case, and considering how future 
generations could be encouraged to take a more active role in politics, remains 
an important academic and public priority.  
ThirdIXWXUHVWXGLHVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ± and potentially of 
political participation more broadly ± must take account of the multi-
dimensional nature of the concept. As Chapters Two and Three argued, in 
PDQ\VWXGLHVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQDWZR-dimensional conception is 
assumed in which activity is considered to be either formal or cause-oriented in 
nature. While the evidence in this research suggests that there is good reason to 
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distinguish between formal and informal political activity, it also suggests that 
this two-dimensional approach is too broad. In particular, Chapter Three 
showed that there is a difference between formal political activity and issue-
specific formal activity, which is far less common. It also showed that there is a 
distinction between cause-oriented and civic political participation, with the 
ODWWHUEHLQJSDUWLFXODUO\IRFXVVHGRQWKHSROLWLFVRIRQH¶VFRPPXQLW\%RWKRI
these dLVWLQFWLRQVDUHDEVHQWIURPVWXGLHVRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDO
participation, and yet offer greater insight into the ways in which political acts 
relate to each other. Further study of these dimensions could uncover yet more 
information about the preferences of certain citizens for certain types of 
political participation. 
Finally, this thesis has demonstrated the importance of providing a clear 
definition, conceptualisation and operationalisation of political apathy and 
alienation in studying how and why young people participate in politics. 
Chapters One and Two criticised much of the extant literature (e.g., Henn et al. 
2005; Marsh et al. 2007; Fahmy 2006; Henn and Foard 2012; Sloam 2014) for 
failing to do so, and argued that the utility of such theoretically under-
developed conclusions is limited and that there can be little confidence in the 
validity of their claims. Having developed clear definitions and measures of 
apathy and alienation, this thesis not only challenged the conceptions often 
employed in other research, but has challenged many of their conclusions as 
well ± not least the view that the Millennials are unusually alienated and not 
apathetic. Furthermore, this research has been uniquely placed to examine 
whether changes in political apathy and alienation over time are the result of 
age, period or cohort effects, as well as to study the role of explanatory theories 
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in driving those effects. While future research may challenge the conception 
and measures of political apathy and alienation developed here, the case for 
actually developing clear conceptualisations and validated measures of them is 
unchallengeable. 
9.5 Academic Implications: Apathy and Alienation 
The efforts to develop the definitions, conceptualisations and measures of 
formal political apathy and alienation taken in this research have also revealed 
a great deal about the concepts themselves. These lessons can both advance our 
understanding of political apathy and alienation as characteristics, and provide 
a basis for future research to develop that understanding further, as well as 
inform future studies in other fields in which political apathy and/or alienation 
are thought to be important (such as, for instance, the study of the rise of far-
right populism in Europe).  
The concept oIµIRUPDOSROLWLFDODSDWK\¶GHYHORSHGLQWKLVVWXG\EURDGO\
corresponds to the impression given in existing research (e.g., Rosenberg 1954; 
Dalton 2013): it is a one-GLPHQVLRQDORULHQWDWLRQUHIOHFWLQJDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VODFN
of desire for personal engagement with politics. It is strongly influenced by the 
life cycle in the manner conventionally understood from studies on the 
relationship between the life cycle and political interest (Smets 2008; Stoker 
2006; Jankowski and Strate 1995). It is also heavily influenced by political 
VRFLDOLVDWLRQLQWKDWKDELWVUHODWLQJWRSROLWLFDODSDWK\GHYHORSHGGXULQJRQH¶V
formative years are likely to influence how apathetic that person is throughout 
their adult lives. This is consistent with studies of the relationship between 
political socialisation and political interest (Prior 2005). Finally, consistent 
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with studies of the relationship between political interest and knowledge 
(characteristics central to political apathy) and other individual characteristics 
(such as Verba an Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Putnam 2000; Wattenberg 
2012; Whiteley 2012; Clarke et al. 2004), Chapters Five, Six and Eight showed 
that political apathy tends to be higher among socially under-represented or 
under-resourced groups (such as young people, women, the poor, and the 
uneducated). 
Political alienation is a more nuanced and complex characteristic, and the 
differences between the conception developed in this research and that which 
dominates the existing literature are more extensive. As Chapter Five showed, 
the dominant conceptualisation of political apathy is based on that developed 
by Finifter (1970) who used data from America in the 1950s. Finifter (1970) 
argued that political alienation should be conceptualised and measured in terms 
of two dimensions: political powerlessness, indicated by measures of political 
efficacy; and political normlessness, indicated by measures of political trust. 
One of the major challenges to that approach suggested in this research is that a 
third dimension of political meaninglessness, rejected by Finifter (1970) as 
theoretically possible but empirically unverifiable, is also a valid manifestation 
of alienation from formal politics.  
The reason for the difference between the conclusions of Chapter Five and 
Finifter (1970) remain unclear. It could reflect methodological differences in 
the way the multi-dimensional structure of alienation was determined, or it 
could reflect genuine differences in the structure of political alienation between 
WKHFRQWH[WRI)LQLIWHU¶V(1970) research and this study. In any event, it is clear 
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that the assumption that political alienation as conceptualised by Finifter 
(1970) can be universally applied across national and historical contexts ± as 
done in much literature since (e.g., Gniewosz et al. 2009; Kabashima et al. 
2000; Southwell 2003; 2012; Southwell and Everest 1998; Dermody et al. 
2010) ± is unsustainable.  
This research has also revealed further lessons about how manifestations of 
political alienation may differ between citizens. Like political apathy, all three 
dimensions of political alienation were shown to typically have negative 
relationships with indicators of political sophistication (such as education). 
However, the different dimensions of alienation have variable relationships 
with other individual characteristics. Powerlessness, for example, is not related 
to social class, whereas normlessness and meaninglessness are higher among 
those of lower social classes. Higher levels of income depress normlessness 
and meaninglessness, but have no effect on powerlessness. There are no 
differences based on gender in terms of powerlessness or normlessness, but 
women are more likely to exhibit higher levels of meaninglessness alienation 
than men. Members of minority ethnic groups typically exhibit higher levels of 
meaninglessness alienation, while exhibiting lower levels of normlessness. 
Finally, as detailed above, the young are more likely to be alienated through 
meaninglessness and powerlessness than the old at any given time.  
The analyses in Chapter Eight also suggest that the three dimensions of 
alienation may be changing as a result of different forces over time. Political 
normlessness, for example, is increasing as a result of a period effect in Britain 
which has been apparent since at least the 1980s, and is also changing as a 
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result of cohort effects. Powerlessness is in decline as a result of a cohort effect 
in which successive generations enter the electorate with more faith in their 
ability to influence political outcomes than the last. Meaninglessness is in 
decline as a result of a period effect apparent since the early 2000s.  
Furthermore, both powerlessness and meaninglessness are related to the life 
cycle in a comparable manner to that seen for political apathy (i.e., they are 
higher among the young, fall as people reach middle age and then increase 
slightly again amongst the very old), whereas normlessness is not. It is unclear, 
however, what the causal relationship between the life cycle and these 
dimensions of political alienation is. For political meaninglessness, it is likely 
WKDWWKHµVWDUW-XS¶SUREOHPVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHHDUO\VWDJHVRISROLWLFDOOLIH ± 
such as starting a career, finding a partner, purchasing a home, and having 
children (Smets 2008) ± which inhibit political engagement could increase 
SROLWLFDOPHDQLQJOHVVQHVVDVDUHVXOWRI\RXQJSHRSOH¶VODFNRIH[SRVXUHWR
politics which in turn means they have lower levels of political knowledge. 
Given that actual SROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHFRUUHODWHVVWURQJO\ZLWKRQH¶VFRQILGHQFH
in their own political knowledge (Hansard Society 2012), this could explain 
why the young and the very old typically have higher levels of 
meaninglessness alienation than the middle aged. As for powerlessness, it is 
unclear why the young would typically feel more influential over politics than 
the middle aged; perhaps it reflects a degree of naivety on their part regarding 
how much influence they will have once they engage, or perhaps the lack of 
FRPPLWPHQWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHµVWDUW-XSSUREOHPV¶RIWKHSROLtical life cycle 
equip the young with a greater sense of their capacity to influence politics if 
they needed to. Further research into the relationship between the life cycle and 
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both meaninglessness and powerlessness is clearly needed to answer these 
questions.  
9.6 Academic Implications: Social Modernisation 
The final implications of this research relate to the ongoing study of the impact 
RIVRFLDOPRGHUQLVDWLRQRQ:HVWHUQFLWL]HQV¶SROLWLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV,WLV
important to note that the test of the role of social modernisation in this 
research was not exhaustive; there are many other components to social 
modernisation which were not examined, such as changes to social capital. 
Nonetheless, Chapter Eight suggested that the current understandings of the 
post-PDWHULDOLVPDQGPHGLDIUDJPHQWDWLRQµVXE-WKHRULHV¶RIVRFLDO
modernisation are in need of refinement. In challenge to the post-materialist 
theory outlined by studies such as Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Dalton (2013) 
and Norris (2001), Chapter Eight showed that the theory cannot explain why 
the Millennials are the most politically apathetic generation in the British 
HOHFWRUDWHGHVSLWHWKHLUEHLQJWKHPRVWµSRVW-PDWHULDOLVW¶DWWKHVDPHWLme. It 
also cannot explain why they are so un-alienated in terms of political 
normlessness, as the current theory suggests that post-materialism should be 
positively associated with normlessness alienation through its impact on 
political trust (Dalton 2004). The post-materialism theory also predicts that the 
Millennials should be the least alienated in terms of meaninglessness (Dalton 
2013; Norris 2001), which again Chapter Eight showed not to be the case. The 
only characteristic which did correspond to the theoretical expectations was 
political powerlessness, in which the Millennials were found to be at the 
leading edge of a generational decline in powerlessness alienation which 
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corresponds to a generational increase in post-materialism. However, the rise 
of post-materialism was found not to explain this generational effect. 
Furthermore, the model fit statistics in Chapter Eight showed that post-
materialism made a very modest contribution to explaining differences in 
apathy and alienation, and was usually inferior to that of demographic 
characteristics (gender) and social and political resources (social class). 
Overall, therefore, while the post-materialism theory has some success in 
explaining period effects in political apathy and alienation, and is even more 
successful in helping to explain both generational and period effects in other 
characteristics (such as shifts in political agendas (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) 
and partisan dealignment (Dalton 2013)), it is poorly suited to explaining 
generational shifts in apathy and alienation.  
The media fragmentation theory was successful in helping to explain the 
generational trends in political apathy, and so why the Millennials (as well as 
the 90s generation) are more apathetic than previous generations. It was unable 
to account, however, for the generational trend in meaninglessness alienation; 
i.e., the media fragmentation theory predicts that there should be a similar 
increase in meaninglessness among the younger generations to that seen in 
political apathy, but Chapter Eight showed no such trend. The theory correctly 
predicted that there would be no significant relationship between media 
fragmentation and political normlessness, but is unable to explain why the 
fragmentation of media consumption would lead to a reduction in political 
powerlessness (although Chapter Eight showed that this process is not related 
to the generational decline in powerlessness). As with the post-materialist 
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theory, therefore, there is scope for the media fragmentation theory to be 
updated and to consider why the process would have such an unexpected effect 
on powerlessness, and to address its failure to explain the absence of a 
generational trend in meaninglessness. That said, like post-materialism, media 
fragmentation was shown to make a modest contribution to explaining overall 
differences in apathy and alienation ± demography and social and political 
resources were suggested to be more influential in most cases.  
Furthermore, the findings in Chapter Eight relate to a broader debate regarding 
the role of new media in driving political engagement, particularly among the 
young. Studies such as Casero-5LSROOHVDQG2¶1HLOOKDYHDUJXHG
WKDW\RXQJSHRSOH¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKQHZPHGLDFRPSHQVDWHVIRUWKHLUODFNRI
engagement with more traditional media (e.g., newspapers), and can provide 
the information and stimulus needed for them to engage with politics. Others, 
such as Wattenberg (2012) and Theocharis (2012) argue either that this is not 
the case, or that there is insufficient evidence to sustain such a claim (see 
Chapters Two and Seven). The analyses in Chapter Eight support the latter 
argument, suggesting that the processes associated with media fragmentation ± 
which include a shift from old to new media among the young ± are leading to 
higher levels of political apathy and are related to higher levels of 
meaninglessness alienation (though not necessarily among the young). In other 
words, media fragmentation is associated with people developing lower levels 
of motivation for engagement with politics and lower levels of political 
knowledge.  
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9.7 Further Research 
,QDGGLWLRQWRLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHH[LVWLQJUHVHDUFKRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDO
participation, political apathy and alienation, and social modernisation, this 
research has implications for future research in these fields through raising 
several questions and avenue of inquiry worthy of further study. The first 
relates to the assumption behind this research that the findings relating to 
British Millennials (in terms of political participation as well as apathy and 
alienation) are generalizable to Millennials in other Western democracies. 
Chapter Two outlined the grounds upon which this assumption is based: that 
the characteristics ± and many suggested causes of them ± exhibited by the 
Millennials are apparent throughout Western society, suggesting that a Western 
society-wide causal factor is likely responsible for their emergence as a unique 
political generation. While there is plenty of evidence supporting this 
assumption in the extant literature, it is nonetheless untested with regard to the 
four-dimensional conceptualisation of political participation developed in 
Chapter Three, as well as the conceptualisation and operationalisations of 
political apathy and alienation developed in Chapter Five. A worthy avenue of 
further research, tKHUHIRUHLVWRWHVWWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶DUH
indeed a distinct political generation in terms of similar characteristics relating 
to political participation, apathy and alienation ± as well as in terms of the 
relationship between apathy, alienation and participation ± in other Western 
electorates besides that of Britain. 
This study also clearly identified several avenues for further research into the 
nature of formal political alienation. Many lessons have been learned about 
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how the various dimensions of alienation are related to individual 
characteristics, how their manifestations in British citizens are changing over 
time, and their effects on political participation, and these were discussed 
above. Further examination of how political alienation is related to individual 
characteristics and of how it affects other dimensions of political participation 
not examined in Chapter Six ± particularly civic participation ± would be an 
obvious route for further inquiry. There is also the question of why the 
conception of alienation developed in Chapter Five differs from that outlined 
by Finifter (1970). Future research should aim to resolve the matter of whether 
those differences reflect historic or national context, or variations in 
methodological approach.  
There are also some more fundamental questions, however, about the concept 
of formal political alienation. First, as Chapter Five discussed, political 
alienation is widely assumed to be a multi-dimensional construct; this was 
LPSOLFLWLQ)LQLIWHU¶VVWXG\LQWKHPDMRULW\RIVWXGLHVXVLQJ)LQLIWHU¶V
conceptualisation since, and in this research. Empirical justification, in the 
form of latent structure analysis, has been provided for considering the various 
components of political alienation as distinct dimensions; but justification has 
yet to be provided for considering the three dimensions as part of one over-
arching concept (i.e., alienation) rather than three separate yet correlated 
constructs.  Future research should explore the ways in which the three 
dimensions of powerlessness, normlessness and meaninglessness relate to each 
other in order to justify their being considered sub-dimensions of political 
alienation. This will require both theoretical exploration ± to identify the 
conceptual requirements for three related constructs to be considered part of 
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the same over-arching construct ± and empirical exploration. The empirical 
exploration could, for example, examine the causal relationships between the 
three using structural equation modelling, and so determine whether they are 
mutually reinforcing (as was hinted at by the data in Chapters Five, Six and 
Eight) and so more strongly related than simply being correlated with similar 
effects on political behaviour. 
An additional unanswered question relates to the dimensions of alienation 
themselves. Chapter Five determined that political powerlessness, 
normlessness and meaninglessness are valid indications of political alienation. 
It found that a fourth potential dimension ± political deprivation ± was not 
valid. Chapter Five was unable to determine, however, whether this simply 
reflected an inadequate choice of survey instrument for measuring deprivation, 
or a genuine rejection of the concept as a valid indication of alienation. Future 
research should explore the concept of political deprivation in more detail and 
consider whether it can be considered a sub-dimension of political alienation if 
operationalised differently.  
The final possibilities for further study relate to the examination of the effects 
of social modernisation on political apathy and alienation. Owing to matters of 
practicality, only the rise of post-materialism and the fragmentation of media 
consumption were examined as potential causal processes behind trends in 
political apathy and alienation. There are, of course, numerous other trends 
associated with the evolution of Western society which could conceivably 
affect apathy and alienation, and which should be explored in this context. The 
most notable of these trends, based on the impact they have been suggested to 
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have on the political participation of the young in the present literature (see 
Chapter Two), include the decline and/or evolution of social capital (Putnam 
2000; Macedo et al. 2005); the impact of globalisation in expaQGLQJWKHµ\RXWK¶
section of the political life cycle (Smets 2008; Peterson 1996; Norris 2001); 
and evolving conceptions of citizenship and civic duty (Dalton 2013).  
Finally, the success of the media fragmentation theory in helping to explain the 
unusually high levels of political apathy apparent in the Millennials suggests 
WKDW\RXQJFLWL]HQV¶FRQVXPSWLRQRIQHZVPHGLDDQGWKHHIIHFWRIQHZPHGLD
on the way young people interact with political information, is in need of 
further study. This research presents the consequences of media fragmentation 
in a fairly negative light, in that the process is leading to lower levels of 
political knowledge (and confidence in that knowledge) and political interest 
among the younger generations. Developing a greater understanding of why 
this is happening and of the impact on political knowledge and interest of new 
forms of media, and of how this trend relates to some of the more positive 
aspects of the evolution of the media (such as the expansion of opportunities 
for polLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQVWHPPLQJIURPWKHULVHRIWKH,QWHUQHW2¶1HLOO
Norris 2001)), would enhance our understanding of the ways in which young 
generations relate to and engage with politics further.  
9.8 Policy Implications 
The conclusions of this study have substantial implications beyond academia as 
well, particularly with regard to ongoing efforts to increase electoral 
participation among young citizens by Western governments. This debate is 
particularly salient in Britain at present, in light of not only the recent general 
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election, but the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum in which 16 and 17 
year olds were allowed to participate, and the focus on political issues of 
salience to young people in light of high-profile policy decisions taken by the 
Coalition Government (such as the increase in university tuition fees, and plans 
to restrict access to benefits for the under-25s) and apparent in the decision of 
WKH/DERXU3DUW\WRODXQFKDµ\RXWKPDQLIHVWR¶LQWKHHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQ
Britain, and the current debates about how to increase the electoral 
participation of the British youth, therefore, provides a good setting in which to 
consider the policy implications of this research.  
There are three key proposals currently being debated in this regard: to lower 
the voting age to 16; to implement online voting and encourage the 
government, political parties and politicians to give greater significance to 
online communication; and to dramatically re-design citizenship education and 
give it a more prominent place in school curricula.  
There are two aspects to the debate about lowering the voting age: one based 
on what caQEHFDOOHGWKHµULJKWVLVVXH¶ in which supporters of lowering the 
voting age argue that the rights of 16 and 17 year olds are being disrespected 
by their not having the franchise (BYC 2015); and one based on political 
participation, in which supporters suggest that lowering the voting age will 
increase participation among the young (BYC 2015; Democratic Audit 2014). 
The implications of this study clearly relate to the latter, and so the discussion 
will focus on this area.30 The main argument for lowering the voting age is 
based on studies such as Franklin (2004) which have shown that ± consistent 
                                                 
30
 6HH&RZOH\DQG'HQYHUIRUFULWLTXHVRIWKHµULJKWVLVVXH¶DUJXPHQWV 
351 
 
with the impressionable years theory outlined in Chapter Three ± voting 
behaviour is largely the result of a habit developed during the formative years 
of political socialisation. By lowering the voting age, therefore, supporters 
expect that more people will be given the chance to vote during their formative 
period while in an environment more conducive to political engagement than 
the period surrounding the ages 18-21. This is because, for example, 16 and 17 
year olds are more likely still to live at home and be in education, meaning that 
they can be encouraged and supported to participate by parents and teachers 
(Democratic Audit 2014; Zeglovits and Aicholzer 2014). In addition, 
supporters suggest that politicians will be forced to pay more attention to 
young people if they make up a greater proportion of the electorate, which in 
turn will convince those young people that their engagement matters and can 
make a difference (e.g., Prof Sarah Birch, Democratic Audit 2014). 
The findings of this research suggest that the second of these two arguments is 
unconvincing. The suggestion that the young do not vote because they do not 
feel listened to implies that they are alienated in terms of political 
powerlessness i.e., have no influence over formal political outcomes. Chapters 
Six and Eight have shown that this is not the case and that, in fact, the 
Millennial generation are likely to be the least alienated generation in these 
terms throughout their adult lives. 
There is more cause for optimism in relation to the first argument, however. 
The Millennials have been shown to be the most politically apathetic 
generation in the electorate, and are likely to remain more apathetic than their 
elders throughout their adult lives. Part of the reason for this is that they do not 
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receive the same stimulus to engage through the consumption of political 
information through news media as previous generations. Providing the 
opportunity for young people to engage with politics, therefore, in an 
environment in which other sources of information and stimulus are readily 
available (such as the parental home or school) could encourage them to 
register to vote and engage with election campaigns to a greater extent than is 
currently the case. That said, Chapter Eight also showed that a lack of political 
information through the news media only accounted for part of the reason for 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶XQXVXDOO\KLJKOHYHORISROLWLFDODSDWK\:KLOHORZHULQJWKH
voting age could address part of the problem of unusually low formal 
participation among the younger generations, therefore, there are other factors 
at work which it may be less successful at addressing.  
The second common suggestion to increase youth engagement is to introduce 
online voting and encourage more political communication to be delivered 
online. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, for example, 
recently recommended the introduction of online voting and more online 
communication from politicians and political parties, arguing that it would 
make voting and political engagement more accessible to young people and 
more relevant to the way they communicate in their daily lives (PCRC 2014). 
Similarly, the charity vInspired suggests that communicating through social 
media will allow politicians to reach more young people and encourage them 
directly to engage with politics (vInspired 2015). At the heart of this approach, 
therefore, is the suggestion that young people do not vote because they 
perceive that the cost of doing so through existing methods (such as going to a 
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polling station) is too great, or because political information is inaccessible or 
unappealing to them and they are consequently too uninformed to cast a ballot.  
It is certainly true that young people are more likely to use the Internet in their 
daily lives (Di Gennaro and Dutton 2006; Bakker and de Vreese 2011). 
However, this research has shown that the Millennials are the most apathetic 
generation in the electorate i.e., they possess the lowest motivation for 
engagement with formal politics. The suggestion that making the method of 
voting more appealing will increase youth turnout assumes that young people 
possess the motivation to vote in the first place. While this research has shown 
that some young people undoubtedly possess such a motivation, they are 
nonetheless less likely to do so than their elders. Changing the method of 
voting is unlikely to make the world of formal politics ± which that vote is 
intended to influence ± more appealing to these young citizens. 
The suggestion of communicating more political information through social 
media faces a similar problem: if young people lack the motivation to engage 
with formal politics in the first place, they are unlikely to consume information 
about it regardless of how it is presented to them. One of the main arguments 
of the media fragmentation theory is that while social media has provided more 
channels through which young people can access political news, it does so in a 
way which makes that news easier to avoid. High levels of political apathy 
make the Millennials more likely to avoid political news, regardless of the 
medium through which they encounter it, meaning that changing how that 
news is presented is unlikely to have much of a positive impact on their 
political engagement. 
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The one benefit to this suggestion, however, is that by communicating political 
information more widely through social media it will make that information 
more accessible to those young people who already possess the motivation to 
seek it out. Through being able to access more political information, those 
young people may become more politically knowledgeable, and so ultimately 
more confident in their knowledge of how to influence the political system. In 
other words, their meaninglessness alienation would be reduced. As Chapter 
Six showed that the higher level of meaninglessness associated with the youth 
stages of the life cycle in which most Millennials currently live depress their 
political participation, this could well have a positive impact on their chances 
of participating in elections. 
Finally, the third common suggestion to increase youth electoral engagement is 
to reform the citizenship education curriculum in UK schools (YCC 2009; 
Sloam 2015; Citizenship Foundation 2015). Supporters argue that the current 
citizenship curriculum leaves school-leavers with limited political knowledge 
and interest ± a problem which is compounded through the weakening of 
\RXQJSHRSOH¶VDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKRWKHUVRXUFHVRIVXFKUHVRXUFHVVXFKDVWKH
traditional media and political parties ± to the extent that either they take no 
interest in elections or feel too poorly equipped to cast an informed vote 
(Sloam 2015; Crowhurst 2015). In terms of apathy and alienation, therefore, 
this argument suggests that the current citizenship curriculum does not do 
enough to offset the higher levels of political apathy and political 
PHDQLQJOHVVQHVVDPRQJWRGD\¶V\RXQJSHRSOH7KURXJKDVVLJQLQJPRUH
resources and school time to the delivery of citizenship education, and 
reforming that curriculum so that pupils are given the opportunity to engage 
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with and participate in politics in their community, supporters argue that 
school-leavers would be exposed to more political information and issues so 
that they a) receive the stimulus to develop a motivation to engage, and b) 
develop greater political knowledge and a greater confidence in their  
knowledge to facilitate their political participation. There is also the hope that 
E\GHOLYHULQJVXFKRSSRUWXQLWLHVGXULQJSXSLOV¶IRUPDWLYH\HDUVWKH\ZRXOGEH
more likely to develop habits of engagement with political issues and sources 
of political information which would endure throughout their lives. 
Of the three proposals considered here, this is the one most likely to have a 
SRVLWLYHDQGVXEVWDQWLDOLQIOXHQFHRQ\RXQJSHRSOH¶VIRUPDOSROLWLFDO
engagement and participation based on the conclusions of this study. Chapters 
Six and Eight have shown that a lack of motivation to engage with politics and 
DODFNRIFRQILGHQFHLQRQH¶VRZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISROLWLFVDUHWZRVWURQJ
QHJDWLYHLQIOXHQFHVRQWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶SROLWLFDOSDrticipation. Furthermore, 
&KDSWHU(LJKWVKRZHGWKDWDWOHDVWSDUWRIWKHH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
high levels of apathy lies in their lack of exposure to political information 
through the news media. Reforming the citizenship education curriculum in the 
manner described above would directly address both of these issues by 
LQFUHDVLQJSXSLOV¶H[SRVXUHWRSROLWLFDOLQIRUPDWLRQDQGHYHQWV7KLVLQWXUQ
can be expected to increase their motivation to engage with politics and their 
knowledge ± and confidence in that knowledge ± of how to do so. Should this 
behaviour become habitual, this measure could instil habits of political 
engagement among future generations of school children which will reduce 
both political apathy and political meaninglessness, and subsequently increase 
their formal ± and indeed their informal ± political participation.  
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9.9 Conclusion 
Conventional wisdom holds that the stability of Western democracy is under 
threat, and that this threat takes the form of the political alienation of the 
young, who are actively discouraged from participating in formal politics and 
are instead forced into other arenas of political life to promote their agendas. 
As is the ambition of much social research, this study has demonstrated that the 
conventional wisdom is wrong: the Millennial generation are indeed unusually 
inactive in formal politics, but this is not being compensated for by their being 
unusually active in other arenas of politics. Nor is this behaviour the result of 
their unprecedented political alienation, but rather their political apathy. In 
direct challenge to the conventional wisdom, the Millennial generation appear 
to be the least politically active, most politically apathetic and least politically 
alienated generation in the history of British survey research.  
These findings pose a substantial challenge not only to the conventional 
understanding of how and why the Millennials participate in politics, but also 
to the academic study of and policy responses to that behaviour which is often 
(though not always) based on the misconception of a politically alienated 
youth. The normative dimension to the study of political apathy and alienation 
should be abandoned, and a determination to identify and study the true nature 
RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶Ds well as future generations) relationship with politics, 
palatable or not, embraced by journalists, academics and politicians alike. 
Political apathy, and processes that could exacerbate it (such as changes in 
media consumption) must be made a central concern of academic studies in the 
political participation of the young. Finally, the lessons regarding the 
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importance and benefits of clearly defining, conceptualising and measuring 
political apathy and political alienation learned in this study need to be 
examined and built upon so that a further unjustified conventional wisdom can 
be avoided. 
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Appendix One 
This Appendix provides additional details on the survey data used throughout 
the thesis, including specific details of control variables used in regression 
analyses. 
x Chapter Two: Audit of Political Engagement 
Further information on the Audit of Political Engagement surveys (including 
the datasets and codebooks) can be found here: 
http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/research/public-attitudes/audit-of-political-
engagement/ 
- Control Variables 
The details of the control variables used in the regression analyses reported in 
Table 2.2 are: 
Education - highest educational qualification of respondent: none; other; 
GCSE/NVQ Level 2 or equivalent; A-Level/NVQ Level 3 or equivalent; Degree 
or above 
Social Class - UHVSRQGHQWV¶VRFLDOFODVVEDVHGRQRFFXSDWLRQLowest 
grade/unemployed/pensioner/students; semi-/unskilled manual; skilled manual; 
supervisory/clerical/junior management; intermediate 
management/administrator; professional/higher managerial 
Ethnicity - white British (0), non-white British (1) 
Gender - male (0); female (1) 
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Year - the survey year: 2009; 2010; 2011 
,QDOOFDVHVµQD¶RUµUHIXVHGWRDQVZHU¶UHVSRQVHVwere coded as missing data. 
x Chapter Three: British Election Study & British Social Attitudes 
Survey 
Further information on the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) can be found 
here: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/british-social-attitudes/ 
Information on the British Election Study (BES) is available here: 
http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/ 
The details of the control variables used in both the BES and BSA analyses in 
Chapter Three are: 
Education - age at which respondents left full-time education: 15 or under; 16; 
17; 18; 19 or older 
Social Class - UHVSRQGHQWV¶VRFLDOFODVVEDVHGRQRFFXSDWLRQ
unskilled/unemployed/lowest subsistence; semi/skilled manual; non-manual; 
intermediate non-manual; professional or higher managerial 
Gender - male (0); female (1) 
Party Identification - represents whether respondent reports identifying with or 
feeling closer to a political party: no (0); yes (1) 
,QDOOFDVHVµQD¶RUµUHIXVHGWRDQVZHU¶UHVSonses were coded as missing data. 
x Chapter Four and Chapter Five: British Election Study 
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The details of the control variables used in the regression analyses (throughout 
both Chapters Four and Five) are: 
Age - UHVSRQGHQWV¶DJHDWWKHLUODVWELUWKGD\ 
Education - age at which respondents left full-time education: 15 or under; 16; 
17; 18; 19 or older 
Social Class - UHVSRQGHQWV¶VRFLDOFODVVEDVHGRQRFFXSDWLRQ
unskilled/unemployed/lowest subsistence; semi/skilled manual; non-manual; 
intermediate non-manual; professional or higher managerial 
Income - 15 category continuous variable, ranging from £0-£5000 a year to 
£90,001 and over 
Gender - male (0); female (1) 
Ethnicity: white British (0), non-white British (1) 
Civic Duty - the extent to which respondents agree that voting in elections is a 
civic duty: strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) 
Social Trust - This is the social trust variable that was identified in the Mokken 
Scale Analysis 
  
395 
 
Appendix Two 
x Mokken Scale Analysis 
This section reports the Mokken Scale Analyses (MSA) to identify the latent 
dimensional structure of political participation, and ultimately refined into the 
finalised analysis presented in Chapter Three. The process involved a series of 
analyses in which the parameters were refined so as to find the best level at 
which the multi-dimensional structure could be identified without losing too 
much information.  
- Analysis 1 
The first analysis included all twenty political participation items and used the 
standard H-Coefficient threshold of 0.3. Table 10.1 reports this analysis, which 
found that all twenty items represented a single latent dimension to a fairly 
strong level (scale H-Coefficient 0.42). This confirmed that all twenty acts 
were measuring a common latent construct (political participation), and 
VKRZHGWKDWDFRHIILFLHQWWKUHVKROGRIZDVLQVXIILFLHQWWRLGHQWLI\µVXE-
GLPHQVLRQV¶ZLWKLQWKHGDWD
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Table 10.1: Mokken Scale Analysis of Political Participation 1 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Helped with fund-raising 0.18 0.35 0.42 3686 
Done voluntary work 0.24 0.38     
Presented views to Cllr or MP 0.15 0.36     
Written a letter to an editor 0.05 0.35     
Been an officer of an organisation or club 0.09 0.40     
Made a speech to an organised group 0.10 0.41     
Donated to or paid a membership fee to a charity or campaign organisation 0.36 0.46     
Expressed political opinion online 0.07 0.39     
Signed a petition 0.31 0.45     
Taken part in a demonstration, march or rally 0.04 0.37     
Urged someone to contact their MP or Cllr 0.13 0.41     
Donated to or paid a membership fee to a political party 0.04 0.36     
Urged someone outside family to vote 0.17 0.38     
Voted in last general election 0.56 0.42     
Voted in last local election 0.54 0.48     
Attended any political meeting 0.05 0.40     
Stood for public office 0.01 0.50     
Boycotted products 0.13 0.41     
Take an active part in a political campaign 0.03 0.46     
Discussed politics or political news with someone 0.36 0.52     
Source: Audit of Political Engagement composite dataset. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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- Analysis 2 
For the second analysis the H-Coefficient threshold was increased to 0.4, and 
the results are reported in Table 10.2. Three sub-dimensions of political 
participation were identified; one very large including fifteen of the survey 
items, and two much smaller. While this analysis provided more discriminatory 
capacity, it was still unsatisfactory for identifying distinct sub-dimensions of 
political participation given that the majority are still represented by a single 
scale. 
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Table 10.2a: Mokken Scale Analysis of Political Participation 2 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Made a speech to an organised group 0.1 0.42 0.46 3686 
Taken part in a demonstration, march or rally 0.04 0.4     
Donated to or paid a membership fee to a charity or campaign 
organisation 0.36 0.46     
Signed a petition 0.31 0.46     
Expressed political opinion online 0.07 0.43     
Urged someone to contact their MP or Cllr 0.13 0.44     
Donated to or paid a membership fee to a political party 0.04 0.38     
Urged someone outside family to vote 0.17 0.45     
Voted in last general election 0.56 0.45     
Voted in last local election 0.54 0.5     
Attended a political meeting 0.05 0.42     
Stood for public office 0.01 0.49     
Boycotted products 0.13 0.46     
Taken an active part in a political campaign 0.03 0.48     
Discussed politics or political news with someone else 0.36 0.54     
Source: Audit of Political Engagement composite dataset. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
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Table 10.2b: Mokken Scale Analysis of Political Participation 2 
Scale 2 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Helped with fund-raising 0.18 0.47 0.5 3686 
Been an officer of an organisation or club 0.09 0.54     
Done voluntary work 0.24 0.52     
Scale 3 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Presented views to MP or Cllr 0.15 0.44 0.44 3686 
Written a letter to an editor 0.05 0.44     
Source: Audit of Political Engagement composite dataset. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
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- Analysis 3 
Table 10.3 reports the results of the third analysis, in which the H-Coefficient 
threshold was increased to 0.5. This threshold provided much more 
discriminatory power and identified several distinct sub-dimensions of political 
participation, however it did so at the cost of six of the twenty survey items 
which were found to be un-scalable. Losing almost a third of data is 
unacceptable, and so a further refined H-Coefficient threshold of 0.45 was 
employed.  
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Table 10.3a: Mokken Scale Analysis of Political Participation 3 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Urged someone outside family to vote 0.17 0.5 0.52 3686 
Voted in last general election 0.56 0.52     
Attended any political meeting 0.05 0.46     
Stood for public office 0.01 0.5     
Voted in last local election 0.54 0.56     
Boycotted products 0.13 0.49     
Taken an active part in a political campaign 0.03 0.54     
Discussed politics or political news with someone else 0.36 0.56     
Source: Audit of Political Engagement 2009, 2010, 2011. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
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Table 10.3b: Mokken Scale Analysis of Political Participation 3 
Scale 2 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Expressed political opinion online 0.07 0.54 0.58 3686 
Signed a petition 0.31 0.68     
Taken part in a demonstration, march or rally 0.04 0.5     
Scale 3 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Made a speech to an organised group 0.1 0.52 0.55 3686 
Been an officer of an organisation or club 0.09 0.52     
Donated to or paid a membership fee to a charity or campaign 
organisation 0.36 0.62     
Un-scaled Items Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Donated or paid a membership fee to a political party 0.04 N/A N/A 3686 
Helped with fund-raising 0.18      
Done voluntary work 0.24      
Written a letter to an editor 0.05      
Presented views to an MP or Cllr 0.15      
Urged someone to contact their MP or Cllr 0.13       
Source: Audit of Political Engagement 2009, 2010, 2011. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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- Analysis 4 
This analysis initially produced three clear scales which corresponded fairly 
closely to the conceptual outline of formal, cause-oriented and civic political 
participation outlined in Chapters Two and Three. Some of the acts, however, 
were identified in what were conceptually unusual scales (e.g., boycotting 
products was found to fit in the first scale corresponding to formal political 
participation, whereas conceptually it is better placed in the cause-oriented 
participation scale).
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Table 10.4a: Mokken Scale Analysis of Political Participation 4 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Urged someone to contact MP or Cllr 0.13 0.46 0.51 3686 
Urged someone outside family to vote 0.17 0.48     
Voted in last general election 0.56 0.52     
Voted in last local election 0.54 0.56     
Attended a political meeting 0.05 0.45     
Stood for public office 0.01 0.5     
Boycotted products 0.13 0.45     
Taken an active part in a political campaign 0.03 0.53     
Discussed politics or political news with someone 0.36 0.57     
Source: Audit of Political Engagement 2009, 2010, 2011. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
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Table 10.4b: Mokken Scale Analysis of Political Participation 4 
Scale 2 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Made a speech to an organised group 0.1 0.47 0.49 3686 
Donated or paid membership fee to a charity or campaign organisation 0.36 0.49     
Expressed political opinion online 0.07 0.47     
Signed a petition 0.31 0.51     
Taken part in a demonstration, march or rally 0.04 0.46     
Scale 3 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Helped with fund-raising 0.18 0.47 0.5 3686 
Been an officer of an organisation or group 0.09 0.54     
Done voluntary work 0.24 0.52     
Un-scaled Items Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Donated to or paid membership fee to political party  0.04 N/A N/A  3686  
Written letter to an editor  0.05      
Presented views to MP or Cllr  0.15       
Source: Audit of Political Engagement 2009, 2010, 2011. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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The analysis with an H-Coefficient threshold of 0.45 was consequently re-run 
with boycotting products and attending political meetings removed. The act of 
boycotting products was tested for being suitably placed in the second scale, 
which improved the scale H-Coefficient from 0.49 to 0.52 (and also resulted in 
the formal political participation scale H-Coefficient increasing from 0.51 to 
0.54). This analysis also identified a fourth scale, in which the act of attending 
a political meeting was found to associate with presenting views to a 
Councillor or MP, thereby reducing the total number of un-scalable items from 
three to two. The MSA test function was employed on these four scales which 
confirmed the statistical validity and significance of this four-dimensional 
structure of the data, and this structure was detailed in Chapter Three.  
x The Meaning of Politics  
Chapter Three argued that the majority of British citizens tend to think of 
IRUPDO:HVWPLQVWHUSROLWLFVZKHQWKH\DUHDVNHGWRFRQVLGHUZKDWµSROLWLFV¶
means to them. This section presents the evidence for this argument using data 
from the Audit of Political Engagement survey for 2010. Respondents were 
DVNHGDQRSHQTXHVWLRQDERXWµZKDWWKH\XQGHUVWRRGE\³SROLWLFV´¶+DQVDUG
Society 2010), and were allowed to provide as many responses as they wished. 
These were then coded and categorised, and the proportion of respondents 
providing answers which fit into each category reported in Table 10.5 below, 
broken down by political generation.
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Table 10.:KDWGRUHVSRQGHQWVXQGHUVWDQGE\µ3ROLWLFV¶" 
What is 'Politics'? Mills 90s 80s 60s-70s Pre/Post-War Total 
The way the country is governed/run 22% 21% 23% 31% 24% 24% 
Parliament 15% 14% 17% 18% 22% 18% 
Elections/Voting 18% 13% 14% 13% 18% 15% 
Local government/Council 12% 12% 10% 11% 10% 11% 
Sleaze/Corruption 7% 8% 10% 11% 14% 10% 
People with power 8% 8% 11% 11% 11% 10% 
Arguments between parties & politicians 9% 8% 9% 5% 12% 9% 
Party system/Alignment of groups 4% 7% 12% 12% 9% 9% 
Talking/People discussing issues/Reaching decisions 7% 6% 11% 5% 6% 7% 
Choices for society/How the country should be run 6% 5% 6% 7% 6% 6% 
Spin/Lies 3% 9% 5% 7% 6% 6% 
A way of making decisions 4% 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 
Public link with/control over government 3% 3% 5% 5% 6% 4% 
Boring 8% 4% 3% 4% 3% 4% 
Disagreement/Confrontation/Argument 4% 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 
Not listening/Ignoring public opinion 1% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 
Important issues of the day 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 
Irrelevant/Doesn't involve me 1% 5% 3% 4% 2% 3% 
Campaigning 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 2% 
Source: Audit of Political Engagement 2010; note that responses provided by fewer than 2% of the total number of respondents are omitted.
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7KHPRVWFRPPRQUHVSRQVHVLPSO\DQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµSROLWLFV¶similar to the 
conception of formal politics outlined in Chapters Two and Three. The three 
PRVWFRPPRQUHVSRQVHVUHODWHGWRµWKHZD\WKHFRXQWU\LVJRYHUQHG¶ (24%), 
µ3DUOLDPHQW¶ (18%)DQGµHOHFWLRQVDQGYRWLQJ¶ (15%). 82% of responses were 
related to formal politics, as were RIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶UHVSRQVHV)HZHU
than 1 in 5 respondents, and 1 in 4 Millennials, failed to indicate an 
understanding of politics not related to formal politics. This suggests, therefore, 
WKDWZKHQWKHPDMRULW\RISHRSOHUHIHUWRµSROLWLFV¶VXFKDVZKHQUHSRUWLQJ
DWWHQGLQJDµSROLWLFDOPHHWLQJ¶WKH\WHQGWRWKLQNRIWKHIRUPDOSROLWLFDO
environment. In addition, the differences between the Millennials and their 
elders are very small. The most popular responses for the Millennials, for 
H[DPSOHLQFOXGHGµWKHZD\WKHFRXQWU\LVJRYHUQHG¶µHOHFWLRQV¶µ3DUOLDPHQW¶
DQGµORFDOFRXQFLOJRYHUQPHQW¶7KHVHDUHDOVRWKHPRVWSRSular categories for 
the older generations as well. While there are certainly differences in the 
ranking of the less popular responses between the generations, on the whole the 
0LOOHQQLDOVDUHQRGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHLUHOGHUVLQWHQGLQJWRWKLQNRIµSROLWLFV¶ in 
terms of formal political activity, institutions and processes.  
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Appendix Three 
The sample sizes for each generation in each survey year used in the analyses 
throughout Chapter Four are as follows: 
 
Table 10.6: Sample Sizes for British Social Attitudes Survey 
Year Millennials 90s 80s 60s-
70s 
Post-
War 
Pre-
War 
Total 
1983 0 0 239 416 575 525 1755 
1986 0 0 639 734 1047 677 3097 
1989 0 160 627 671 933 628 3019 
1991 0 206 611 615 863 611 2906 
1994 0 344 852 724 945 591 3456 
2000 34 649 801 643 933 359 3419 
2002 111 706 814 616 868 316 3431 
2003 172 925 956 923 1122 333 4431 
2005 272 857 923 865 1081 268 4266 
2011 456 766 635 657 722 72 3308 
Source: British Social Attitudes surveys, 1983 ± 2011. See Chapter Two for details on 
generational classifications. 
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Table 10.7: Sample Sizes for British Election Study 
Year Millennials 90s 80s 60s-
70s 
Post-
War 
Pre-
War 
Total 
1974 0 0 1 448 852 1139 2440 
1979 0 0 101 455 672 649 1877 
1983 0 0 636 920 1268 1111 3935 
1987 0 59 774 912 1178 872 3795 
1992 0 314 741 816 1043 571 3485 
1997 0 526 827 769 1012 463 3597 
2001 55 503 663 607 879 306 3013 
2005 212 800 905 884 1114 227 4142 
2010 322 659 595 635 772 76 3059 
Source: British Election Study 1974 ± 2010. See Chapter Two for details on generational 
classification 
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Appendix Four 
This Appendix reports the Mokken Scale Analyses (MSA) for political apathy 
and alienation discussed in Chapter Five.  
x Mokken Scale Analysis 1 ± Formal Political Apathy  
Table 10.8 reports the results of the MSA for formal political apathy. The 
variables included were: 
Interest in politics µQRQHDWDOO¶µQRWYHU\PXFK¶µVRPH¶µTXLWHDORW¶µDJUHDW
GHDO¶) 
,QWHUHVWLQWKHHOHFWLRQµQRWDWDOOLQWHUHVWHG¶µQRWYHU\LQWHUHVWHG¶
µVRPHZKDWLQWHUHVWHG¶µYHU\LQWHUHVWHG¶ 
Attention to politics (0-10 scale, with 0 indicating µQRDWWHQWLRQ¶) 
As well as the responses to eight true or false statements: 
- Polling stations close at 10pm 
- The Liberal Democrats favour proportional representation 
- The minimum voting age is 16 
- The standard income tax rate is 26p 
- The Chancellor of the Exchequer sets interest rates 
- It is Labour policy to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by the end of 
2010 
- It is Conservative policy to reduce the deficit and not touch the NHS 
- Any registered voter can request a postal ballot 
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Table 10.8: MSA for Formal Political Apathy 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Chancellor sets interest rates 0.41 0.44 0.61 3069 
Lib Dems favour PR 0.36 0.5 
 
  
Polling stations close at 10pm 0.1 0.34 
 
  
Interest in 2010 general election 1.86 0.64    
Attention to politics 5.46 0.64    
Interest in politics 2.83 0.7 
 
  
Scale 2 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
The minimum voting age is 16 0.16 0.4 0.4 3069 
The standard income tax rate is 26p 0.59 0.4 
 
  
Scale 3 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Tory policy is to reduce the deficit and protect NHS spending 0.53 0.3 0.3 3069 
Any registered voter can have a postal ballot 0.13 0.3 
 
  
Un-scaled items Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Labour policy to withdraw troops from 0.61 N/A N/A 3069 
Afghanistan by the end of 2010         
Source: BES 2010, post-election face to face survey. 
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x Mokken Scale Analysis 2 ± Formal Political Alienation 
Table 10.9 reports the MSA results for formal political alienation. The 
variables included: 
Democratic satisfaction (very dissatisfied, a little dissatisfied, fairly satisfied, 
very satisfied) 
Government treats people like respondent fairly (five item Likert scale, strongly 
disagree to strongly agree) 
Trust Parliament (1-10 scale) 
Trust MPs (1-10 scale) 
Trust political parties (1-10 scale) 
People can generally be trusted (1-10 scale) 
People will generally be fair rather than take advantage (1-10 scale) 
Political activity brings benefits to me and my family (five item Likert scale, 
strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
Political activity brings benefits to groups in need (five item Likert scale, 
strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
Life satisfaction (1-10 scale) 
There is a gap between what respondent expects out of life and what they get 
(five item Likert scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
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Political activity takes too much time and effort (five item Likert scale, 
strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
Influence respondent feels they have on politics (1-10 scale) 
The government takes better care of minorities than it does the majority (five 
item Likert scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
Where necessary the items were recoded so that higher scores indicated a 
greater level of political alienation. Table 10.9 reports the results of the MSA, 
the results of which were discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
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Table 10.9a: MSA for Formal Political Alienation 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Democratic Satisfaction 2.39 0.36 0.60 2625 
Govt treats people like respondent fairly 3.00 0.46     
Trust Parliament 5.42 0.66     
Trust Parties 5.96 0.65     
Trust MPs 5.94 0.67     
Scale 2 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
People can generally be trusted 3.86 0.64 0.64 2625 
People will generally be fair 3.65 0.64     
Scale 3 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Conservative Policy is to reduce the deficit & not touch the NHS 0.18 0.34 0.37 2625 
Standard income tax rate is 26p 0.36 0.35     
Polling stations close at 10pm 0.04 0.30     
Liberal Democrats favour proportional representation 0.26 0.40     
Chancellor sets interest rates 0.14 0.40     
Source: BES 2010, post-election face to face survey 
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Table 10.9b: MSA for Formal Political Alienation 
Scale 4 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Political activity brings benefits to me and my family 3.17 0.40 0.40 2625 
Political activity brings benefits to groups in need 2.37 0.40    
Scale 5 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Life satisfaction 1.83 0.31 0.31 2625 
There is a big gap between what respondent expects in life and what they get 3.39 0.31    
Un-scaled Items Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Political activity takes too much time and effort 3.11 N/A N/A 2625 
How much influence does respondent feel they have on politics 8.27    
The government takes better care of minorities than the majority 3.45    
(True or False) Minimum voting age is 16 0.84    
(True or False) Any registered voter can have a postal ballot 0.87    
(True or False) Labour policy is to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2010 0.61    
Source: BES 2010, post-election face to face survey 
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There were no variables in the BES which diUHFWO\PHDVXUHGUHVSRQGHQWV¶
confidence in their political knowledge, which relates to the conception of 
political meaninglessness. To capture this dimension of alienation, therefore, 
WKHµWUXHRUIDOVH¶SROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHYDULDEOHVXVHGLQWKH06$IRUSRlitical 
apathy above were recoded so that respondents who attempted to answer the 
question (regardless of whether or not they gave the correct answer) were 
VFRUHGµ¶DQGWKRVHZKRGLGQRWDWWHPSWWRDQVZHUWKHUHE\LQGLFDWLQJDODFN
of confidence in their political knowledge to such an extent that they choose 
not even to attempt a guess to a question for which they have a 50% chance of 
JHWWLQJWKHDQVZHUULJKWHLWKHUZD\ZHUHVFRUHGµ¶ 
The validity of this assumption can be tested using data from the 1991 British 
6RFLDO$WWLWXGHVVXUYH\ZKLFKLQFOXGHGDVHULHVRIµWUXHRUIDOVH¶SROLWLFDO
NQRZOHGJHTXHVWLRQVDVZHOODVDGLUHFWPHDVXUHRIUHVSRQGHQWV¶FRQILGHQFHLQ
their political knowledge (through assessing their agreement with the view that 
µSROLWLFs and govHUQPHQWFDQEHVRFRPSOLFDWHG¶7KHµWUXHRUIDOVH¶TXHVWLRQV
were recoded in the same manner as described above and the confidence in 
political knowledge variable recoded so that higher scores implied less 
confidence. These indicators were then analysed using MSA to determine 
whether or not they were measuring the same latent construct, namely a lack of 
FRQILGHQFHLQRQH¶VSROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJ 
Table 10.10 shows the results of two MSA ± the first to confirm that the 
UHFRGHGµWUXHRUIDOVH¶SROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHYDULDEOHVZHUHPHDVXULQJWKHVDPH
latent construct, and the second to test the theory that this battery of items 
measured the same latent construct as the question measuring confidence in 
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political knowledge. Table 10.10 shows first that all of the recoded political 
knowledge indicators measured the same latent construct, and second that they 
scaled with the question on confidence in political knowledge. The recoded 
µWUXHRUIDOVH¶SROLWLFDONQRZOHGJHLQGLFDWRUVWKHUHIRUHFan be taken to 
measure the extent to which a given respondent has confidence in their own 
political knowledge and understanding.
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Table 10.10a: MSA on BSA 1991 Indicators Political Knowledge 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Women not allowed to sit in the HoL 0.13 0.36 0.43 1145 
MPs from different parties sit on committees 0.30 0.41     
Cabinet ministers are elected by MPs 0.15 0.39     
Cannot be on electoral roll in two places 0.10 0.37     
Home Secretary is responsible to Parliament for law and order 0.19 0.42     
Warsaw pact is a trade agreement between GB and Poland 0.30 0.42     
GB has separate elections for national and European Parliament 0.19 0.44     
GBs electoral system is PR 0.23 0.45     
PM is appointed by the Queen 0.08 0.48     
Cannot stand for Parliament without a deposit 0.14 0.42     
Longest time between elections is 4 years 0.10 0.44     
Leader of Labour is Neil Kinnock 0.03 0.72     
Number of MPs is about 100 0.28 0.43     
Un-scaled items Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Prime Minister prepares the Queen's Speech 0.21 N/A N/A 1145 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1991; Mokken Scale Analysis conducted in Stata. 
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Table 10.10b: MSA on BSA 1991 Indicators of Confidence in Political Knowledge  
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Political Knowledge battery 2.09 0.4 0.4 1418 
Politics and Government can be so complicated 3.56 0.4     
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1991; Mokken Scale Analysis conducted in Stata.
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Appendix Five 
x Mokken Scale Analysis for Expected Political Participation 
This section reports the MSA on the indicators of expected political 
participation employed in Chapter Six. In total nine variables were analysed, 
DOORIWKHPPHDVXULQJUHVSRQGHQWV¶H[SHFWHGOLNHOLKRRGRISDUWLFLSDWLQJLQD
given act on DVFDOHIURPPHDQLQJµQRWDWDOOOLNHO\¶WRAs was found in 
Appendix Two, the nine variables were found to measure the same latent 
construct when using an H-Coefficient threshold of 0.3, and so the threshold 
was increased to 0.4 so as to provide more discriminatory power and identify 
latent dimensions within the series of variables without losing too much 
information. Table 10.11 reports the results of the MSA using the 0.4 H-
Coefficient threshold only.
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Table 10.11: MSA Results for Expected Political Participation 
Scale 1 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Discuss politics with family or friends 5.46 0.41 0.47 2865 
Campaign for a political party 1.18 0.44     
Donate money to a political party 1.14 0.44     
Vote in the next European election 6.2 0.49     
Vote in the next local election 7.58 0.53     
Scale 2 Mean H Coef Scale H Coef Obs 
Work with a group to solve a problem 3.58 0.41 0.45 2865 
Take part in a rally or demonstration 2.51 0.46     
Boycott products for political reasons 3.63 0.48     
Buycott' products for political reasons 4.28 0.46     
Source: 2010 BES face to face survey post-election wave
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x Expected Political Participation vs Previous Political Participation 
The BES 2010 post-election face to face survey contains only a few variables 
asking respondents about previous political participation comparable to those 
used in Chapter Three, too few to get a detailed picture of the relationship 
between political apathy and alienation, and political participation. Instead, 
therefore, the variables measuring expected participation were used. While 
there are differences in the nature of data obtained by asking people about their 
expected political participation and their previous participation, it is expected 
that these differences are very small, meaning that the relationships between 
apathy, alienation and participation identified in Chapter Six can be used to 
give meaningful insights into the differences between the political activity of 
the Millennials and their elders in Chapters Three and Four.  
Studies such as Pattie et al. (2004) and Grasso (2014) point out that measures 
of expected activity tend to produce more optimistic impressions of overall 
participation than measures of previous participation. This is partly because 
questions on expected SDUWLFLSDWLRQWDSLQWRUHVSRQGHQWV¶QRUPDWLYHEHOLHIV
about the importance of participating in politics for a good citizen, and also 
EHFDXVHWKH\IDLOWRSURYLGHDFRQWH[WLQZKLFKUHVSRQGHQWV¶FDQSUHGLFWWKHLU
activity, leading them to predict their future participation while imagining a 
context unlikely to ever be realised (such as without constraint from time or 
money) (Grasso 2014; Pattie et al. 'HVSLWHWKLVµLQIODWLRQ¶LQKRZDFWLYH
respondents expect to be compared with how active they usually end up being, 
however, there are no further substantial differences between the two measures 
(Pattie et al. 2004; Grasso 2014). 
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This assumption is validated below by comparing the relationship between the 
measures of expected participation used in Chapter Six with those of previous 
participation used in Chapter Three. Table 10.12 shows a standardised 
(percentile) indication of the average participation score for the formal and 
cause-oriented measures in Chapters Three and Six for each political 
generation. The data shows that respondents typically score higher on the 
expected participation variables than the previous participation indicators, but 
that the relationship of each with political generation is very similar. There are 
one or two small exceptions, such as the Pre-Post-War generation expecting to 
be less active than the Millennials in cause-oriented politics (based on data for 
Chapter Six) while actually being more active (based on data for Chapter 
Three). They do not, however, indicate a substantial difference in the 
relationship between political generation and political activity which would 
undermine the utility of measures of expected political participation being used 
to study the relationship between participation, apathy and alienation in 
Chapter Six to help explain the relationship between generation and activity 
outlined in Chapter Three. 
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Table 10.12: Expected versus Previous Political Participation 
  Chapter Two: Previous Political Participation 
  Formal Participation Cause-Oriented Participation 
  Percentile Percentile 
Millennials 12.6% 12.5% 
90s 20.3% 16.5% 
80s 26.5% 19.8% 
60s-70s 30.0% 20.5% 
Pre/Post-War 26.3% 14.0% 
      
  Chapter Five: Expected Political Participation 
  Formal Participation Cause-Oriented Participation 
  Percentile Percentile 
Millennials 36.6% 32.7% 
90s 42.0% 38.6% 
80s 41.8% 37.6% 
60s-70s 45.4% 35.8% 
Pre/Post-War 42.3% 26.3% 
Source: Audit of Political Engagement composite dataset and British Election Study 2010 post-
election face to face survey 
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Appendix Six 
This Appendix provides validity tests of the variables used to measure post-
materialism and media fragmentation in Chapter Eight. The first tests relate to 
the measure of post-materialism, indicated by the highest educational 
qualification obtained by survey respondents. For this to be a valid proxy, it 
should have an almost linear relationship with political generation and survey 
year. The oldest generations ± socialised in an environment of limited 
individual autonomy and indicated by their limited access to education ± 
should be the least post-materialist and on average have the lowest educational 
qualifications. The youngest generations, in contrast, should have the highest 
qualifications. There may be little difference between the 90s and Millennial 
generations in this regard, however, as at least some members of the Millennial 
generation will not yet have had the opportunity to complete their education. 
There should also be an almost linear relationship between highest educational 
qualification and survey year, similarly reflecting the fact that (as post-
materialist theory points out) the quality of and access to education has 
generally expanded over time.  
Table 10.13 shows the results of a regression analysis examining the 
relationship between generation and educational qualification, while table 
10.14 shows the analysis of the relationship between survey year and 
educational qualification. In both cases, an almost linear relationship is clearly 
apparent ± more recent surveys, and younger political generations, show higher 
educational qualifications. This corresponds to the linear relationship between 
rising post-materialism ± both indicated and caused by rising levels of 
education ± and both time and generation outlined by Inglehart and Welzel 
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(2005), Dalton (2013) and Welzel (2007), and confirms that the highest 
educational qualification indicator is appropriate. 
 
Table 10.13: Regression Analysis of Highest Educational Qualification 
versus Political Generation 
 
Coef Std Err 
Generation (Millennials)    
90s 0.15** 0.04 
80s -0.12** 0.04 
60s-70s -0.51*** 0.04 
Post-War -1.32*** 0.04 
Pre-War -1.87*** 0.05 
  
 
  
Constant 3.75*** 0.04 
  
 
  
Obs 39871   
Prob > F 0.00   
r-squared 0.14   
Adj r-squared 0.14   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012, ols regression. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; 
*** - p-value <0.001. 
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Table 10.14: Regression Analysis of Highest Educational Qualification 
versus Year of Survey 
 Coef Std Err 
Year (1986)    
1991 0.22*** 0.05 
1994 0.29*** 0.04 
1996 0.44*** 0.04 
1998 0.47*** 0.05 
2000 0.50*** 0.04 
2002 0.70*** 0.04 
2003 0.67*** 0.04 
2005 0.69*** 0.04 
2010 0.92*** 0.05 
2011 0.91*** 0.05 
2012 0.91*** 0.05 
  
 
  
Constant 2.54*** 0.03 
  
 
  
Obs 39963   
Prob > F 0.00   
r-squared 0.02   
Adj r-squared 0.02   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012, ols regression. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - p-value <0.01; 
*** - p-value <0.001. 
 
The tests below assess the validity of the media fragmentation measure. The 
first test looks at the correlation between newspaper readership ± taken to 
represent the broader process of media fragmentation ± and Internet use outside 
of work. If newspaper readership is indeed a good proxy for the processes 
associated with media fragmentation, a key component of which is increasing 
Internet use at the expense of engagement with traditional media (Wattenberg 
2012), then this correlation should be negative and statistically significant. 
Table 10.15 confirms that this is indeed the case; while the correlation is very 
weak, it is nonetheless negative and suggests that increasing Internet use is 
negatively associated with engagement with traditional media. 
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Table 10.15: Correlation between Newspaper Readership and Internet Use 
  Read paper 
Hours of Internet use -0.0279 
Source: BSA 2000 ± 2012. Coefficient statistically significant to the 95% confidence level 
 
The media fragmentation theory argues that the decline of traditional media 
engagement and subsequent growth of Internet based media engagement (or no 
media engagement at all) should be related to political generation and time in a 
similar way to that seen for post-materialism i.e., almost linear. Table 10.16 
reports a regression analysis examining the relationship between newspaper 
readership and political generation, while Table 10.17 shows the relationship 
between newspaper readership and BSA survey year. Both analyses correspond 
to expectations: there has been a continual decrease in overall newspaper 
readership over time, and this is reflected in changing patterns of media 
consumption exhibited by different generations ± with the youngest 
generations being the least likely to read newspapers at all. This supports the 
validation of the newspaper readership variable as an indicator of the processes 
associated with the media fragmentation theory. 
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Table 10.16: Analysis of Newspaper Readership and Generation 
 Coef Std Err 
Generation (Millennials)    
90s 0.27*** 0.05 
80s 0.47*** 0.05 
60s-70s 0.83*** 0.05 
Post-War 1.24*** 0.05 
Pre-War 1.19*** 0.06 
  
 
  
Constant -0.63*** 0.05 
  
 
  
Obs 41557   
Prob > chi2 0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.03   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012, logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - p-value 
<0.01; *** - p-value <0.001. 
 
Table 10.17: Analysis of Newspaper Readership and Survey Year 
 
Coef Std Err 
Year (1986)    
1991 -0.36*** 0.06 
1994 -0.54*** 0.05 
1996 -0.64*** 0.05 
1998 -0.73*** 0.05 
2000 -0.74*** 0.05 
2002 -0.87*** 0.05 
2003 -0.90*** 0.05 
2005 -0.99*** 0.05 
2010 -1.33*** 0.05 
2011 -1.40*** 0.05 
2012 -1.40*** 0.05 
  
 
  
Constant 0.97*** 0.04 
  
 
  
Obs 41660   
Prob > Chi2 0.00   
Pseudo r2 0.03   
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012, logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient <0.05; ** - p-value 
<0.01; *** - p-value <0.001. 
431 
 
Appendix Seven 
APC Analysis and Generalised Additive Models 
A recurrent methodological issue in this thesis has been overcoming the 
µLGHQWLILFDWLRQSUREOHP¶DVVRFLDWHGZLWK$3&DQDO\VLVi.e., overcoming the fact 
that age, period and cohort are measured in the same unit ± year ± and so are 
linear functions of each other. The method chosen to overcome this issue in 
Chapters Four and Eight was what Yang and Land (2013) identify as the 
µFRHIILFLHQWFRQVWUDLQWDSSURDFK¶± in this case, categorising the cohort variable 
into political generations so that the linear dependency between the three 
variables is broken. As Chapter Four discussed, however, this approach is 
problematic because of the somewhat arbitrary nature of that categorisation. 
While the risks of applying an inaccurate constraint were mitigated somewhat 
through reference to empirical evidence provided by Grasso (2014), there is 
still a need to provide further empirical support for the categorisation of 
political generations used to constrain the cohort coefficient when running 
APC analyses of trends in political apathy and alienation. This appendix 
provides this empirical support by presenting Generalised Additive Models 
(GAMs) which estimated age, period and cohort effects based on the data used 
in Chapter Eight.  
A GAM is a semi-parametric version of a generalised linear model, in which 
one of the variables can be modelled non-parametrically i.e., without 
constraints from prior assumptions regarding the relationship between it and 
the dependent variable (Keele 2008; Neundorf 2010). In the case of APC 
analyses, this allows for the constrained coefficient to be modelled without any 
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prior assumptions (such as those implied when categorising the cohort variable 
into political generations) while still accounting for the influence of age and 
period effects (which are still modelled parametrically) (Neundorf 2010; 
Grasso 2014; Keele 2008). This is not a perfect solution to the identification 
problem (no such solution is possible (Glenn 1977)), as it still requires one of 
the three effects to be constrained so as to overcome the co-linearity of the age, 
period and cohort effects so that the model can function. Following the 
example of Keele (2008), Neundorf (2010) and Grasso (2014), this constraint 
will be applied to the age variable on the basis that there is a great deal known 
about the relationship between age and political apathy and alienation already 
(see Chapters One, Two and Five), and so the risk of information loss or 
invalid conclusions based on such a categorisation is smaller.31 
The results of the GAM can be presented graphically, which allows for visual 
inspection of the estimated effects (Keele 2008). In this case, the (smoothed) 
cohort coefficient can be presented so that it can be visually examined by 
inspecting how the estimated effect corresponds to year of birth. This visual 
representation can be compared with the relationship suggested by the APC 
regression outputs (in which the cohort variable was constrained) to see if they 
produce similar results. If the relationship implied by the APC regression 
analysis is similar to that implied by the GAM, then there is additional 
empirical evidence to support the validity of the constraint applied to the cohort 
coefficient ± because when the cohort effect was estimated non-parametrically 
                                                 
31
 Specifically, 18-35, 36-50, 51-69 and 70-95. The categories had to be broad enough to 
contain enough respondents, but not so broad that they ran the risk of losing too much 
information and minimising variance. This categorisation meets these requirements and 
broadly corresponds to what is already known about the relationship between political attitudes 
and the life cycle (Jankowski and Strate 1995; Stoker 2006; Smets 2008).  
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and without any constraint, it was found to correspond to that produced in the 
regression analysis. 
In this Appendix, therefore, the visual depictions of the estimated cohort 
effects from GAMs are presented, and compared with the implied cohort 
effects reported in Chapter Eight. This can be used to determine whether 
categorising the cohort variable into the political generations used throughout 
this thesis produces a valid estimate of the cohort effect when modelling 
changes in political apathy and alienation. 
Table 10.18 presents a section of the regression outputs in Chapter Eight ± 
specifically the coefficients showing the relationship between political 
generation and apathy and each dimension of political alienation. The visual 
depictions of the smoothed cohort effect from the GAMs below can be 
compared to the relationship implied by these coefficients. 
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Table 10.18: APC Analysis, Political Apathy and Political Alienation 
  Apathy   Powerlessness Normlessness Meaninglessness 
Generation  Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er 
Millennials 0.36* 0.14 -0.64*** 0.16 -0.47** 0.16 -0.01 0.16 
90s 0.20* 0.1 -0.50*** 0.11 -0.22 0.12 -0.17 0.12 
80s 0.13 0.07 -0.36*** 0.08 -0.09 0.09 -0.19* 0.09 
60s-70s -0.04 0.05 -0.22*** 0.05 -0.02 0.06 -0.23*** 0.06 
(Post-War)             
Pre-War 0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.07 -0.16* 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. Ordered logit regression. * - p-value for coefficient is <0.05; ** - p-value below 0.01; *** - p-value below 0.001 
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Political Apathy  
Figure 10.1 shows the smoothed cohort effect estimate for political apathy. A 
quadratic age function was included in the GAM to model the curvilinear 
relationship between apathy and the life cycle. The year variable was modelled 
as a factor variable (as in Chapter Eight) to allow for non-linear relationships 
between year and apathy to be estimated (Neundorf 2010). The cohort variable 
(measured by year of birth) was estimated non-parametrically as a continuous 
variable. The line in the graph shows the smoothed estimate of the cohort effect 
on political apathy. The y-axis represents the magnitude of that effect, and the 
x-axis reports year of birth. 
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Figure 10.1: GAM output for Cohort and Political Apathy 
 
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. GAM performed in R 
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Figure 10.1 implies a curvilinear relationship between cohort and apathy, with 
those born between 1920 and 1950 having the lowest levels. There is evidence 
of a sharp rise in apathy among those born after 1950, with a slight tailing off 
of the effect for those born after 1980s, though their levels of apathy continue 
to rise. There is also evidence of high apathy among pre-1920 respondents; 
however, the large confidence intervals which surround that estimate 
(illustrated by the dashed lines) mean that it must be interpreted with caution. 
Overall, therefore, Figure 10.1 implies a cohort effect broadly consistent with 
that implied by the regression coefficients in Table 10.18. The least apathetic 
are the Post-War and 60s-70s generations i.e., those born between 1927 and 
1957. There was increasing levels of apathy among those born since 1958 (i.e., 
the 80s, 90s and Millennial generations), although the effect for the 80s 
generation was not significant according to Table 10.18. Finally, Table 10.18 
suggested that the Pre-War generation was more apathetic than the 60s-70s and 
Post-War generations ± this is also suggested by Figure 10.1, but to a much 
greater magnitude (wide confidence intervals notwithstanding).  
There are some differences between the curve in Figure 10.1 and the 
impression given by the coefficients in Table 10.18, however. Figure 10.1 
shows that the most dramatic increase in apathy was among those born after 
the 1950s; this includes, therefore, those born between 1950 and 1957, many of 
whom are categorised in the 60s-70s generation which were suggested (along 
with the Post-War generation) to be the least apathetic in the electorate. In 
addition, the curve suggests that the difference in apathy between the Pre-War 
generation (i.e., those born prior to 1925) and the Post-War generation (born 
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between 1926 and 1945) was much more dramatic than the impression given 
by the coefficients in Table 10.18.  
For the most part, therefore, the cohort effect depicted in Figure 10.1 
corresponds to the impression given by Table 10.18, with some minor 
differences. The overall impression from both analyses is of a trend of 
increasing apathy among people born since the 1960s which culminates in 
those born after the 1980s (the Millennials) being the most apathetic. The 
differences between the two analyses suggest there is room for small 
improvement in the categorisation applied to the cohort effects in Table 10.18, 
but not that a dramatic change is needed.  
Political Powerlessness 
Figure 10.2 presents the GAM graph for political powerlessness. It suggests a 
non-linear relationship between powerlessness and year of birth. The curve 
suggests a steady increase in powerlessness among respondents born between 
pre-1900 and the 1930s. This was followed by a steady decline among those 
born after 1930, which tails off slightly among those born after 1970 (though 
this tailing off effect is accompanied by a notable widening in the confidence 
intervals). 
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Figure 2: GAM output for Cohort and Political Powerlessness 
 
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. GAM performed in R 
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As with apathy, this cohort effect is broadly similar to that suggested by the 
generation coefficients in Table 10.18, but there are some more notable 
deviations this time. Table 10.18 suggested that the Post-War generation were 
the most alienated, at the peak of a curve with the Pre-War generation slightly 
less alienated on one side, and a steady decline in powerlessness among all of 
the younger generations on the other. Figure 10.2 depicts a similar relationship, 
but suggests that the Pre-War generation are by far the least alienated, rather 
than the Millennials. It also suggests that the difference between the 
Millennials (born after 1982) and the 90s generation (born between 1969 and 
1981) is negligible, as opposed to the more substantial difference suggested in 
Table 10.18.  
These two slight differences suggest that some refinement of the cohort 
classification used to model powerlessness may be warranted. However, it is 
important to note that the confidence intervals surrounding the estimated cohort 
effect for respondents associated with the Pre-War and Millennial generations 
are much wider than those for other years. In other words, while the cohort 
effect in Figure 10.2 is slightly different from that suggested by Table 10.18, 
the confidence in that estimate at the points at which it is suggested to deviate 
from the impression in Table 10.18 is much lower than elsewhere.  
Political Normlessness 
Figure 10.3 presents the GAM for political normlessness. The graph depicts a 
fairly straight-forward curvilinear relationship between cohort and 
normlessness: those born before 1920 are the least alienated, those born 
between the 1950s and the 1970s are the most alienated, and those born after 
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1970 are less alienated (though not so much as those born prior to 1920). This 
effect fits well with the impression given in Table 10.18, which also suggested 
a curvilinear relationship in which the Millennials and the Pre-War generation 
(born after 1982 and before 1926 respectively) were less alienated than the 
generations in between.  
The only exceptions to the overlap between the impressions given by the two 
analyses relate first to the differences estimated between the generations born 
between 1926 and 1981 (Table 10.18 suggests no significant difference 
between them, while Figure 10.3 suggests that the differences between those 
born in the 1920s and the 1960s may be more substantial), and second to the 
issue of which group is the least alienated. Table 10.18 suggests that the 
Millennials are the least alienated, and by a notable margin, while Figure 10.3 
suggests that the Pre-War generation are the least alienated, followed by the 
Millennials. Once again, the GAM estimates for the points at which there is 
difference between the GAM and the APC regression in Table 10.18 are 
accompanied by large confidence intervals.
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Figure 3: GAM output for Cohort and Political Normlessness 
 
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. GAM performed in R 
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Political Meaninglessness 
Finally, Figure 10.4 relates to the GAM on political meaninglessness. Once 
again, the graph implies a curvilinear relationship between cohort and 
alienation. The curve suggests that the least alienated respondents were those 
born between the 1950s and early 1960s. There is evidence of a slight decline 
in meaninglessness alienation among those born between around 1900 and the 
late 1940s, and of a more dramatic increase among those born after the 1980s. 
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Figure 4: GAM output for Cohort and Political Meaninglessness 
 
Source: BSA 1986 ± 2012. GAM performed in R 
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Here the differences between the cohort effect implied by the GAM results and 
that in Table 10.18 are more notable. There are clear similarities between the 
two: Table 10.18 suggested that the least alienated respondents were those born 
between 1946 and 1968 (i.e., the 60s-70s and 80s generations), which 
corresponds to the lowest point of the curve in Figure 10.4. Table 10.18 also 
suggested that there was little difference between the Pre-War and Post-War 
generations (i.e., any respondent born prior to 1945), and apart from a decline 
in meaninglessness among those born in the early 1940s compared with those 
born pre-1940, the curve in Figure 10.4 also gives this impression. Finally, 
Table 10.18 suggested that respondents in the 90s generation were slightly less 
alienated than those in the Post-War generation (the 90s generation coefficient 
was -0.17, but was not statistically significant), which the curve in Figure 10.4 
also supports. For most respondents, therefore, Table 10.18 and Figure 10.4 
give comparable impressions of the cohort effect.  
The difference between the two comes in relation to the Millennials. Table 
10.18 suggested that there was essentially no difference between the 
Millennials and the Post-War generation (the Millennial coefficient was an 
insignificant -0.01). Figure 10.4, however, suggests that the Millennials (i.e., 
those born after 1982) were becoming increasingly alienated compared with 
those born between the 1940s and 1960s, and (the large confidence intervals 
for the oldest and youngest respondents notwithstanding) could be the most 
alienated cohort in the electorate. 
Summary 
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Overall, the four GAMs presented above estimate cohort effects broadly 
similar to those in Table 10.18. For political apathy, powerlessness and 
normlessness in particular, the differences between the two are largely trivial 
and limited to slightly different impressions of how the oldest and youngest 
respondents differ from those in-between, the estimates for whom are always 
accompanied by large confidence intervals. At most, therefore, the GAMs 
imply that minor differences could be made to the generational classification 
for estimating cohort effects in apathy, powerlessness and normlessness, 
though it is unlikely that such small changes would produce substantial results 
in the final conclusions.  
A more substantial difference emerges when looking at political 
meaninglessness. For the most part, the cohort effect is suggested to be very 
similar in the two analyses; for the Millennials, however, Figure 10.4 suggests 
that they could be the most alienated generation (notwithstanding large 
confidence intervals around that estimate) while Table 10.18 suggests that 
there is no difference between them and the Post-War generation. As the 
GLIIHUHQFHUHODWHVKRZHYHUVSHFLILFDOO\WRWKHHVWLPDWHRIWKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶
alienation, it seems unlikely that this is a problem for the generational 
classification used to constrain the cohort coefficients in the APC regression 
analyses. It is more likely to specifically reflect differences in the estimates for 
the alienation of the Millennials compared with the Post-War generation. 
Rather than suggesting a revision to the generational classification used to 
estimate cohort effects in Chapter Eight, therefore, this data suggests that 
caution should be employed when interpreting the specific estimate relating to 
WKH0LOOHQQLDOV¶PHDQLQJOHVVQHVVDOLHQDWLRQFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHLUHOGHUV
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Overall, therefore, the evidence presented in this Appendix is broadly 
supportive of the cohort classification employed in Chapter Eight, and provides 
empirical evidence of the validity of that classification for estimating cohort 
effects in political apathy and alienation. 
